Wendell Berry

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE ARE INDIVISIBLE:

WENDELL BERRY ON PATRIOTISM AND PREJUDICE

 

I wrote this review essay last year in the hopes of placing it in the Literary Review of Canada but was told that its length and a backlog of Canadian books made it ineligible.  It has since been published in Conspiratio, a journal that forms part of an initiative called Thinking After Ivan Illich (https://thinkingafterivanillich.net), but it seems appropriate to also make it available here.

 

Wendell Berry, The Need to Be Whole: Patriotism and the History of Prejudice, Shoemaker and Company, 528 pages, paperback

 

In 1964 Wendell Berry abandoned the cosmopolitan life that might have been his as a “promising” writer and returned to his roots in rural Kentucky.  At the time of this abrupt change of direction, he was living and teaching in New York City, having earlier been a Wallace Stegner fellow at Stanford University and then lived in Italy and France on a Guggenheim fellowship.  The year after moving back to Kentucky he and his wife Tanya bought Lane’s Landing Farm in Port Royal, not far from the Berry “home place” where his family had farmed for generations.  He didn’t stop writing – not at all, as his large and still growing body of poems, stories, novels and essays will attest – but he did start farming, and he did resume his membership in the local community in which he had been born and raised. 

Nearly thirty years later, when the series American Authors devoted a volume to Berry’s literary achievement in 1991, his old teacher Wallace Stegner contributed a letter which noted that Berry had defied almost every rule which had governed the writing of American fiction in the twentieth century.  The rules Stegner had in mind, among others, hold that estrangement is a more engrossing theme than belonging, the city a more vivid scene that the countryside, leisure a more interesting subject than work, and evil a richer topic than good.  Berry has reversed all these rules. His subject in his novels and stories, and in many poems and essays as well, has been the goodness of a vanished way of living and working in a tiny region of rural Kentucky.   He has celebrated the art of farming as it was still practiced in his childhood in the 1940’s and 1950’s – Berry was born in 1934 – drawing attention to the balance that existed on the old mixed farms – between men’s and women’s work, between cash crops and subsistence, between cultivated and wild land, and between the many elements of the farm’s internal economy.  He has written of the extraordinary range of competencies that this way of life fostered, and of its arduous but unhurried pace in which there was still time for talk and for the flowering of individual characters.  Given this subject matter, Stegner wrote, in his letter to Berry, “By every stereotypical rule of the 20th century, you should be dull.”  But Berry, as Wallace Stegner knew, and many other readers will attest, is far from dull.  Indeed, I would say, speaking just for myself, that Berry’s stories and novels have not only entertained me, but also heartened, nourished and strengthened me in a way that almost no other contemporary literature has, a way that has called me back, again and again, to places and people and stories already deeply familiar.  Berry’s characters and scenes exist in my mind sub specie aeternitatis – as if seen from the perspective of eternity – and deserve the name Northop Frye applies to romance, in its largest sense – a secular scripture. 

Now, in his 88th year, Wendell Berry has produced what seems to me a crowning glory – a 500-page book called The Need to Be Whole in which he pleads with his divided compatriots for peace, understanding and mutual forgiveness.  No one could be better placed than Berry to issue such a plea.  On the one hand, he is a man who has written against racism – The Hidden Wound – opposed his country’s foreign wars, and, with others, occupied the office of Kentucky’s Governor in opposition to the depredations of the state’s powerful coal industry.  On the other, he has consistently spoken up for that rural America which is now the great reservoir of support for Donald Trump, and deplored the contempt in which its people are held by many of his erstwhile allies in peace, civil rights and environmental causes.  

Berry’s plea for wholeness rests on the idea that a land and its people are, or should be, indivisible.  “The danger of dividing land and people into two thoughts,” he says, is something that he has understood “more and more clearly” as he has gone on, but the idea was there from the start.  From the time he returned home in 1964, he saw that if he was to be an advocate for this “endangered” place, it must be as an advocate for the people as much as for the place.  He was, as he says, “a native” – his affection “unspecialized.”  He couldn’t love the land and hate the people, as so many “environmentalists” seem to do.  “So without quite knowing what I was doing,” he writes of his early years back in Port Royal, “I had entered the way of love and taken up its work.”  As the word work suggests, he means nothing sentimental here by “the way of love.”  He speaks as Simone Weil speaks when she says that “faith is the experience that intelligence is enlightened by love.”  Berry writes, “…We know…things by means of love that we cannot otherwise know.”  And this means, he goes on, that “…we know in the fullest sense only what we love and…we love and know in the fullest sense only what we have imagined.”  It follows, he concludes, that change must “begin in the heart.” 

In 1977’s The Unsettling of America, Wendell Berry denounced the depopulation of the American countryside, the industrialization of agriculture, and the tendency of urban America to become “a nation without a country.”  The divorce he then deplored between land and people, country and city, citizen and citizen has grown acutely worse in the forty-five years since that book appeared.  “Oversimplification” and “exaggeration,” he writes in the book under review, have increasingly replaced civil discourse.  Caricatures have pushed aside full-dimensional persons, as people have “withdrawn into subcategories.”  And “language [has] overpower[ed] knowledge.”   “Public conversation about race and racism” is conducted, he says, “in terms highly generalized, unexamined, and trite: bare assertions and accusations, generalizations, stereotypes, labels, gestures, slogans and symbols.”  Victory and vindication count for more than clarity and understanding.  “Public causes,” he says, “become specialized in various movements” and, in being separated they are inevitably deprived of context and set into competition with one another – “each one a distraction from every other one.”  “Powerfully felt abstractions,” without pertinence or sense, are deployed in futile wars of words, as people “angrily accuse one another of anger, and hatefully accuse one another of hate.”   

Berry’s diagnosis is that there has come to be “a prejudice against community life itself” insofar as this means encountering, loving and suffering one another as  situated and ensouled persons.  More particularly, he thinks that the proper relationship between the general and the particular has been lost.  “We must think of [general] terms,” he contends, “as always in search of particular examples, just as a particular event or memory will go looking for the general sense or truth, if any, that it embodies.”  Without this constant resort to particulars, he says, there is no chance of ever solving the gigantic, aggregated problems that are made to loom over us in that simplified “public conversation” of which Berry speaks.  When, for example, “white liberals” take on the symbolic burden of racism in its entirety – “systemic racism,” as one now says – anything “so ordinarily human as friendship or neighborliness or help in solving a human problem” must necessarily be marginalized and trivialized – dwarfed by the need for “something public, large, symbolic and monumental.” 

One of the particulars that Berry thinks is being fatally lost is historical memory, and a substantial section of his book is devoted to the Civil War and its aftermath.  Again Berry is well placed.  His native Kentucky was what was called a border state during that war – a slave state that didn’t secede from the Union in 1861.  It maintained an officially neutral government throughout the war but also possessed a shadow “Convention of the People of Kentucky” that participated in the government of the Confederacy.  In effect, Kentucky was at war with itself and bears the scars of that internal division to this day, Berry says.  But that self-division is just one figure for Berry of the complex reality that the Civil War reflected and bequeathed to the United States of today.  A paradigmatic figure for him in this regard is Robert E. Lee, who commanded the Confederate armies.  Lee held contradictory views on race.  He freed slaves that he personally owned and denounced slavery as a “moral and political evil” in private correspondence, but he never opposed the institution publicly and was certainly a racist who opposed voting rights for blacks after the war, holding that they would not vote “intelligently.”   He was offered a high command in the Union army and opposed secession, but, when secession came, and invasion of his native Virginia was imminent, he chose to fight for the Confederacy.  “I cannot raise my hand against my birthplace, my home, my children,” he said.  For Berry, “he embodied and suffered, as did no other prominent person of his time, the division between nation and country, nationalism and patriotism that some of us in rural America are feeling at present.”  Nation and nationalism, in Berry’s usage, refer to an abstract allegiance,  while country and patriotism describe a vital and demanding relationship – to a place to which we belong as much as it belongs to us.  Lee, limited and even culpable as he may have been, was a man grown in such a place, and he put his obligation to it above any other claim.  When the terrible war ended at last, he preached and practiced reconciliation between North and South, but, while the war continued, he fought.  This makes him, for Berry, a tragic figure, a man caught in a web not of his weaving, who was guided by “loyalties that he selflessly respected and intimately felt rather than by general principles telling him what he ought to feel.” 

In 2017 a decision by the Charlottesville, Virginia City Council to remove an equestrian statue of Lee from a city park led to a pitched battle in the streets of the city.  It became one of the defining events of the first year of the Trump presidency, when the President spoke equivocally about the pro-statue protestors rather than unconditionally condemning them.  The statue was finally taken down in 2001.  Berry regards such actions as an attempt to “kill the past” and render it “obsolete.”  This is dangerous, in his view, on several grounds.  First it removes from sight and mind a living history which still informs the present and which ought to be faced and discussed rather than purged.  Second it shows contempt for local loyalties and affections – the Confederate soldier toppled from his pedestal is not just an incarnate abstraction, but somebody’s brother or son, friend or lover.  And, finally, the statue topplers perpetuate the very war that they ostensibly want to end.  The forces of righteousness “refuse…to imagine…the humanity and suffering of an ‘enemy’,” Berry writes, “and, to me, this is the most troubling revelation of the movement against monuments… for such a principled numbness foretells only more killing.” 

Berry’s book is rooted, as all his work has been since he entered on “the way of love,” in a spirit of forgiveness.  He takes the commandment to “love your enemies” seriously – though, I reiterate, unsentimentally – and he finds “an imperishable absurdity in the idea of war as a means of peace.”  Among the virtues that he thinks best support a spirit of forgiveness he includes a sense of humour – that “wise and generous laughter that is meant to wedge or wear a breath of space between our ourselves and our opinions” – and a sense of humility rooted in a recognition of the fragility and evanescence of goodness –  “We must bear in mind,” he dares to say “that the language of division is more perfectible than the language of agreement - for the reason that, for humans, evil is simpler hence more perfectible than goodness and truth.”  The inevitable incompleteness of our knowledge provides yet another motive for a forbearing attitude.  This is an old theme of Berry’s, wonderfully developed a few years back, in an essay called “The Way of Ignorance.” “…it is the unknowable, not the knowable and the known,” he says here, “that ought to set the tone of our conversation about the past.” 

One of the most surprising, and, for me, most inspired elements of The Need to Be Whole is the amount of attention Berry gives to the idea of sin.  It’s a word rarely heard these days outside of theological circles, embarrassing even to most Christians, and yet Berry devotes a whole chapter to it.  I have the impression that for most people sin is closely connected to guilt and is therefore regarded as a fetter on that glowing self-esteem that should be proper to a contemporary person.  There is a good reason for this aversion to the idea.  During the Middle Ages sin was “criminalized” by the Church.  It was turned from a ground for contrition and mutual forbearance into a juridical and actionable fault within the Church’s emerging legal order.  Worse, it became a means by which the Church shamed and controlled its flock.  Not surprisingly, people eventually rebelled against this oppression but, in the process, the baby went out with the bath water, and people were left with no concept at all to account for their inevitable short-comings.  This has resulted, in Berry’s opinion, in a thin and weakened morality.  Not only is “our incompleteness and brokenness as a public culture” revealed by “our self-comfortably small selection of public sins,” but “the issues of our merely public morality are incomplete, scattered, arbitrary and discontinuous.”  (His we here refers to Americans, but Canadians, I think, share this vitiated morality.)  With only “a meagre handful of highly specialized sins, he says, “an unprecedented multitude [can] be sinless.”  Getting down to cases about these “specialized sins,” he writes… 

A properly educated conservative who has neither approved of abortion nor supported a tax or a regulation, can destroy a mountaintop [mountaintop removal is a method of coal mining in Kentucky] or poison a river and sleep like a baby.  A well-instructed liberal who has behaved with the prescribed delicacy towards women and people of colour can consent to the plunder of the land and people of rural America and sleep like a conservative. 

Neither trembles at their own sinfulness, and self-righteousness rules the field across the political spectrum.  The complacently woke see no need to discover a country “filled only with Trump voters, disbelievers in science, climate change deniers, racists, sexists, homophobes, [and] backward ‘non-college’ country people.”  Those so vilified and patronized make equivalent caricatures of the “liberal elites” and become angrier and more defiant, as they are driven deeper into the character ascribed to them.  Where there should be conversation, there is instead “a rhythm of retribution passing back and forth between two hostile sides.” 

I am only able to give a bare idea of this rich book in a short review, but one other feature that deserves note is the dialogue the book carries on with various black writers.  One example is the work of his contemporary Ernest Gaines (1933-2019), with whom he maintained a lifelong friendship which began when they were both Stegner fellows at Stanford in 1958-1959.  What Berry commends in Gaines’ work is a “language [that] locates him particularly and exactly in his native place and its history.”  He continues… 

Ernest Gaines speaks so fully and responsibly of what he knows that in speaking for himself he speaks also for others.  His language…is so attentive to the details and qualities of lived lives, and so mindful of itself, that it displaces us from the loaded abstractions and slogans of public confrontation and returns us to the lovely possibility that people can talk with one another.  No language could be…more determinedly unavailable to the purposes of hatred and violence than that of this book or this writer.  [Gaines’ A Gathering of Old Men, set in Louisiana, is the book under discussion.]   Because he speaks of and from his own small place, which, as he knows, is only one in a mosaic of thousands of small places, the South cannot be for him an abstract idea as it is for many less settled and located people.  Having so particularly placed himself, he cannot speak as a representative southerner any more than he can speak as a representative black person.   

Berry’s book hopes to foster “the willingness to speak as and for ourselves” and to be known as ourselves rather than as types, emblems or instances of some category.  He quotes William Blake’s statement that “he who would do good to another must do it in minute particulars” and its corollary that “‘General Good’ is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite and flatterer.”  Writing, like Gaines’ novel, brings the unique and unrepeatable individuality of experience to light.  Pro and con dissolve in understanding, and this, he thinks, is the proper function of literature – to bring us into the presence of “the lovely possibility” of talking with rather than at one another.  

The one thing in Berry’s book that I am inclined to question is the way in which he uses the word public.  With him this is often a pejorative term.  “The public,” he writes, “is not, except in the most remote and theoretical sense, a membership.”  It is “nobody’s home,” there is no “spirit of hospitality,” its freedom is “the freedom of the richest and most powerful to reign.”  He approvingly quotes the essayist Paul Tenny, who defines the public as “a collection of unrelated individuals whose interactions are mediated through various shallow and transactional mechanisms, where common ground with a neighbour can only, at best, be found, in the most banal of trivialities.”  Elsewhere he says, “We are now defining our society as a public composed of individuals persons with no intervening structure.”  The opposition here between community as a hospitable membership and the public as an empty assortment of easily manipulated strangers strikes me as too stark.  Berry undeniably has his roots in Port Royal, but he is also a writer who has spent his life assembling his readers into what I would like to call publics – with the accent on the plural rather than the singular form.  He does not know and will never know most of his readers and yet they form a kind of community – an intervening structure? – nonetheless.  I think my difference with him on this point might be terminological rather than substantive, and yet it might still be important.  Between the mass or general public and the face-to-face community are many smaller publics, sustained by loyalties, interests and affinities that are neither entirely personal nor entirely impersonal.  It is just such an assembly that Berry’s book seeks, as it reaches out for readers, and I would like to call this hoped-for but always open and incomplete gathering a public.  In this way the hollow and impersonal public that Berry deplores can be contested; the associations that mediate between the lonely crowd and the local community can find an honourable name; and a necessary concept can be retained.  

Wendell Berry’s book is quite explicitly addressed to his fellow Americans, but I think that Canadians will find it pertinent nonetheless, as we too are in the midst of a brutal simplification of our past, and one that has arguably struck even closer to the heart of the country than in the U.S.  Take the exemplary case of Egerton Ryerson whose statue, on the grounds of the university in Toronto that used to bear his name, was recently defiled and dishonoured.  Ryerson was accused of being an architect of the residential school system.  In fact, he was a man closely connected with indigenous people who had – to quote his entry in The Canadian Encyclopedia – “worked and lived alongside Ojibwa people and learned to speak the language.”  He counted Kahkewaquonaby (Peter Jones) as a lifelong friend and himself received the Ojibwa name Cheechock in 1826 as a tribute from the people of the Credit River among whom he had lived.  A year later, writing in the American Methodist Magazine, he recalled “the affectionate manner in which they received me [which] removed all the strangeness of national feeling, and enabled me to embrace them as brethren, and love them as mine own people.”  Ryerson went on to become the architect of Upper Canada’s system of public schools.  He continued in conversation with indigenous leaders, and, in 1847, after wide consultation with them, he wrote a memo recommending the establishment of agricultural training schools for indigenous youth.  (This was fifty years and more before there was anything even resembling the residential school system of the first half of the 20th century.)  These were imagined as voluntary boarding schools which would aspire to self-sufficiency as the students learned the techniques of farming.  That’s the history, and that’s Ryerson’s crime – to have cooperated with indigenous leaders who had come to think that the uneasy entente that had prevailed between natives and newcomers in the 17th and 18th centuries was coming to an end and that they would now have to adapt to a rapidly modernizing society.  However, I have not found that there is much interest in history amongst the Ryerson (now Metropolitan) faculty and students whose views I know.  Excepting the handful of historians who know something about the man, most seemed eager to get the name changed and “move on” without reference to who or what Egerton Ryerson may have been.  

This case, among numerous others, embodies many of the tendencies that Berry identifies in the U.S.: extreme simplification, keen self-righteousness, uninformed contempt for the past, and a taste for vindication and victory at the expense of understanding.  I find these tendencies ominous.  To say what should be obvious but no longer is: the present, for good and ill, continues the past.  If we don’t at least try to see the past in its true colours, we will be able to form little or no idea of what we are currently doing insofar as what we are doing is inevitably shaped and constrained by the past.  With the past erased and unremembered, a seemingly boundless present will lose itself in fantastic and impossible futures. These are good reasons, I think, for Canadians to attend to what Berry is saying.  

A New Yorker profile of Berry recently reported that “several of Berry friends urged him to abandon this book” as, in his words, “a dire breach of political etiquette.”  (Dorothy Wickenden, “Wendell Berry’s Advice for a Cataclysmic Age,” Feb. 21 2022)  I can see why.  It’s a brave book, and I imagine it cost its author more trouble than its affable style might, at first, seem to indicate.   Berry speaks, by his own admission, into a “great silence,” and takes his stand on a common ground that is quickly disappearing.  He risks almost inevitable misunderstanding in using a word like patriotism – a word which men like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin invoke on behalf of the very nationalism that Berry despises.  But someone must speak for wholeness in world of dichotomies where one must be either a globalist or a nativist, a statist or a libertarian, a technophile or an “anti-vaxxer,” because no other positions are recognized.  Berry speaks for practical wisdom and practical judgment which he believes can be exercised only where people know each other as whole persons.  If this should prove his final book, it will stand, in my view, as a worthy summing up of all that he has created throughout his long life.     

 

                                                       

 

 

Oak Ridge

THE STRANGE CASE OF OAK RIDGE AND THE QUESTION OF HISTORICAL MEMORY

 

Oak Ridge was once the site of a maximum-security ward for the criminally insane at the Ontario Hospital in Penetanguishene Ontario.  The building that stood on that ridge has since been torn down, and today only its old gates remain standing on the grounds of what is now called the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s that building housed an experiment in “therapeutic community” that went under the name of the Social Therapy Unit (S.T.U.).  It was created by psychiatrist Elliot Barker with the support of the institution’s superintendent, Dr. Barry Boyd, who hired Barker in 1965.  At the time, Boyd hoped to replace the current “warehousing” of mental patients with more active treatment.  Barker, for his part, had just returned from a journey of discovery in which he had visited, among other destinations, R.D. Laing’s Philadelphia Association in London and Maxwell Jones’ “social psychiatry” unit at the Henderson Hospital in Surrey – two of the time’s pioneering attempts at therapeutic community.  Both knew that professional resources for a treatment program at Oak Ridge were unavailable and likely to remain so – that was the very reason why the patients in question had for so long been warehoused and forgotten.  Both agreed that, under those circumstances, a program in which inmates helped one another was worth a try.  They proceeded, using both encounter and drug therapies in a treatment plan in which patients counselled, accompanied, and disciplined one another.  What resulted was widely celebrated.  Television and radio documentaries acclaimed the program.  Favourable newspaper stories, and series, were devoted to it.  A federal Parliamentary Committee visited and gave its endorsement.  The provincial Ombudsman’s office also gave its blessing.   

Then, in the 1990’s and afterwards, the tide of opinion began to turn.  Psychiatric survivors, as they began to call themselves, re-evaluated the Social Therapy Unity, first as a form of oppression, and later as a form of torture.  Around the turn of the century the then-new law firm of Rochon Genova began to assemble a law suit against the Ontario government and the two psychiatrists who had directed the S.T.U., Elliott Barker and his successor Dr. Gary Maier.  By the time the case finally went to trial in 2020 there were twenty-eight named plaintiffs – several of whom had died in the meanwhile, and several more of whom would die before judgment was rendered.  They claimed damages from the Province of Ontario and the two psychiatrists on the grounds of assault and breach of “fiduciary duty.”  Gary Maier was called and gave evidence during the trial; Elliott Barker was unable to appear – he had given evidence at an earlier preliminary hearing, but by the time the case finally went to trial he was over eighty and was suffering from dementia.   Edward Morgan, a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, presided and rendered judgment on June 29, 2020.  He found, in a nutshell, that the defendants had been cruel, careless, and irresponsible, and that they had neglected their duty to protect those in their care – their “fiduciary duty” in the legal language of the trial.  His findings are here:  Barker v Barker, 2020, ONSC 3746.  The case was appealed, and Morgan’s judgment was largely upheld by the Ontario of Appeal which released its decision in August of 2022.  (Barker v. Barker, 2022 ONCA 567 – the text had not yet been posted at the time of writing.) 

In the early 1980’s, I interviewed Elliott Barker for Ideas in connection with an organization he had founded called the Canadian Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children – a name that gives a pretty good idea of the rueful conclusions he had drawn from his efforts over twenty years at curing the psychopaths who had been his patients at Oak Ridge.  We became friends and saw each other occasionally.  I also  knew Barry Boyd and other people in this story, so I followed the trial closely and attended in person when I could.  There were few spectators, and the case was barely noticed in the media – the Toronto papers had handful of cursory inside page reports, and the broadcast media ignored it altogether.   

Justice Morgan’s decision, when it came, was unsurprising – his reasoning was entirely consonant with the contemporary disposition to judge the past by the standards of the present – and yet, for all that, still appalling in its complacent and high-handed attitude towards the past.  After I read it, I made a few notes on what seemed to me to be its most outstanding faults.  I have posted them below.  I do so in the hope of stirring some competent historian’s interest in the case.  I am, by now, too old, and too occupied with other work, to imagine that I would be capable of the task, but I think that, in the right hands, the Oak Ridge story could be most illuminating.  There is, first of all, the question of historical memory, and the status of the past in relation to the present.  (A Canada so entirely bent on condemning its past, rather than trying to understand it, doesn’t seem to me to have much of a future.)  The Oak Ridge story is also an important chapter in the history of psychiatry and anti-psychiatry (as well as in the history of science more generally).  And, finally, the story might shed a valuable light on the particular character of the 1960’s in Canada – a decade too long eclipsed by the clichés of American popular culture.  So here are my notes, with apologies for the fact that they are just notes, without much context or connective tissue.  A very partial bibliography follows.

 

THE OAK RIDGE JUDGMENT: PRELIMINARY NOTES

 

§  One of the singular things about this case is the dramatic change in the reputation of the Social Therapy Unit at Oak Ridge.  During most of the years of its existence this was a celebrated program.  The media were favourable – Joan Hollobon in the Globe and Mail, Matty Lanzo on CBC Radio, Bob Davis in This Magazine is About Schools are all examples – and so were the Ontario Ombudsman’s Office and a committee of Parliament.  Then at some point this reputation began to change.  A sign of this change for me was an encounter, sometime around 1990, with a woman who identified as a psychiatric survivor.  I happened to mention to her my friendly acquaintance with Elliott Barker, and she reacted as if I had told her that I was an admirer of Joseph Mengele.  How this change happened seems to be an untold story.  Without this story, the whole judgment is mystifying.  How could the people involved – Boyd, Barker, Maier etc. – possibly have been as morally obtuse as they appear in Judge Morgan’s hindsight? 

§  At the first session of the trial that I attended, I was surprised to find that one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs was a man with whom I had previously enjoyed a friendly acquaintance.  We greeted each other, I told him that I was there because I considered Elliott Barker a friend.  The atmosphere became immediately uneasy.  He gave me a quick summary of the position he had been arguing in court: Barker and Maier, according to him, had viewed his clients as disposable people.  They had seen these patients, he went on, as people so badly damaged that they could not be damaged any further and had therefore felt free to experiment on them with impunity.   What had gone on at Oak Ridge. he concluded, belonged in the same category as the treatment of indigenous children in residential schools - both belonged, as I later heard him say in court, to “Canada’s dark past.”  I began to understand that, for him, the case was generic – it was not about unique people caught in unique predicaments – it was about a set of powerful abstractions like “the dark past.” 

§  The judgment is apparently thorough, but the terrifying offenses committed by some of the plaintiffs – including sadistic rapes, arsons, and murder for its own sake  – don’t really seem to be taken into account.  They are accurately described, and then seemingly set aside, as the judge patiently attempts to weigh up how much harm was or was not done to each plaintiff.  This leaves the impression that one has gone through the looking glass into law-world.  How can the desperate measures instituted in the S.T.U. be so totally divorced from the desperate acts to which these measures attempted to respond? 

§  This divorce is evident in a lot of the language of the judgment.  The S.T.U. was an attempt at “therapeutic community.”  The central idea was that the patients would help and discipline one another.   In the eyes of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, this meant that their clients were wantonly put under the power of “psychotic killers” and “hardened criminals.”  But many of their clients were of the same kind.  The victims were also victimizers.  This figure-ground problem pervades the judgment. 

§  In a paragraph toward the end of the judgment [1321] Justice Morgan argues that Elliott Barker was not disadvantaged by being unable to appear.  Because Barker could be represented by his writings, he claimed, “the court has now ‘heard from’ Dr. Barker, as it were, at his most articulate and in a way that did not allow him to be directly countered or visibly undermined.”  This struck me as odd – why was the case being conducted at all if it could have been settled from the written record? – and very unfair to Barker, as if the judge knew that Barker would only have made it worse for himself had he been able speak.  I mention it because Barker’s motives and his actions remain almost entirely obscure in Morgan’s judgment. 

§  What did Elliott Barker think he was doing?  We have his writings in which he explains his theory, and we have the testimony of the plaintiffs in which they reconstruct what happened to them in testimony given thirty to fifty years after the fact, but the judgment provides no bridge between the two.  We don’t see Barker working with patients, we don’t hear his hopes or his fears, we hear of no successful treatments.  Convicted now of recklessness, assault, and torture – Judge Morgan repeatedly calls the S.T.U. treatments “tortuous” but I presume he means “torturous” – he appears as something of a monster.

§  Elliott Barker, as I understood him, was preoccupied by the figure of “the psychopath.”  This term was thrown around a good deal during the trial but usually in the partial and polemical way that I pointed to earlier – patients were characterized as psychopaths insofar as they exercised power over other patients, and as vulnerable individuals when they were subject to this power.  This manipulation of the term served the plaintiff’s case well, since it allowed the very design of a therapeutic community in which patients were to heal one another to be shifted at will into the image of vulnerable people subject to the illicit and abusive power of psychopaths.  But it did not do justice to the meaning that Barker gave to this word.  What he understood by it goes to the heart of what was attempted in the S.T.U.  Psychopaths, for him, were people so warped by vicious treatment that they had effectively lost all conscience – people who had ended up, at least temporarily, beyond appeal.  There was nothing accessible in them to which an appeal could be made.  To find and awaken the conscience was the whole point of the treatment and the reason why its main emphasis fell on disrupting defences.  By its very nature, this attack on well-entrenched defense would have to be coercive and sometimes violent – a point on which Barker was quite frank in his writings.  (He paid dearly for this frankness when these writings were later turned against him, as they were in this trial.). Barker’s theory, and the consequences that flowed from it, are not taken seriously in Justice Morgan’s judgment.  At no point does he confront Barker’s central claim that only aggressive and invasive treatment can undo the wrong that has put the psychopath beyond appeal and made him – these were all men  – dangerous.  Instead we have the sleight of hand by which the psychopath and the vulnerable individual become distinct personalities.  As a result, the whole force of Barker’s argument is lost and his procedures reframed as an odious abuse of helpless victims.

§  One of the murkiest matters here is the idea, promoted in court and in the media by the lawyers for the plaintiffs, and seemingly accepted by Judge Morgan, that the authorities at Oak Ridge regarded the plaintiffs as “throw-away people” and took the view that since they were already damaged they could not be damaged further by the reckless experiments that were conducted on them.   There is a certain irony here, since what Barry Boyd and Elliott Barker believed they were doing was exactly the opposite. When Boyd took over as superintendent he wanted to end the “warehousing” of the criminally insane and attempt active treatment.  That was why he hired Elliott Barker and why the radical methods Barker employed were even thinkable.  Barker wanted to rehabilitate those who would otherwise be tranquillized, locked up and forgotten.   It is strange that he should now be accused of having no regard at all for his patients, when he may in fact have had too optimistic a view of their capacity and willingness to change. (This, I believe, was his own view in later years.)

§  The idea that what Barker and Maier were doing at Oak Ridge constituted either research or experimentation is another very murky matter.  A lot of the trouble arises from the ambiguity of both terms.  To experiment can mean to try something, or it can refer to the careful staging of a precise scientific question.  Research, likewise, can mean simply the attempt to find something out, or it can take the form of controlled study.  Barker and Maier used both words in their attempt to attract support but arguably in the first sense of trying to find something out.  In the judgment the second meaning is invoked, and they appear in the unacceptable position of conducting “experiments” on people.

§  Here the question of consent becomes very important.  All “experimental” use of drugs at Oak Ridge was voluntary – one signed a “contract” to participate.  But, since the patients were there involuntarily – mostly on indeterminate sentences – and the psychiatrists largely determined when and if they would be released, the judge ruled that this was not informed consent.  One can see his point, but it leaves Maier and Barker without a leg to stand on.  The patients appear as pure victims – without agency or influence – the doctors as purely arbitrary authorities who make decisions based on their “experimental” or “research” agendas without regard for the interests of their coerced patients.

§  All sorts of drugs are named in the judgment, and one hears how often and in what amount they were administered.  Yet little light is shed on how and to what end these drugs were used.  The plaintiffs, in keeping with their suit, recall bad experiences, and one never hears, except in general, what Barker and Maier thought they were doing or even if their “experiments” now and then succeeded.  This is a result of the judgment’s lack of interest in the social atmosphere in which the S.T.U. once made sense.  (The judgment is equally uninterested in interrogating the current atmosphere in which it’s possible for the plaintiffs to appear as pure victims without agency or responsibility.)  Work with LSD in therapeutic settings had shown great promise in Canada up to the time the drug was outlawed in 1968.  Canadian scholar Erica Dyck has documented some of this research in her book Psychedelic Psychiatry (U of Manitoba Press, 2012.)  A lot of this work has resumed in the last ten years, as Michael Pollan has shown in his recent book How to Change Your Mind.  But no notice is taken of this literature.  Dr. Maier is referred to repeatedly as an enthusiast for LSD – he is even pictured at one point as telling a group of patients, “I hold in my hand…the power…to cure psychopathy.” (para 1307) – but the idea that Maier’s belief in the therapeutic potential of LSD was anything more than a megalomaniac fantasy is never seriously entertained.  All the psycho-active drugs used in the STU are effectively demonized.  No account of the harms that might have been caused by the tranquillizing psychiatric drugs that would otherwise have been used is allowed to modify this picture.

