Excerpts from Jay Irwin’s Christopher Alexander Book: "Subdued Brilliance: Life and Order in the Cosmic Vision of Christopher Alexander”

P.35: We do not see the world as a scrambled Pollock painting but mediated by lines and boundaries; we know harmonies, we know balance; we know the fitting and unfitting; we know everything as bearing similarity and difference, all the way to the quick of the heart which measures the event of every thought and action as against an ineffable ideal that renders judgment (and thus thought) possible at all. We do not know the world through discursive means, ultimately, but through analogy, and thus through its communication of the good in beauty.

P.37: While section two will present an implicit critique of philosophies which deny a transcendent cause, this study does not ignore the Barthian warning that beauty—or general revelation—without Christ is no revelation at all. Indeed, beauty without Christ can only be but a shallow flourish of vitality moonlighting as a call of the good: celebrity, materialism, nationalism, and other pretty evils to which confused souls commit themselves.

P.89: Whether in the form of the camera eye shared by both human and octopus, the form of the dorsal fin, structurally identical on both shark and dolphin, or the form of consciousness, which appears in phyla as distinct as insects, fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals, there appears a form, almost like a “biological cul de sac”172 in which evolution slows down. What this supposes is that in any iteration of, for instance, the proto-camera eye strives an unrealized potency—a problem (e.g., “spherical aberration”)173 that already, in some sense, knows its solution, without which there would be no problem, nor evolutionary change.174

P.92: (Quoting Alexander) “Thus the fullness of my existence, my capacity to be a person, my capacity to drink in, enjoy, and commune with the full depth of living matter in the universe is sanctified, and allowed, and enlarged, by my relatedness with the tree stump. It is prevented, atrophied, cut off, by my not-relatedness with the plate-glass window, the fashionable façade, and the deadness of the supermarket parking lot.”

P.93: To put it another way, the “primitive fact” of experience had gone from one of intrinsic order and relationship to one of a world of exteriority in which all physical bodies—along with the nonphysical mind, now entrenched in an isolated subjectivity—all stood apart from one another.

P.100: Love . . . “possesses and desires at the same time,” and it is the very condition of desire. Biran, then, is a philosopher of will, whereas Ravaisson is led, through an idea of tendency and desire, to a conception of love….And for Ravaisson, this principle of love in us supposes its shared existence in nonhuman nature; for it is by a desire for its origin that the mind plunges into a knowledge of what is other than itself. “To search for a reason for everything when certain things, and precisely the highest things, are known immediately by intuition and analogy is a weakness of the understanding—weak undoubtedly because it lacks the intuitive force for it to reach the principle.”

195 The (effortless) impetus to go beyond ourselves is the condition which lends us the desire to know anything at all, one which seats us in love already and moves us “to reunite ourselves there again.” For Ravaisson, to know is to love. Being grasps itself in consciousness—so that being is a certain manifestation of consciousness; the mind and the material world are separate expressions of a unified order, a single creative movement of thought thinking itself.

p.103 One may say that the fairy tale deepens the truth of our encounter, plunging us into the difference that beckons and reunites us with love—a reunion which the primitive fact of consciousness demands. It is therefore the aesthetic and imaginative senses that first reveal the world, before discursive and analytical thought; in the intuitions of an analogy or a fairy tale something truer is wrought than in those mechanical principles which speak to only a superficial layer of their essence. As Coleridge knew, particularly in his theory of polar thinking (a theory he developed from the pre-mechanist Giordano Bruno), the forces of the world which hold the affinities of difference and similarity together are of an order beyond their material realities: Imagination reveals the connective tissues of being.

p.105: What art reveals here is that there is something profoundly personal in freedom, or in life itself. Freedom is not an untethered chaos but a participation—and what’s more, a reciprocity—within a creative order; there is a felicity, a joy which supposes another’s joy (or freedom). In art—as in the freedom which all nature, unimpeded, expresses—the free act supposes the company of another (who is “the same differently”), supposes the love in which, again, we always already find ourselves at the root of the primitive fact: the effortless desire that impresses upon us the movement to be.