§  The judgment has an air of inevitability, as if no other conclusion could possibly have been reached.  In this I think Judge Morgan speaks solidly for his time and its common sense.   The conditions under which the Oak Ridge “experiment” became possible are not seriously taken under consideration beyond a few sloppy clichés about “the sixties.”  Elliott Barker had his roots in a liberation movement within psychiatry that had many expressions in 1960’s Canada.  He was connected, for example, during his student days with the group that was working to unlock the wards and free warehoused patients from the old asylum at 999 Queen St.  He would certainly have been aware of the promising work Humphry Osmond, Abraham Hoffer and others were doing with LSD and other psychedelics at the Mental Hospital in Weyburn, Saskatchewan.  I would characterize the mood of the time as both utopian and apocalyptic – utopian in the sense that great things seemed possible, and apocalyptic in the sense of now or never – that it was time to act and act decisively.  Barker was aware of the paradoxes involved at Oak Ridge.  He acknowledges, in a passage from his essay “Buber Behind Bars” that Morgan cites against him (para 31ff.), that there was inevitably an element of coercion in the treatment of people already doubly coerced – by the indefinite terms of their incarceration and by the violent compulsions that had put them in Oak Ridge in the first place.  Nevertheless, he had the sense that something must be attempted.  Witnesses found the atmosphere on “F Ward” circa 1968 to be full of promise.  Against the judge’s flat claim that all the S.T.U. interventions were “therapeutically useless,” (para 1316] I can point to a case with which I’m familiar – that of Mike Mason, who was Barker’s co-author on the above-mentioned “Buber Behind Bars” and other papers.  Mason was released from Oak Ridge in 1968 and went on to become a successful family lawyer.  How many others ought to be counted as “cures” is unknown at this point.  My point is that no account is taken of this period whatsoever in the judgment.  As a man of his own time the judge has a keen eye and a keen conscience for victims and victimization, but no appreciation whatsoever of a climate in which it was hoped that people could change one another by opening up to one another and taking responsibility for themselves.

§  Justice Morgan puts a lot of emphasis on the destructive side of the S.T.U. programs and claims at several points that they had no constructive side.  Typical is his assertion [para 293] in the case of Eric Bethune that, “Dr. Barker went out of his way to break down Mr. Bethune’s mental defences, and by all accounts he succeeded. There is no indication in the record that those mental defences were built back up.”  There are several problems here.  One is what “built back up” might mean.  Barker is the one who is accused of psychiatric hubris, but I don’t think he ever imagined that he could “build mental defenses” for another person.  He was certainly interested in disrupting defenses – the drug program was called Defence Disruptive Therapy – but his theory was that once the character armour that inhibited self-knowledge began to crack, people would be healed by opening to one another.  There was no sense that they were to undergo psychiatric “reconstruction.”  Justice Morgan may disagree with Barker’s theory, and with Barker’s belief that the reorientation of the personality that it aimed at was possible, but he should at least acknowledge that such a theory and such a belief were in play.  (Morgan does give a brief nod to Barker’s approach in the first section of the judgment where Barker and Mason’s article “Buber Behind Bars” is mentioned, but, since the judge doesn’t take Barker’s argument seriously and regards his methods as “therapeutically useless,” he seems to feel no need to revert to Barker’s ideas when discussing cases.)   At this point – fifty years on – it’s very hard to know how much Barker may have worked with Eric Bethune, when the latter was his patient.  Barker can’t speak, and Bethune, as a plaintiff seeking damages, is now an interested party.  The record, however voluminous – the judge mentions 120,000 pages of Oak Ridge records – will not necessarily disclose Barker’s disposition towards Bethune.   The suggestion here from justice Morgan of a tidy therapeutic procedure in which everything that is broken down is then carefully built back up makes me think, once again, that his opinions emanate from some ideal “law-world” rather than from any attempt to stretch his mind around the chaotic milieu in which those he now judges had to operate.  The plaintiffs in this case, as their lawyers have emphasized, and media reports have reemphasized, were vulnerable individuals.  Many of them were also, in their time, extremely dangerous people who had not only committed frightening crimes but were also convincing liars, able to hide their proclivities from themselves and others.   On top of that, they now have both a material and a psychological interest in proving that Drs. Barker and Maier were the source of their troubles.  A further complication is a zeitgeist in which claims of victimization now regularly trump all other claims.  All this makes me feel that this judgment does not provide an accurate picture of what went on at Oak Ridge between forty and fifty-five years ago.  I wonder if such a picture is now even possible – certainly it would require more humility and more historical perspective than is shown in Judge’s Morgan’s decision.

§  The judge asserts that he has is able to make an “objective” assessment of the specific harms inflicted by Oak Ridge on plaintiffs who mostly knew terrible harm from the day they were born.  He argues this in a remarkable section of the judgment (para 1151) where he claims that it is of no consequence that one of the plaintiffs, Shauna Taylor, now claims to have been damaged by programs she once enthusiastically praised.  (Taylor, when held at Oak Ridge for multiple rapes, was known as Vance Egglestone.  She has since undergone a sex-change operation.) “She obviously says different things at different times,” Justice Morgan writes, “and it is not possible to discern which is true and which is false. In my view, however, it does not particularly matter. The debate over her credibility is a debate about what she thought then and thinks now. But what is relevant at the moment is whether or not, objectively, the STU programs did her harm. Ms. Taylor’s subjective perspective is, in a sense, neither here nor there in terms of the causation of harm.”  By what light does Morgan discern “objectively” what is obscure to Shauna Taylor herself?  The answer, essentially, is that he regards his own judgment, and the opinion of the plaintiff’s main expert witness, psychiatrist John Bradford, as having this objective character.  He apparently can survey Taylor’s troubled life and determine what caused what.  I presume this same confidence underlies his sense that Barker and Maier were in the grip of the prejudices of their time, while he possesses unclouded “objectivity.”

§  Since Elliott Barker’s reputation has been so serious impugned by Judge Morgan, and Barker will now be remembered, unless this judgment is challenged, as one guilty of assault, breach of his duty as a physician, and moral recklessness, it’s worth recalling the case of Matt Lamb, one of the patients at Oak Ridge in the 1960’s.  Lamb was a young man from Windsor who went to prison at sixteen for assaulting a police officer.  Within weeks of his release in 1966, he went on what the papers of the time called a “shooting spree,” killing two strangers and wounding two others – a case of what one of the psychiatrists who testified at the Oak Ridge trial called “lust murder” – a sheer desire to kill.  Lamb did well during the seven years he was in the S.T.U., and Barker took a sustained interest in him which seems quite at odds with the picture of the careless experimentalist that one gets from Justice Morgan’s pages.   This close relationship led in 1973 to Lamb’s release under Barker’s personal supervision.  For the next year Lamb lived with Barker’s family, working as a hired hand on the farm that Barker and his wife Julie then ran, and even sometimes baby-sitting their infant daughter.  This speaks to me of a commitment to the rehabilitation of his patients which is not recognized in the judgement against him.   Lamb eventually became a soldier, enlisting in the Rhodesian Army – the only army that would have him – which was then fighting the independence movement that took power in 1980 and turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe.  He was killed in 1976.  The story is neither neat nor pretty, but the commitment Barker and his wife Julie showed to Matt Lamb shows a very different man than the one portrayed in the pages of Justice Morgan’s judgment.

§  The Oak Ridge judgment, finally, poses a huge issue of historical memory.  Before Elliott Barker took over at Oak Ridge in 1965, he made a trip around the world which included a call on Martin Buber in Israel, visits to the “therapeutic communities” that had been started in England by R.D. Laing and Maxwell Jones, and a period in China where he studied the re-education methods of the Cultural Revolution.  This last, seemingly irresistible, detail has led a lot of the scant newspaper coverage of the court’s decision.  Sean Fine, for example, begins his story in the Globe and Mail, by describing the S.T.U as “a psychiatric program developed by an Ontario doctor after a visit to Mao Zedong’s China.”  (“Court rules that Ontario mental health program amounted to assault,” July 1, ’20). It sounds so simple – we all know how the Cultural Revolution turned out, why couldn’t Elliott Barker see through it?  That “Mao Zedong’s China” has an entirely different significance in 2020, than it had for Barker in 1964 is easily overlooked.  The past, I would argue, can only be understood by those willing to bracket their knowledge of how it turned out and to entertain the possibility that it might have turned out differently.  This difficult discipline is not even acknowledged in the Oak Ridge judgment, let along attempted.  Justice Morgan and those whose counsel he took are secure in their enlightened present.  They would never have done what those they judge did, even if tasked with the rehabilitation of men who were then considered the most dangerous mental patients in Canada.  Justice Morgan sweeps the whole difficulty of understanding the past under the rug by his egregious claim that he rises “objectively” above the vicissitudes of memory and opinion.  The result is that the cartoon version of the 1960’s that has already prevailed for some time is upheld.  This matters in several ways, I think.  It matters because Elliott Barker deserves a better reputation than this judgment will leave him with.  It matters because what he attempted – to free the most fearfully damaged of his fellows from their compulsions – has now been turned against him and made to appear as arrogance, cruelty and abuse of power.  It matters because the predicament he tried to address – those who have been hurt hurting others – persists in a way the judgment tends to hide by treating the plaintiffs, now mostly too old to do further harm, only in terms of their “vulnerabilities” rather than the responsibilities Barker tried to enjoin on them.  And it matters, finally, because the “presentism” embodied in the judgment is now epidemic.  It’s not only Elliott Barker who has become an incomprehensible moral monster.  Most of our ancestors now fall into this category – the entire scene of Canadian history evokes only weeping and remorse amongst many of the young.  This has produced a generation so divorced from history that it seems to believe that anything is possible.  People have become so good, in their own eyes, and so alert to any falling away from this impossible and paralyzing goodness, that a gamble like Elliott Barker’s – flawed as it certainly was – has become unthinkable. He should have known better, as Justice Morgan is happy to remind him.  A more modest and more truthful account remains to be written.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

“Buber Behind Bars”, (1968) 13 Cdn. Psych. Assoc. J. 61 (Barker/Mason)

“The Insane Criminal as Therapist” (1968) 10 Cdn. J. of Corrections 3 (Barker’Mason)

“LSD in a Coercive Milieu Therapy Program (1977), 22 Cdn Psych. Assoc. J. 311 (Barker)

Gary Maier and T. Hawke, “Penetang: People and Paradox” (1975) (no citation)

Butler, Long & Rower, “Evaluative Study of the Social Therapy Unit” (Ontario Ombudsman, 1977

E.T. Barker, M.H. Mason, J. Wilson, “Defence Disruptive Therapy”, (1969) 4 Cdn. Psych. Assoc. J

John Gunn, “Abuse of Psychiatry”, (2006) 16 Crim. Behaviour & Mental Health 77 (derisory description of visit to Oak Ridge)

E.T. Barker, “Treating psychotics with LSD: good results are reported”, Modern Medicine (March 30, 1978)

Elliott Barker and Alan McLaughlin, “The Total Encounter Capsule”, (1977) 22 Cdn. Psych. Assoc. J.

Dr. Stephen Hucker, “Oak Ridge: A Review and an Alternative” (the “1985 Hucker Report”).

MEDIA

From the time – a film by Norm Perry for CTV: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6OBy-9s_p0

From the time of revision – the Fifth Estate: The Fifth Estate story on Oak Ridge aired March 4, 2021

More video resources are linked on the website of former Oak Ridge inmate Steve Smith: http://www.thepsychopathmachine.com/media.html

 

 

Concerning Life

CONCERNING LIFE: AN OPEN LETTER TO JEAN- PIERRE DUPUY AND WOLFGANG PALAVER

 

“And the Gileadites took the fords of the Jordan against the Ephraimites.  And when any of the fugitives of Ephraim said, “Let me go over,” the men of Gilead said to him, “Are you an Ephraimite?”  When he said, “No,” they said to him, “Then say Shibboleth,” and he said, “Sibboleth,” for he could not pronounce it right; then then seized him and slew him in the fords of the Jordan.   And there fell at that time forty-two thousand of the Ephraimites.” (Judges 12: 3-6)

 

A shibboleth is a dividing line, and dividing lines are sharpest when they are razor thin.  For the Ephraimites the price of forty-two thousand lives was nothing more than what linguists call an unvoiced fricative.  Things are not yet quite so bad with us, but the pandemic has certainly brought division between friends.  (And how great, after all, were the differences between Ephraimites and Gileadites, if all that distinguished them was the ability to make this crucial sound?)  One of the shibboleths dividing us seems to be life.  Recently two admired friends have taken issue with me over this word and the interpretation I have given of Ivan Illich’s views on the subject.  Theologian Wolfgang Palaver, in an interview in the German weekly Die Zeit for Dec. 23, 2020, expresses concern that Illich’s claim that life has become “a fetish” is being abused as a justification for “sacrificing the weak.”  And French philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy, in an article for the website AOC called “The True Legacy of Ivan Illich,” argues, similarly, that those who follow “the fashion of covidoscepticism” misunderstand and misappropriate Illich’s strictures on “the idolization of life.”  Dupuy’s article is the second of two on the “alleged ‘sacralisation of life.’”  The first denounces what Dupuy calls “the blindness of the intellectuals.”  

In Dupuy’s essay I am named in a way that flatters my achievements as an interlocutor of Illich’s before I “succumbed to the times.”  “Alas, a thousand times alas,” he says, that “David Cayley himself” has “succumbed to the times” and now “multiplies his clichés and manifests his ignorance” while engaging in a “classic minimization of the severity of the pandemic.”  Palaver is milder and doesn’t name me directly, but since I have been prominent amongst those who have tried to argue that “the idolization of life” has played a pernicious part in political responses to the pandemic, I include myself within that company whom he thinks have pushed Illich into dangerous territory, far beyond Illich’s intention.   

The stakes are high here.  “Saving lives” has justified every policy adopted to counteract the pandemic during the last year, and life is likely to continue as the sacred sign in which the revised social order that emerges from the pandemic will root its legitimacy.  Accordingly, it seems important to seek some clarity on what is now meant by this word.  (I hope my frequent resort to italics will be understood as a way of marking the usage I want to question.). I will begin by trying to understand what is worrying Palaver and Dupuy, then present what I take to be Illich’s view, and conclude with some reflection on the role of life in the present, and emerging, social order.  

Palaver and Dupuy are concerned with what they call the protection or preservation of life.  Both argue that those who “minimize” the pandemic, criticize the measures taken against it, or flout the rules for its containment are recklessly endangering their neighbours.  Both focus particularly on Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben as the epitome of this recklessness.   Agamben has argued throughout the pandemic that the official response has amounted to destroying the village in order to save it.  By leaving the old to die alone and unconsoled, by making people afraid of one another, and by banning funerals, church services and other elementary forms of social and cultural life, he has written, we have eviscerated what is left of our way of life, and allowed medicine to establish itself as an all-powerful and virtually incontestable religious cult.  Dupuy is outspoken in his criticisms.  Agamben’s “intellectual posturing,” he writes, is the “soft version” of the same “reactionary violence” as one sees in “American far-right groups…shouting, guns in hand, in front of the steps of their legislatures.”  This is already unfair and entirely ad hominem, but then Dupuy goes further.  With respect to Agamben’s concept of “bare life,” by which Agamben clearly and explicitly means life without the cultural qualifications that give life narrative shape and dignity, Dupuy claims as an implication of this concept that Agamben must “despise… the simple, ‘animal’ life of the poor landless peasants of the Brazilian northeast.”  This seems to me to verge on slander as well as willful misreading.   

Palaver, again, is milder and more temperate, but he too says that he is “upset” with Agamben.   The relevant passage in Palaver’s interview with Die Zeit: where he expresses this consternation is worth quoting in full: 

Agamben really upsets me. He is more papal than the Pope and more ecclesiastical than the Church. He claims that the Church has given up salvation and sacrificed it to health: because it sought salvation in history, it could only end in health. Nonsense!  Why did Jesus heal people and take care of physical ailments? The many healings alone contradict Agamben’s theological escape from the world. I am the LORD, your doctor.  Or think of the miracle of the multiplication of bread. When people are hungry, you have to do something! Agamben practices bad theology when he tears salvation and health apart. 

…Agamben rightly laments an attitude for which health and survival are the most important things in life. But here one would have to ask: is it about my own life? Or is it the concern that applies to other people? 

I can’t overlook the possibility that this is mistranscribed, mistranslated or just spoken hastily off the cuff, but, if this is what Palaver meant to say, I think he goes too far.  Jesus certainly fed people and healed people, but he  didn’t heal everyone or feed everyone.  Indeed he fed and healed people so sparingly that it seems fair to say that such actions, when he performed them, were intended illustratively rather than administratively or programmatically.   This is the great issue in Dostoevsky’s fable of the Grand Inquisitor.  The Inquisitor reproaches his Lord for not turning stones into bread when he was challenged to do so.  Because of this failure to allow for the weakness of suffering humanity, which cries always, “Enslave [us] but feed us!,” the Inquisitor says, it was necessary for the Church to step in to “correct and improve” the Gospel.  I don’t mean to imply that Palaver takes his stand with the Grand Inquisitor, but only to point to a profound ambiguity in the Gospel view of Jesus as physician. Yes, there are feedings and healings, but there are also declarations that the Kingdom is “not of this world” and references to a way or a path so narrow or so arduous that “few find it.”  It seems unwise therefore for Palaver to accuse Agamben of a “theological escape from the world.”  Agamben has never claimed to be a theologian, and his defence of particular “forms of life,” like funerals for the dead or human solace for the dying, seems to me eminently worldly.  What he lays at the Church’s door is to have forgotten the messianic, and therefore to have lost a necessary “dialectical tension” between history and what exceeds or interrupts history.  It is only between “these poles,” Agamben claimed in an address to “the Church of our Lord” in Paris in 2009, that “a community can form and last.” Palaver may disagree, but, in that case, I would expect arguments rather than irritation and dismissal (“Nonsense!”) 

The second point that Palaver makes is that the masked and distanced citizen is not necessarily concerned with his own life, but with the lives of others.  Dupuy says just the same – it is not for myself that I take precautions but for others.  Some of this is quite uncontroversial.  Long before COVID I would have declined to go out into society with an infectious disease, and hoped for the same courtesy from others. But in a world where everyone is a danger to everyone else, and the threat of “asymptomatic transmission” inhibits all social interaction without exception, it seems to me that a limit of “responsibilization” has been reached and surpassed.  Reconceptualizing society as an immune system writ large is a formula for social dissolution.  

Palaver argues further that those who argue against lockdown and similar measures are preparing to “sacrifice the weak..”  Behind this willingness he says stands “scapegoat logic” – the logic of the High Priest when he says, in the Gospel narratives of the Passion, that “it is better that one man should die than that the whole people should perish.”  In the understanding that Palaver shares with his teacher René Girard, this was the archaic principle – timely sacrifice preserves social order  - that first Judaism and then Christianity began to question and overturn.  All “utility thinking,” Palaver says, reasserts “scapegoat logic.”  “Only life can provide orientation,” he concludes.  I agree, but much turns, as we shall see, on what is meant by life. 

Before turning to Illich I can’t avoid saying, though with some trepidation, that in both Palaver and Dupuy, I feel I detect a note of panic.  Once, long ago, after a lecture of Illich’s on Medical Nemesis, a member of his audience turned to a friend of Illich’s and asked in innocent perplexity, “What does he want? Let people die?” Both Dupuy and Palaver are more sophisticated, and more conversant with Illich’s work, than was this bemused young man, and yet both seem, finally, to have reached the same sticking point.  Lives must be saved – more or less at all costs – and anyone who argues otherwise has blindly forsaken “the height of humanism” (Dupuy) and succumbed to “scapegoat logic” and “social Darwinism.” (Palaver) 

Both my interlocutors think that “covidosceptics” are mistaking and abusing Illich’s claim that life has become “an idol” and “a fetish.”  Palaver admits that Illich issued a salutary warning, but feels that Illich is being taken too prescriptively.  Dupuy claims that’s Illich’s strictures on the “idolization of life” were intended only to prevent life’s degradation, not to in any way limit its protection and preservation.  To get to the bottom of this we will first have to establish what Illich, in fact, said. 

Sometime in 1985 a Baptist minister by the name of Will Campbell approached Illich after a lecture to a group of social workers in Macon, Georgia.  In his private papers, Illich left behind a brief account, written ten years later, of this fateful meeting: 

[Following the lecture] I noticed [a] man with…a…knotted walking stick coming towards me.  He introduced himself as a preacher: “Will Campbell…who has to ask you for a great favour.”  I gasped, because that name I knew, “If you are the one who animated Martin Luther King, do not ask me but simply command, I obey.”  He mumbled something which ended in “…you darn papists” and then said, “You refused to speak about ‘life’.  You see, ‘life’ is tearing our churches apart.  There are those who condemn capital punishment, but not the A-bomb, and others who call for the execution of abortionists.  I will gather the representatives of our Churches so that you can talk to them.” 

I was frightened.  I cast about in my mind what to make of such a call.  Many months later, somewhere in Ohio, I faced the room full of ‘church leaders’ that Campbell had assembled.  The mood was tense.  A clergyman in the front row identified himself as the representative of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference and urged me to start with a prayer.  This trap I had to refuse; I told him that I would start with a solemn, formal curse and asked those who did not stand for such a ceremony to leave.  Then, dramatically, I raised my hands and repeated three times, “To Hell With Life.” 

Beyond the curse I do not know what Illich said on this occasion – Ohio is a big place, the meeting left no further trace in Illich’s papers, and I’ve never encountered anyone who can tell me anything more about it – but four years later, in Chicago, Illich addressed a conference convened by the American Lutheran Church on the same subject.  This lecture, called “The Institutional Construction of a New Fetish: Human Life” was published, three years later, in Illich’s book, In the Mirror of the Past.  On that occasion Illich told his auditors, without qualification, that “life is the most powerful idol the Church has had to face in her history.”  “More than the ideology of empire or feudal order, more than nationalism or progress, more than Gnosticism or enlightenment, the acceptance of substantive life as a God-given reality lends itself to a new corruption of the Christian faith.”  The word “substantive” is important here, and I will return to it in a moment, but first I want to examine the claim that contemporary reverence for life corrupts Christian faith. 

In the gospels, Jesus asserts, repeatedly, that He is Life.   “He does not say, ‘I am a life,’” Illich comments.  “He says, ‘I am Life,’ tout court.”  What is meant is more than merely being alive.  The Life which Jesus incarnates and exemplifies can be given and received, Illich says, only as a gift.  As such, it can be encountered, celebrated and shared, but it can never be ours to define or delimit, administer or control.  This way of thinking and speaking about life, in which the word always implies a relationship to the One in whose gift Life lies, saturated the culture of Christendom for many centuries.  “For much more than a millennium,” Illich says, “it was quite clear that people can be among the living and be dead, and other people can be dead and have life. This is not simply a religious statement; this…became an ordinary everyday assumption.” This everyday character is significant because it was Illich’s argument that the “preconditions for modernity” were created by this acculturation of “Gospel truths.”  Modernity bent, folded and mutilated these truths, in his view, but it could never have come to be without them.  This is why Illich dares to say that contemporary usage “abuses the word for the Incarnate God.” He considered this a historical rather than a theological judgment.  Trace the word life back through its many expressions in the Western theological, philosophical and scientific tradition, he said, and it will become evident that its meaning, however altered, continues to be shaped within the field that emanates from Latin Christendom.  

The way we speak of life is rooted in a civilization once suffused with belief in the Incarnation.  And this “Christian ancestry,” is shared with “other key verities defining secular society.” But at the same time the word’s meaning has completely changed.  It has become “substantive,” Illich says.  By this he means both that it has taken on the character of a stuff –  of something palpable – and that it has acquired substance in the more philosophical and theological sense of something that can exist in itself – it has become self-standing and self-sufficient.   That life has become a stuff can be seen, Illich claims, in the discourses of law, medicine, economics and ecology – all of which claim this stuff as both their jurisdiction and their justification.  The law protects it – in several U.S. states one can even sue for “wrongful life” – medicine extends it – corporations administer it – as manpower or human resources – and ecology studies it.  The science of genetics now knows its “language.”  Demography and journalism tirelessly count its units.  Lives lost index disaster; lives saved index social progress.  The pursuit of health prolongs it; technology enhances it.  Life is known, as never before and it is managed, as never before.  

But, at the same time, life transcends all management as what Illich calls a “fetish.”  This was a favourite word, chosen more for its power to shock than for any particular anthropological resonance.  A fetish is a magical object with the power of channelling or fixating certain feelings.    “Technological society,” he says, “is singularly incapable of generating myths to which people can form deep and rich attachments.”  And yet such a society, just for its “rudimentary maintenance,” requires some way of commanding sentimental and not just rational allegiance.  This is the role of the fetish.  It is “a Linus blanket…that we can drag around to feel like decent defenders of sacred values.”  Life is managed as a biopolitical resource, but, as a fetish, it is also something that can be “spoken about in hushed tones as something mysterious, polymorphic, weak, demanding tender protection.” What Illich calls ‘epistemic sentimentality” can thus attach itself to life, at the same time that life is being intensively managed.  To live under the sign of life is to become adept at eliding these seemingly contradictory connotations.  One learns to slide smoothly from one to the other without this operation ever having to come into consciousness as such.  With a single verbal gesture, we revere what we manage, and manage what we revere. 

Life, Illich says, “tends to void” both the moral and the legal “concept of a person.”  For him, it is in “the notion of ‘person’ [that] the humanism of Western humanism is anchored.”  A person possesses a clear boundary, and an inviolable integrity.  A life does not.  One is a person; one can, as the saying goes, “get a life.”  Lives can be a evaluated and improved in ways that persons cannot.  A doctor, facing me as a person, faces a certain story and a certain unknown destiny – there is a lot he or she must learn in order to treat me.  A doctor facing me as a life can discern everything he or she needs to know from my test results.  Lives vary, of course, as the skillful physician will recognize, but not quite in the same way that persons vary. 

Life, for Illich, was also the sign of a profound change in “religiosity” – a term that he used to refer to the feelings, gestures and barely conscious dispositions that might not be captured by the more formal word religion.  “My nose, my intuition, and also my reason tell me,” he said in 1992, “that we might be at a historical threshold, a watershed, a point of transition to a new stage of religiosity.”  This idea had first taken hold of him a couple of years earlier, he told me, while he stood in the kitchen of the apartment of a group of graduate students whom he was visiting: 

On the icebox door two pictures were pasted.  One was the blue planet and one was the fertilized egg.  Two circles of roughly the same size – one bluish, the other one pink.  One of the students said to me, “These are our doorways to the understanding of life.”  The term doorway struck me profoundly. This stuck with me for quite a few months, until, for a totally different reason, I…took down a book of Mircea Eliade[’s].  Eliade has been for many of us a teacher of religious science…And, going through this book, I came to the conclusion that better than anyone else I had studied he brings out the concept of sacrum.  The term sacrum, the Latin noun corresponding to our sacred, has been used by religious scientists to describe a particular place in the topology of any culture.  It refers to an object, a locality, or a sign which, within that culture, is believed to be – this young lady was right – a doorway.  I had always thought of it as a threshold, a threshold at which the ultimate appears, that which, within that society, is considered to be true otherness, that which, within a given society, is considered transcendent.  For Eliade, a society becomes a conscious unity not just in relation to neighboring societies – we are not you – but also by defining itself in relation to what’s beyond. 

The pink disk and the blue disk, Illich concluded, performed, very precisely, the function Eliade described.  Just as much as the megaliths at Stonehenge, the Ka’bah in Mecca, or the omphalos of the earth at ancient Delphi, they were sacrums.  But, as “emblems for scientific facts,” they were sacrums of an entirely new kind.  The “ultimate” which appeared at earlier “doorways” beckoned from a beyond that was transcendent – the opposite and other of this world with which it was understood to be radically discontinuous.  What appears in the doorway of the two disks is more of the same – a realm of the invisibly small or the invisibly large to which we can gain access only with electron microscopes or the vast explosive power required to overcome gravity but which is yet no different than what is at hand.  The doorways at which life is experienced and understood are, in Illich’s words, “a frontier with no beyond.”  Like the endless virtuality that extends beyond the computer screen, they open to an infinity without difference.  The new religiosity he had discovered was a “spirituality” of pure immanence, in which virtual objects, conjured out of the womb of technology, present both a here and a beyond at once.  

Life as pure immanence is uniquely available – it opens itself to our microphones and our cameras, our microscopes and our scanners.  Life is at our command, even as we are at life’s command.  We manage what we praise, administer what we venerate.  Both aspects are at play in the notion of responsibility for life which has played such an important role in the discourses of the pandemic and which seems to be the main concern of both my interlocutors.  Palaver says, “We are responsible for each other’s life. It is our highest responsibility, for which we may even have to sacrifice our lives.”   Dupuy evokes “the risk of infecting one’s loved ones” as the standard one should apply to one’s own behaviour.  To criticize either the ideological construction of the pandemic or the counter-productive measures adopted against it is to flirt with irresponsibility – the reckless disregard for the lives of others which both Dupuy and Palaver deprecate and fear.  But the word responsibility, according to Illich, is something of a trap – a word that’s easier to get into than to get out of.  The key issue for him is whether the thing for which I am said to be responsible is within my reach, within my power, and within my understanding.  “Responsibility catches,” he says, by imputing to the one being made responsible some imaginary power– it might be the power to overcome racism, save life on earth, or end the pandemic by staying home.  But very often Illich says this power “turns out to be phoney.”  And that makes responsibility “the ideal base on which to build the new religiosity of which I speak, in the name of which people become more than ever administrable, manageable.”  

No challenge is offered here to behaviour that is prudent, considerate or courteous.  Illich’s concern was with illusion, moral grandiosity and epistemological confusion.  The last is particularly important in the present case.  Despite immediate domestication in a thousand cartoons as a spikey malevolent little demon, little was known about SARS COV-2 when it first appeared, and much is still in question, including its origins, the mortality it causes, its mode of transmission, and how it is best prevented and treated,  But, at the same time, “consistent messaging” and “following the science” having been emphasized.  This has been seen to require an effective censorship, first to keep perfectly normal scientific dissensus out of the news, and second to lend an air of obviousness and impregnability to what are in fact scientifically doubtful precautions.  (An example of the first is the marginalization of dissenting public health experts like former Ontario chief medical officer of health Richard Schabas and former Manitoba head Joel Kettner in Canada.  The best example of the second is the use of masks, dismissed as useless at the beginning of the pandemic, then, without new evidence, made compulsory and indisputable.)   This creates a strange situation with regard to responsibility.  Real response-ability depends on an intelligible situation in which I can respond and reach a practical judgment about what to do.  But the pandemic, while real for those who are ill, has also been played out in the realm of hypothesis, model, and metaphor.  This means that responsibility is often exercised not in the face of an actual neighbour but in relation to a risk profile.  This hypothetical neighbour, in effect, goes on for ever. And so we are, as Illich says, “caught.” 

How we are caught is best illustrated by the idea of risk.  This was the contemporaty preoccupation that most worried Illich, who called it today’s “most important religiously celebrated ideology.”  “Risk awareness” he said is “an invitation to intensive self-algorithmization,” and, as such, it is “disembodying.”  The crucial point is that risk does not pertain to an individual person – no one knows what will happen to me individually.  It is a calculation of the frequency with which a given event will happen in a population or class that shares some attribute or set of attributes – a prediction of what might happen to someone like me.  The individual is displaced or decentred and replaced by a mathematical construct.  To speak about “my risk” is, therefore, to conflate what should be two entirely distinct ways of speaking, and to introduce a hypothetical dimension into my own flesh.  Illich became aware of this predicament through the German legal regime which requires pregnant women to undergo genetic counselling, so that they can become conversant with the various risks attending their pregnancies and then make an informed choice – a responsible decision – about whether to proceed.  Illich found this horrifying, particularly when he found out, through his friend and colleague Silya Samerski’s study of these counselling sessions, that women regularly mistook statements about risk as statements about their own pregnancies.   

Risk in its colloquial meaning is part of living.  No one could safely walk to the corner store without some estimate of possible hazards based on past experience.  But, when formalized and mathematized risk defines a new type of social order that German sociologist Ulrich Beck called a “risk society” (Risokogesellschaft).  In such a society an unprecedented intrusion of the hypothetical into the actual occurs.  This is enacted in two ways.  The first is that advanced modernity as a whole is a giant uncontrolled risk – an ongoing science experiment.  We will find out what it means to have “weapons of mass destruction” stockpiled all over the world after the fact – the experiment is still in progress.  The same is true for homelier examples like mobile phones or the internet - to take just two everyday technologies that are currently transforming social life in completely unpredictable ways.  This element of uncontrolled and uncontrollable risk is inherent a way of life in which constant technological innovation is regarded as good, necessary and inevitable.  “When you see something that is technically sweet,” said physicist Robert Oppenheimer, with reference to his leading role in the creation of nuclear weapons, “you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success.”   

This uncontrolled, universal and barely endurable risk generates, it seems to me, a compensation:  a zealous attention to those risks which apparently can be controlled.  This is the second way in which Beck’s risk society is enacted – in our preoccupation with safety, our “zero tolerance,” our constant scanning for incipient “problems.”  “Risk awareness” – “religiously celebrated,” as Illich says – is the complement to uncontained risk.  This type of awareness requires people to live outside and beyond their embodied experience.  It also requires them to dominate the future in a novel way.  Once the likelihood of some unwanted eventuality has been ascertained, one can take steps to prevent its occurrence – the at-risk pregnancy is terminated, security cameras are installed, safety become the promise of every institution.  Prudence passes over into obsession; “be safe” becomes the new farewell.  

Illich, by his own account, lived for surprises. “Our hope of salvation,” he told the graduating class the University of Puerto Rico in 1969, “lies in our being surprised by the Other.  Let us learn always to receive further surprises.  I decided long ago to hope for surprises until the final act of my life – that is to say, in death itself.”  In the first half of his career, he saw the routinization of charity through service institutions as the main threat to the spirit of surprise.  Service institutions replace the fitful, spontaneous unreliable workings of personal vocation with a guaranteed response.  Later I believe he saw “risk awareness” in the same light.  A risk is a probability distribution in a population, it is not a person.  A person invites discernment – careful attention to an unrepeatable story – a risk is an algorithm, an operational rule that tells you what to do in a case like this.  But there may a world of difference between this case and a case like this.  Surprise is the enemy when following a rule. 

This is not to say that risk has no proper place in the world.  An actuary needs precise knowledge of the frequency of certain adverse events; a surgeon would be remiss in not weighing the harms of intervention versus the benefits.  Like much in Illich’s thought this is a question of degree, or balance.  In medicine for example, one needs to ask whether knowledge of risk supplements personal knowledge of the patient, or replaces it, so that the patient, in effect, becomes the risk.  The same question applies to the genetic counselling sessions for pregnant women that made such a big impression on Illich through Silya Samerski’s research.  Does the woman being counselled know the difference between herself, and the risk that she carries as a member of a class?.  To internalize risk is to become, in effect, somebody else.  The unique is replaced by the general; the possible gives way to the probable; hope yields to calculable expectation.  Risk becomes a problem when it moves from the position of a qualified and partial form of knowledge to a “religiously celebrated ideology.” 

The god that rules the realm of risk is life.  All is done to enhance, to extend and to save life.  “I have got up each morning,” said British Health Minister Matt Hancock the other day, in extenuation of his conduct during the pandemic, “and I have asked, what must I do to protect life?”  The interests of life mandate and superintend risk awareness.  The concepts are akin in their generality.  Both absorb the particular and the personal into the abstract and synoptic.  One attends to risk, finally, in order to conserve life. 

This astonishing and stupefying generality make life, according to Illich a plastic word.  A plastic word is a word which is all connotation and no denotation, a word which can go anywhere and do anything because it is subject to no limit.  It is a bare, unshaded light that is never turned off.  Illich first spoke of such words as “amoeba words,” a term he used in Deschooling Society for a term “so flexible” that it can fit “any interstice of [a] language.”  When Illich found a kindred spirit in Uwe Pörksen, a novelist and a professor of German literature at the University of Freiburg whom Illich met at the newly-established Wissenschaftkolleg in Berlin in 1980, they developed this concept further under the name of plastic words.  Pörksen continued to work on what they began together and in 1988 published his book Plastikwörter: Die Sprache einer Internationalen Diktatur, which was translated into English as Plastic Words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language in 1995.   

Plastic words, among other things, are words plucked from the vernacular and put through what Illich once called “a scientific laundry.”  They then return to everyday use with a fresh scent of expertise and the appearance of wearing a lab coat.  In the movie Cool Hand Luke, when the chain gang “captain” utters the often-quoted line, “What we’ve got here is…failure to communicate,” the irony depends on communication’s character as a plastic word.  To communicate is no longer just to connect, as a communicating passageway connects, it is to engage a process which can be studied and formalized with scientific precision.  To speak of communication is to refer to a realm in which an expert knows, better than you, when you’re communicating and when you’re not.  The word information goes through a similar history.  An old colloquial term was coopted by “information science” and reconstructed as a matter of signal to noise ratio or of bits and bytes.  This lent the word an aura or halo which it retained in common use, so that when the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation introduced “Information Radio,” it invoked a “communication” from this higher plane of science.  The CBC wasn’t just telling you something – it was providing Information.  Plastic words become professional resources.  With communication or development, experts can build and make the world as malleable as the words themselves.  

It was with “a sense of sudden horror,” therefore, that Illich realized that life might have become a plastic word – a word that functions primarily as a professional resource.  He shared his reluctant intuition with Uwe Pörksen and found that his old friend was even more appalled than he at the idea that the word life could ever become a member of this egregious category: 

When I came to Pörksen and said, “Uwe, I think I’ve found the worst of them, life, he became very silent.  For the first time…I had the impression that he became angry with me, disappointed in me.  He was offended.  And it took about six months or nine months before we could speak about that issue again, because it is just unthinkable that something as precious and beautiful as life should act as an amoeba word.  

Pōrksen’s horror was an index of Illich’s own. 

To summarize then, before moving on to our current circumstances: Illich regarded life as an idol – a man-made god in whose form we worship ourselves, while at the same time generating a sacred which mandates and justifies our manipulation of living.   He claimed that life had become the object and anchor of “a new stage of religiosity” – a further perversion of the Biblical understanding of life as an implication of God’s breath. He thought that life had become a “substantive” – a stuff to be counted and conserved, a resource to be enhanced and administered.  He held that the idea of each one as a person – a unrepeatable and inscrutable being pervaded by a “mysterious historicity” – was being replaced by system concepts in which individuality dissolves.  And he believed finally that the word life had become the site of a fateful “conceptual collapse of the borderline” between “model and reality” and between “process and substance.”  This collapse is expressed in our thinking that in becoming the protectors, champions and devotees of life we have touched life itself without remainder, reservation or detour. 

How does all this pertain to the present situation, and to the fears of my interlocutors that Illich is being recklessly misappropriated by Dupuy’s “covidoskeptics”?  Well the thing that impressed me most about the onset of the pandemic was the blind certainty with which everyone acted once the W.H.O. uttered the magic word pandemic on March 11, 2020.  Formerly, the conventional wisdom in public health would have urged prudence, calm, and targeted action to quarantine the sick and protect the vulnerable. But, now, suddenly, it was understood by all, seemingly, that fear was our friend and ally, that as many as possible must be quarantined for as long as possible, and that any policy that hinted at accommodation with this new reality was reckless – “Herd  immunity’s a great strategy, if you don’t mind millions of dead,” as one Canadian headline read.  To my amazement, the ugly term lockdown, previously used mainly in prisons and occasionally in schools, completely changed its valence and became an expression of our regard for one another.  Other surprises, for me, were that the “health care system” had to be “protected” from a health emergency and that we would religiously “follow the science” long before there was any relevant science to follow.  Epidemiologist like John Ionannidis of Stanford were ignored when they warned of a “fiasco” amounting to “jumping off a cliff” if draconian policies were adopted before anyone knew for sure just how infectious and how lethal the new disease actually was.   

It quickly became difficult to question the costs of lockdown.  Scientific dissensus, though widespread, was largely swept under the carpet.  “Canada is at war” declared a major Canadian newspaper, and dissent, in wartime, can be construed as treason.  In Canada a distinguished group of public health veterans, including several former chief medical officers of health, released a statement calling for the restoration of “a balanced approach” in which harms are intelligently weighed against benefits and a single disease is not the sole focus and preoccupation of government policy.  This statement was ignored, and those who signed it were largely excluded from major media.  An effective censorship was established.  When three eminent epidemiologists – Sunetra Gupta, Jayanta Bhattacharya and Martin Kulldorf – produced the Great Barrington Declaration, calling for a policy of what they called “Focused Protection” in place of universal quarantine, their intervention was not even reported in major Canadian media, despite the fact that all they were arguing for was the restoration of the status quo ante in public health.  More recently the College of Physicians of Ontario, the medical governing body in my native province, has threatened “investigation” and “disciplinary action” against physicians questioning vaccination, the utility of masks and social distancing, and the value of lockdowns.  Whether in the media, in medicine or in government only approved opinions are to be expressed.  

Of particular concern to me in this has been the reinforcement of what I have written about elsewhere as the myth of Science, by which I mean essentially the idea that there is an institution called Science which speaks in a single unquestionable voice.  Whenever someone speaks of “the science” this myth is engaged.  Sciences, by their nature, are plural, contestable and subject to endless messy revision.  To speak of them in the singular, and then treat this conflation as an oracle, has two profoundly pernicious consequences.  First it pre-empts policy.  Neither the harms supposedly averted by lockdowns nor the harms supposedly created by them are definite data.  There is no science that can precisely ascertain either because, in both cases, certain questionable founding assumptions will be involved, along with many other models and might-have-beens.  (Not to belabour what should be obvious, but the same society cannot be, at the same time, locked down and not locked down, which is the only way that a definitive “scientific” comparison between the two conditions could be undertaken.)  This is why people, at the moment, are so passionately and, I would claim, quite legitimately divided on the effectiveness of lockdowns – they are starting from different assumptions, comparing dissimilar cases, and making varying allowances and adjustments for these dissimilarities.  To imagine that “Science” could sort all this out is, in my opinion, a destructive and reactionary fantasy.  Politics is the sphere of moral choice – the sphere in which decisions about how we are going to live are properly made.  Science simply cannot tell you whether it’s right to let an old person die alone in order to obviate some necessarily hypothetical risk of spreading infection.  “Following the science” in cases where science either doesn’t apply or doesn’t exist is, therefore, a formula for the complete hollowing out of politics.  I have for a long time agreed with the view of French philosopher of science Bruno Latour who holds that we can only get “down to earth” through a revival of politics and that this revival will depend on a redefinition of the sciences that breaks the stranglehold of mythified Science on politics.  It seems to me, accordingly, that the reinforcement of the myth of Science that the pandemic has made possible is something that must be fought. 

The second pernicious consequence of this myth is the injury to the sciences themselves.  Despite the censorship that has been exercised during the pandemic, anyone with an open mind and a variety of sources will still have noticed the fundamental disagreements that have divided epidemiologists, virologists, infectious disease specialists and public health experts from the outset.  These disagreements are normal, expectable and healthy.  What has been unhealthy is the fiction of unanimity upheld by those claiming to know and to follow the science.  This fiction, in my view, perpetuates a false image of the sciences in which all variability, contingency and bias is suppressed.  Worse, its fundamentalism breeds the very anti-science which it intends to oppose.  The sciences will thrive and serve their proper purposes only when they are no longer mistaken for the voice of Nature or the voice of God. 

The policies of mass quarantine followed by many governments during the last year have sown various ominous and fateful consequences.  Basic rights have been eliminated; livelihoods have been lost; a crippling debt has been incurred; social relations have been virtualized; panic has been encouraged; the arts have been decimated; and a hundred other troubles have festered as a result of an exclusive focus on COVID-19.  Whether the benefits of these policies have offset these costs is, as I’ve tried to show, a political question.  I’m obviously doubtful and inclined to think that the “focused protection” option put forward by the Great Barrington Declaration would have been the wiser course.  But what really preoccupies me is why something so clearly debatable cannot, seemingly, be debated.   And this is where I think Illich comes back into the picture.

Illich, as far back as the 1980’s, detected among his contemporaries a new “conceptual and perceptual topology,” a new “mental space,” he said, which was “non-continuous with the past.”  It seems to me that the concepts behind which most have obediently lined up in the last year belong to this new topology.  Notable are the concepts of risk, safety, management, and, above all, life.  We have been “practicing” and acculturating these ideas for many years, but it took a pandemic to show how completely they have taken hold.  Mass quarantine appeared as an unquestionably necessary step, and not as a debatable novelty, because life must be protected, risk must be averted, safety must be paramount.  The damage to established styles of conviviality and engrained cultural habits was endurable because these new concepts increasingly determine our way of life – they are our culture.  The idea of distancing and avoidance as a practice of solidarity worked because enough people already thought of themselves as components of an immune system – a life writ large – rather than as members of a polity or culture.  The contrast was stark in the case of religious worship.  The rituals of health and safety were approved and encouraged; religious rituals were banned.  The first were treated as consensual, substantive, and mandatory;  the second as empty optional husks practiceable only at the pleasure of the state.  

When Illich wrote on “deschooling,” promoting it as the sine qua non of any “movement for human liberation” he argued not for the elimination of schools but for their “disestablishment” – a word most of his readers would have associated entirely with religion.  The government, says the first amendment to the U.S. constitution, may “make no law with respect to an establishment of religion.”  Illich’s proposal failed because few shared his opinion that schooling should be considered “an establishment of religion” rather than as something more utilitarian.  Religion becomes perceptible as such only when it becomes an optional belief, rather than a self-evident way of life.  It was precisely in order to marginalize and contain it that religion was redefined as belief, rather than as practice, during the modern period.  

My point is that Illich’s “new stage of religiosity,” centred on life, is not easy to perceive as such.  It may stand out for committed members of the Abrahamic faiths which centre life in the One in whom “we live and move and have our being” and so do not see the preservation and prolongation of life as either an exclusive good or as the highest good.  But for those who live within the horizons of this religiosity, it must necessarily take the form of something obvious and unquestionable.  When I spoke recently to a surgeon who wanted to convince me to have a surgery which he believed would extend my “life expectancy,” I had the impression that he simply could not understand how any other object – a seeking after the proper “hour of my death” for example – was even possible.   Life, for him, is an unlimited good, death an unqualified evil.  Whatever is made sacred becomes untouchable and unquestionable.  Before life, as that precious stuff which we must at all hazards save, all must bow and fall silent.  This allows government to go on behind a veil, as it were.  The image is precise inasmuch as it was a veil which sheltered the Holy of Holies from view in the Second Temple in Jerusalem.  It was this veil which the Gospels say was torn in two at the hour of the Crucifixion, profaning the old sacred and opening the door, eventually, to our reverence for life-in-itself, life as its own god. 

To sum up: I believe that during the last year people have been made less competent, less aware, more frightened and more prone to ritualism and sentimentality.  Fatal myths, like the myth of the Science, have been strengthened.  More people have been consigned to the new proletariat whose only remaining job is to collect welfare, consume entertainment and cheer on command.  The World Economic Forum has been emboldened to cook up its Great Reset by which monopoly capitalism will be finally made indistinguishable from socialism.  Disabling professional hegemonies have been reinforced.  Difficult conversations – about Covid vaccination, let’s say – have been more difficult, if not impossible, by reckless polarization.  The sovereign who authorizes these developments is Life, along with the lesser, attendant divinities who carry its train, like risk, safety and management.   I believe that Illich saw this coming, and that I remain in tune with him on this point. 

Earlier I told the story of the young man who wondered, after listening to Illich lecture on Medical Nemesis whether Ilich’s proposal was to “let people die.”  I’m sure the same question could now be asked of me.  It’s a strange question because it implies that it’s up to me, or Illich, or whoever else might be challenged in this way, to allow or not allow death.  Ancient images of the Fates show them spinning and cutting the cloth of destiny, allotting each one an unchangeable portion at birth.  The contemporary image is the opposite.  Nothing determines our fates except the vigilance of the institutions that protect us.  We will live until, at the termination of treatment, we are “let” die.  The hubris of this image mirrors the fatalism of the earlier one.  Illich was a man of “the middle way,” which for him meant not mediocrity but the razor’s edge of constantly renewed  discernment.  He did not advocate wantonly letting people die, and no more did he advocate keeping them alive whatever the cost.  Nothing will tell us in advance where the balance should lie, but we will certainly never find it by outlawing discussion. 

The idea that life and death, or good and evil are inextricably tangled in the world is not a new idea, and should not be a controversial one.  Christians have the parable of the wheat and the tares to teach it to them; Buddhists have the idea that good and evil are of “co-dependent origin.”  Only in a civilization completely seized by what Illich once called “a compulsion to do good” would this idea require defense or explication.  But, having to defend it puts the defender in the peculiar position of seeming to speak for whatever evil the latest war is supposedly rooting out.  I believe it was Illich’s view, expressed in his wonderful essay “Research by People,” that a rough and ready distinction can be drawn between technology that “remedies” certain ills and incommodities of the human condition and technology that aims, in Francis Bacon’s words, at “mastery over nature.”  This idea of technology as remedy which he ascribes to Hugh of St. Victor, is as close as he ever came, and as close as he thought he was ever likely to come, to specifying a principle of enoughness, sufficiency or limit on which a new post-Promethean, post-Baconian philosophy of technology could be founded.  However this principle is construed it will certainly stipulate things not to be done as well as things to be done.  Life, on the other hand, exerts an unlimited demand.  It is the monotonous, unshadowed and endless good that corrupted Christianity bequeaths to modernity.   In the last year we have pursued it as never before and without even noticing the watershed that is being crossed.  To “save lives” we have turned the world upside down, accepting censorship and intrusive social control, abandoning the old, and immolating the economically marginal.  We have allowed a further mythification of what was already badly mythified – Science as an immaculately conceived and infallible oracle.  We have opened the door to intensive virtualization, increased fear, and injured conviviality.  Was it worth it? is my question.  

To conclude then: Both Wolfgang Palaver and Jean-Pierre Dupuy have suggested that Illich is either being misinterpreted or pressed too far.  In response, I have tried to draw out the implications of Illich’s denunciation of life as an idol, and to show that what his “nose, his intuition and his reason” told him forty years ago has been much more fully revealed and realized in the meanwhile.   What I would now like to know is where the difference with my interlocutors lies.  Do they think I am wrong about the damage done in the last year?  Do they think I am misrepresenting Illich?  Or do they think that Illlich himself is wrong?

 

 

 

 

 

Gaia and the Path of the Earth

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GAIA AND THE PATH OF THE EARTH: LOVELOCK/ ILLICH/ LATOUR 

I have had a long-standing interest in the claim of British scientist Jim Lovelock that the earth as a whole is self-regulating – his Gaia Hypothesis, so called – and I featured Lovelock several times during my years at Ideas at CBC Radio.[1]  During those years, the preeminent influence on my thinking was the philosopher of technology Ivan Illich.  But, when I tried, on more than one occasion, to discuss the Gaia theory with him, his response was disparaging.  Lovelock’s theory, he said, was a travesty, an empty abstraction untrue to the living earth and “inimical to what earth is.”[2] Now, nearly thirty years after Illich made these remarks, a new interpretation of Lovelock’s theory has appeared. It comes from French philosopher of science Bruno Latour in a book called Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime. Latour claims that Lovelock’s hypothesis, properly understood, is as significant as Galileo’s reimagination of the heavens in the early 17th century, and that it is much less inimical to an embodied experience of place than Illich had supposed.   This has challenged me to revisit Illich’s objections to Gaia à la Lovelock and to ask whether Latour’s new interpretation can answer them.  I will begin by introducing Lovelock’s theory: 

 

In 1965 Jim Lovelock was working at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL), a joint initiative of NASA and the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California.  His assignment was to devise instruments that could detect life on Mars, should there be any.  In thinking about this problem, he had the inspired idea of turning his question around and asking, in effect, how a Martian would know that there is life on earth.  This brought to his attention the earth’s unlikely atmosphere, a mix of gases as unstable, Lovelock has joked, as those mingled in the intake manifold of a car.  Why don’t these gases react with one another until they eventually reach that state of chemical equilibrium that had recently been shown to characterize the atmospheres of Mars or Venus?  How is such a “giant disequilibrium” maintained?  The answer came “in a flash,” Lovelock told me in one of the several interviews I did with him for CBC Radio: “The organisms at the surface [of the earth] must be regulating the atmosphere.”  “Not just putting gases in the atmosphere,” he reiterated to emphasize his point, but “regulating the atmosphere.”[3]  Thus was born the Gaia hypothesis.  

 Lovelock, as he has now related in more than ten books on the subject, soon discovered many more ways in which living things produce their own environment.  He has shown, for example, that marine creatures emit aerosols of sulfur and iodine in exactly the quantities required by creatures on the land where these crucial elements are deficient. He has demonstrated that earth’s biota remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in the amounts necessary to maintain a comfortable climate. And he has established that forest fires help regulate the proportion of oxygen in the atmosphere.   The discovery of these mechanisms, and others like them, confirmed Lovelock’s initial intuition at JPL that the earth as a whole must engage in some form of self-regulation.  The idea of naming this hypothesis after Gaia, the ancient Greek goddess of the earth, came from the novelist William Golding who was Lovelock’s friend, interlocutor and neighbour at the time Lovelock first began to explore the implications of his “flash” at JPL.  So grand a theory, Golding said, deserved an equally grand name, and what better name than Gaia, mother of all, first to arise from primeval Chaos, oldest of the gods.  Lovelock, fatefully, accepted his friend’s suggestion.  “When you get given a name by a wordsmith of quality like Bill Golding,” he later told me, “you don’t turn it down.  But, boy has it given me trouble.”[4] 

The name, as Lovelock says, was a blessing and a curse in one.  It attracted media attention, as the several broadcasts I did about it for Ideas testify, and it resonated with many counter-cultural movements – from that branch of feminism in which interest in goddesses was reviving, to the environmental movement which grew out of the first Earth Day in 1970, to the hippie cultural ecologists who were advocating retooling, degrowth and a return to earth.  Musician Paul Winter composed a mass, the Missa Gaia, that was first presented at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York in 1982; writer William Irwin Thompson made the name a sign of a new way of thinking in a book he edited called Gaia: A Way of Knowing.  But, at the same time, this cultural and philosophical resonance became a source of derision amongst Lovelock’s scientific colleagues – the trouble he referred to above.  Biologist Stephen Jay Gould wrote that the theory struck him as “a metaphor, not a mechanism,” and many other leading biologists rejected it out of hand as well.[5] Some of this condescension and disregard was rooted in the theory’s cultural associations, but it also arose from the sense that Lovelock’s hypothesis offended and threatened neo-Darwinian orthodoxy.   

Modern sciences rest on the banishment of any idea of end, goal or purpose from their accounts.  Aristotle held that each thing was determined by its end or final cause, as well as by its material character and the forces acting on it.  Objects fall to earth because they seek their “natural place” – it is in their nature to do so.  17th century natural philosophy subtracted this idea.  It held that things move only because some overt and discernible force pushes them – everything can be reduced to matter in motion,  “Occult” causes were ruled out.  Purpose was driven out of science and thereby fated to return endlessly as heresy.  In the neo-Darwinian orthodoxy that ruled evolutionary biology at the time Lovelock first presented his hypothesis, it was an axiom that change could not arise by any purposeful process – e.g. giraffes developed long necks so they could reach high branches – but only by random mutation which might confer an advantage in what Darwin called the struggle for existence – a giraffe with a longer neck, by happy chance, appeared and was then rewarded with more food and more progeny.  In this context Lovelock’s idea of planetary self-regulation looked like the latest version of the perennial heresy that had erupted in Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s theory of evolution, in which new “needs” call forth new habits, or in Hans Driesch’s “vitalist” developmental biology in which “entelechies” governed embryological development, and in many other such attempts to reintroduce teleology to biology.  (Teleology, from telos the Greek word for end of goal, refers to any sequence determined by its end and not by a chain of antecedent mechanical causes.)  What evolutionary advantage could there be for marine creatures in producing dimethyl sulfide or methyl iodide in the exact quantities required on the land, or in producing the nuclei which allow clouds to condense and form in just the amount needed to radiate light away from the earth and preserve its comfortable temperature?   These phenomena might demonstrably occur, but they must be only fortunate accidents or coincidences, not elements of self-regulation. 

Lovelock learned to answer these objections in several registers.  He stopped saying that “living organisms” were producing their own environment and began to say that “the whole system” was involved.[6]  He drew attention to the baffling properties of cybernetic systems in which causation is circular rather than linear.  Once a domestic thermostat is set, the temperature regulates the furnace, and the furnace regulates the temperature in an endless circle of which neither is the cause.  The Gaia hypothesis models such a circular process, Lovelock said, whereas modern sciences had previously used linear mathematics to model linear, cause-and-effect processes.   He recognized, of course, that a thermostat must be set by someone before it falls into its homeostatic pattern of self-regulation.    The system must have a goal or end-state which governs its self-regulation.  In the case of Gaia, he claimed that this goal was set by “the properties of the universe.”  Because carbon-based life forms are “quite fussy about the range of temperatures and conditions at which they can exist,” these tolerances “set the goal of the self-regulating system Gaia.”[7] 

In effect, Lovelock argued that the earth itself is a unit of evolution, still subject to natural selection but on a cosmic or universal scale where the selection pressures are established by the parameters of life itself.  He was not contradicting or replacing Darwinian theory by this hypothesis, he said, he was only supplementing it by enlarging its frame.  Just as Newtonian physics had worked fine until Einstein pushed it to the limit at which it broke down, so Darwinian principles of natural selection had been sufficient until the planet as a whole was considered.  Only when Earth was observed from outside, as it was for the first time in Lovelock’s thought experiment during NASA’s Mars mission, did it become necessary to ask whether Earth itself evolves.  People had known for a long time that it changed – they had, for centuries, hunted fossils, measured the age of rocks, and charted the advance retreat of glaciers – but they had still taken that “Nature” which governs “natural selection” for granted  as the context in which evolution operates.  Lovelock by considering the  earth as a whole had identified properties that belonged to it only as a whole, properties that could not be reduced to more rudimentary terms.  

Lovelock’s theory was initially polarizing and controversial.  The problems, as I mentioned earlier, began with the grandiloquent name that was William Golding’s equivocal gift.   The name expanded the idea’s cultural reach but poisoned its scientific reception, creating the view that Lovelock’s hypothesis was, as an editor at Nature said, “a danger to science.”[8]  Leading biologists denounced the theory as mystical para-science, rather than as the fruitful and fully testable proposal that Lovelock showed, again and again, that it was.  This disdain began to abate during the 1990’s when Lovelock decided it was time he talked directly to opinion leaders in biology.  In England, at the time, this group included Robert May, John Maynard Smith and William Hamilton, all or whom Lovelock sought out.  They told him they thought his theory was nonsense.  He asked if they had read any of his papers.  They admitted that they had not and were relying entirely on the opinions of their graduate students.  Once they became acquainted with what he was actually saying, Lovelock says, “they swung right round,” accepting the evidence for self-regulation while still insisting on the challenge this evidence posed to neo-Darwinian theory.[9]  Parallel scientific developments also assisted Lovelock’s cause and made his theory seem less exotic and less threatening.  These included the emergence of various new sciences employing similar concepts of self-organization and self-regulation as those which Lovelock was developing.  Where things stand today is a question somewhat beyond my competence.  There is no body which grants scientific theories the equivalent of the imprimatur – let it be printed – by which the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church certifies books.  But I do have the impression that Lovelock’s theory is today better understood and more widely accepted than ever before.  In 2001, for example, four scientific organizations, operating “global change research programmes,” met in Amsterdam and released a Declaration on Earth System Science which stated that, “The Earth System behaves as a single, self-regulating system comprised of physical, chemical, biological and human components”[10]

 

ILLICH’S OBJECTIONS

At this point, I want to introduce Ivan Illich and his critique of the Gaia theory.  Illich, for the first twenty years of his adult life, was a Roman Catholic priest.  He worked during that time to declericalize and transform the Church.  These efforts brought him into conflict with the Roman Curia.  In 1968, he was subjected to formal processes of inquisition, and, the following year, the Center for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) which he directed in Cuernavaca, Mexico was placed under a ban.  He withdrew from church service and during the 1970’s produced a series of ever more wide-ranging critiques of contemporary institutions, techniques, and social practices.  Deschooling Society, Tools for Conviviality, Medical Nemesis, and several other such works all argued that modern institutions had become counter-productive monopolies which defeated their own purposes and stifled popular initiative.  As he went on, he inquired more deeply into the “certainties” underlying. contemporary ways of life and the ways in which our technologies, through what Marshall McLuhan called their “symbolic fallout,” tell us not just what we should do but what we are.  He also explored the ways in which the Roman Catholic Church had served as the incubator of modernity, perfecting not just the institutional forms that would become characteristic of modern societies but also that care of souls that brought the faithful under minute and detailed clerical regulation and created the template for modern service bureaucracies.  

I got to know Illich fairly well during the last fifteen years of his life – he died in 2002 – and I had the privilege of doing several extended interviews with him, two of which became books – 1992’s Ivan Illich in Conversation and the posthumous The Rivers North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich, published in 2005.  A third book, Ivan Illich: An Intellectual Journey, an account of his life and thought many years in the making, has just been published by the Penn State Press.  One of the subjects I several times tried to bring up was Lovelock’s Gaia theory, a theme on which I was enthusiastic.  As I said earlier, I did three lengthy interviews with Lovelock during my career at Ideas.  I featured him alongside David Bohm, Ilya Prigogine, and Rupert Sheldrake in a series called “Religion and the New Science” in 1985; presented a full hour called “The Gaia Hypothesis,” in 1992; and devoted an episode of “How To Think About Science” to Lovelock’s story in 2008.  Illich was not really interested, essentially refusing to discuss a theory which he claimed is “inimical to what earth is.”  I found this somewhat exasperating.  I wanted to discuss the merits of the theory; he insisted that there was nothing to discuss since there was no difference between “that kind of science and religion.”  He said little more, but I return to these sparse remarks now, nonetheless, because I want to try and understand what it was that Illich objected to, and then to consider whether Bruno Latour’s construal of the Gaia theory gives a satisfactory answer to Illich’s objections.  

Illich concluded, during the 1980’s, that the world in which he was living had reached and was passing a watershed.  This change surprised him.  It was, he said, “a passage [which] I had not expected, in my lifetime, to observe.”[11]  A “catastrophic break” had occurred which had made “the mental space,” “the conceptual and perceptual topology,” in which we now live “non-continuous with the past.”  This rupture, he. believed, had invalidated many of the assumptions on which he had based the “call for institutional revolution” that informed many of his books of the 1970’s.[12]  He had thought of institutions like education or medicine as instrumental creations, brought into being to serve the purposes of a citizenry or a public who were able to use them for the purposes for which they had been designed.  “I was still thinking,” he told me in 1998, “of someone who stood in front of large institutions with the idea, at least, that he could use them for the satisfaction of his own dreams, or his own needs.”[13]  It followed that he could address these someones about the dangers these institutions posed when they outgrew their proper size and scale and became what Illich called radical monopolies.  And it followed, further, that he could hope to assemble a political majority capable of stopping and permanently limiting this counterproductive growth.  His “deschooling” proposal provides a simple example.  He wanted to “disestablish” educational systems by removing their legal right to make their services compulsory.  Implied was the idea of a citizenry that stood apart from such systems and was capable of evaluating them on instrumental grounds.  If schools were frustrating their own stated purposes, then they could be changed.  

What Illich began to notice in the 1980’s was that this instrumental logic no longer obtained.  A new age had begun in which people were no longer distinct from the systems in which they took part.  They had been, he supposed, “swallowed by the system.”  He began to speak of the emergence of an “age of systems” or, alternately, of “an ontology of systems” in which being itself was conceived as a system.[14]  The word, of course, is tricky – which isn’t? – because it can refer to anything that possesses some over-all integrity or constitutes an established way of doing things – any coherent plan or approach, from Hegel’s philosophy to someone’s special way of making coffee,  can be called a system.   Illich was not invoking these old meanings but pointing to something radically new – a system so total and comprehensive that there could be no ground or standpoint outside it.  The very idea of a tool or an instrumental means, he argued, depended on a distinction between that tool and its user.   A system in the contemporary sense incorporates its user – he/she becomes part of the system.  One uses a hammer but joins a network.  

Behind this distinction between tool and system lay an original historical analysis.  The use of tools is often taken as a primordial and defining feature of humanity.  The caveman in the museum diorama is already Man the Tool User.  Some ethologists even ascribe tool use to the chimpanzees who sharpen sticks to fight or the birds who impale larvae on twigs.  Illich thought differently.  Until the 12th century, he said, with a few premonitory stirrings earlier, there was no general idea of tools.  Tools remained inseparable from their users.  Aristotle, for example, uses the same word for the tool and the hand that holds it.  Tools remained attached and enculturated, limited to their accustomed uses.  Then, for reasons I won’t go into here, a general science of tools began to appear.  A technological revolution began.  In the 12th century, even the newly defined seven sacraments were conceived as instruments or tools – peculiarly efficacious means of grace selected by theologians from the manifold blessings the Church had formerly pronounced on all the affairs of life and “used by God himself…as instrumental causes towards the desired end.”[15]  The spirit of instrumentality, according to Illich, became the leading feature of the age which stretches from the 12th century to our own time, an age characterized by its “extraordinary intensity of purposefulness” and by its idea that to each end some special instrument must correspond.  Even love, says Illich, becomes “an instrument for satisfaction”[16]  There is nothing that is worth doing for its own sake, nothing good in itself, which will not finally be made to submit to a rational means/ends logic.  Modernity, Illich says, was characterized by “the loss of gratuity.”[17] Even the word itself came to mean a negligible consideration – something beside the point, or, at most, a small addition, a tip.  The good gave way to the valuable. 