p.164: we must remind ourselves that our empiricism is not a positivist science but that, again, what we positively behold within this process is form—not form understood as shape or size or colour as such but form understood as the “radiance of mystery,” which is to say “the mystery of Being itself.” In this way, intuition toward this sensation of inner light is gained not by adherence to some external method we call “negative capability” but by an openness to the terrain of mystery and uncertainty; it is an active receptivity that is both the means and the goal, an exposure that returns us to innocence so that “the artist is able to reproduce what originally surprised us in natural objects, teasing out ‘their invisible substance’ and ‘their endless exchanges and correspondences’—penetrating beyond the surface to the mystery and wonder which shines through their contingent forms.”

p.171: in a sophiological ontology, the suffering or pathos (or waiting) to which we are exposed is not the suffering of, say, the cherry blossom, whose beauty is rooted in that ethereal moment between glory and death—rooted, that is, in what cannot hold—but in life, which results from that eternal, trinitarian self-oblation (kenosis) marked upon every creature. Gauguin’s cow invites us to tears, to a joy elevated by pathos that returns us to the humble mood when we stand present before being’s surprise. Of course, in order to partake of it, or in order to paint or build anything like it, we must ourselves undergo this subdued brilliance (i.e., negative capability), actively receiving these gifts by surrendering before them our lesser selves.

p.174: “The use of money to make money,” writes Alexander, “which ‘inspired’Western society in the 20th century, and which has quaintly been called ‘democracy’ and euphemistically ‘the market economy,’ did produce great wealth for a few. But not for most people. And it has ravaged our environment. None of it unites people with the land they love; indeed, most often the land that is left, cannot be loved.”

p.182: on the charge of nostalgia, System A has not been lost, for it manifests in method what we are in fact: spiritual. “System-A itself,” Alexander states, “is emphatically not a re-creation of any past era. It is something entirely new, a production system made today. In its present form, it exists for the first time”—that is, it is not merely an identical repetition of past times but the processes of the human heart brought to bear upon a new context, amongst new forms of being and making. “It relies on a new kind of humane organization of building and creative processes and is carried out in a highly modern, even avant-garde form, acceptable for our time, and congruent with the technical marvels we have come to expect every day. Its essence lies in the focus on human experience—on feeling, on well-being, on the possibility of living a deeply contemplated life.

p.202: Alternating repetition, therefore, expresses relation (i.e., sophianic) not only within its own pattern but with a further third (fourth, fifth, etc.) pattern of boundary-forming repetition. In such a way, Alexander states, “it seems that what is really happening is not repetition, but oscillation. The thing repeats like a wave.” Cunningham also notes “that this does not mean that a second painting is simply not as good as the first” but that if the second is better, as can often be the case, it “is better because of the first, so in this sense is less.” Mere cumulation does not intensify a repetition; it requires, instead, a “lived realisation of the beginning.” This may also be put as the logic of the gift in which the “primal event” is an “eruption of eternity into [time],” an “infinitely gratuitous gift that can never be reciprocated” in that its equality (its fertility or perfection) is beyond measure.

A repetition only has life where others have it too: livingness reverberates through the fabric of the whole in a subtle melody to which every repetition contributes rhythm. This, however, is even more pronounced if we see that (nonidentical) repetition is not merely a pattern over against other patterns, but characteristic of any thing qua thing. As Catherine Pickstock notes, res (thing), considered a transcendental to most Scholastics, may be “a more fundamental term than ens,” as that “linking term” which connects ens (being) to essentia (nature). That a finite thing’s nature (essence) is not its being (over against God whose nature is being) is not a privative effect, some fall in scale from God’s greater nature, but the condition for which we are granted his likeness. Thus our thinghood, that which manifests our “unique specificity,” supposes a participation in God’s ultimate thinghood (ens realissimum). We are not things by default, but things by design. There could be no difference without thingness, no love which supposes difference, no particularity—nihil. To aesthetically capture repetition as a living quality is to give an iconographic face to the individual particulars, as well as to the relationships their differences augur.

214: where I recognize beauty, I recognize identity, the I meets the I, or the self the Self, a relational symmetry that is, qua relational, irreducible and therefore, as Catherine Pickstock notes, participatory: “If one were to regard this integrity of things as irreducible (and modern thought usually does not), then it can only be ascribed to a participation in the creative action of God, allowing to things a share in his plenitude of formed existence as a kind of grace of coherent beauty to be accounted for in its own terms.”