But this age is now ending, Illich says, succeeded by an Age of Systems.  He left only a partial, sometimes disgruntled, occasionally caricatured account of this new reality, but, from scattered passages in his late works, the following outline can be assembled.  I have already referred to the crucial feature: the lack of an outside.  “Means of production,” to take Marx’s maximally general characterization of the ensemble of tools, can be put to any purpose – Communism was premised on the idea that changing the ownership of the means of production would be sufficient to turn the means of oppression into the means of liberation.  It was already a great part of Illich’s argument in 1973’s Tools for Conviviality that this fond hope overlooked the inherent qualities of tools.  “The issue at hand,” he wrote then, “is not the juridical ownership of tools, but rather the discovery of the characteristic of some tools which make it impossible for anybody to ‘own’ them.   The concept of ownership cannot be applied to a tool that cannot be controlled.”[18]  His solution then was to identify those tools that foster conviviality and proscribe those that lead to domination and monopoly.  He spoke of “the roof of technological characteristics under which a society wants to live and be happy.”[19]  This was a radical proposal, but it still implied the existence of a citizenry able to stand aside or apart from its technological array and ordain what is fit for use.  Technology was no longer a neutral means in this account , but it remained a means.  Systems, in the contemporary cybernetic sense, have lost this quality.  A system, by definition, includes its user – there is no place to stand outside it.  What disappears is what Illich sometimes called “distality,” although I don’t think the word was particularly helpful in conveying what he wanted to say.  It’s a term that has its main uses in anatomy, dentistry and horticulture, where it refers to how distant something is from a defined centre or point of attachment – the growing tip of a plant is its distal portion.  What Illich wanted, I think, was a term of art describing critical distance or distinction.  It wasn’t a question of distality but of difference.  

Illich was an apostle of otherness.  His Christianity was Incarnational, and he understood the Incarnation as signifying that we encounter Christ in one another.  “Whoever loves another,” he said, “loves [Christ] in the person of that other.”[20]  When he spoke of the obedient listening that characterizes friendship, he described his posture as “bend[ing] over towards the total otherness of someone.”  To “initiate a free relatedness,” he said, required that he “renounce searching for bridges between the other and myself [and] recognize…that a gulf separates us.”  Across this gulf, “the only thing that reaches me is the other in his word, which I accept on faith.”  The same point was made, again and again, in his misunderstood book Gender.  Paraphrasing the argument of that book for me, he said that it described “the transition from one type of duality to another.”[21]  In the first type which characterized “all worlds before our own,”[22] there were substantial differences that could be bridged only by imagination.  “Otherness, even at the height of intimacy, was what gave ultimate consistency to what today we call consciousness.”[23]  Modernity, for him, was defined by “the loss of the idea of otherness.”  The constitutive and proportional pairs that had constituted all premodern worlds – heaven and earth, man and woman, here and there, macrocosm and microcosm – gave way to a world of universals.  “The human being, the self, the individual became the model of our thinking.”  The universal sustained many variations but it was fundamentally consistent.  “The Cartesian inside,” Illich said, is only “a special zone within a more general space.”  Goods circulate internationally without changing their character at borders.  Sex circulates generally in bodies distinguished only by their plumbing.   

Otherness was Illich’s great study because he believed that it is by this pathway that God’s word reaches us.  The Incarnation, for him, is summed up in the saying, “the Word became flesh.”[24] In his early, more explicitly Christian writing, word is the metaphor by which he most frequently tries to express the meaning of the Christ’s appearance.  Speaking of the Annunciation – the Gospel scene in which the angel tells Mary that she is to bear a divine child, a scene of crucial importance for Illich – he characterizes Mary’s stance as “openness to the Word.”[25]  This openness has two aspects: one is the “silence” by which she enacts her awareness of “the distance …between…man…and God,” the other a disposition to be surprised.  Distance here means difference, I think, as well as spatial extent.  The angel’s greeting to Mary is homely and intimate – a domestic scene that has been evoked in countless poems, songs and paintings – and yet it crosses an unimaginable, unfathomable gulf – the ultimate otherness.   This otherness, because it cannot be scrutinized or anticipated, can be disclosed only to those able to be surprised.  The announcement to Mary – that God was to become “a living person, as human as you or I” – “is.” Illich writes, “a surprise, remains a surprise, and could not exist as anything else.[26]  A surprise, by definition, is what cannot be either anticipated or fully understood.  It is also, for Illich, a permanent and desirable condition and not merely a momentary disorientation before we assimilate what has surprised us and learn henceforward to expect it.  “Our hope of salvation,” he told the graduating class at the University of Puerto Rico in 1969, “lies in our being surprised by the Other.  Let us learn always to receive further surprises.  I decided long ago to hope for surprises until the final act of my life – that is to say, in death itself.”[27] 

Illich claims that surprise is something more than Mary’s discomfiture at the angel’s unexpected and impossible claim.  (“How can this be since I have no husband?”[28]) He says that it is the only mode in which The Incarnation can exist at all – “could not exist as anything else” – its permanent and unalterable condition.  This is an inexhaustibly radical assertion.  Arguably it contradicts the entire claim of Christian civilization – first to be able to discern God’s plan of salvation and, second, to be able to administer it through the Church and then through the Church’s secular descendants, the service institutions that were, as Illich says, “stamped from its mould.”[29]  That’s a theme I have treated elsewhere.[30]  What I want to emphasize here is that Illich’s understanding of the Incarnation hinges on otherness – the otherness of God and the otherness of the human other, as marked by that “gulf [that] separates us.”  And this otherness is precisely what he thought was being lost with the unexpected “passage” into a new way of thinking, feeling and being, that “new perceptual and conceptual topology,” that startled him in the 1980’s.  

Illich’s thinking throughout his life was concerned with borders, boundaries and distinctions.  His entire effort in the 1970’s was aimed a writing a constitution of limits for contemporary societies.  This required him to describe a boundary or a threshold at which liberal institutions turn into counter-productive “radical monopolies” which frustrate their own purposes.  The “roof of technological characteristics under which a society wants to live and be happy” is another such boundary.  He drew careful distinctions by which opposing domains could be divided, circumscribed, and kept to a scale at which they could be understood and controlled.  He disparaged monopolies, in which one form, style, or mode predominates.  The differences by which places, peoples and practices remained separate and defined were always prized.  It was precisely this effort that he saw as threatened by the Age of Systems.  

Modernity had continually eroded boundaries but had not challenged the boundary of the human person.  Personhood, Illich says, is the idea in which Western humanism and individualism is “anchored.”[31]  A person is a unique, bounded, and irreducible entity. The idea, for Illich, rests finally on the imago dei, the image of God in which we have been created, but it continues to inform Western humanism long after this creator God has been rejected and the divine spark extinguished.  But, in the age of systems, Illich believed, the boundary defining the human person has been breached and erased.  Systems recognize no such boundary.  This breach was not made all at once at some arbitrarily chosen point in the early 1980’s.  Ages overlap, and, once the idea of a new age is accepted, antecedents and precursors, auguries and portents can be discerned throughout the middle years of the 20th century.  All Illich claimed was that for him this new age was sufficiently well established by the early 1980’s that its premises had become obvious and largely irresistible. 

Let me take some examples.  In 1943 German physicist Erwin Schrödinger lectured in Dublin on the theme, What is life?  In his lectures, he supposed, in Illich’s paraphrase “that genetic substance could best be understood as a stable text whose occasional variations had to be interpreted as textual variation.”[32]  This was a novel hypothesis at the time, but it was only ten years later that James Watson and Francis Crick revealed the “letters” in which they supposed that the genetic code is written.   Around the same time that Schrödinger was lecturing in Dublin, Roland Jakobson, a Russian émigré linguist, working in the United States, “cracked the atom of linguistics, the phoneme.”[33]  The phoneme, as the basic sound unit of speech, had been taken as irreducible, but Jakobson argued that it was an effect of an underlying set of binary contrasts and not a thing in itself at all.  “A phonetic system must therefore be analyzed,” anthropologist Adam Kuper writes, “as a…system of relationships rather than as a series of individual sounds.”  Jakobson’s finding was a “revelation” to Claude Lévi Strauss and many other “structuralist” thinkers in his wake.  Not only was language becoming a metaphor for a bio-chemical code, as with Schrödinger, it was itself decomposing, in the hands of structural linguistics, into a set of patterns or relationships.  Language, Illich had argued, was an effect of the alphabet, text a consequence of the clarification of the manuscript page in the 12th century.  Now something new was happening.  Language, in the older sense of something stable, privileged, and unique, was disappearing.  When germ plasm can compose a text with no author, and Levi-Strauss can stretch linguistic analysis into an account of all the “elementary structures” of society, language has dissolved into code.  And this was what Illich claimed had happened: in place of language we have “a communications medium” or an “information process.”  

Speech and writing have become instances of something more general.  The embodied word, capable of expressing a personal intention, has lost its contour, its defining boundary has been blurred.  Text is now written everywhere – in the genome, in the kinship structure of Bororo society, in the computer’s binary code.  Literacies abound, as “print literacy” is joined by “computer literacy,” “media literacy,” “cultural literacy” etc.  “Intertextuality” links text to text in a blur of interpenetrating tropes.   Language is naturalized and deprived of its unique relationship to personality.  This deprivation is summed up in the word “meme.” Coined by British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene, it’s a term that imitates the word gene, and implies that processes analogous to natural selection determine how ideas and expressions spread within a culture.  It is no longer clear whether we use language, or language uses us.  

The fate of language, as a modern certainty that had lost its definition, privilege and limit, was an instance of something Illich saw happening across the board.  When he revisited his Medical Nemesis a decade after it was published, he pointed to a similar process of “systemization.”[34]  He had assumed, he said, a certain agency and a certain autonomy on the part of both doctors and patients, which had in the meanwhile disappeared.   Medical Nemesis had begun with the bold statement that, “The medical establishment has become major threat to health.”  A decade later Illich claimed that the concepts which gave that sentence its power and its purchase had dissolved.  There was no meaningful “medical establishment,” since doctors had become mere technicians – “adjuncts,” he said – in the administration of treatments based entirely on system parameters and system protocols.  “Health” had become equally vast and indistinct – its obsessive pursuit now itself a “threat to health” in the older sense of the term.  Patients had ceased to be persons and become a collage of risks and probabilities.  This amounted, Illich claimed, not just to a loss of personhood, but to a loss of embodiment.  A simple example is the role that risk now plays both in medicine and in everyday life.  Risk is “disembodying,” Illich argues, because it invites people to think of themselves in purely mathematical terms as items of population. “When I think of risk,” he says. “[I] place…myself… into a base population for which certain events, future events, can be calculated.”[35]  The subject of risk, in other words, is not the individual person but the general class to which he or she belongs.  The unique irreplaceable one is supplanted by an abstract.  Pursued beyond a certain intensity, this “self-algorithmization” leads to disembodiment.  I abandon “the mysterious historicity” of my particular life in favour of the general life, the life that can be opened, enumerated and managed.[36]  Medical Nemesis had still harboured the obscure hope that medicine could be recalled to its proper vocation as a moral undertaking in which the relationship between physician and patient was the crux.  Now he saw that this personal dimension had been permanently and decisively erased. 

The figure within which the Age of Systems coheres for Illich is life.  Illich’s engagement with this theme began in the mid-80’s when he was approached after a lecture in Macon, Georgia by a man who introduced himself as “Will Campbell, who has to ask you for a great favor.”[37]  Illich recognized the name.  Campbell had been a close associate of Martin Luther King’s – the only white person present at the founding of Southern Christian Leadership Conference – and Illich was so impressed that he agreed to the favour without even asking what it was.  “Command and I will obey,” he recalls himself saying in a memoir of this meeting.  The favour turned out to be an address to an ecumenical meeting Campbell would assemble on the subject of life, a subject Campbell told Illich which is “tearing our churches apart.”  Campbell mentioned abortion, ecology, nuclear disarmament, and capital punishment as life-related issues on which Christians were at each other’s throats.   

The meeting took place within the year.  The atmosphere was tense – so tense that a representative of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference who was present approached Illich before his speech and suggested that he begin with a mollifying prayer.  Illich began instead with a curse – an improvised anathema in which he solemnly repeated the phrase “To Hell with Life” three times.  “Life,” he said, “is the most powerful idol the Church has had to face in the course of her history.”[38]  I found this idea absolutely galvanizing when I encountered it, a few years later, in the text of a lecture Illich had given to a congress of the Lutheran Church in Chicago in 1989, but it was not an idea which Illich ever succeed in conveying to more than a handful of his co-religionists.[39]  Mostly he met blank incomprehension, as I discovered for myself, when I asked him to do an interview with me for Ideas on the themes of his Chicago talk.  The transcript of this interview became the last chapter of my book Ivan Illich in Conversation, but, when it was broadcast on Ideas as “Life As Idol” in 1992, it landed with a very dull thud, occasioning less reaction, I think it’s fair to say, than any other program I ever broadcast on Ideas.  It was as if I had farted, and everyone was politely pretending that  I hadn’t.  What I had thought was a dramatic, and perhaps somewhat scandalous claim, passed without comment.  Illich had the same reaction when he lectured on the subject in Germany and the United States.  “In neither place,” he told me, “did I get the impression that one person understood what I was speaking about.”[40]  Illich had thought he was pointing to an epochal crisis for Christian faith – “the most powerful idol the Church has had to face in her history” – but, in the meanwhile, this new reality had become so obvious, and so utterly taken-for-granted that it could not even break the surface of attention and register as a topic.  I will return to the reasons for this – powerfully on display in the current pandemic when the saving of “lives” utterly dwarfs and dominates every other consideration – but first let me try to spell out what Illich wanted to say. 

It should be said first that Illich regarded contemporary veneration for life as the corruption of a Christian original.  The Gospels assert, in various ways, that Jesus is the Lord of Life, that in him is Life, and that this Life is not known in merely living but is a gift of the Spirit.  This usage in his view shaped the mind and soul of Christendom and created the very matrix from which contemporary attitudes have emerged.  According to Illich contemporary lives could neither be “saved” nor enhanced – Coke adds life is a famous instance – were it not for this deep and largely unconscious cultural preformation.  That argument is beyond my scope here but must be acknowledged, since it is an open question to what extent Illich’s view is determined by his sense that ascribing divinity to mere life is a blasphemy.  His argument was that it is a blasphemy, whatever the blasphemer may believe, because it misattributes and misplaces divinity.  Illich knew that faith was not his to confer or withhold and never presumed its presence in his audiences or among his readers.  “Recourse to faith provides an escape for those who believe,” he wrote in Medical Nemesis, “but it cannot be the foundation for an ethical imperative, because faith is either there or it’s not there; if it’s absent, the faithful cannot blame the infidel.”[41]  He spoke of blasphemy “as a historian and not as a theologian.”[42]  And “as a historian” what he claimed was that the life that is reverently spoken of in various contemporary discourses has a secret and unacknowledged tap root in the “life more abundant” that was offered on the Cross.[43] 

What Illich wanted to point out was that life, in recent times, had ceased to be a quality or attribute and become rather a substance or stuff, able to be possessed, managed and manipulated in a new way.  Life had become, as one now says, a thing – “an essential referent” in the discourses of law, medicine, politics and ethics.  An egregious example, in the field of law, is the so-called “wrongful life” suit: an action, now permitted in four U.S. states, in which a disabled person can sue a parent on the grounds that the plaintiff’s life should have been prevented.[44]  The administration and surveillance that ought to have been carried out in cases where life is “wrongfully” given is also implied in the no-longer-remarkable terms “human resources” and “manpower” – each suggests manageable quanta of life.   The same quantification is now a reflex in news media where lives saved or lost – the death toll – now index newsworthiness.  Medicine counts in years of life expectancy.  Ecology defends life on earth.  In all cases, life is a palpable, measurable and manageable entity – a unit of value. a unit of administration, a unit of political power.  Life had been abstracted from persons, Illich thought.  The word person describes a unique, storied and bounded destiny; a life is an amorphous instance of something unimaginably general and impossibly indistinct – the ultimate resource. 

At the time Illich was writing, life was still a questionable term in the academy  – there were “life sciences” but many still doubted that life could ever itself become a scientific object.  Modern science had pursued mechanism – the how of things, the world through the lens of “matter in motion.”  British Biologists Peter and Jean Medawar summed up this old orthodoxy when they wrote in 1983, “From a strictly scientific point of view, the concept of life makes no sense.”[45]  Life, from this “strictly scientific point of view,” was the kind of “occult” factor that science had banished from its explanations.  Scientists who tried to bring it back in were tarred as “vitalists.”  British biologist Rupert Sheldrake was still given this treatment in 1983, the same year the Medawars wrote, when his book A New Science of Life was denounced in Nature and called, by the journal’s editor Sir John Maddox, ““the best candidate for burning there has been in many years.”[46] But things were changing.  Eight years after l’affaire Sheldrake, in 1991, Canadian bio-physicist Robert Rosen published Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin and Fabrication of Life.[47]  It took up the very question the Medawars had pronounced, by scientific consensus, nonsensical.  Rosen argued that “the machine metaphor” which had dominated biology must be replaced.  Addressing the question, what is life?, will generate, he says,  a “relational biology” which is unafraid of the previously neglected topics of complexity and internal organization.  Rosen’s work was a harbinger of the emergence of what is sometimes called “systems biology” – that is a biology which studies whole systems rather than reducing them to simpler component parts.  Complexity, emergence, and self-organization became the new scientific frontiers. “Our vision of nature,” wrote Nobel laureate physical chemist Ilya Prigogine and philosopher Isabelle Stengers, “is undergoing a radical change towards the multiple, the temporal and the complex.”[48] 

I was an enthusiastic chronicler of this new scientific turn.  Many of the people I have just mentioned, including Ilya Prigogine, Robert Rosen, Rupert Sheldrake, and James Lovelock, were featured in a 1985 Ideas series I did called “Religion and the New Science.”[49] This was another reason why I found Illich’s claim that life was an idol so provoking.  His argument was that in the effort to describe what Rosen called “life itself” a crucial collapse had occurred – the boundary between reality and representation had been erased.  The Gaia hypothesis was, for him, a similar instance.  Speaking, not specifically of Gaia, but more generally of the idea that the world as a whole can be modelled, he says, that this style of ecology involves “thinking in terms of a cybernetic system which, in real time, is both model and reality, a process which observes and defines, regulates and sustains itself.  Within this style of thinking, life comes to be equated with the system: it is the abstract fetish that both overshadows and simultaneously constitutes it.”[50]  When the cosmos – the whole – is understood as a system, he goes on, it is imagined as something that can be “rationally analyzed and managed.”  But, when this abstraction is “romantically identified with life,” it is transformed into “something mysterious” whose weakness evokes pathos and “tender protection.”  The procedure by which we slide between these positions, as life’s master and as its reverent servant, is described by Illich as ‘epistemic sentimentality.”[51]  This ability to slip unnoticed between a commanding managerial stance – we will defeat the virus - and facile feeling – one life lost is too many – has been a hallmark of public discourse throughout the current pandemic. 

Epistemic sentimentality is, I think, a useful and illuminating expression, though it may at first seem pretentious and hard to parse.  Why epistemic?  Why not just sentimentality?  Sentimentality is false or corrupted feeling – feeling whose sympathy for its object is compromised by self-interest.   It may be what Milan Kundera calls “the second tear” – the tear aware of itself as “me being moved.”[52]  It may be an affectation or dramatization of a state that sustains a pleasant image of myself.  Or it may be a way of avoiding action. Always one dwells on the feeling, rather than simply suffering it and passing on.  What makes sentimentality epistemic is that it attaches to an object of knowledge – to some certainty whose “objective” features justify and compel the feeling.  If it is a sufficiently compelling object, as life is, any perception or awareness of self-interest can be easily and unobtrusively erased from one’s attachment to it.  During the pandemic the “saving” of “lives” has been an object so obviously and transcendently good that no question can be entered about it or cost charged against it.  This is epistemic sentimentality.  Behind it, in the case of life, is our attitude to death, as the ultimate and unspeakable obscenity interfering with out enjoyment of life, but that’s outside my purview in this essay. 

What is central to Illich’s analysis of systems is the claim he makes that in many of the discourses of systems the distinction between model and reality has been annulled.  When DNA is called “the language of life,” or Robert Rosen mathematically depicts “life itself” as part of his new “relational biology,” one loses awareness that a metaphor is being deployed.  Gaia, as a schematic or abstract of the planet, collapses into the goddess without residue.  To illustrate, Illich sometimes told the story of a visit he made to the apartment of some graduate students who were studying with him at Penn State, where he taught during the fall term between 1985 and 1995.  On the fridge door he found two pictures pasted: one was of the blue planet, floating in space, the other was a microscopic image of a fertilized human egg – macrocosm and microcosm, “the blue disk and the pink disk,” as Illich came to call them. [53]  When he showed an interest in these images, one of his hosts described them as “our doorways to the understanding of life.”  The term doorway stuck with Illich, and a little reflection made him see in it what historian of religions Mircea Eliade calls a sacrum.  As Illich later explained, 

A Sacrum describes a particular place in the topology of any culture.  It refers to an object, a locality, or a sign which, within that culture, is believed to be… a doorway.  I had always thought of it as a threshold, a threshold at which the ultimate appears, that which, within that society, is considered to be true otherness, that which, within a given society, is considered transcendent.  For Eliade, a society becomes a conscious unity not just in relation to neighboring societies – we are not you – but also by defining itself in relation to what’s beyond.[54]   

What was novel about the sacrums on the fridge door was that they were not conventionally religious signs, objects or places.  Indeed, they were not signs at all but. rather, as Illich put it, “emblems for scientific facts” – visions obtained not by faith but by technology.  That scientific facts should function as religious symbols suggested to Illich that we have entered “a new stage of religiosity.” [55]  (Illich always distinguished religiosity as a broad sensibility from religion as a circumscribed set of formal beliefs.)  What was unique about the “doorways” at which Illich’s young interlocutors experienced reverence for life was that they led into a beyond that was not a beyond, a beyond that was only an infinitely extendable here. Like a bridge erected on only one side of a river, or the computer “icon” which opens only into the endless virtuality of cyberspace, these thresholds stood at the edge of a here with no there, “a frontier with no beyond.”[56] What Illich had discovered was a religiosity of pure immanence.  He thought it quite unprecedented.  The dialectical tension between transcendence and immanence may have been adjusted differently in each religion, but both were always in some way present.  Even ostensibly atheist faiths in which there was no personified “master in heaven” recognized a transcendent dimension, constitutionally out-of-reach, and other to what is present and at hand..[57]  Here, for the first time, was a world with no correspondent, no complement, no other – a “wombless world,” Illich said, self-enclosed and unbegotten. 

Illich asserted, as I quoted earlier, that people around him had begun to conceive of the world as a “a cybernetic system which, in real time is both model and reality, a process which observes and defines regulates and sustains itself.”  He was certainly not alone in this claim.  Some of his contemporaries went even further.  A prominent example is French media theorist Jean Baudrillard with his claim that the world has become a “simulacrum” – an artifice in which reality has been so thoroughly absorbed by its models that now “the map generates the territory.”[58]  Models, Baudrillard says, have now become “more real than the real” and exert such a preponderant influence that the ostensibly real itself is shaped in their “magnetic field.”[59]  This is extreme.  Illich claims only that model and reality have become indistinguishable and exclusive.  When people now speak of their systems, it is of themselves that they speak.  There is no sense that a model or metaphor is being applied.  Nature is an ecosystem; you are an immune system; the CAT-scan of my brain or the angiogram of my heart is me.  The element of deprivation in this, for Illich, is that nothing is ever only itself.  An account British theologian John Milbank once gave me of the principle of analogy in medieval theology captures well what Illich would also have said.  “Nothing that’s created exists in itself,” Milbank said.  “It only exists by sharing in the divine reality.  So, in that sense, it’s always other to itself.  It’s speaking of itself but also of God.  By speaking of itself it speaks of something other to itself which is God.”[60]  And what applies to our relationship to the “divine reality” applies equally to our relationships to one another.  I know myself only in and through others.  I move towards myself by moving away from myself.  I have my beginning and my end in what is other than me.  ‘We are creatures that find our perfection only by establishing a relationship,” Illich says.[61] 

Systems are self-contained.  Nothing escapes their gravity by definition.  Whoever uses them becomes part of them, whoever tries to dissent or depart from them is reincorporated as feedback, whoever claims individual exception or exemption is reminded of the holistic or “systemic” properties that condition them.  The pandemic is their perfect embodiment – each one constantly reminded that they are part of a global immune system, responsible for the health of all.  What systems thinking produces, in Illich’s view is nothing less than the “disappearance” of the world.   A world to be a world must stand apart from us, as other than we are.  It must possess a mysterious agency that we cannot fully anticipate or fully understand.  Only in this way can it surprise us, and surprise, for Illich, represents the most crucial and most indispensable dimension of existence – its messianic dimension.  A system can be known because it is composed of the same ground patterns as I am and is consistent throughout.  A world, in the sense I am using the term, can only be very partially known – I cannot know, by assumption or in advance, from which direction or by which means what I need will appear.  A world embodies, in infinite variety, otherness – abstract and general logics cannot comprehend it.   An understanding of the world as system thus deprives it of its most precious and needful quality.  Life, unsurprised, dwindles.  “Only smoke remains,” Illich wrote to his friend Hellmut Becker in 1992,  “from the world-dwindling we have experienced…Exciting, soul-capturing abstractions have extended themselves over the perception of world and self like plastic pillowcases.”[62]   

Gaia, to now return to my theme, conceives the world as system, and that was all Illich needed to know to condemn Lovelock’s theory as an “a-gaia hypothesis… inimical to what earth is.”  “Earth,” he says, “is something you have to use all your senses to grasp, to feel.  Earth is something that you can smell, that you can taste.”[63]  And then he adds the kicker: “I am not living on a planet.”  This is an extravagantly and provocatively reactionary touch, given that earth is demonstrably a planet, but presumably he means to say that he will continue to live in a created world, whatever geology and astrophysics may discover about the matter.  I have already described how I chafed under Illich’s position, while still seeing something invaluable in it.  The question I now want to raise is whether Bruno Latour’s account of the Gaia theory in his Facing Gaia can in any way reconcile Illich and Lovelock and thus, in a larger sense, bring Illich’s radically humanist and incarnational Christianity into conversation with the political ecology that Latour hopes to foster.

 

FACING GAIA

 

Bruno Latour is certainly a “well-known” thinker, but, in our intellectually factionalized time, that only means he stands in the top tier of one club while in the neighbouring club he is barely thought of as anything more than a vague reputation.  I learned this the hard way in 2007-2008 when I presented an ambitious 24-part radio series on the movement to reconceptualize modern sciences of which I take Latour to be a paragon.[64]  Subsequent discussions of the subject, both on Ideas and CBC Radio generally, made me realize that the prevailing image of “Science” as an immaculate and unequivocal oracle, speaking in the mighty voice of Nature, had barely been touched by my work.  So, having learned my lesson, let me begin by making a sketch of what I think Latour, with others, has accomplished.  Latour’s first book, Laboratory Life (1979), with Steve Woolgar, carried on the task that the pioneering microbiologist Ludwik Fleck had begun in the 1930’s with his book The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact.  Up to the time when Latour and Woolgar wrote, with a few prescient exceptions like Fleck, the history and philosophy of science had been written in a largely theoretical register.  It was a field concerned with what scientists thought that they were doing and what they said that they were doing, and not with what close observation might have shown that they were actually doing.  “We hadn’t been to look,” was historian Simon Shaffer’s pithy summary of the situation on the ground. [65]  Styling themselves as anthropologists in the presence of something radically foreign, rather than as familiars who already know what science is, Latour and Woolgar “went to look,” reporting on the goings on in the neuroscience laboratory of Nobel laureate Roger Guillemin at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California during the sequencing of a previously undescribed neurohormone.  What they, and many other similarly motivated anthropologists showed, was, first of all, the sheer artisanal skill involved in laboratory work, and second, the elaborate and contingent character of the many and far-flung networks that are involved in discovering, stabilizing and sustaining a scientific fact.  

In later works Latour would spell out what he first began to notice in Guillemin’s laboratory.  Particularly important to me was a set of propositions entitled “Irreduction of ‘the Sciences’” with which he concludes his wittily entitled historical case study The Pasteurization of France. [66] By his word “irreduction,” he refused to abridge the “ramshackle” edifices constituting the various sciences, or to boil them down to an essence called Science. (4.3.1) There are sciences, but “Science,” he said bluntly, “does not exist.”  It is only “a name pasted on to certain sections of certain networks,” networks that are in themselves “tenuous, fragile and sparse.” (Networks here can refer to institutions, but also to practices, pathways of communication and shared understandings.)  They take on the appearance of omnipresence only as an effect of “exaggeration.” (4.2.6).  Exaggerations hide the veritable and mundane modes of operation of the various sciences from us “because when a series of locations has been mastered and joined together in a network, it is possible to move from one place to another without noticing the work that links them together.” (4.4.3) Not noticing the work that keeps a network functioning, we are able to suppose that what is contained, supported and extended by the network is in fact universal.  “When people say that knowledge is universally true,” says Latour, “we must understand that it is like railroads, which are found everywhere in the world but only to a limited extent.  To shift to claiming that locomotives cans move beyond their narrow and expensive rails is another matter.” (4.5.7.1)  Sciences can know, in other words, exactly what they are organized, equipped and financed to know – which is a lot but much less than the everything that is promised by abstract and general words – exaggerations – like law, nature, truth etc. 

Latour is a thorough-going pragmatist; and, as it has become clearer that he is as much a philosopher as a sociologist, it has been easier to appreciate how much he stands in the formally Pragmatist tradition of William James and John Dewey, as well as in the distinct but related lineage of Alfred North Whitehead.  For example, in his Irreduction, he challenges an imaginary interlocutor to prove to him that “this substance which works so well in Paris is equally good in the suburbs of Timbuktu.”  Why bother, replies his interlocutor, since a “universal law” is known to obtain.   Yes, says Latour but I don’t want to believe it.  I want to see it.  Ah, says the other, then “just wait until I have built a laboratory, and I’ll prove it to you,” (4.5.7.1). This illustrates the principle that “nothing escapes from a network.”  Not all would agree.  Perhaps the “substance” works even in places where there are no laboratories to prove it and even where the very concept may be unintelligible.  Isn’t the atomic weight of gold always 79 even where no apparatus exists to prove it?  (This is Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus’s example in their Retrieving Realism, where their target is Richard Rorty’s claim, more or less identical to Latour’s, that there is no reality independent of our knowledge of it. [67])  But, however this old debate is settled, I find Latour’s attention to the actual practice of science[s] invaluable, and widely applicable.  It happened, for instance, that when I was first reading Irreduction, I stepped out for a walk and was passed by a van from a Toronto television station with the word EVERYWHERE emblazoned on its side in bold letters.  Television stations also claim knowledge which far exceeds the reach of their vehicles, cameras, and work routines.  Though the van was manifestly there in the street beside me and nowhere else, it could claim to be everywhere by virtue of its knowledge.  Knowing the universal laws by which news can be identified, the station’s eye was effectively all-seeing, despite the modest appearance and restricted ambit of its rather small van.  

Latour went on to spell out the political implication of the revised and more humble view of the sciences which he proposed – first in We Have Never Been Modern (English 1993).  There he described what he called the modern “constitution.”  The term usually has a political reference, and Latour certainly wanted to retain this reference, while at the same drawing attention to the way in which our knowledge of the world is “constituted” in the first place.  This modern knowledge constitution, he said, involved a series of clarifying separations, or “purifications.”  The primary division segregated nature from society.  In a second move God was set at a safe distance from the world – “crossed-out” as Latour said and denied any active part in the affairs of people or nature.  Nature would be the province of the sciences and would speak through them in a clear, indisputable and unconstrained voice, so that the facts on the ground would virtually, as we say, speak for themselves.  Society alone would be the province of politics.  Latour has many witty pages on the illicit commerce that has always taken place between these two supposedly distinct realms – hence his title, We Have Never Been Modern – but his main point is that this distinction has now been utterly overwhelmed by the hybridization of nature and society.  Climate change is a sufficient example.  It is neither a social phenomenon with natural causes nor a natural phenomenon with social causes, but a predicament in which the two are inextricably and indistinguishably mixed.  Moreover, it is also a result of this pretended separation, since humans could never have taxed nature to the extent we have without the fiction of standing apart from it as subjects facing an object.  (This drawing apart of subjects and objects is another of Latour’s modern separations or purifications.)  

The modern constitution is now defunct, Latour says, belied by the countless hybridizations of Nature and Society that surround us.  But sunk capital and intellectual inertia together sustain its existence.  Even critical thought, Latour says, continues to stop and show its passport at the old, approved boundaries.  Critique “demystifies” and purifies – it puts things back in their proper categories.  Any attempt to make a social phenomenon appear as a natural one is denounced as an illicit “naturalization.”   Any incursion of nature on society will be rejected as a limitation on freedom.  What is not faced, either among the moderns or the post-moderns, is the fact that the realities that make are world are generated in the intermediate zone – the “metamorphic zone,” Latour says – where nature and society meet and exchange properties, as they are continually networked, mediated and translated into one another.  Notable at the moment is the COVID-19 virus, a perfect example of what Latour calls a “hybrid.”  It is an entirely natural object, which is also an entirely social object, its physical existence fostered by contemporary socio-technical conditions, it meaning determined in the stew of anxiety and opportunity comprising politics, media and the “health professions.”   

My sketch necessarily simplifies and omits, but the next book I want to mention is 2004’s The Politics of Nature (first French edition 1999), an essay on “how to bring the sciences into democracy.”  Latour’s argument there was that politics in modernity had been disabled – “render[ed] impotent” – by the creation of an “incontestable nature.”[68]  Nature’s authority was expressed through science which brought forward matters of fact, “risk free objects” scrubbed clean of any trace of their artificial origin.  Politics was left to bob in the wake of the sciences, responsible for managing the world of opinion, but with no jurisdiction over the scientifically produced creations and discoveries which sprang out of Nature like the armed men, in the old Greek story, who jumped up from the furrows when Cadmus sowed the dragon’s teeth.   Science filled the world with hybrids – imbroglios in which humans and non-humans were hopelessly entangled – artificial intelligence and genetic engineering, transformed landscapes and a changing climate – but these new kinds of things were represented in politics only, so to speak, after the fact.  Scientists remained the vestal virgins of Nature even as they filled the world with uncanny objects that could have found no place in the cosmograms of earlier societies.  Politics belonged to society, science to nature. 

Latour’s proposal for “bringing the sciences into democracy” involved recognizing that scientists are the de facto representatives of the various non-humans that they have introduced into society.  The modern constitution portrays these non-humans as objects – the only position it has available for whatever is not a speaking human subject – but they are in fact social actors or actants, as Latour sometimes says. The microbes that Pasteur “made public” have had a profound influence on society – the actions taken against them are a primary reason why the human population has now almost reached 8 billion.  And, as humans have acted on them, they have re-acted, mutating and adapting and forcing society to adapt in turn.  Things that have no voice still speak.  The ravaged wetland that once absorbed spring runoff speaks, often without anyone hearing, as a downstream flood.  Microbial antibiotic resistance transforms agriculture and health care.  But these matters have no political representation, so long as the sciences believe that their standing, authority and integrity rest on their having nothing to do with politics.  The difficulty that this poses ought to have been on glaring display during the current pandemic, when manifestly political decisions with profound social consequences have been regularly dressed up as scientific mandates, but no one notices so long as the modern constitution continues to keep any intercourse between science and politics out of sight and out of mind.  

Representing non-humans in domains long-defended as exclusively social is a task that turns on the two primary meanings we give to the word represent itself.  Representation is first of all a question of knowledge.  It speaks of the shape and form we give to things, the way we picture or conceive the things of the world.  The modern constitution, according to Latour, provides us with a map that is now profoundly at variance with the territory it supposedly pictures.  This discrepancy has been brought into clear relief by science studies.  By actually going to look, these new anthropologists of the sciences have shown that the practice of the sciences is quite different than what is claimed by the prevailing myth.  According to this cover story science is the servant of nature – the immaculate oracle through which nature makes itself known.  This is a misrepresentation and must now change, Latour says, if we are to have any understanding at all of how our world is being made and remade from day to day.  But representation has a second sense which refers to the ways in which political assemblies are constituted.   This is currently understood as an entirely social matter.  The entire biosphere may have been thrown into question, but only humans may deliberate about the matter.   This too must change in order to give voice to the many non-humans that now comprise society as surely as we do.  How are all the objects – that have turned out to be subjects – to speak?  How is their, so far, unaccounted for agency to be recognized?  Who speaks for the forests and oceans, glaciers and wetlands, microbes and cloned sheep?  Latour’s answer is that the sciences which know them will have to speak for them.  But for this to happen the inherently political character of scientific knowledge will first have to be faced.  I don’t mean political here in the narrow, prejudicial sense in which the word is taken to refer to knowledge coloured by interest, but in the larger more generous sense in which politics concerns the way in which we make a world together.  

What Latour calls science studies goes by various names: science, technology and society; social studies of science; history and philosophy of science.  Work done under these various auspices over the last fifty odd years, and in a few cases like Fleck’s earlier, has shown a practice utterly unlike the idealized picture provided by the modern constitution.  But this new style of academic study has faced staunch and continuous resistance.  The frequently used expression “trust in science” sums up this reaction.  The position taken by this resistance movement, baldly stated, is as follows: 1/Democracy, progress, and social concord all rest on science.  2/Without science social existence will degenerate into an always potentially violent war of opinion.  3/Trust in science must therefore be preserved and enhanced at all costs.  4/A view of science as plural, fallible, and political can only undermine this trust and should therefore be rejected.  During the 1990’s, “back-to-basics” partisans of trust in science initiated a sub-set of the culture wars that came to be called the science wars, though it was, in fact,  little more than a skirmish, and few, in my experience, have ever heard of it.  It began when physicist Alan Sokal tricked the journal Social Text into accepting and publishing an article he called "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.”  The essay was a satirical pastiche of currently fashionable styles, consisting mostly of artfully contrived but, in the end, only faintly plausible balderdash, but the magazine’s editors fell for it.  This then allowed Sokal to make large claims in which he tarred the entire science studies movement with the same brush.  A few polemical books followed, one by Sokal himself, with Jean Bricmont, called Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science.  Paul Gross and Norman Levitt’s The Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrel with Science argued in the same vein.  A few lectures were cancelled; a few science studies scholars were denied academic posts; and then the whole thing died down.  Writing about the affair in 2009, I said optimistically that it looked to me in retrospect like “a last ditch effort to save the credit of an obsolete image of science.” [69]  Today I’m not so sure.  Too often, during the current pandemic, “science” has been used as a shibboleth to divide the sheep from the goats, the enlightened folks from the “hardcore, anti-mask wackosphere,” as one newspaper columnist recently put it, without much regard at all for legitimately scientific findings.[70] (This columnist, for example, seemed either unaware or uninterested in the fact that no randomized trial has ever shown that masks of the kind currently in use reduce viral transmission.[71])  

Facing Gaia - to come at last to the text I want to consider – began with an imagined scene that Latour says had preoccupied him for some time before he wrote his lectures.  In this scene, a figure retreats from a frightening apparition, running backwards with her eyes fixed on the feared object, and then, at last, turns around to find that something even more frightening is facing her.  (His vision eventually became a dance piece created with Stephanie Ganachaud called The Angel of Geohistory,)  Latour understands this haunting image as a parable of the modern condition.  The modern constitution was put in place, he says, in order to hold at bay the troubles threatening Europe as a result of the “wars of religion” that followed the Reformation.  (Some argue that these were actually wars of state-building under religious guise – notably William Cavanaugh, building on the work of Charles Tilly – but that’s beside my purpose in this writing.[72])  The Christianity that had once united Europe now divided it.  War had become endemic and vicious – some of the German lands lost up to half their people during the 30 Years War of the early 16th Century.   The program that resulted – Latour’s modern constitution - did three things.  First it forced God into retirement – He would continue to reign only ceremonially and without effect as what Latour calls “the crossed-out God.”  Second a strong state would be established – a “mortal God, as Hobbes called his Leviathan – able to confine religious passion within private bounds.  And, finally, knowledge would be put on the firm and uncontestable footing that we today call science. Modernity broke decisively with the past, and, at the same, time kept its eyes fixed on this past, from which it now believed itself to be utterly different, in order to prevent any resurgence of the dangers lurking there.  Meanwhile, new dangers accumulated, unnoticed at first, and unaccounted for, concealed by the constitution which safely segregated nature from society and kept the hybrids with which science and technology were remaking society out of view.  Only now have we suddenly turned around and found ourselves, as Latour says, “facing Gaia,” and not only facing her, but also having to deal with her in what is rapidly becoming a seriously bad mood. 

This Gaia which now confronts us is nothing like Illich’s imagination of a disembodied and highly cerebral system “inimical to what earth is.”  In fact, Latour interprets Lovelock’s Gaia theory in a way almost opposite to Illich’s version.  Whether Latour’s interpretation agrees with Lovelock’s own is something I’ll leave moot here. I’ve seen no response from the now 101-year old scientist to Latour’s lectures.  But, in any case, it is Latour’s opinion that Lovelock is trying to describe something so new and so different that he often “struggles for language” when expounding his own theory.[73]  Lovelock, for example, quite commonly uses the word system with reference to Gaia, but Latour claims that “[Lovelock’s] version of the earth system is anti-systemic.”[74] (What could be closer to the edge of language than an anti-systemic system?)  The difficulty, according to Latour, is the temptation to think of Gaia as a superorganism or a superordinate whole, or, in cybernetic language, a commanding steersman. (When Nobert Weiner named the infant science of cybernetics in 1948, he derived the name from the ancient Greek word kybernētēs for the pilot or steersman of a ship.)  But Gaia, he says, is an assemblage in which “there are neither parts nor whole.”  It is “not an organism. And we cannot apply to it any technological or religious model.  It may have an order but it has no hierarchy.”  It has “no frame, no goal, no direction.”  It is “chaotic” – indeed “more chaotic than either economists or evolutionary biologists are able to imagine.”  “There is only one Gaia,” he quotes from Philip Conway’s Back Down to Earth, “but Gaia is not one.”  

Gaia, to this way of thinking, is an ensemble without being a whole in the usual sense of a unity which precedes its parts as their organizing principle or transcends them as their coordinator.  Perhaps this is what some people mean by a self-organizing system – perhaps it’s what Lovelock is stumbling towards even when he speaks of “the system” in seemingly conventional holistic terms – but Latour prefers to stress all the ways in which Gaia cannot be represented by machine metaphors – even cybernetic ones – or with reference to anthropomorphic divinities – even Gaia, William Golding’s beguiling name, is, in his view something of a Trojan Horse with its belly full of unwanted associations.  Lovelock, according to Latour, is trying “to follow the connections without being holistic.”  What this amounts to is that Gaia is a network or an assemblage in the sense that Latour has been developing throughout his work, and, with others, in the development of what he and these colleagues have called Actor/Network Theory.[75] 

The essential idea is that society is made or composed by patient and persistent acts of assembly.  The networks that result last only so long as they are maintained and are comprised always of diverse beings, some human, some not, some animate, some not.  Behind a robust and durable scientific fact, for example, stands an astonishing array of actors – from the physical infrastructure of the lab where it was made to the energy grid that powered the lab; from the financial institutions that supplied the money to the administrative  machinery that kept the lab afloat; from the knowledge networks that disseminated the finding to the habits of mind that make “matters of fact” intelligible in the first place.  But once such a fact enters the world as a “scientific discovery” that has descended on some genius from the “Heaven of Ideas,”[76] this messy background begins to be erased and forgotten.  Abstractions displace and disguise the networks.  Science explains scientific discovery; Society explains social creation.  Latour develops the point at length in his Reassembling the Social where he shows how sociology, instead of explaining how society is made, instead treats “the social” as, in effect, its own cause.  “[Sociology] begins where is should end,” he says, “and assumes what it should explain.”[77] 

Nature is another such abstraction – an assumed unity which then becomes an explanation for that unity, according to the principle of what A.N. Whitehead called “the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” – “mistaking the abstract for the concrete…the occasion of great confusion in philosophy.”[78]  By this means, nature is endowed with an independent existence – a crucial plank of the modern constitution.  Although we live within Nature without distinction from it, and although we constantly mobilize nature in our construction of Society, Nature is given the character, when convenient, of a “disinterested third party,” able to settle disputes and protect the scientists who shelter from the dirty work of politics in Nature’s bosom.[79]  Politics is made “subservient to science.”  The creative and constructive side of science is disguised as the discovery and disclosure of preexistent laws.  Many of the functions of the “crossed-out God” are reinvested in this Nature which stands above and beyond us.  A civilization that has already begun to extract and exploit “natural resources” as never before becomes able to hide this rapacity by always reverting to transcendent nature at the crucial moment.  “This concept of ‘nature’,” Latour writes, “now appears as a truncated, simplified exaggeratedly moralistic, excessively polemical and prematurely political version of the world.”[80]  

Gaia must now replace Nature, according to Latour.  For him, Lovelock’s discovery is as momentous as the new image of the heavens disclosed by Galileo’s telescope.  Galileo confirmed what Copernicus had demonstrated – the earth moves.  Lovelock has shown that the earth is moved – it is not the unchanging object that Galileo “launched…into movement in the infinite universe”[81] but an ever shifting and only partially stabilized collaboration between the elements that compose it.  The human impacts constituting the Anthropocene now make this undeniable.  What was true all along according to Lovelock – that living things produce their own environment – now stares us in the face when, like Latour’s dancer, we turn around.  A living world which we partly comprise and partly make is not an independent nature in which we can find solace, shelter or authority.  It is time, Latour argues, for an account of nature that is, at last, “secular.”  We must abandon, he says, the “under-animated” law-like clockwork bequeathed us by classical science, but also avoid the compensation of an “over-animated” nature that might result from taking the Gaia metaphor too seriously and succumbing to the post-modern avidity for a new sacred.  For him the best word to comprehend “the multiplicity of existents” and “the multiplicity of ways they have of existing” is world – a word we have always used to summarize the whole without subdivision – nature and culture are equally world.   

Latour argues that Lovelock’s hypothesis represents a crucial modulation of the theory of evolution.  According to the common understanding of Darwin’s theory, Nature “selects” the creatures who will prosper and leave descendants according to their “fitness,” or the degree to which they are adapted to a pre-existing “environment.”  This understanding produces what Latour calls the “primal scene” of evolutionary theory - a “bounded organism” living in an “environment” that acts as arbiter of its fitness.  But, according to Lovelock, there is no such limit to the organism because it is always and at the same time producing the environment to which it is also subject.  The atmosphere, to take the example with which Lovelock began, is not a stable environment but a continuing creation – exhaled by some even as it is being inhaled by others.  “We are the atmosphere,” Latour says.   The reason why Gaia produces such a critical supplement to the theory of evolution, for him, is that it shows the earth to be a more chaotic, less easily modelled “system” than many had supposed.  As a dance in which organism and environment are “tightly coupled,” and one cannot easily “know the dancer from the dance”[82] the invitation to participate speaks louder than the commonly heard desideratum to control, manage or save.   

What has brought us face to face with Gaia, according to Latour, is “the new climatic regime” – the accumulating evidence that human activities are appreciably altering earth’s atmosphere.  But Latour’s version of what climate science has achieved remains in keeping with both his vision of a world in flux and his view of scientific knowledge as precarious and provisional.  It is important to him, first of all, that the picture we now have of a changing climate has not been produced by a “prestigious” science, like, let’s say, particle physics with its multi-billion dollar accelerators, but by a “coalition” of more workaday “earth sciences.”  These sciences have made no “earth shaking discovery” but rather have proceeded by “the weaving together of thousands of tiny facts, reworked through modeling into a tissue of proofs that draw their robustness from the multiplicity of data each piece of which remains obviously fragile.”[83] This obvious fragility is important to Latour because he thinks that the challenge that the “climate skeptics” have posed to these individually vulnerable data is salutary and amounts to a “gift” – a “blessing in disguise” as my old aunt used to say.   He has argued throughout his career, as we have seen, that a prime reason for the invention of Nature was to depoliticize science.  It was under this cover that science was able, again and again, to change the world, without ever having to acknowledge the utterly political character of this intervention.  Microbes, artificial fertilizers and atomic bombs could be brought, with immense, unforeseeable political consequences, on to the world stage as if Nature Herself had disclosed and imposed these things through her transparent scientific intermediaries.  Many scientists believe, Latour says, that their only integrity, succour and safety lie in Nature.  Science, they think, can only retain and deserve its authority so long as this authority is seen to be entirely disinterested and to rest on Nature alone.  The result, Latour claims, is that climate scientists, for the most part, engage in political controversy with “their hands tied behind their backs.”[84]  “The science,” as one often hears, will speak for itself. 

The climate skeptics have no such scruple.  Not only have they seized the high ground by claiming the virtue of skepticism – a hallmark of Enlightenment – but they have also fought with the unrestrained polemical vigour that the scientists have denied themselves.  This is what Latour calls their gift – they have shown the sciences how to fight.  Latour has long argued that the sciences must stop hiding behind Nature and  enter the political fray – they must come “into democracy,” as he said in The Politics of Nature.  Now with the end of God-haunted Nature, or at least with its pluralization, “politics can begin again,”[85] and the sciences must take part.  Under the modern constitution, science was covertly authorized to change the world while at the same time constituting itself as the authority before which the political, the controversial, the merely human must bow and give way.  Science was the great exception by which modernity distinguished itself definitively and forever from all other times, place and peoples.  The field of Science Studies, according to Latour, has now shown that science is continuous with other human constructions.  Its networks may be unusually long, its effects unusually powerful, but it extends no farther than these networks can carry it.  It is not universal, and it is not the voice of a displaced God called Nature.  The sciences are therefore obliged to argue their case rather than to claim that it is beneath their dignity as sciences to enter into vulgar contests of opinion.  They must stake their claim in the political arena and reveal the grounds on which their claim rests.  These grounds, according to Latour, are persuasive and compelling but they are not beyond argument. 

Latour has always imagined a new politics, constructed beyond the fictions of Nature and Society, and including all those beings who are now at stake as a result of the “ecological mutation” which modernity has brought about.  He calls the parties who will participate in this politics “collectives” in recognition that they are not just societies but worlds in which places, histories, techniques and the many non-human beings a given group mobilizes also play a defining part.  These collectives, he insists, each rest on a distinct and different foundation.  This is a corollary of never having been modern.  Once we abandon universality, and the coordinating role universals like Nature, Society and Science have played in constructing modernity’s uniqueness, we can see that we are not all living in one time or one space or one set of scientific laws.   Politics must therefore begin again on the basis of difference.  The different “peoples” who will become perceptible once we stop arranging everything along the  arrow of time implied by terms like development or modernization will have to introduce themselves to one another and practice the arts of diplomacy at the boundaries that join and divide them.  Each people will have to disclose “what supreme authorities convoke them, on what lands they believe they are localized, in what time period they situate themselves and according to what cosmograms – or cosmologies – they have distributed their agencies.”[86]   

In trying to define this new politics Latour calls on Carl Schmitt, a German jurist who served the Nazi party during the 1930’s but who has been found indispensable by later political theorists nonetheless.  In his book The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt supposed that politics is defined by what he called the friend/enemy distinction.  For Schmitt if something was true, as for him Christianity was true, a decision was demanded in favour of that truth – a decision which would inevitably reveal enemies as well as friends.  According to Schmitt, liberalism had not faced this hard truth, preferring postponement, equivocation and endless indecisive talk.  Arguably, it was his preoccupation with these failings that blinded him to the evil of National Socialism, but Latour still feels there is something in Schmitt’s idea, and, using the long spoon enjoined on those who sup with the devil, he tries to extract it.   There are real indissoluble differences in the world, Latour says.  This is an unavoidable consequences of withdrawing science’s epistemological privilege and dismantling the framework of universality this privilege underwrites.  Latour’s  “peoples,” each convoked by different gods, appealing to different histories, and living in different times, have no common denominator.  What he takes from Schmitt is the idea that there can be no peace without prior recognition of a possible state of war, no friend without an enemy.  A decision is demanded of contemporary people – that is the nub of the “new climatic regime” for Latour – but there is no agreement on how to make it or the grounds on which it should be made.  At the moment all parties hope to prevail by calling their opponents insulting names.  What this epidemic incivility indicates is that they have not in fact recognized genuine enemies – people standing on different moral foundations – but just assumed that the others have somehow stupidly failed to adopt the correct view. Latour’s proposal, if I understand him well, is that the opponent can only become a friend if he/she is first respected as an enemy.  (And perhaps the injunction in the Sermon on the Mount to “love” the enemy says the same.[87]).  Relinquishing the modern framework allows one to see that differences are real and not just the result of incomplete modernization.  And only this acknowledgement can produce the delicate diplomacy that will be required to harmonize these differences.  

Latour has long recognized that the modern constitution is a displaced theology.  Only with Lovelock’s chaotic and indifferent Gaia, he says, do we reach an account of nature which is “finally secular.”[88]  But, in Facing Gaia, he goes much further into theological analysis than he has in the past, summoning to his aid another surprising ally, political philosopher Eric Voegelin.  Voegelin argued in his influential book The New Science of Politics (1952) that modernity is a betrayed and transposed Christianity.  The book’s argument is that Christianity, in its original form, was too spiritual, too arid, and too other-worldly – in short, too difficult – to ever become a popular religion because most people simply lacked “the spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure of the soul that is Christianity.”[89]  And yet it did become a popular religion.  It did so, according to Voegelin, by rendering spiritual and ascetic ends into practical techniques and achievable worldly goals.  He called this reduced and operationalized Christianity Gnosticism, in recognition of the evil twin that had been there all along, ready to turn spiritual wisdom into practicable knowledge (gnosis).   He finds a culmination of this movement in the work of Joachim of Flores (1135-1202), a visionary Italian monk whose writings applied the Trinity to history and declared that, at the beginning of the second Christian millennium, the Age of the Son was about to give way to the Age of the Spirit. (The Age of the Father, corresponding roughly with what Christians call the Old Testament, had preceded the Age of the Son in Joachim’s scheme.)  In Voegelin’s terms, “a symbol of faith” had been made into an object of historical experience – a fateful philosophical fallacy in Voegelin’s view because history, being incomplete, can never be an object of experience.[90]  The eschaton, the final, or ultimate things, had been mapped onto history.  Voegelin calls this “immanentizing the eschaton” – what can properly be grasped only in symbols, because it is inherently transcendent, has been rendered palpable and present.   Many revolutions and New Ages will follow, but Joachim’s visions set the pattern by which the end of history was brought within history. 

What this means to Latour is that, once the eschaton has been historicized or immanentized, the end is, in a sense, already behind us.  As part of history, it has already happened – and therefore we can’t recognize it or react to it intelligently when it suddenly looms ahead of us as vexed Gaia.  His Angel of Geohistory dance/parable reenacts this predicament.  For the moderns, Latour says, history began to come to an end a long time ago.  Modernity is already an “immanentized heaven” and, as such, lacks an “accessible earth.”  We may be on the brink of creating an unliveable environment for much of earth’s existing population, but we can’t conceptualize this end because it doesn’t fit the scheme in which the end has already been installed in history as infinite progress.  How could we go back?  

Latour’s answer, already given thirty years ago, is: abandon the belief that we are or ever have been modern – the belief that we have magically instituted an unending progress – the belief that time can be told in a sequence of which we are the culmination.  We must return to the condition which we, in fact, have never left (except in the undeniably powerful and consequential fantasy by which we appeared to bring heaven to earth in the first place.). Once, says Latour, paraphrasing Voegelin, “immanence and transcendence, the passage of time and the time of the end, the terrestrial city and the celestial city, were in a relation of mutual revelation.”  Then came what Voegelin calls the fall into Gnosticism.  Heaven came to earth; eternity nested in time.  Religion, “so fragile, so unsure of itself,”[91] was given more solid footings.  We became modern.  The perfected society we were making blocked access to the earth.  Now we must once again become, in Latour’s word, earth-bound.   And this can only be done by first releasing heaven from our grasp and letting it return to its proper place – out of our reach. 

“The new climatic regime,” in Latour’s estimate, confronts us with a potential end, but we have brought this situation about by being a civilization whose religion has always preached that time tends inexorably towards its end.  We must, therefore, he says, recognize that, “The end times have come but that time is lasting.”[92] A series of similar paradoxes follows.  “The end has been reached,” he says, “and it is unreachable.”  “We are saved and we are not.”  And, finally, “‘The end time has come,’ yes, but it goes on.  And this prolongation gives decision the same lacunary, incomplete, fragile, mortal character it had before the end time came. This contradiction must not be overcome.”[93] (my italics). This last sentence, I believe, is a key to the whole work.  Heaven and earth, time and eternity stand in opposition – neither can be dissolved in the other without a catastrophic loss of consistency.  (This is what Latour means when he says that an “immanentized” heaven destroys access to the earth.). This opposition can be conceived as harmony, complementarity or contradiction.  But Western philosophy, since the time of Aristotle, has upheld the principle (or law) of non-contradiction.[94]  The reachable cannot be unreachable, whatever ends cannot continue etc.  Contradiction must be resolved – absorbed dialectically into a higher unity, circumvented by the scholastic principle, “When you meet a contradiction, make a distinction,” or otherwise ironed out.  Latour makes the scandalous suggestion that a contradiction should be recognized as unsurpassable and allowed to stand. 

Latour has written in many of his books against what he sometimes has called “totalization.”[95]  A limited, compassable, local thing when totalized becomes an infinite, abstract, universal thing with holistic or transcendent properties that saturate its parts.  To take a homely example, the little news van that so impressed me by its claim to be “everywhere,” at the same moment that it was passing me in the street, was attempting a totalization.  To mistake a network, which can be painstakingly traced out and followed, for a global or universal system that exceeds any grasp is a totalization.  In the case I’ve been discussing, Latour is trying to insure that the idea of the end or the time of the end is not deprived of its provisional and unfinished character – its fragility and mortality, he says.  The point of Voegelin’s analysis of the Gnostic heresy which infiltrated medieval Christianity is that religious symbols were introduced into history as if they were perceptible and achievable goals – that Age of the Spirit which has ended by ruining earthly existence for so many.  The end must haunt us without our ever thinking of a definitive end.  William Blake in his descriptive notes on his etching “A Vision of the Last Judgment” says that, “Whenever any Individual Reject Error and Embraces Truth, a Last Judgment passes upon that Individual.” “Vision,” he says, “…is a Representation of what Eternally Exists.”[96]  In this way, a last judgment can occur repeatedly.  Latour is talking of a recurring end, an end that can guide us, haunt us, instruct us, but which we can never specify or pin down without it turning against us as one more intimidating and discouraging totalization. 

Latour has always been hospitable to religion as a mode of experience.  Earlier I quoted his counsel against the illusion that religion can ever be “left behind.”  Established religions, he says, have long since produced their own “antidote.”  Those who think that they have left religion behind instead become prey to its more debased forms and drink its poison without antidote.[97]  I first began to suspect that Latour was, and is a Christian writer, though of an extremely subtle and tactful kind, while I was reading The Politics of Nature.  I began to hear Gospel accents in statements like, “Weakness, it seems to me, may lead further than strength.”[98] and a little further on, “The smallest can become the largest,” which he  backs up by quoting Jesus’ saying, “It was the stone rejected by the builders which became the keystone.”[99]  His An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013) makes his openness to religious experience more explicit:   

It would not be of much use to say that religious beings are ‘only words,’ since the words in question transport beings that convert, resuscitate and even save persons.  Thus they are truly beings; there’s really no reason to doubt this.  They come from outside, they grip us, dwell in us; we address them, pray to them, beseech them.   

By granting them their own ontological status, we can already advance quite far in our respect for experience.  We shall no longer have to deny thousands of years of testimony, we shall no longer need to assert sanctimoniously that all the prophets, all the martyrs, all the exegetes, all the faithful have ‘deceived themselves’ in ‘mistaking’ for real beings what were ‘in fact nothing but’ words or brain waves – representations in any case.  Fortunately, investigators no longer have to commit such reductions (not to say such sins!), since we finally benefit from a sufficiently emptied-out universe to make room not only for the invisible bearers of psyches but also for the pathways of alteration – we can even call them networks – that allow the procession of angels to proceed on their way.[100] 

Religion here is treated just as the sciences have been treated in earlier writings – as a mode of experience with its own distinct character and its own very specific requirements.  There is nothing, he says, “behind religion.”  There is no higher court in which religious beings can or should prove themselves to us, no test by which we can ascertain what or who they “really” are.  Indeed the heart of religion – as “all testimony agrees” and Scripture again and again attests – is the unending effort to discern what can never be finally or definitively discerned: 

All testimony agrees on this point: the appearance of [the] beings [of religion] depends on an interpretation so delicate that one lives constantly at risk and in fear of lying about them; and, in lying, mistaking them for another – for a demon, a sensory illusion, an emotion, a foundation.  Fear of committing a category mistake is what keeps the faithful in suspense.  Not once in the Scriptures, do we find traces of someone who was called who could say he was sure, really sure, that the beings of the Word were there and that he had really understood what they wanted of him.  Except for the sinners.  This is even the criterion of truth, the most decisive shibboleth: the faithful tremble at the idea of being mistaken, while infidels do not. Exactly the chiasmus that the transmigration of religion into fundamentalism has lost, replacing it by a differentiation – as impossible as it is absolute – between those who believe and those who do not.[101] 

The emphasis on discernment, vigilance and humility here may help to clarify the paradoxes I cited earlier concerning the end which has arrived but which continues, which has been reached but is unreachable etc.  The peculiar property of the beings of religion is that they are “ways of speaking.”  In religion, he says, language “flows.” It does not “refer.”  And this flowing speech must be constantly “renewed,” Latour says, because this “Logos cannot rely on any substance to ensure continuity in being.”[102] Religious beings are, by nature, “intermittent.” and “neither their appearance or their disappearance can be controlled.”  

One can neither deceive them nor deflect them nor enter into any sort of transaction with them.  What matters to them apparently is that no one ever be exactly assured of their presence: one must go through the process again and again to be confident that one has seen them, sensed them, prayed to them…the initiative comes from them…They are never mistaken about us, even if we constantly risk being mistaken about them; they never take us “for another”, but they invite us to live in another – totally different – way.  This is what is called, accurately enough, a “conversion.”[103] 

Religion for Latour is a “mode of existence” as are science and politics (though the last is often unjustly scorned by those in the grip of the modern delusion that the truth of science outshines and belittles politics’ grubby transactions.)  These three modes must be kept distinct, in Latour’s view, because their virtues become poisons when these modes are confused.  To try to extricate them from one another is one of the main purposes of Latour’s lectures.  With a proper understanding of religion he hopes to do four things.  The first is to expose the illusion that religion can be overcome or “left behind,” which, as we have seen already, only exposes people to more debased religions while depriving them of the interpretive resources already accumulated within established religious traditions.  The second is to undo what Jan Assman in his influential book Moses the Egyptian called “the Mosaic distinction,” or the unprecedented idea that appeared first within Judaism that there is one true religion which renders all others false, one true God who invalidates all others.  This monotheism, in Latour’s view still haunts modernity as the “crossed-out God” whose properties have been transposed onto Nature and prevents “the peoples” in their religious variety from ever meeting on an equal footing.  The third is to allow us to see the sciences for the precious but precarious practices that they are by scrubbing the vestiges of theology from their self-portrait.  And finally – the biggest surprise in Facing Gaia for me – he hopes to restore Christianity to its proper vocation. 

It was Christianity’s fate, he argues, to misunderstand and misapprehend the Incarnation – the idea that God has taken flesh and become present and available to us in and through one another.  What should have been taken as pertaining to this world, as a radically new way of understanding it, instead was taken as indicating  another “supernatural” dimension, in which and for which we are “saved.”   “The Incarnation,” he writes, “has been changed into a vanishing point far from all flesh, pointing to the disembedded realm of remote spiritual domains.”[104]  Christianity, he says was “led astray” as “generations of priests, pastors and preachers…have mistreat[ed] the Holy Gospels in order to add above nature a domain of the supernatural.”  The eventual result of this estrangement from what should have been the most earthly of doctrines – the Word made flesh – has been that “the faithful [were made] to disdain the path of the sciences at the very moment when the sciences were showing the path of the earth more clearly than the column of smoke that led the Hebrews into the desert.” (my italics)  That the sciences ultimately “show the path of the earth” is an absolutely crucial point here, and one that might easily be overlooked by those who have misread Latour’s radical re-description of science as an expression of enmity rather than of, as I think it is, profound respect.  

Latour’s view that Christianity ought to have remained earthbound does not lead him to reject the idea of Creation.  Creation might have functioned, he says, as “an “alternative to Nature,” if it had retained the character of an imaginative vision of a living earth.  If this had happened, it might have allowed “the power of conversion of the Incarnation [to] extend little by little, I ought to say neighbour by neighbour, to the entire cosmos.”   Instead Creation became the prototype of Nature – the inert, obedient, law-like petrification of a mighty will. 

As I’ve been stressing, Nature, in Latour’s view, is displaced theology.  Gaia, as he understands it, is the overcoming of this outmoded and mistaken theology.  Gaia, at last, “offers a secular, worldly, terrestrial figure” – an image of a world instinct with immanent powers, not bound by the dictate of a designer or the predictions of a plan.  With Gaia as the image of nature – an image neither over-animated as in paganism nor under-animated as in Christian natural theology – the Incarnation can return to earth.  “The dynamic of the Incarnation,” he says, referring to that movement “from neighbor to neighbour” of which he just spoke, “can recapture its momentum in a space freed from the limits of nature.”  And this way of thinking, he argues, has been a potential of Christianity all along.  In support of this view he quotes the apostle Paul’s statement in his letter to the Romans that the whole creation has been groaning in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time.[105]  “This shows,” he writes, “that the creation has not been completed, and that it therefore must be completed, step by step, soul by soul, agent by agent.”[106]  Gaia rescues Christianity from an abstract God and an abstract nature – that God whom William Blake called Urizen (a pun more perceptible when the name is read aloud as “your reason”): 

LO, a Shadow of horror is risen

In Eternity! unknown, unprolific,

Self-clos’d, all-repelling. What Demon

Hath form’d this abominable Void,

This soul-shudd’ring Vacuum? Some said        5

It is Urizen. But unknown, abstracted,

 Brooding secret, the dark power hid.[107]

 

 

ILLICH AND LATOUR

 

Having now introduced Latour and Illich, let me now take my final step and try to understand what their views say to each other.  It is Illich’s contention that systems are inherently totalizing.  First, they integrate all their elements in a whole which conditions every part.  Second, because of this internal consistency, they eliminate otherness – there are no breaks, discontinuities or inherently unknowable features within the system that can be bridged only by hope, prayer or imagination – the system is all of a piece.   And, finally, systems have no outside – all thought or action in relation to a system becomes part of that system – the system continuously transforms transcendence into immanence, outside into inside, absence into presence.  So, system, for him, is the ultimate monism – the terminus of what Charles Taylor calls the “direct access society” in which each part is immediate to the whole.[108] People who may not even know their neighbours’ names worry about the planet.  The scale on which a human life is even possible is destroyed.  “As long as you think of the world as a whole,” Illich says, “the time for human beings is over.”[109]  Gaia, in Lovelock’s rendition, signifies this predicament for Illich.  It is the system of systems, the summit of the vast architecture of abstractions by which the world – local, individual, incomplete – has been replaced.   Latour challenges this view in various ways. First of all, he interprets Lovelock’s Gaia as the emblem of a living world – diverse, inventive, every changing – not as the dictation of a Master Steersman who has slipped without much friction into the place of Nature (which had been the place of God.)   Gaia, Latour says, is anti-systemic – a muddle constantly sorting itself out without “frame…goal…[or] direction.”  Second, Latour’s sees Gaia as a source of otherness and not its denial.  Nature as Gaia is “finally secular.”  Being without frame, we can gain no synoptic view of it; being without goal, we cannot confidently predict its future; and being without direction, we can impose no plot or historical narrative on it.  It is an “order [without] hierarchy” on which we can impose no “technological or religious model.”  This more or less defines otherness, if we take the other, in Illich’s sense, as what we depend on but can’t control, predict or fully understand. 

Gaia also generates otherness in a second sense.   Gaia as a living, responsive world, deprived finally of the theological echoes that resounded in Nature, generates disagreement.  The world that God has given us – first as his creatures and then, in the scientific era, as his surrogates – comes with a set of implicit and sometimes explicit instructions.  An emergent, finally secular world which makes itself up as it goes along does not explain itself in the same way.  The sciences “show the path of the earth,” Latour says, but they never show it unambiguously or incontestably.  That is the very significance of the debates over climate science for Latour. The “coalition of earth sciences” who have made the case for climate change have done so in a way that Latour finds ingenious, admirable and persuasive.  But they have been able to do so only by supplementing empirical observations with models built on more questionable assumptions, and this has left weak points in their argument – “obvious fragility,” as Latour says – which opponents have been able to attack and exploit.  Latour has called these controversies a gift insofar as they require the sciences to stop posing as the virginal priests of Nature and enter political discussion with all their strengths and weaknesses showing.  This idea of Latour’s that, after Nature is secularized and Science defrocked and disaggregated, “politics can begin again” implies fundamental disagreement: the reemergence of peoples whose ways of life rest on different foundations and can no longer be plotted on a single axis measuring their degree of modernization or development.  All the gifts and all the liabilities that Illich imputes to the other are in play.  There is no system which dissolves differences but rather an anti -system which amplifies them.  

The third, final and, for me, most surprising way in which Latour challenges Illich’s account of Gaia as the very paradigm of disembodied systems thinking is by making Gaia, as post-Nature, the key to the very revival of Christianity that Illich himself sought.  Latour, as we have seen, sees in the totalized concept of Nature a deprivation of freedom and spontaneity – continuous and continuing creation immobilized within a rigid and reified framework of law and petrified theology.  The Incarnation, in this preoccupied and predetermined order, is banished to a supernatural realm – Latour’s “vanishing point far from all flesh” where it exerts a purely “spiritual” leverage on human affairs.  Shatter monolithic Nature and return the sciences to their full, fallible humanity, Latour says, and the Incarnation might “recapture its momentum” and resume its proper vocation: to move hand to hand or “neighbor to neighbor” without plan or preordination in an unfinished creation.  

It became clear to me reading Facing Gaia and thinking back on earlier works that Latour’s political proposals resemble Illich’s much more closely than I had previously thought.  In his Tools for Conviviality (1973) Illich spelled out what he called the “three formidable obstacles” standing in the way of “recovery” – by which he meant a way of life in balance with its surroundings.[110]  The first was “the delusion about science” which has removed science from the realm of personal knowledge and turned it into a “spectral production agency” turning out certified knowledge which ultimately overwhelms and paralyzes “the social and political imagination.”  People come to think that they are governed by knowledge which is of a different kind than their own – a finished knowledge from which all traces of its fabrication have been erased, like Marx’s “commodity fetish” which takes on “a life of [its] own” as an “autonomous figure” stripped of all vestige of the labour that went into it.[111]   Illich wanted to demystify scientific knowledge.  This has also been Latour’s purpose.  He has offered an account of scientific knowledge production in which everything that goes into producing and sustaining this knowledge remains visible and accountable.  He has shown that most scientific facts are not the unmediated disclosures of genius by the product of complex and ingenious craftsmanship.  And he has tried to deprive science of its epistemological privilege in order to return it to the common and entirely political world in which we must decide together what to do.  

This similarity goes further, I think.  Illich wrote Tools for Conviviality in order to restore the balance between what people can do for themselves and what is done for them by their institutions and advanced technologies.  He proposed a set of criteria by which tools that people can use for what he called convivial purposes can be distinguished from those tools which, in effect, use people – tools that are too big, too complex, too destructive or too expensive to be controlled.  And he insisted that the control of tools was a political decision – not a scientific or a religious one.  Latour’s attempt to “bring the sciences into democracy” has had no other purpose.  He has believed that the sciences “show the path of the earth” – a point I’ll come to in a minute – but he has also argued that the “modern constitution” has deprived people of exactly the same principle or criterion which Illich was seeking in Tools for Conviviality.  By segregating Nature from Society, and science from politics, modernity allowed the unregulated production of what Latour calls hybrids – those uncanny creations of techno-science that fuse nature and society and appear as nobody’s doing.  Science discovers nature; politics governs society; but nuclear missiles, antibiotic resistant bacteria, and melting glaciers come out of nowhere, admitted by a secret, unwatched door which the constitution doesn’t recognize.   The point of recognizing the florid creativity of science, for Latour, is to be able to regulate it – “to replace,” he says, “the clandestine proliferation of hybrids but their regulated and commonly agreed upon production” in the interests of “moderation” and “slowing down.”[112]  This does not seem very different from Illich’s ambition “to find the roof of technological characteristics under which a society wants to live and be happy.”[113]  So I think, in summary, that there is broad agreement between Latour and Illich – both on the need to dispel the mists and quieten the choruses of angels around the throne of Science, and on the need to bring techno-science within the purview of politics. 

The surprise of Facing Gaia, as I’ve said, was to find Latour so seemingly close to Illich on “the dynamic of the Incarnation.”  In the interviews I published after his death as The Rivers North of the Future, Illich sketched a vision of “modernity as an extension of Church history.”[114]  He argued that the reformed Church of the second millennium, and then a whole array of modern inheritors, had taken salvation into human hands in order to better manage it.  Modernity, he said, could only be fully understood as a corruption or perversion of Christian vocation, whereby a supremely free and unpredictable calling was brought under administration.  The alternative which he preached, until formal proceedings against him by the Holy Office made him withdraw from Church service, was de-clericalization of priesthood and de-bureaucratization of mission.  Latour’s account of the “beings of religion,” as intermittent and unbiddable, assorts well with Illich’s vision of a reformed church.  So does his sense of the Incarnation as a personal encounter and not a theological “vanishing point” far from earthly existence.  There are many other congruences.  Latour points to the common etymological roots of humility and humus and urges living awareness of this link, so that humility becomes a relation to the earth and not just the placation of an always potentially jealous god.   Illich is the author of a “Declaration on Soil” that laments the absence of soil from Western philosophy and praises the bonds which tie us to the earth.[115]  Latour praises the critical work of his friend, German philosopher Peter Sloterdyck on what the latter calls spherology – the prevalence in Western iconography of transparent, traversable spheres, tending always to the imagination of a total visibility and total spatialization.[116]  Illich speaks of “the long drawn out martyrdom of the image,” as more and more of what cannot be seen was brought to virtual visibility.  Both want to disable the myth of progress, deprive time’s arrow of its confident direction, and reestablish the dignity, authority, and fecundity of the past.  Both imagine a revived role for religion, once it renounces its claim to worldly authority. 

There is also common ground in Illich and Latour’s interpretation of the figure of Gaia.  In the concluding chapter of Deschooling Society, in an essay called “The Rise of Epimethean Man,” Illich wrote about Gaia, as follows:

From immemorial time, the Earth Goddess had been worshipped on the slope of Mount Parnassus which was the center and navel of the Earth.  There, at Delphi (from delphys, the womb), slept Gaia, the sister of Chaos and Eros.  Her son, Python the dragon, guarded her moonlit and dewy dreams, until Apollo, the Sun God, the architect of Troy, rose from the east, slew the dragon, and became the owner of Gaia’s cave.  His priests took over her temple.  They employed a local maiden, sat her on a tripod over Earth’s smoking navel, and made her drowsy with fumes.  Then they rhymed her ecstatic utterances into hexameters of self-fulfilling prophecies. From all over the Peloponnesus men brought their problems to Apollo’s sanctuary.  The oracle was consulted on social options, such as measures to be taken to stop a plague or a famine, to choose the right constitution for Sparta or the propitious sites for cities which later became Byzantium and Chalcedon.  The never-erring arrow became Apollo’s symbol.  Everything about him became purposeful and useful.[117] 

According to Illich, when people worshipped Gaia, they “trusted in the delphos of the earth” and in “the interpretation of dreams and images.”   When the priests of Apollo took over, instrumental rationality put Gaia’s dreams into service.  There was “a transition from a world in which dreams were interpreted to a world in which oracles were made.” Illich supplemented this passage in an interview he recorded with his friend Jean Marie Domenach for French public television in 1972 – an interview that took place in a garden in front of a statue of Pandora, a figure whom Illich took to be derived from Gaia, though in a much reduced status, the Greeks having become by the time Pandora was imagined “moral and misogynous patriarchs. [118] Illich tells Domenach that the myth of Gaia in its original form is “the best story about the corruption of man.”  “In today’s world,” he continues, “if we don’t turn back to Pandora/Ge, who lived, and I believe still lives, in her cave at Delphos, if we don’t regain our ability to recognize the dream language she can interpret, we are condemned.  The world cannot survive.”  This is a very strong statement, but not an isolated one.  In Gender Illich wrote about the attenuation that took place in image of Mary during Church history.  Mary “shed the aura of myth that had been borrowed from the goddess and the strong theological epithets with which the Church fathers had adorned her [e.g. theotokos, the God-bearer].”  She became “a model for ‘woman’…the conscience of genderless man.”[119]  These hints at goddess worship and Mariolatry were not developed but they remain evocative. 

Illich’s statement to Domenach that human survival depends on our ability to interpret “the dream language” in which the earth speaks to us seems to come particularly close to Latour’s version of Gaia.  Dreams are chaotic and unconscious products of the mind.  Order and meaning may emerge from this chaos, but dreams in their raw state frequently flout the principles of temporal sequence, hierarchy of significance, identity, and narrative consistency that prevail in the conscious mind.  Latour’s Gaia, in a similar way, is beyond the reach of rational understanding.  It lacks hierarchy and has neither “frame... goal…[nor] direction.”  It possesses “neither parts nor whole” and so cannot be imagined as any sort of super-organism.  Unlike Nature which manifested order even when it overawed and overpowered humanity, Gaia is not a fixed or predictable order but more of an on-going improvisation in which one order dissolves kaleidoscopically into another.   In both accounts – Illich’s dreaming goddess, Latour’s alarming “intruder” on modernity’s fantasies – human pretensions are punctured.  Both preach a return to earth and a rejection of images of humanity as “Atlas, Earth Gardener, Steward [or] Master Engineer” – the expressions are Latour’s who repudiates them because they imply, wrongly, that we are “alone in the command post” but they could as easily be Illich’s.[120]  In both cases humility is the key note.  Latour wants to revive religion as the spirit that makes us alert and aware that there are things which we “must not neglect.”[121]  Illich too feared negligence, telling me once that his motto was “I fear the Lord is passing me by.”[122]  

Do all these agreements suggest that Illich would have recanted his critique of the scientific version of Gaia, had he only known of Latour’s interpretation?  I doubt it because major differences remain.  The first concerns nature.  “My roots are in natural law,” Illich once told an interviewer.  “I have grown up in that tradition.  I just cannot shed the certainty that the norms with which we ought to live correspond to our insight into what we are.”[123]  He repeated variations on this statement many times.  Once he told me that he understood himself best when he supposed the world to be resting in God’s hand “as you can see on any Romanic or Gothic apse.”[124]  He said he was proud to belong to a church that “could still say, “It’s against nature,” even if the Church sometimes trivialized this denunciation by applying it to the wrong objects.[125]  He staked much of his argument in Tools for Conviviality on the restoration of “natural” balances and scales.  This seems to say clearly enough that the world is a created order from which we can derive norms.  Latour, on the other hand, hinges his whole program on the abolition of nature and its replacement by a de-moralized, de-divinized, “finally secular” alternative.  The opposition here seems stark, except that each man means something entirely different by Nature.  Nature for Latour is an almost entirely malign concept – a concept that replaces an active, inventive world by an inert and passive creature of Law, and that hides both the profuse creativity of science and its political responsibility for its creations behind the myth that politics belongs entirely to a separate domain called Society.  Nature, for Illich, is the spontaneous,, living, speaking world bought to its ultimate refinement in the doctrine of contingency in which the world appears as “pure gift,” and every time, place and creature speaks of the overflowing creative spirit that sustains it in existence from moment to moment.[126]   These two accounts are not easily compared.  But it appears, at first glance, that Illich, rather than opposing Latour, is part of that reanimation of tradition that Latour hopes will occur once the dead hand of the “modern constitution” is lifted.  Illich characterizes the transition from the medieval to the modern world as follows: “Things no longer are what they are because they correspond to God’s will but because God has laid into what we now call nature the laws by which they evolve.”[127]  The second half of this description, in which God, in effect, disappears into law-like nature, is pretty much identical with Latour’s account of the crossed-out God and Nature-as-automaton.  If all we know or need of God is to be found in Nature, then God has become, as Illich’s says, “redundant.”  Illich spoke always of the living God – the  God with whose will we “correspond” – and, like Pascal contrasting “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” with “the God of the philosophers,” [128]  he was always scornful of any merely supposed or deduced God – “To hell with God as a hypothesis,” as he once roundly declared.[129] Latour is interested in what comes after Nature, in its modern sense, Illich is concerned with what is before it.  

As I’ve said, Illich more than once declined to discuss Lovelock’s Gaia with me. “Stop it with [the] appeal to science,” he said impatiently on one such occasion.  “What the difference between that kind of science and religion is I don’t know.”  This summary dismissal of a large swath of contemporary reality is of a piece with many other statements that he made in the last twenty years of his life.  When the Dallas Institute for the Humanities invited him, in 1984, to reflect on the artificial lake that the city was then considering creating, he told his auditors that the “recycled toilet flush” with which this sparkling new urban amenity was to be filled could never become “the water of dreams.”[130]  His hypothesis was that planning and processing beyond a certain intensity deprives water of its imaginative resonance and leaves behind only H2O.  When I asked him later if that ruled out baptism, since the water which Christ “sanctified…to the mystical washing away of sin” was clearly something more than mere H2O, he at first denied it, but later said he was not so sure.[131] “I wonder,” he said, “if God might have to redeem us by fire because we have done away with water.”[132]  On another occasion, speaking about the contemporary body as an internalized “ideological construct” rather than a lived experience, he told me that he had come to the conclusion that “when the angel Gabriel told that girl in the town of Nazareth that God wanted to be in her belly, he pointed to a body which has gone from the world in which I live.”[133]  Illich had warned in Tools for Conviviality that, if limits were not set to institutional hubris, humanity would find itself “totally enclosed within [its own] artificial creation, with no exit.”[134]  He gave many evidences in later life that he thought this total enclosure had occurred and the world had indeed been swallowed up by this new human creation and “disappeared.”  This thought has no more poignant index than the claim that the Incarnation has become inaccessible because it pertains to a different body than the iatrogenic “construct” in which most now walk around.  

This apocalyptic strain in the later Illich can sometimes obscure the equally significant and equally emphatic non-apocalyptic strain.[135]  These elements in his thought are in my opinion complementary, which doesn’t mean that they are not contradictory.  The world is made of contradiction.  Complementarity is the disposition to acknowledge this character and dance with it, as I believe Illich did.  But the unwary reader might easily form the idea that Illich in the first half of his career made a constructive critique of modern institutions with a view to reining them in and reinstituting the human comedy within its proper limits, and then, in the second half, despaired of all reform in an Age of Systems so suffocating that it seemed to point only to the end of the world.   It was as a student of Illich trying to come to terms with this complementary contradiction that I rejoiced in Latour’s claim that the time of the end has been reached and is, at the same time, unreachable, and that this contradiction must be endured and sustained, not resolved or overcome.  A lot depends here on how religious language is used and understood – the point that Voegelin made long ago when he began to try to disentangle time and eternity, earth and heaven, historical experience and symbols of faith.  Illich and Latour are also aligned within this project, but it can be hard to see because of their radically different emphases. 

Let me take a single issue in order to try and make this clearer: the status of science.  Illich made the overcoming of the “delusion about science” one of the keystones of his early work.  When he saw that this delusion was only intensifying in a cybernetic science that could no longer distinguish the world from its models of the world, he seemed to say, more or less, that science is over.  (In 1992, we get, for example, “…science in America has become fundable research, and in Germany it’s tasks for which civil service positions can be created.  I mean stop it with that appeal to science.”[136]). Latour on the other hand has been admiring of climate science and its painstaking effort to show “the path of the earth.”  He has staked everything on a re-vision of the sciences.  Only when the sciences are seen in their true light, he says, will politics “begin again.”  You might say that he has tried to imagine the sciences as they would be if Illich’s “delusion” did not obtain.   These are, I think, complementary positions that can learn from each other.  

Illich says: “As long as you think about the world as a whole, the time for human beings is over.”  This has been my watchword in the discussion of climate change that is now well into its third decade. The worldwide civilization whose seed was Western modernity is unsustainable.  Men like John Ruskin and William Morris knew that in the 19th century.  M.K. Gandhi knew it in the 1920’s when he wrote in Young India that that if a society as populous as India ever took to industrialization in the style of Britain “it would strip the world bare like locusts” [137]  Fritz Schumacher knew it when he published Small Is Beautiful in 1973.  All cultures and civilization that have emphasized reciprocity with some donating source have known it.  And all have known that human encroachment isn’t just bad for the biosphere, it also bad for human beings for whom the path to wisdom has always gone through humility (humus) and the observance of due measure and due respect for what we have not made and cannot replace.  The climate change discussion, on the other hand, has mostly been about how far the biosphere can safely be pushed.  It has been about management, often on a scale that is inherently corrupting to human beings.  “Managing planet earth” and “saving the planet” are examples of expressions that evince this corruption – these phrases are uttered frequently and without blush, but they can only imply either tyranny or hubris or both.  So there’s a terrible paradox involved: addressing climate change as a question of mitigation and not of repentance reinforces the habits of thought that produce climate change in the first place.  We don’t ask: what is good?  We ask only: what can we get away with without changing?   Illich helped me to recognize this predicament.  And since, if we lived as we should, climate change would take care of itself, I didn’t see the need for a specific politics of climate change apart from the more general aim of re-inhabitation, limits to growth etc. 

A second point, related to the first, is that knowledge of something as vast and imponderable as “the climate” can never be certain.  Given the number of guesstimated assumptions that must go into a model of the climate, it should not be a surprise that these models sometimes misfire.  This then leads to conflict and misunderstanding.   Claiming too much for science generates a reactionary anti-science faction that admits far too little.  What gets lost is any recognition that there are limits to knowledge.  What Wendell Berry calls “the way of ignorance” – the habit of acting in the light of all that we do not and cannot know – becomes unthinkable.[138]  The failures of scientific management – from Thalidomide to the collapse of the Canadian cod fishery – tend to be forgotten.   Perceived ‘anti-science” evokes a credulous “trust in science.”   Instead of seeking solid moral grounds on which to stand and on which to act, we pursue the divisive will of the wisp of “scientific” assurance. 

Enter Bruno Latour. Instead of claiming that climate science is bullet-proof – rejected only by yahoos, “deplorables,” and deniers – he admits that the science has its frailties and vulnerabilities and he praises “the gift” of the climate skeptics.  Instead of asking all to bow unquestioningly to “the science,” he suggests that the sciences must enter the political arena prepared to argue their case on the same terms as everyone else argues, and not as a privileged disclosure from a higher sphere.  Instead of portraying Gaia as a unified and intelligible system that might conceivably be subject to management, he portrays it as an improvised and incomprehensibly complex assemblage, with none of the coherence, neat categories and clear lines of authority formerly evident in Nature – the dancer and the dance now indistinguishable. 

Latour sees Gaia as grounds for humility, not glorification.  It is first of all not one, as Nature is, but an aggregate of diverse agencies engaged in continuous accommodation and adjustment to one another.  This provides a basis for a dramatic reduction in human self-importance – we are no longer “alone in the command post” – and the foundation for a new pluralism.  This pluralism is of two kinds. First, it enlarges politics to include all the non-humans who are both part of and subject to what was formerly Society.  (Oceans and forests belong at the table alongside France and Kazakhstan, as Latour and his friends tried to demonstrate at a “Theater of Negotiations” they staged in 2015, just before the Paris Climate Summit.  At this gathering, the usual suspects were joined at the table by “Indigenous Peoples.”  “endangered species” and various other natural forms and non-national groups.  Territory was defined “not as a two-dimensional segment of a map but as something on which an entity depends for its subsistence, something that can be made explicit or visualized, something that an entity is prepared to defend.”)  Second, it accepts humanity itself as incommensurably and irreducibly diverse and no longer to be ranked on a single scale or confined in a single story. This leads to his sense that newly defined peoples, or collectives, must make their allegiances explicit and seek a new modus vivendi through peace-oriented diplomacy.  

And this is where Latour again comes so unexpectedly close to Illich.  The campaigns Illich conducted between the 1960’s and the early 1980’s – against development, radical monopoly, and the myth of scarcity – all turned ultimately on his view that these things were consequences of the perverse institutionalization of the Gospel in the Latin Christian Church.  Freedom was the essence of this Gospel – it is “for freedom,” Paul writes to the Galatians, that “Christ has set us free”[139] – but the very universality of this grant of freedom soon urged an unprecedented sense of mission and a universal institution into which all should be enrolled.  Previous societies had stood aloof from “the others” around them.  “Only during late antiquity, with the Western European Church,” Illich wrote, “did the alien become someone in need, someone to be brought in.  This view of the alien as a burden has become constitutive for Western society; without this universal mission to the world outside, what we call the West could not have come to be.”[140]  Behind this sense of universal mission lay the idea that the truth which had been shown in Christ could be possessed, contained, administered and ultimately realized in history so long as all kept their feet on the one path.   Illich wanted to break this spell and put an end to the disastrous conflation of the earthly with the heavenly city that lies at the root of Western modernity and the world-wide predicament it has now generated.  He wanted those who had been “brought in” to be let out again.  This was in the interest of bringing human societies back within human bounds – “the roof under which all can live” – but also in the interest of renewing Christianity.  Latour’s aim seems to be just the same.  His vision of politics “begun again,” freed from the inhibiting supervision of that “disinterested third party”[141] – God, Science, Nature, Progress, etc. – that stood always above it seems very close to Illich’s attempt to end “the war on subsistence” and create a renaissance of diverse vernacular styles.[142]  So does Latour’s vision of “the power of conversion of the Incarnation” pulled back into the human world from its theological ‘vanishing point” and allowed once again to move hand to hand and “neighbour to neighbour.” 

Illich relished the role of the man of the past.  “I’ve increasingly been certain, as I’ve grown older,” he said, “that it’s good to be very consciously a remainder of the past, one who still survives from another time one through whom roots still go far back, and not necessarily examined roots.”[143] This stance, in a man as superbly attuned to his times as Illich, had its uses.  He made the past vividly present for many people. (This is another point in common with Latour whose We Have Never Been Modern argues that we should stop patronizing our ancestors, reorient time’s arrow and supplement progress with regress.)  But Illich could also carry this stance to a fault, as I believe he did, when he told me “stop it with that appeal to science” because Jim Lovelock had discovered nothing that religion didn’t already know.  Lovelock, I continue to be believe, did discover something – about how our unstable atmosphere is stabilized, about how clouds are made, about how land creatures get the iodine they need, and, ultimately, about the kind of world that we live in – a world that makes itself and will in time re-make itself without us, should we render it uninhabitable for creatures like us.  

I cannot, finally, answer the question of whether Illich rejected Lovelock’s findings on theological grounds.  Nor have I space in this already overlong essay to examine the  theological implications of Lovelock’s hypothesis.  I can say that Illich’s claim that a theory of planetary self-regulation is disembodying and “inimical to what earth is” doesn’t say anything about whether the theory can be judged true on the basis of the evidence presented for it.  I will leave moot the question of whether a God who holds the world in his hands could conceivably hold a world as indifferent to humanity as the one Lovelock pictures.  But what I do want to point out is that Latour has answered many of Illich’s practical objections to the Gaia theory, such as that it is abstract, other-denying, and earth-denying.  He has also challenged Illich’s claim that science is over, with a vision of science disaggregated and brought to earth.  One of Latour’s reviewers, John Tresch, puts it very succinctly: “Rather than a view from nowhere of a pre-assembled Nature, objectivity can be recognized in the quantity and rich variety of mediations that establish and maintain robust chains of reference. Scientists must foreground the instruments, institutions, and relationships that form the sciences’ lifeblood; they strengthen their power by realistically presenting their limitations.”[144]  This is science on the other side of “the delusion about science” that Illich deplored in Tools for Conviviality, but it is still science and still grappling with a predicament concerning that synoptically-perceived “world as a whole” that signalled to Illich that “the time for human beings is over.”  All of Illich’s reservations retain their force with me.  The question I would like to leave hanging at the end is whether Latour’s revision of Gaia has opened a way forward which respects Illich’s reservations.  

A final point:  Illich is an anti-idolator, and the idol he singled out for particular attention in his last years was life.  Life, in its contemporary meaning, is the work of human hands, something we are constantly constructing – in law – wrongful life – medicine – saving life – commerce – adding life, etc.  The idol obscures the true God, and it’s having persuasively borrowed one of the names of God – “I am Life” – makes it, for Illich, “the most dangerous idol the Church had had to face in her history.”  His denunciation of Gaia rests on the idea that Gaia is one of the emblems of this idol.   Latour, on the other hand, has come to the conclusion that anti-idolatry is an infinite regress and leads to a situation in which endless sterile denunciation gets in the way of constructive work.  “When one begins with iconoclasm,” he says in Facing Gaia, “one never ends.”[145] In his Inquiry into Modes of Existence, he expands this thought, “The Golden Calf has no sooner been cast down, than the Tabernacle with its sculpted Cherubim is put up.  Polyeucte has just destroyed Zeus’s temple and someone is already erecting an altar on the same spot with the relics of St. Polyeucte.”  Each anti-idol becomes a new idol in turn.  Latour thinks that iconoclasm, or anti-idolatry, is one of the main tributaries of modern critique and produces in the end a somewhat fanatical spirit.  Critique does the work of purification and separation mandated by the modern constitution, but its horror of mixtures hides the “metamorphic zone” in which our world is actually made.  His proposal is to substitute what he calls composition for critique, as the engine of intellectual culture.  “Critique is past,” Latour says.  “We are in such a situation of intellectual ruins, that the question has now become one of composition… Composition means you have to take up all the tasks of assembling disjointed parts, so to speak, from the ground up.”[146]  

Their positions seem to be opposite.  And yet I think they are, once again, quite close to one another.  Illich’s defence of the varieties of subsistence, against prescribed forms of development and modernization, was in many ways a defence of composition – of people’s right and competence to assemble the elements of their lives and livelihoods as they see fit.  Latour, for his part, is a formidable critic and anti-idolator – remember his resounding, “There is no such thing as science,” from his Irreduction of the Sciences – but he has taken the plurality of truth and the plurality of religions seriously, and that has made him aware of the tasks of diplomacy, peace-making and negotiation in a way that rules out the endless denunciations by which the true God eternally trounces his rivals.  Different emphases obscure complementary positions.  In the 1980’s widespread misunderstanding of Illich’s book Gender largely lost him the ear of the social movements of the time.  Latour’s Facing Gaia seems to me to re-open a possibility of dialogue.  If I am right and there is such an opening then Latour’s “This contradiction must not be overcome” seems to be a promising saying to emblazon over its entrance.  



In the following notes, I have abbreviated frequently cited titles of Illich’s as follows: 

David Cayley, Ivan Illich in Conversation, House of Anansi, 1992 (IIC)

David Cayley, The Rivers North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich, Anansi, 2005 (RNF)

Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality, Harper and Row, 1973  (TC)

Ivan Illich, In the Mirror of the Past, Marion Boyars, 1992 (IMP)

 

 
References

[1] “Religion and the New Science,” Part Two, Nov. 4, 1985; “The Gaia Hypothesis,” April 30, 1992; and “How to Think About Science,” Part Six, Jan. 2, 2008.  Transcripts here: http://www.davidcayley.com/transcripts

[2] IIC, p. 287

[3] “The Gaia Hypothesis,” op. cit., p. 4

[4] “How To Think About Science,” op. cit., p. 48

[5] Stephen Jay Gould, “Kropotkin Was No Crackpot,” Natural History, Vol. 97, No. 7, 1988, p. 21

[6] “The Gaia Hypothesis,” op. cit., p. 4

[7] “How To Think About Science,” p. 51; Ideas on the Nature of Science, p. 120

[8] “The Gaia Hypothesis”, p. 7; Lovelock relates that he had submitted a paper with several other scientists that showed a connection between marine algae and cloud condensation nuclei.  The paper was accepted as valid, but the editor insisted that all reference to the Gaia hypothesis be stricken from it on the grounds that the theory was “a danger to science”

[9] “How To Think About Science,” p. 50; Ideas on the Nature of Science, p. 118

[10] 2001 Amsterdam Declaration on Earth System Science http://www.igbp.net/about/history/2001amsterdamdeclarationonearthsystemscience.4.1b8ae20512db692f2a680001312.html

[11] Quotations about this watershed come from IIC. p. 124 and pp.169-1707

[12] “A Call for Institutional Revolution” was the subtitle of Illich’s first book – 1970’s Celebration of Awareness.

[13] RNF, p. 162

[14] Ivan Illich,  “Brave New Biocracy: Health Care From Womb to Tomb,” NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly, Winter 1994, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 9

[15] RNF, p. 79

[16] RNF, p. 266

[17] Ibid., p 227

[18] TC, p. 27

[19] Ivan Illich, The Powerless Church, Penn State Press, 2018, p.165

[20] RNF, p. 47

[21] IIC, p. 184

[22] RNF, p. 132

[23] IIC, p. 185; following quotations in this paragraph on the same page

[24] John 1:14

[25] Ivan Illich, Celebration of Awareness, Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1970, p. 33 – subsequent quotes, until noted, same page

[26] RNF, p. 48

[27] “Commencement [Address] at the University of Puerto Rico,” New York Review of Books, Oct. 9, 1969, p. 15

[28] Luke 1:34

[29] RNF, pp. 47-48

[30] David Cayley, Ivan Illich: An Intellectual Journey, Penn State Press, 2021

[31] IMP, p. 220

[32] IMP., p. 200

[33] Adam Kuper, review of Emmanuelle Loyer, Lévi-Strauss, TLS, Oct. 14, 2016, p. 4; following quotes, same place7

[34] Illich dealt with this subject of what had changed since he wrote Medical Nemesis sin two places.  The first was “Twelve Years After Medical Nemesis: A Plea for Body History,” in IMP; the second was “Death Undefeated” in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Dec. 23, 1995, Vol 311, pp. 1652-1653.

[35] RNF, p. 210

[36] RNF, p. 184

[37] My account here is based on an unpublished memoir Illich wrote of this event.

[38] IMP, p. 220 (This quotation comes from a presentation to a Lutheran congress in Chicago in 1989.  No text survives of Illich’s speech at the event Campbell organized, but I’m quite confident that this quote represents what he said on the earlier occasion.)

[39] “The Institutional Construction of a New Fetish: Human Life,” IMP, pp. 218-232

[40] IIC, p. 279

[41] Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine, Penguin, 1976, p. 269

[42] Ivan Illich, “Blasphemy: A Radical Critique or Technological Culture,” Science Technology and Society Working Paper No. 2, Penn State University, 1994  (This program has been discontinued, and this paper is no longer available.)

[43] John 10:10

[44] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wrongful_life

[45] Peter and Jean Medawar, Aristotle to Zoos: A Philosophical Dictionary of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 66-67

[46] John Maddox, “A Book for Burning?”, Nature 293, Sept. 24, 1981, pp. 245-246; Sheldrake discusses the affair in my radio series “How To Think About Science,” transcript p. 81.  The transcript is here: http://www.davidcayley.com/transcripts

[47] Robert Rosen, Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin and Fabrication of Life, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. xiii

[48] Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, New Science Library, Boulder: Shambala, 1984, p. xxvii

[49] Religion and the New Science http://www.davidcayley.com/podcasts/category/Religion+and+Science

[50] IMP, pp.229-230

[51] Ibid., p. 222 ff.

[52] The Unbearable Lightness of Being

[53]  IIC, pp. 263-264

[54]  Ibid., p. 264

[55] IIC, p, 276

[56] RNF, p.137; the image of a bridge that stays on the same side of a river I owe to one Illich’s former German students, Andreas Calic of Bremen.

[57] When Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci appeared at the Chinese court at the end of the 16th century, one of the complaints brought against him was that his belief in “a master in heaven” could potentially disturb the perfect balance between heaven and earth. French scholar Jacques. Gernet has told the story in his China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures (Cambridge University Press, 1981).  Illich repeats it in RNF, p. 133 ff.

[58] Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, 2nd edition, Polity Press, 2002, p. 169

[59] Ibid., p. 178

[60] Myth of the Secular, Part 6 http://www.davidcayley.com/podcasts/category/Myth+of+the+Secular- Part Six

[61] RNF, p. 52

[62] The letter is unpublished.  A translation of it by Barbara Duden and Muska Nagel, entitled “The Loss of World and Flesh” was read out at Illich’s funeral by Wolfgang Sachs, and I am quoting from that text.

[63] IIC, p. 287

[64] https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-science-part-1-24-1.2953274; transcript: http://www.davidcayley.com/transcripts; a reduced transcript of the series was published in book from as Ideas on the Nature of Science (Goose Lane, 2009)

[65] “How To Think About Science,” op. cit., p. 1

[66] Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Harvard, 1988, p. 212 ff.  Latour’s “Irreduction” is presented in numbered propositions.  I will avoid further footnotes by supplying the number I am quoting in my text.

[67] Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism, Harvard, 2015, Chapter 7

[68] Bruno Latour, The Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, Harvard, 2004, p. 10

[69] Ideas on the Nature of Science, op. cit., p. 15

[70] Chris Selley, “If tests are unwanted then provinces should return,” National Post, Feb. 12, ‘21

[71] See, for example, https://ocla.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Rancourt-Masks-dont-work-review-science-re-COVID19-policy.pdf

[72] William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Religious Violence, Oxford, 2004’ and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States 990-1990, Basil Blackwell, 1990

[73] Facing. Gaia, p. 95

[74] Ibid., p. 97

[75] Latour presents Actor/Network and argues its potential to transform sociology for the better in Reassembling the Social (Oxford, 2005)

[76] We Have Never Been Modern, p. 79

[77] Reassembling the Social, p. 8

[78] A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Mentor, 1948/1925,  p. 52

[79] Facing Gaia, p. 46

[80] Ibid., p. 63

[81] Ibid., p. 86

[82] “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” is the concluding line of William Butler Yeats’ poem “Among School Children.”

[83] Facing Gaia, p. 31

[84] Ibid., p. 28

[85] Ibid., p. 143

[86] Ibid., p. 223

[87] Matthew 5:44

[88] Facing Gaia, p. 86; Latour’s terminology is problematic at this point because secular is one of those terms that takes its meaning from the modern constitution.  Secular implies a space cleansed of religion, but to pretend to “leave religion behind,” Latour says elsewhere, is only to bring along the worst of religion and “leave aside the antidote that they have also been able to develop.” (p. 286) If there is no prudent exit from religion, there is no “finally secular.”  Despite this incoherence, it is clear enough that what he means by “finally secular” is the end of a specific theology.

[89] Eric Voegelin,  The New Science of Politics, Chicago, 1952, p. 121

[90] Ibid., p. 120

[91] Facing Gaia, p. 198

[92] Ibid., p, 175

[93] Ibid., p. 178

[94] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-noncontradiction/

[95] See, for example, We Have Never Been Modern, op. cit., pp. 125-127

[96] The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, Anchor Books, 1988, p. 560. 554

[97] Facing Gaia, p. 285

[98] The Politics of Nature, op. cit., p. 6

[99] Ibid., p. 22; Matthew 21:42

[100] Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, Harvard, 2013, p. 308

[101] Ibid., p. 310

[102] Ibid., p. 306

[103] Ibid., p.309

[104] Facing Gaia, p. 286; subsequent quotes, until noted, same page7

[105] Romans 8:22

[106] Ibid., p. 287

[107] Collected Poetry and Prose of William Blake, op. cit., p. 70

[108] Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Harvard, 2007, p. 207 ff.

[109] IIC, p. 281

[110] TC, p 91 ff.

[111] Karl Marx, Capital, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1990, p. 165

[112] We Have Never Been Modern, op. cit., p. 142

[113] The Powerless Church, op. cit., p.165

[114] RNF, p. 169

[115] https://www.pudel.samerski.de/pdf/Illich_ua90DECLARPU.pdf

[116] Peter Sloterdjck, Bubbles: Sphere Volume I: Microspherology, Semiotext(e), 2011; Globes: Spheres Volume II, Semiotext(e), 2014; Foams: Spheres Volume III: Plural Spherology, Semiotext(e), 2016

[117] Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, Penguin Education, 1973 (first edition 1971), p. 107.

[118] https://vimeo.com/66948476

[119] Ivan Illich, Gender, Pantheon, 1982, p. 158

[120] Facing Gaia, p. 283

[121] John Tresch quotes this in his review of Facing Gaia on the Public Books site - https://www.publicbooks.org/we-have-never-known-mother-earth/. I can’t find it in the text, but I’m sure it’s there, as Latour has said this before.

[122] RNF, op. cit., p. 97

[123] This interview, which I have in typescript, was recorded by his friend Douglas Lummis in the early 1980’s, but, so far as I know, never published.

[124] IIC, p. 114

[125] Ibid., p. 101

[126] RNF, p.65

[127] Ibid., p. 68

[128] The text of Blaise Pascal’s so-called “Memorial” is quoted in full here, along with a reflection by Romano Guardini, who was one of Illich’s teachers: http://inters.org/faith-reason-pascal-memorial

[129] IIC, p. 277

[130] Ivan Illich, H2O and the Waters of Forgetfulness, Heyday, 1985

[131] Quote from the order for “The Ministration od Holy Baptism to Children,” The Book Common Prayer, Anglican Church of Canada, 1962, p, 522

[132] IIC, p. 298, n. 201

[133] RNF, p. 210

[134] TC, p. 54

[135] This point is argued at length in the chapter called Apocalypse in my new book Ivan Illich: An Intellectual Journey (Penn State Press, 2021).

[136] IIIC, p. 288

[137] Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 38, Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1953, p. 243

[138] Wendell Berry, The Way of Ignorance, Shoemaker and Hoard, 2005

[139] Galatians 5:1

[140] Ivan Illich, Shadow Work, Marion Boyars, 1980, p. 18

[141] Facing Gaia, p. 247

[142] See the essay called “The War Against Subsistence” in Shadow Work, op. cit.

[143] IIC, p. 101

[144] https://www.publicbooks.org/we-have-never-known-mother-earth/

[145] Facing Gaia, op, cit., p. 176

[146] “How to Think About Science,” op. cit., p. 447

Pandemic Revelations

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PANDEMIC REVELATIONS

 

In early April I posted an essay called “Questions About the Pandemic from the Point-of-View of Ivan Illich.”  It was written mainly to clarify my own mind and to share my thoughts with a few like-minded friends, but, thanks to the good offices of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who reposted my essay on Quod Libet, a site where he blogs, the piece was widely read, reproduced, and translated.  Since then I have been asked a number of times whether I have changed my mind about what I wrote in April.  No.  But I have continued to reflect on the meaning of what has overtaken us.  One result is an article that I wrote for the Oct. issue of the Literary Review of Canada, which is available at: https://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2020/10/the-prognosis/.  Here are some further reflections:

 

In an earlier essay, I tried to explain why a policy of total quarantine, the so-called lockdown, could gain wide acceptance, despite its being highly destructive of livelihood, social morale and, ultimately, public health.  How could people even countenance a term like lockdown, with its overtones of imprisonment and total control, let alone coming to think well of it and condemning and shaming its violators and critics?   My argument was that societies like Canada had, for a long time, been “practicing” – we’d already turned the concepts on which our pandemic policies have been founded into common sense.  These concepts include risk, safety, pro-active management, science as a mighty oracle speaking in a single authoritative voice, and above all, Life, as a quantum to be preserved at all costs.  Gradual naturalization of these concepts has made the policy that has been followed seem so rational, so inevitable, and so entirely without alternative that it has been possible to freely vilify its opponents and largely exclude them from media which might have made their voices politically influential.  But knowing this doesn’t make it any easier to swallow.  What has come into stark relief during the pandemic may have been already latently there, but to see it actualized as the outline of a new social order is still a compelling and somewhat frightening experience.  It seems worthwhile, therefore, to look further into what the pandemic has revealed and brought to light. 

SCIENCE

From the very beginning of the pandemic, there has been a steady drumbeat of scientific criticism of the policy of total quarantine – the name I will give to the attempt to keep SARS COV-2 at bay until a vaccine can be administered to all.  The first instance to come to my attention was a paper by epidemiologist John Ioannidis, a professor of medicine at Stanford, particularly expert in bio-medical statistics.  He warned of the “fiasco” that would result from introducing drastic measure in the absence of even the most elementary data, such as the infection mortality rate of the disease and the costs of immobilizing entire populations.[1]  What some of these costs might be was spelled out in a May 16th article in the British journal The Spectator by Ioannidis’s colleague, Jayanta Battacharya, writing with economist Mikko Packalen of Ontario’s Waterloo University.[2]   Entitled “Lives v. Lives” it argued that the deaths that would be caused by lockdowns were likely to far outnumber the deaths averted.  They projected, for example, a massive increase in child mortality due to loss of livelihood – an increase completely out of scale with the effects of the pandemic.  They also pointed out that lockdowns protect those already most able to protect themselves – those in comfortable situations for whom “working from home” is no more than a temporary inconvenience – and endanger those least able to protect themselves – the young, the poor and the economically marginal.  By summer a stellar  group of Canadian health professionals had recognized the same dangers as Battacharya and Packalen.[3]  In their open letter to Canada’s political leaders, they pleaded for “a balanced response” to the pandemic, arguing that the “current approach” posed serious threats to both “population health” and “equity.”  This group included two former Chief Public Health Officers for Canada, two former provincial public health chiefs, three former deputy ministers of health, three present or former deans of medicine at Canadian universities and various other academic luminaries – a virtual Who’s Who of public health in Canada.  Nevertheless, their statement created barely a ripple in the media mainstream – an astonishing fact which I’ll return to presently.

This pattern has continued – most recently with the Great Barrington Declaration.  This was a statement, issued on Oct. 6 by Martin Kulldorf, a professor of medicine at Harvard, Sunetra Gupta, a professor of theoretical epidemiology at Oxford, and Jay Battacharya of Sanford, whom I introduced a moment ago.[4]  Their statement deplored “the devastating effects on…public health” of the present policy and advocated “focused protection” – a policy of protecting those at risk from COVID while allowing everyone else to go about their business.  In this way, they reasoned, immunity could gradually build up in the healthy population, without endangering those who are particularly vulnerable to the disease. 

A little while after the Great Barrington Declaration was put into circulation, an article by a British immunologist and respiratory pharmacologist, Mike Yeadon, provided reason for hope that there might already be much higher levels of immunity than is commonly supposed.[5]  Yeadon is a veteran of the drug industry where he directed research on new treatments for respiratory infection and eventually started his own biotech company.  He argued that, even though SARS COV-2 was “novel,” it was still a coronavirus and, as such, substantially similar to other coronaviruses.  By his estimate, up to 30% of people may have possessed “reactive T-cells” capable of fighting off SARS Cov-2 infections when the pandemic began.  This is startling information, because it shows that the hypothesis from which all governments began – that all were equally vulnerable – was quite wrong.  In support of his theory Yeadon asserted that “multiple, top quality research groups around the world”[6] had shown that such cross-immunities between coronaviruses are real and effective.  His second move in this article was to try to establish how many people had been infected so far.  This he did by reckoning backwards from the so-called Infection Fatality Rate (IFR), or the percentage of people who have had the disease who die from it.  (If you know the percentage who have died you can derive from it the total number infected.)  Here he relied on the work or John Ionannidis – he of the “fiasco” warning mentioned earlier – who had recently published in the Bulletin of the WHO a peer-reviewed meta-study – a study surveying other studies – in which he estimated the infection mortality rate of COVID-19, arriving at a median figure of .23%.[7]  (This figure falls to .05% when deaths among those over seventy are excluded.). Applying Ioannidis’s estimates to the British population, Yeadon calculated that up to 30% of the British population had probably been infected.  Combining his two numbers – those with prior immunity and those with immunity acquired during the pandemic, he concluded that herd immunity was probably in sight.  

The positions taken by Yeadon and the Great Barrington epidemiologists have been echoed or anticipated by many other health professionals.  On September 20, a group of nearly 400 Belgian doctors, supported by more than a thousand other health workers, published an open letter pleading for an end to “emergency” measures and calling for open public discussion. [8]  Ten days later more than twenty Ontario physicians sent a comparable letter to Ontario Premier Doug Ford.  Whether all these people are “right” is not the question I want to raise here.  Since only time will tell, and even when it does, probably not definitively, I don’t even think that’s the proper question.  Better questions might be: is what they’re saying plausible, is it well founded, is it worth discussing?  Science supposedly works by a patient and painstaking process of eventually getting things right by first being willing to get them wrong and then comparing notes in the hope of finally arriving at a better account.  But what we have seen during this pandemic is something quite different: the strange spectacle of governments and established media trumpeting their attachment to science while, at the same time, marginalizing or excluding any scientific opinion not in agreement with their preferred policy.  This is striking in the case of the discussion, or lack of discussion, of herd immunity – a natural fact which has somehow been vilified as a heartless “strategy” recommended by those who don’t mind seeing a lot of their fellow citizens killed.[9]  (In case this seems extreme I will provide evidence when I come to my discussion of media.).  This began in March when the British government were held to be following a policy of herd immunity and immediately shamed into introducing the same stringent lockdown imposed by all comparable countries, with the qualified exception of Sweden.  (In the face of this shaming, the British government denied that it had ever had such a policy, so whether it did or not remains moot.) The same arguments have recently been brought to bear against the Great Barrington Declaration.”  There was, for example, “the John Snow memorandum” in which a group of doctors denounced any “management strategy relying upon immunity from natural infections.”  This memorandum haughtily declined to mention the Great Barrington Declaration by name, as if even mentioning would give it an undeserved dignity, but was clearly a response to it nonetheless.  

Three points stand out for me in the positions of the Great Barrington signatories.  The first, which they have all reiterated almost plaintively, is that what they are recommending was formerly, in Jay Battacharya’s words, “standard public health practice.”[10]  The novelty is not in the idea that humanity must come to terms with a new virus; it’s in the idea that this process of reaching what epidemiologists call “endemic equilibrium” can somehow be forestalled, postponed or avoided altogether. This hope has been fostered by the rhetoric of war that has supported total mobilization against COVID-19 from the outset, and this rhetoric has in turn depended on public ignorance of elementary virology.  (By this, I mean, roughly speaking, the sheer number of viruses to which we are exposed, the role viruses have played in our evolution, the role they continue to play within us, and the robustness of our defences against viral infections.).  “So powerful and ancient are viruses,” says Luis P. Villareal, the founding director of the Center for Virus Research at the Irvine campus of the University of California, “that I would summarize their role in life as ‘Ex Virus Omnia’ (from virus everything).”[11]  Appreciation that what we are currently going through with a new virus is natural and, historically speaking, normal, might do a lot to take the air out of the frequently repeated and self-dramatizing claim that it is quite “unprecedented,” “the greatest health care crisis in our history”[12] (Prime Minister Trudeau) etc.  

The second point is that herd immunity is not a “strategy” but a condition.  Whether it’s reached by vaccination or by immunity acquired through natural exposure, it is the way in which we get along with viruses.  The idea that this process can be extensively reshaped by what the John Snow memo writers call “management strategy” seems fanciful to the Great Barrington writers.  It is at least debatable.  It might be true that isolation works to “flatten the curve”,  and that masks reduce viral load and thus sometimes transform a sickness-inducing dose into a beneficial “innoculum.”  But one still has to ask what is gained and what is lost by these interventions and postponements.  Can we really circumvent nature and maintain control without violating the Hippocratic maxim that when the way is not clear one should at least refrain from harm?   

This brings up the third and decisive point: the definition of public health.  Can this definition be confined to the prevention of a single disease, however much of a challenge it poses, or must it be conceived as taking in all the various determinants of health?  If the second definition be accepted, then I think a case can be made that the policy of total mobilization against COVID has been a catastrophe.  Consider just a preliminary sketch of the consequences.  There has been widespread and potentially fatal loss of livelihood throughout the world, especially amongst economically marginal groups.  Businesses that have taken years to build have been destroyed.  Suicide, depression, addiction and domestic violence have all increased.  Public debt has swelled to potentially crippling proportions.  The performing arts have been devastated.  Precious “third places”[13] that sustain conviviality have closed.  Fear has been sown between people.  Homelessness has grown to the point where some downtown Toronto parks have begun to resemble the hobo camps of the 1930’s.  There have been surges in other diseases that have gone untreated due to COVID preoccupation.  Many formerly face-to-face interactions have been virtualized, and this change threatens, in many cases, to become permanent – it seems, for example, that “leading universities” like Harvard and U.C. Berkeley have enthusiastically adopted on-line teaching in the hopes of franchising their expertise in future.  The list goes on.  Is this a worthwhile price to pay to avert illness amongst healthy people who could for the most part have sustained the illness?  The question, by and large, has not even been asked.  We don’t even know how much illness has been averted by our draconian policies, and we probably never will, since the experiment of comparing a locked down population to a freely circulating one would be impossible to conduct.  In the absence of such an experiment most discussion will founder on the elementary distinction between correlation and cause – that a lockdown was introduced and the disease abated does not prove that the lockdown was the cause of the abatement. 

This is a glaring issue.  The course of the epidemic in different countries is almost invariably ascribed to the policy followed by its government: Jacinda Ardern saved New Zealand, Donald Trump sank the United States, the scientifically minded Angela Merkel brought Germany through much more safely than bumbling Boris Johnson did in Great Britain, etc.  This overlooks a huge amount that is not in the control of politicians – New Zealand is comprised of two remote islands; the United States suffers from epidemic obesity; populations differ in their habits, susceptibilities and even their genetic makeup.  Anyone who tries to understand why they caught a cold when they got a cold and why on another occasion they didn’t while someone else did will recognize an element of mystery, or at least obscurity.  We don’t know, and yet it currently seems obvious to everyone that a straight line can be drawn from policy to the pattern of COVID infections. 

But the main question here is why there has been no discussion of the public health implications of the policy that has been followed.  I will try to answer this question as it touches on various institutions, notably media, but first I’ll continue with my discussion of science.  This word is, in my opinion, a source of fatal confusion.  The basis of this confusion is that the term functions at the same time as a myth and as a description.  Words possess denotations – the objects, real or imagined, at which they point – and connotations – the cloud of associations and feelings which they generate.  The word science, in everyday talk, is all connotation and no denotation – the crucial attribute of those verbal puffballs that German scholar Uwe Pörksen calls “plastic words,” and Ivan Illich “amoeba words.”[14] It points to no agreed object – there are so-called hard sciences, and therefore, by inference, soft sciences, observational sciences and mathematical sciences, historical sciences and experimental sciences – and it possesses no agreed method.  One often hears of “the scientific method” but even the most cursory survey of the philosophy of science will yield multiple competing accounts of what it might be.  Because of this the word science, when its meaning is not further specified, functions as a collage of meanings whose rhetorical purpose is very often to induce nothing more than a radiating field of positive connotations.   It is, in in this respect, what French theorist Roland Barthes calls a myth.[15]  Myths, according to Barthes, “naturalize” the phenomena they aggregate and summarize.  In the case of science, a diverse, heterogeneous, and sometimes internally contradictory phenomenon is smoothed out and compressed into an apparent compact and consistent object which can be then made into a social protagonist and a grammatical subject: science says, science shows, science demands etc.  An actual history, with all its twists and turns, has been replaced by what appears to be an unproblematic natural object – intelligible, obvious and at hand. 

The result is that the myth obscures and absorbs the actual object(s).  Actual sciences are limited and contingent, conditional and conditioned bodies of knowledge.  These limits are of various kinds.  Some are practical: evidence may be contradictory, insufficient, inaccessible, or impossible to obtain without exposing the subjects of the research to some unacceptable harm.  Some are limits in principle: ignorance expands with knowledge, reductive methods will necessarily fail to disclose the reality of the whole phenomena which they disassemble analytically, all scientific procedures rest on philosophical pre-suppositions which cannot themselves be put in question and so on. During the last century, philosophers, historians and sociologists have undertaken many studies of what one of those philosophers, Bruno Latour, calls “science in action.”[16]  They have attempted, as historians Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have written, “to break down the aura of self-evidence surrounding the experimental way of producing knowledge.”[17]  Through this work a detailed picture has been built up of what is involved in producing and stabilizing scientific facts and then, as Latour says, “making them public.”[18]  I tried to give some idea of the range of these new images of the sciences in an epic 24-hour Ideas series called “How to Think About Science” that was broadcast in 2007 and 2008.[19]  That these images of the sciences are of a constrained and situated object in no way undermines or denies their precious achievement in building up bodies of knowledge that are based on public and contestable evidence. 

A realistic image of the various sciences as they are actually practiced is a necessary foundation for political conversation.  The myth of Science on the other hand is utterly corrosive of politics insofar as it supposes a body of immaculate and comprehensive knowledge that renders politics superfluous.  I do not think this is an exaggeration.  Again and again in the last year I have listened to political statements that present Science as a unified, imperative and infallible voice indicating an indisputable course of action.  The implication is that knowledge can replace judgment.  But it cannot – because knowledge, as I have argued, is limited both in practice and in principle.  Moral judgment is unavoidable, and is the proper domain of politics.  To institute a lockdown which protects that part of the population able to shelter at home, while exposing another part to the harms that follow from lockdown, involves a political judgment.  To disguise it as a scientific judgment is, in the first place, deceitful.  At the time the decision was made no evidence whatsoever existed to support a policy of mass quarantine of a healthy population.  Such a policy had never even been tried before and, even after the fact, is not really amenable to controlled study in any case.  But more important was the moral abdication that was involved.  Instead of an honest evaluation of the harms avoided and the harms induced, the public was told that Science had spoken, and the case was closed.  The politicians and the media were then free to rend their garments and tremble in sympathy over all the harm the virus had done without ever having to admit that much of this damage was politically induced.  Where there was no science, the myth of Science became a screen and a shield behind which politicians could shelter themselves from the consequences of decisions they could deny ever having made. 

It is fair to say, I think, that the various sciences that are involved in the continuing catastrophe of COVID-19 are deeply divided.  Their voices have not generally been heard, but many hundreds of medical doctors, epidemiologists, virologists and former public health officials have spoken against a policy of indiscriminate quarantine.  It’s quite possible that many thousands more share their opinion and might have said so had the onset of the virus been met by a discussion rather than a stampede.  It is after all true, as Jay Battacharya says, that what these scientists have recommended – “a balanced response” rather than a utopian pursuit of total control – was once “standard public health practice.”   But so far almost no hint of scientific dissensus has appeared in the Canadian media I have followed like the CBC and the Globe and Mail.  What are the consequences?  Some warn that “trust in science” will be impaired.  This is the fear expressed by four medical scientists writing recently in The National Post on the need for what they call “healthy discussions.”[20]  But in the end these writers only want to foster freer expression in order to protect the authority of a unified subject called “science” which depends, in the last analysis, on trust rather than argument.  The phrase is telling because it doesn’t speak of knowledgeable assent to the findings of a particular science – for this no trust is necessary – but rather of a general disposition to believe whatever carries the imprimatur of some scientific institution and is authorized to appear in its livery.   Science, in this sense, resembles Plato’s “noble lie” – a fable told by the wise to prevent credulous citizens from falling prey to inferior myths.[21] 

It is my belief that trust in a Science that stands above the social fray – immaculate, oracular, disinterested – is already fatally eroded – both by several generations of patient study of what the sciences actually do and actually know, and by the dogmatism of the noble liars who have driven unanswered skeptics into the desperate straits of conspiracy theory (more on that in a moment).  I would like to plead for a new picture in which a mystified Science is replaced by diverse sciences, dissensus is recognized as normal, limits to knowledge are admitted as being in the nature of things, not a temporary always about-to-be-overcome embarrassment, and the rough and ready moral judgments that are the proper stuff of politics are flushed out of the cover currently provided for them by Science-as-myth.  It has been my view for a long time that only after the myth of Science is overcome will we be able to see what the sciences are and escape the spell of what they are not.  Unhappily one of the revelations of the pandemic seems to be that this myth is entrenching itself ever more deeply in our social imagination.

 

ON THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REALIGNMENT

 

A figure of great pathos for me during the most recent phase of the pandemic has been the theoretical epidemiologist Sunetra Gupta, a professor at Oxford, the recipient of several prestigious awards for her scientific achievements, and one of the authors of the Great Barrington declaration.  In her writings and statements she has consistently made three crucial points bearing on public policy: 1) “lockdowns only delay the inevitable spread of the virus” 2) “lockdown is a luxury of the affluent; something that can be afforded only in wealthy countries — and even then, only by the better-off households in those countries” and 3) that, under lockdown, “the poorest and most vulnerable people” will inevitably be made “to bear the brunt of the fight against coronavirus” with “the working class and younger members of society…carry[ing] the heaviest burden.”[22]  She has publicized these ideas, expecting, in her words, “debate and disagreement” and “welcoming” such disagreement insofar as that is how, in her understanding, “science progresses.”  Early in the pandemic she also hoped, as someone who identified with the political left and had “strong views about the distribution of wealth [and] about the importance of the Welfare State,” that others so identified could be brought to see that lockdowns were aggravating existing social inequalities as well as generating new ones.  Neither her hopes nor her expectations have been fulfilled.  In place of debate, the Great Barrington statement has generated, again in her words, “insults, personal criticism, intimidation and threats” – an “onslaught,” she writes, “of vitriol and hostility” from “journalists and academics,” as well as the public at large for which she was “utterly unprepared” and by which she has been “horrified.”  And all this for enunciating what she and her colleagues understood was formerly “standard public health practice” – that phrase of Jay Battacharya’s that I keep repeating because I find it so evocative of the seemingly unnoticed novelty of the present moment. 

Perhaps most striking of all, the Great Barrington Declaration was made in a  handsome, converted mansion in bucolic Western Massachusetts, the home of the American Institute for Economic Research, an institute founded on a vision of a society of “pure freedom and private governance” in which “the role of government is sharply confined” and “individuals can flourish within a truly free market and a free society” – a view commonly called libertarian.[23] This was a rather discordant setting for Sunetra Gupta, avowedly “Left-wing” and a proponent of “the need for publicly owned utilities and government investment in nationalised industries.”  Among other things it allowed her opponents to associate her with “climate change denial” (though that is, in fact, something of a caricature of the AIER’s actual position which questions climate policy more than denying climate change as such.)  But more important for me is the transposition of what, for Gupta, ought to have been a left-wing position into a right-wing position.  What this illustrates, I think, is just how inept, deceptive and confining these antique political descriptions have become. 

The terms left and right originated in the French National Assembly of 1789 when the friends of the revolution sat to the left of the chair and the supporters of the king to the right.  Over time they evolved into signifiers of the balance of power between state and market according to which predominated as an allocator of resources and locus of social decision-making.  Today they are verbal straitjackets and fetters on social imagination.  Like the legendary Procrustes who chopped or stretched his guests in order to adapt them to the bed he had available, they distort our circumstances more than describe them.  The pandemic has made this plain.  It is demonstrable that lockdown and economic shut-down have been applied at the expense of those least able to protect themselves.  Some former fat cats have suffered too, of course – airlines, travel companies and the like have been decimated across the board – but it is generally true that the poorer and weaker have paid a heavier price than the stronger and more well-to-do.  Grocery clerks have stayed at work, while civil servants have worked from home; the working class have lost jobs while most professional employment has continued; small businesses have failed, while big businesses have held on; the economically marginal have been driven to addiction, homelessness and suicide while the well-heeled and well-housed have suffered little more than an excess of one another’s company.   Since the left ostensibly speaks for the less-advantaged, one might have expected anti-lockdown to become a left-wing issue but the case has been quite dramatically the reverse.  Criticism has come almost exclusively from the right with only the bravest of leftists, like Sunetra Gupta, daring to cross the aisle.  

Throughout the pandemic both political decision-makers and mainstream media have treated criticism of the policy of mass quarantine as either beneath mention or outside the bounds of rational discussion.  When demonstrators in small numbers began to gather outside the Ontario legislature back in the spring, the province’s Premier dismissed them as “yahoos.”  Even though a man of the populist right himself, Premier Doug Ford wanted everyone to know that these were not fellow-citizens but sub-humans – the original yahoos in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels were “brutes in human form” – whose opinions need not be recognized or taken into account.   This abuse has continued.  When the “second wave” began, critics pointed out, first, that the number of “cases” being recorded might be related to the number of tests being done; second, that positive tests were not actually “cases” in the sense of sick people; and third, that mortality had remained dramatically lower than in the spring, even as these “cases” had surged.  These criticisms were quickly stigmatized by the Globe and Mail’s André Picard.  The claim that the second wave was mainly a “case-demic,” he wrote, was the work of “conspiracy theorists and ‘fake-news’ chanters.”[24]  Again the implication was that people like me, who had been struck by precisely these three features of the second wave, belonged to a class whose views were the result of some pathology, malice or social defect and needn’t be considered.  This mixture of condescension and contempt was later extended to the Great Barrington Declaration.  The Globe and Mail did not, in fact, deign to notice the declaration as a news item.  Since the paper had stated in its editorial columns that “Canada is at war,”[25] they were presumably under no obligation to report such treasonable views.  Nevertheless, André Picard on Nov. 9th wrote about it in a vein that suggested that he thought his readers would know about it and would certainly share his distaste for it.  The Great Barrington Declaration is entirely couched in terms of public health – building immunity amongst those at low risk while protecting those at high risk, it argues, will achieve the best and “most compassionate” balance of harms under the current circumstances – but, in Picard’s rendering it becomes incomprehensibly cruel and obtuse.  “What the Great Barrington Declaration says,” he writes, “when you got through the pomposity, is that profits matter more than people, that we should let the coronavirus run wild, and, if the vulnerable die in service of economic growth, so be it.”[26]  This is an astonishing misrepresentation – the more so as it is directed against a sober and considered proposal from eminent and qualified scientists by a man who explicitly portrays himself as a friend and defender of threatened “science.” What I want to emphasize here, besides its inaccuracy, is its sheer belligerence and incivility – as if opposing views had only to be mocked not argued with.  Where in all this rage can a civil voice like Sunetra Gupta’s hold a plea? 

I see two great problems here.  The first is the violent reciprocity that turns left and right into warring factions and confines each one ever more tightly in its proper box.  What the enemy says is wrong – entirely and a priori – simply because the enemy has said it.  Let me take an example.  For some years the media have been building up a laughingstock called the “anti-vaxxer.”  This is not a person who questions some element or aspect of mass vaccination on some rational ground – those who hold the correct opinion deny in advance and on principle that there can even be such questions or such grounds – it is rather a social enemy, someone whom you know by definition to be unpardonably ignorant, selfish and irresponsible, and whose arguments you can therefore disregard.  Having created this scarecrow, it then becomes quite easy to assimilate to it a new bogeyman called the “anti-masker.”  Now you have an instant characterization for all who may question the policy of lockdown.  In actual fact the question of masks is scientifically quite murky.  Until last spring both the W.H.O and Canada’s chief medical officer, Teresa Tam held that they were of no utility in blocking an infectious agent as miniscule and as wily as a coronavirus.  On April 20th of this year, the Ontario Civil Liberties Association released a study by retired physicist Denis G. Rancourt, in which he reviewed the scientific literature on masks and concluded bluntly that “masks don’t work.”  “There have been extensive randomized controlled trial (RCT) studies, and meta-analysis reviews of RCT studies,” he wrote in his abstract of this article, “which all show that masks and respirators do not work to prevent respiratory influenza-like illnesses, or respiratory illnesses believed to be transmitted by droplets and aerosol particles.”[27]  Some contrary observational studies (i.e. without controls) have been presented since, and ingenious suggestions made that masks, by reducing viral load, may deliver what amounts to an inoculation dose and thus serve as a sort of proto-vaccine, but one can still say that the science is, at best, ambiguous and that most of the studies touting good effects like reduced viral load have paid no attention to potential ill effects – where do the viruses hypothetically blocked by your mask then go, etc.?  The only randomized controlled trial made during the pandemic that I know of took place in Denmark in the spring.  With more than 3,000 participants, it found no statistically significant difference in how many contracted COVID between those who wore masks and those who didn’t.[28]  Here one almost has to pinch oneself when contemplating the degree to which ritualism and superstition can be disguised as science.  Rancourt’s survey, and the more recent Danish study, if not definitive, should at least weigh heavily in public discussion, but instead the “anti-masker” has become the very epitome of the anti-social, anti-scientific rube.  I do not intend here to speak against ritual – people were so badly panicked by the first phase of the pandemic, and made so afraid of one another, that some ritualization of that fear, like masking, was probably necessary if there was to be a return even to semi-normal social interaction.  I’m only objecting to ritual behaviours being disguised as scientific mandates and then made a basis for ostracization and legal censure. 

This is the first problem: making judgments whose only grounds are the dynamic of enmity: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, whatever the enemy says or thinks is wrong, and so forth.  On this basis, once Donald Trump has said that the cure for COVID shouldn’t be worse than the disease, as he did last spring, then this thought becomes unthinkable and unspeakable by his opponents simply because Donald Trump has said it.  This inability to think the enemy’s thoughts is fatal to sound reasoning.  That the cure must not be worse than the disease is a principle that goes back to Hippocrates and remains true even in the mouth of a scoundrel.  Reflexive polarization creates false dichotomies, cleaving opposites that should be held together into warring half-truths.  The second problem that I want to highlight is the inadequacy of the left-right political map on which battle lines are currently being drawn.  The difficulty lies in what is omitted when all political decisions are plotted on a single axis running from state to market, public to private provision, administrative control to the “pure freedom” espoused by Sunetra Gupta’s erstwhile host, the American Institute for Economic Research.   The first thing that is ignored is scale.   This theme was introduced into contemporary political thought by the Austrian writer Leopold Kohr in his 1956 book The Breakdown of Nations.  “Behind all forms of social misery,” Kohr wrote, there is “one cause…: bigness.”  “Whenever something is wrong something is too big.”[29]  With this book, Kohr founded a new school of political ecology that his student and successor Ivan Illich called “social morphology.”[30]  British biologists D’arcy Wentworth Thompson and J.B.S. Haldane had studied the close fit between form and size in nature and concluded that natural forms are viable only at the appropriate scale i.e. a hawk’s form would not be viable at the scale of a sparrow, or a mouse’s at the scale of an elephant.[31]  Kohr was the first to argue that social form and size show the same correlation.  E.F. Schumacher, another student of Kohr’s, would later popularize the argument in his Small is Beautiful.  Illich also developed and extended Kohr’s crucial idea in his book Tools for Conviviality. 

Why does scale matter in the present case?  Under cover of restricting the spread of COVID, emergency administrative regulation and control is being extended into areas normally outside the purview of the state – friendship, family life, religious worship, sexual relations etc.  (One Toronto city councilor, in her newsletter to her constituents, recommended masturbation, under the slogan “you are your safest partner.”[32]).  In the past, prerogatives justified by war have often been retained even after peace has been restored, and it seems prudent to assume that elements of the current regime will outlast the present emergency.   One can already see the emerging outline of what one might call, on the model of the National Security State, a new Health Security State.  The modern image of a social body comprised of individual citizens associating freely with one another is being replaced by the image of a giant immune system in which each is obliged to the whole according to principles of risk and overall system integrity – an assembly of “lives” comprising ultimately one overarching Life.  In the name of this new social body, any obligation whatsoever can potentially be interrupted and proscribed. The most shocking and telling example for me is the way in which the dying have been left alone – unaccompanied, untouched unconsoled.  But this is not an issue on which the left-right diagram sheds any light whatever.  The answer to such a state is not a market in which private rather than public actors keep us penned in protective isolation form one another.  The issue is one of scale – the prerogatives of friendship, affinity, and mutual aid v. the imperatives of system health – and of culture – are we to be allowed other gods than Health? 

A second issue that fails to compute in the prevailing left-right scheme is conviviality or liveability.  This quality depends heavily on what American writer Ray Oldenburg calls “third places” – places whose character is neither public nor private but an amalgam of both.[33]  These places get left out of the account when public health is pitted against “the economy” and criticism of lockdowns – as in the statement I quoted earlier from André Picard – is equated with a willingness to sacrifice “the vulnerable in the service of economic growth.”  The butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker all contribute their mite to G.N.P. alongside Amazon and General Motors, but they don’t really belong to the same world.  Money may change hands, but many of the small enterprises that make localities habitable, hospitable and vivid belong more to the world of subsistence than to the grow-or-die world of The Economy.  The performing arts also belong in this category.  This whole dimension has been badly and, often enough, fatally injured during the pandemic.  Undertakings patiently built up and patiently built into communities over many years are failing.  At times, conviviality itself has been given a bad name, as it is in caricatures of the reckless young, endangering their elders by getting too close to one another.   But none of this really registers on a spectrum on which the masked left is pitted against the unmasked right, conviviality is conflated with “economic growth,” and civil liberty is consigned to the care of armed militias menacing American state legislatures. 

What this points to – its “revelation” in terms of my theme – is the desperate need for political realignment.  Left and right are very old wineskins that are exploding all around us as they are made to try and contain some very new wine.[34]  Sunetra Gupta finds a platform only among libertarians who conflate freedom with free markets because there is no ground on the left for a position that punctures the dream-world of total safety and total control.  The libertarians for their part affirm the indifferent operations of free markets as the only foundation for economic justice because they see a tyrannical state as the only alternative.   The religious are driven to the right because the left sees religious duty as no more than a revocable privilege granted by that “mortal god,” the state.[35]  The friends of the common good are driven to the left because they see nothing on the right but idolatry of the monstrous machinery of the market.  They defend lockdowns as “care” while overlooking the collateral damage that care can do when it acts at the scale of mass quarantine.  The right acknowledges the damage but can only enunciate a competing view of care in terms that reinforce an economic system that is rapidly chewing up the entire biosphere.  Mightn’t it be time to talk?

 

CONSPIRACY THEORIES

 

Earlier I noted Globe and Mail health columnist André Picard’s willingness to condemn anyone who questioned a policy founded on “cases” (which are often – no one knows how often – not cases of illness but merely positive test results) as a “conspiracy theorist.”   Fed by the shadowy figure of QAnon, this has become a frequent term of abuse directed at those who have been unwilling to accept the idea that a victory over COVID is worth the ruin it may produce.  The epithet is so convenient and so mystifying that I think it’s worth exploring a little what is meant by it and what it may be hiding.  

Let me begin with a story.  Some years ago, in the long aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, a CBC colleague and friend came to me with a request.  Would I support his proposal, he asked, to do a series of broadcasts on Ideas, where I was then a producer, about what was wrong with the official account of the attacks.  This account had been submitted in August of 2004 by the official inquiry, the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (the 9/11 Commission for short).  This colleague then issued a challenge: that before deciding I should at least read David Ray Griffin’s 2004 book The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11.  Griffin, as I was to learn, was a distinguished professor of philosophy at the Claremont School of Theology in southern California, a hotbed in my mind of “process theology,” rather than conspiracy theory.  (Process theology, of which Griffin is as an exponent – he co-founded, with John Cobb, The Center for Process Studies at Claremont – is a school of theology that was inspired by the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead.)  Intrigued, I complied with my colleague’s request and was impressed and disconcerted by Griffin’s temperate, well-argued and well-documented book.  At that point there was no chance that Ideas was going to approve my colleague’s proposal, since Griffin’s book, despite its author’s academic bona fides, still carried the full odium attaching to “conspiracy theories” in respectable journalistic precincts.  But I got interested nonetheless.  Up to that time, I had never taken the slightest interest in such theories, assuming them to be an obsession of cranks, but I was surprised to learn from Griffin that, in the similar case of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 – surprise attack serving as a wished-for casus belli – respectable historians had produced evidence that the U.S. sustained an attack it could have foreseen (and perhaps did foresee) in order to stir its population to war.  (I don’t mean that this is a widely accepted idea or that it has been convincingly demonstrated, just that some evidence along these lines has been admitted over time into the historical record.  See, for example, John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath,  Doubleday, 1982)

I decided to conduct a little informal research, using the case of the assassination of John Kennedy in 1963 and the official account of it that was given by the Warren Commission the following year.  Whenever I found an opportunity, I asked people I was talking with whether they accepted the Warren Report as the truth about Kennedy’s murder.  The results were another surprise: amongst those who had an opinion, I couldn’t find a single soul who didn’t think that the Warren Commission had overlooked or concealed some or all of the truth about what happened in Dallas in November of 1963.  Another striking case was the TV series “The Valour and the Horror” broadcast on the CBC in 1992.  This series, in an episode called “Death by Moonlight,” made the claim that Allied air forces had knowingly committed atrocities against civilian populations as part of the bombing of Germany during the Second World War.  Older relatives of mine had participated in the air war, and I was swept up in the furor that followed the broadcast.  Here the issue was partly about what people actually knew at the time and partly about how the “strategic bombing” of German cities was to be framed fifty years later.  It wasn’t news that German civilians had been incinerated in deliberately-set fire storms in Hamburg, Dresden and other cities.  What was at issue was whether this could be faced as a crime or should remain protectively wrapped in the heroic narrative of necessity bravely borne in the defense of freedom. 

What we can see and what we can say about the past varies with historical distance and with the intensity of the commitments with which we view it.  It becomes easier with time to face the conspiratorial dimension in political decisions – that a few privately decide and many suffer in the execution of their decisions.  How does this lengthy prologue relate to the pandemic?  Well it seems to me that once the name of conspiracy theorist becomes a handy and liberally applied insult, as we saw earlier in the case of André Picard, a certain mystification is right around the corner.  Ruling out conspiracy a priori is as fatal to unprejudiced investigation as assuming it.  Take the strange case of Event 201, the pandemic planning exercise staged last October, on the very brink of the pandemic, by a partnership consisting of the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins, the World Economic Forum, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  This was, according to the organizers, a “tabletop exercise that simulated a series of dramatic, scenario-based facilitated discussions, confronting difficult, true-to-life dilemmas associated with response to a hypothetical, but scientifically plausible, pandemic”[36]  During these discussions, many of the features of the pandemic that followed were quite accurately foreseen.  According to the documentary Plandemic this was because the pandemic was foreseen and planned by a cabal of vaccine manufactures and vaccine promoters with Bill Gates as villain in chief.[37]  This documentary shows many of the characteristics you would find in a textbook description of conspiracy theory: partial and ambiguous evidence is forced into neat, pre-conceived patterns; sinister motives are ascribed to the alleged plotters; a wised-up disregard is shown for competing explanations etc.  Easy then to dismiss the film’s whole argument, and, in the process, to overlook what is uncanny about Event 201 predicting the pandemic so precisely.  One doesn’t have to believe in conspiracy to see that many of the narratives that have guided SARS COV-2 policy were written in advance, or that the events of recent months have long been anticipated and planned for – Event 201, for example, was preceded by three earlier “exercises” going back to “Atlantic Storm” in 2005.[38]  Events often fall into the shapes we have prepared for them, planned for them, dreamed for them.  9/11 may not have been an inside job, as David Ray Griffin claimed, but it was certainly the opportunity that the Bush administration, barely legitimate after its contested election, had been waiting for, and it wasted no time thereafter in initiating its catastrophic War on Terror.  In the same way, the war on the virus, and the many experiments in social control it has empowered, seem to be thought forms long prepared and just waiting for their occasion.  

My point here is similar to my point earlier about political enmity and polarization destroying all ground for discussion.  How many are called conspiracy theorists when they just want to ask a question, how many others are driven to real conspiracy theories when their questions are not answered or acknowledged?  Awareness of this problem began for me with the figure I mentioned earlier of the “anti-vaxxer,” a belittling name that seemed to establish itself in public discussion almost overnight a few years back.  It affected me because I had been reflecting on the question of vaccination for many years without being able to come to a firm conclusion – I was quizzical rather than pro or anti, a position that had been summarily driven from the field with the invention of the anti-vaxxer.  My questions began when my infant son contracted a frightening, potentially fatal (but, in this case, happily not) cerebral meningitis at the age of eight months following his MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) vaccination.  My wife and I subsequently heard of other such cases.  Anecdotal evidence, yes, but I began to wonder – could you really prove the connection, should there be one?  Children and adolescents who follow recommended schedules receive up to sixteen different vaccines, many of which are boosted several times.  Can anyone really say with certainty that they know all the effects or how they interact or how they are expressed?  It should not be controversial to observe that this is a fairly massive attempt to supplement and manipulate the workings of the immune system.  Is it impossible that the plague of allergies and auto-immune diseases that seem to characterize our time is related, as some suppose, to this systematic interference?  Might we be better off with less vaccines, while still recognizing that some have been invaluable? 

To even begin to answer such questions it is necessary to recognize, first of all, that they have a philosophical, as well as an empirical dimension.  There are limits to knowledge in the study of complex systems, but these are often denied in the effort to foster the “trust in science” I wrote about above.  These limits to knowledge must be acknowledged, as must the consequent limits on what can be imposed on people in the name of science.  Within that framework it may then be possible to shed some light on the empirical side of the questions I’ve raised.  But the omens in this respect are not good.  Let me take a couple of examples.  In 2016 a documentary film appeared called “Vaxxed: From Coverup to Catastrophe.”  It claimed that during the course of a CDC (Centers for Disease Control) study into a possible link between autism and the administration of MMR vaccine to infants, documents were destroyed and data fudged in order to make emerging evidence of such a link disappear.   This claim was made by one of the scientists involved, William Thompson, in recorded phone conversations with environmental biologist Brian Hooker.   Thompson’s report could be false, or in some way manipulated, but, on its face, it is impressive and ought to have, at the least, led to wide public discussion.  What has happened instead is that the film has been effectively suppressed.   This began when Robert de Niro, under pressure, cancelled a scheduled screening at the Tribeca Film Festival in 2016.  The film has since disappeared from the internet and is available only by purchase from the filmmakers’ web-site.[39]  The Wikipedia biographies of all the principals in the film show evidence of malicious editing with recurring references to fraud, false information, discredited views and the like.  This does not give the impression of a fair, frank or open discussion but of a ruthless orthodoxy which ostracizes all dissent. 

A second example: I have read countless times that British doctor Andrew Wakefield is the author of a fraudulent study, first published in The Lancet then withdrawn, purporting to show a link between autism and the MMR vaccine.  Such repetition generally produces assent – if everybody believes it, it must be true – and I had unthinkingly accepted this claim until one day an old friend asked me if I had ever seen the discredited study.  No.  Might she send it to me? Yes, of course.  I read it and found that Wakefield was only one of thirteen authors of this rather technical paper, and that it reached no definite conclusion beyond asserting that the enterocolitis which the authors investigated in twelve young children “may be related to neuropsychiatric dysfunction” and that “in most cases, onset of symptoms was after measles, mumps, and rubella immunisation.”  The paper ends with a call for “further investigations.”[40]   This mild and rather tentative conclusion was the famous fraud?  I was astonished.  Further research revealed that Wakefield had gone beyond what the paper asserts in his public statements but only so far as to say that he was sufficiently worried by the suspected link that he recommended disaggregating the triple vaccine and vaccinating separately for each disease with a year’s interval between shots.  This was the extent to which he was “anti-vax.”  Nevertheless he was barred from medical practice – “stricken from the medical register” – and his name blackened around the world.  

There’s a lot of territory between the claim that the SARS COV-2 pandemic was a planned event whose viral protagonist was created in a laboratory in Washington or Wuhan, and the claim that vaccine manufacturers and their philanthropic friends in the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation are innocent altruists selflessly dedicated to a disease-free world.  But discussion tends to get pushed to extremes.  Conspiracy is one of the bogies that keeps it polarized in this way.  As with my initial examples of Pearl Harbor, the strategic bombing of German cities, the Kennedy assassination, and 9/11, it’s quite possible that stories that can’t be told now will become more believable with time.  Perhaps powerful vaccine manufactures did conspire with British medical authorities to discredit Andrew Wakefield and cut short his research.  I’m sure I don’t know.  Nor do many others who think they do.  Perhaps, to complicate the issue further, public confidence in vaccination is so precious and so easily shaken, that slander and persecution of the occasional vaccine safety heretic is a small price to pay for it.  After all, Socrates ascribes nobility to the “noble lie” and the “opportune falsehood” for a very well-argued reason. My conviction, as I’ve said, is that the lustre of “the guardians” – Plato’s name for those who in our time would advocate “trust in science” – is now impossible to restore.  Our only hope therefore lies in an open, pacified and demystified discussion.  What prospect of that?  Am I not simply reiterating Socrates’ impossible dream that philosophers will become kings, or kings philosophers – the only conditions, he says, under which there can be a “cessation of troubles.”[41]  One might as well hope that that meek will inherit the earth. [42]  Only the extremity of our circumstances – humanly, politically, ecologically – makes it seem possible. 

 

PROTECTING OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

 

The pandemic has no stranger figure of speech than this one, and yet it seems to clang ironically on very few ears.  We are in a “health crisis,” the worse in our history according to our prime minister.[43]  At such a moment one might hope that a health care system which absorbs nearly half the provincial budget in Ontario would mobilize to protect us – instead we are asked to protect it.  That our health institutions should not be overtaxed, over-stressed, over-whelmed, pushed to a “tipping point,” etc. has been one of the prime objectives of public policy from Day One of the pandemic.  And, from the beginning, it has been generally accepted as a reasonable objective.  That sickness should threaten the institution that is ostensibly there to deal with sickness is remarkable, I think, and constitutes yet another of the pandemic’s revelations.  How can this be? 

Our health care system is not, in fact, a system of care, presuming that there could even be such a thing as a “system” of care.  It is a giant bureaucracy set up to administer certain health interventions at its own convenience.  That many of these interventions are ingenious, life-changing, and capably administered does not change this impersonal and industrial character.  (Emergency departments are something of an exception here, and I’d like to record my gratitude for the skillful and timely repairs I have sometimes received in various emergency rooms.)  This means that hospital-based medicine has not been designed to deal with an emergency of the kind we are experiencing. 

In the event, there seems to have been surprisingly little overtaxing of hospitals during the pandemic.  Hospitals in New York, Montreal, and Milano certainly experienced short, well-publicized periods of strain in the spring, but in many other places the opposite occurred.  In Toronto, for example, people were so effectively warned off hospitals, that hospital worker friends told me stories of empty beds and under-employed staff.  Meanwhile, the grateful public outside the fortress walls were beating pots and pans and bringing pizza to hospitals in a show of support for their health-care “heroes” or “champions.”   Almost all other treatments and services not connected to COVID were drastically curtailed.  It is quite likely that the adverse consequences of these foregone diagnoses with treatments will, over time, quite outstrip the damage done by the virus.   

A further question is whether hospitals, except in rare cases, are the best place for people suffering from the illness induced by this new coronavirus.  One thinks here of the panic about ventilators that took place in March and April.  Would we have enough?  Auto parts manufacturers in Ontario undertook to supply 10,000 ventilators;[44] an electronics manufacturer promised 10,000 more.[45]  Then it began to emerge that ventilators might be actively dangerous to COVID patients, and that intensive care units might sometimes be using them to protect themselves from infection rather than in the best interests of patients.[46]  One wonders if this story will ever be fully told.  There has been a lot of talk about how treatment for COVID has improved – in Britain just 26% of Covid-19 patients were placed on ventilation after admission to intensive care in September compared with up to 76% at the height of the pandemic [47] - but not so much about how much harm may have been done during the experimental phase.  The CBC Radio program Now or Never. for example, recently reported on a 73-year old man who spent 104 days on a respirator and is now an invalid who requires full-time care by his 29-year old daughter.  The broadcast focused on the daughter’s heroic charity, and the challenges it poses, not on whether the father’s treatment had been prudent.  

Sick people need care.  In hospitals COVID sufferers are isolated from all those who actually want to care for them because fear of the disease and its potential spread has overcome all other obligations.  Might more have been cared for at home?  The answer is probably yes, had the health care system been able or willing to reorganize itself in the interests of its patients.  Instead doctors’ offices largely shut their doors, appointments for other ailments were cancelled, and the hospitals pulled up their drawbridges.  The health care system protected itself. 

 

THE MEDIA

 

Its been more than forty years since I was persuaded by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, in their exemplary two-volume work The Political Economy of Human Rights, that an ostensibly free media can still function as a propaganda system – that there can be, as they say in their book, “brainwashing under freedom.”[48] Media at all times are biased – by their own structure, as Harold Innis and his successors showed, and by the social, political and economic environments in which they operate.  Fairy tales about a golden past, invented only to thrash a decadent present, are not a sound starting point for critique.  And yet, even so, it seems to me that the media to which I have been exposed during the pandemic have risen to new heights of cheer-leading and uncritical “messaging.”  

It is in the nature of news media to disguise and dissimulate their own influence on what they report.  News is not news, they insist, just because the news media make it news – it is already news as a result of some inherent quality that the news media only recognize and reproduce.  This is partly true of course.  The news media do adapt to popular psychology, to established taste, and to pre-scripted narrative forms, more than they invent them.  But the media also innovate – drawing attention to particular facts and reinforcing particular narratives while disregarding others.   And, in the case of the pandemic – a novel phenomenon that might initially have allowed various constructions – their leading role has been striking.  This began the day that the W.H.O announced that the spread of COVID-19 should be considered a pandemic.  Blanket coverage began, implying that there was now nothing else of note happening in the world.  A sense of precariousness and foreboding was generated.  Everything was “unprecedented.”  “A new normal” seemed to fall from the sky almost overnight.   A state of emergency and exception was declared.  War metaphors were rife.  When the Globe and Mail stated explicitly on Sept 21, in an editorial I cited earlier, that “Canada is at war” it was only spelling out the position taken by major news media from the beginning.  Numbers were spun for maximum effect.  Particularly egregious during the second wave has been the constant trumpeting of “cases,” meaning positive test results, with little interest shown in how many are actually sick, how the number of cases might relate to the number of tests, how reliable the tests are etc.  

This emphasis on whatever was most alarming helped to stampede a large part of the population into a state of panicked fear that had little to with the actual dangers facing them.  It also severely constrained political choice.  Politicians were praised for their leadership when they made strict rules and spanked for their laxity when they revoked them.  A myth was promulgated that “we are,” as another Globe and Mail editorial put it, “the masters of our pandemic fate.”[49]  Here the idea is that everything that happens is produced by policy – there is nothing that must be simply suffered because attempting to counteract it would only induce worse harms – every COVID infection accuses a political leadership that, as the same Globe editorial says, “should be doing more.”  Lurking in the background is the long-gestated idea of zero tolerance, now translated into “Covid-zero” and other fantasies of total suppression of the virus.[50]  (I am not denying here that some places – whether because of their size, their situation or the heavy-handed intensity of their regimes, like Melbourne’s 100-day lockdown inside “a ring of steel”[51] – have achieved low numbers.  The question is, for how long and at what cost?) 

War imposes uniformity of opinion, and that has been particularly evident with the CBC and The Globe and Mail.  Some dissent has begun to creep in to the more conservative papers, the National Post and the Sun, but both the Globe and the CBC seem to conceive their role not as platforms for discussion but as guardians of correct thought.  The listeners and readers are to be encouraged, edified, occasionally chastised for incipient “complacency,”[52] but at all times treated as unified and homogeneous mass – all in this together, all sharing the same sentimental regard for our health care champions etc.  What this has meant, I think, is that an elite consensus, fortified by the elemental power of mythic tropes like war, solidarity in crisis, loyalty, heroism, and sacrifice, has imposed itself on the public.  The result has been that two crucial realities have been been hidden, overlooked or suppressed.  The first is the scientific dissensus I spoke of earlier.  The second is the residual popular common sense that instinctively prefers mutual aid and muddling through to centralized bureaucratic control.  I realize that common sense is a tricky term, regularly coopted by right-wing populism, as it was in Ontario in the mid-1990’s when the Conservative government of Mike Harris dressed up neo-liberal laissez-faire and municipal “amalgamation” as a “common sense revolution.”  But this apparent tendency of populism to skew to the right precisely illustrates the difficulty we are in.  Many historians, anthropologists and political theorists, in our time, have tried to describe forms of resistance to the state that do not terminate in an even more oppressive state, like Ontario’s “common sense revolution,” or a hundred other variants from fascism to Peronism to Trumpism.   E.P. Thompson wrote of “the moral economy of the crowd”;  James C. Scott has described various forms of ethnic and agrarian resistance;  Christopher Lasch portrayed  American populism as a defense of the moral and religious integrity of community life against elite and “meritocratic” disruption; and Ivan Illich tried to mark out a “vernacular” sphere in which both state and market are kept at bay.[53]  But these forms of populism remain largely unrecognized in the journalistic discourse I have been talking about.  The result is that populism is forced to the right and its dignity denied.  The outright contempt that is regularly expressed for Trump voters – Hilary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables” – illustrates this dynamic. 

To be concrete, resistance to lockdown, masking and curbs on the right of assembly has steadily grown in Ontario, beginning with the demonstrators who began to gather at the legislature in the spring – the people, as I remarked earlier, that the Premier categorized as “yahoos.”  This fall, in Toronto, several thousand people gathered in Dundas Square.  The breadth of the coalition that made up this crowd is hard to judge but civil liberty, religious freedom and ruined livelihoods seemed to be the main issues animating them.  Remarkably, given the size of this demonstration, it was given, so far as I know, no coverage whatsoever beyond a brief mention as a traffic issue – Yonge St. was blocked – on the news channel CP24.  This appears to be nothing less than censorship – who needs to know what the yahoos are up to?  It certainly invites the nemesis I spoke of earlier – in which dissent deprived of a voice and a forum is driven into the more violent and destructive paths of political reaction.

Equally worrying is the failure to register or report the true variety of opinions amongst doctors, medical scientists and public health specialists – remember how many medical and public health luminaries were among the signers of last summer’s disregarded call for a “balanced approach” to the pandemic.  This does two things.  First, it reinforces the obsolete image I criticized above of science as a singular and unanimous voice, standing above politics, capable of authoritatively settling all disputes, and requiring that the citizenry possesses an unquestioning “trust.”  Second it casts media as guardians or shepherds of public opinion with a duty to withhold from a vulnerable and credulous public disturbing news about anti-lockdown protests, dissident epidemiologists or the actual science regarding the efficacy of masks.  (This presumes of course that the bellwethers of public opinion are attentive enough to know these things themselves rather than being just as sheep-like as those they presume to lead.)  

 

ECOLOGY AND THE PANDEMIC

 

At the beginning of the pandemic some hopeful voices were raised in aid of the idea that it was, as George Monbiot wrote in the Guardian, “nature’s wake-up call to a complacent civilization.”[54]  Climate change activist Bill McKibben, writing in the TLS, also read the pandemic as a warning – “a dry run” for a coming century of horrors in which “there is going to be nothing normal anywhere.”[55]  I call these voices hopeful, because they interpret the pandemic as a call to repentance.  I would like to share this view, but I find it difficult to see in the “war” against the virus any relenting whatsoever in our civilization’s animating passion for domination and control. It seems rather to bespeak the opposite – an intensified desire to become the “masters of our pandemic fate” and the conquerors of this inconvenient scourge, determined to save “lives” even if it costs us even more “lives” than we are saving – like the American commander in Vietnam who told Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett in 1968 that it was “necessary to destroy the town to save it.”   This does not seem to me to presage the ethic of re-inhabitation that will at last bring us into harmony with our wasting world.   

No one really knows where the new virus came from.  To call it a product of “Nature” is probably a stretch.  For, whether it came from a pangolin, a bat or a laboratory, as the producers of the documentary “Plandemic” hint, it is certainly a product of that hybrid nature/culture that has resulted from humanity’s unremitting pressure on every part and particle of our earthly home.  As such it is a part of our world, as viruses have been as long as humanity has existed.  Viruses have helped us – some stitched over time into our very DNA – and they have hindered us – to such an extent that we possess very robust defences against the hail of viruses we encounter every day.   This does not mean, of course, that COVID-19 is our friend, but it does mean that we are dealing with something primordial, and something that belongs to the wild and profuse creativity of the living earth, however malign it may be to our plans for next Tuesday.  One might wish for more of this perspective in those who propose that we should achieve “zero COVID,” become “masters or our pandemic fate,” “conquer COVID,” etc. 

British biologist Mike Yeadon, whom I quoted earlier, is a veteran research scientist specializing in “inflammation, immunology, [and] allergy in the context of respiratory diseases.”  He recently made the following statement:The passage of this virus through the human population is an entirely natural process that has completely ignored our puny efforts to control it.”[56]  My own amateur researches have gradually led me to a similar conclusion.  But anyone whose views have been shaped by politicians, public health officials, or media pundits like André Picard is bound to regard such a view as arrant nonsense, not only erroneous but almost treasonably dangerous to the public weal.  Everyone who drinks from these wells knows that what a given country has been through is almost entirely a consequence of how politicians and public health officials have “managed” or, in the case of Donald Trump, “calamitously mismanaged” the pandemic.  Countries are regularly compared as if the only relevant difference between them were the extent of the restrictions imposed by their governments.  Climate, demography, geographical situation, health status, prior immunity – all have been more or less ignored in favour of the idea that government policy is the key determinant in the spread or containment of the virus.  Let me take some examples.   One is given by Mike Yeadon, in the presentation I just quoted.  He notes that countries with relatively high death rates due to COVID, like Sweden, Belgium and the U.K. all had much milder than usual flu epidemics over the last two to three years, while those with lower rates like Germany and Greece are coming off more severe flu epidemics.  This suggests that the difference between, let’s say Norway and Sweden which has again and again been ascribed to severity of lockdown is, in fact, a function of the number of susceptible old people in each country.  A second example: a recent paper in the scientific journal  Frontiers of Public Health found that, “[The] stringency of the measures [used] to fight pandemia, including lockdown, did not appear to be linked with death rate.”[57] Instead the authors of this paper found that what best predicted the death rate was latitude (between 25° and 65°), GDP, and health status (amount of chronic disease, inactivity, etc.)  And, third, I would point, as Yeadon does, to the degree of prior immunity in a given population.[58]  Yeadon argues that cross-immunity conferred by exposure to other coronaviruses – SARS COV-2 is 80% similar to the first SARS virus – may have made a part of the population immune to COVID-19 at the outset.  This is germane in the case of countries like Taiwan and Vietnam that have had very few COVID deaths.  Both had considerable exposure to SARS and so may have possessed this prior immunity in much greater measure than worse-affected Western countries.  This suggests, again, that policy and popular compliance may have had less to do with lower death rates than has generally been supposed.  

Whether Mike Yeadon’s claim – that our “puny efforts” to contain the pandemic have been absolutely without effect – can eventually be proved remains to be seen.  What it seems quite safe to say right now is that there is substantial evidence, first, that we are in the grip of a powerful and inexorable natural process and, second, that some considerable part of the pretence that determined leaders with bespoke policies ought to be able to dominate this process is mostly bravado, ritual and anthropocentric self-importance.  The conclusions I draw from these two points are not comforting.  Ivan Illich, speaking in Toronto in the fall of 1970, evoked the view of the earth from space that had recently been obtained by American men-on-the-moon.  This image, he said, could be interpreted in two radically different ways.  The first was as a call to repentance, a call, in effect, to sink back into the earth and to live within its affordances.  The second was as a call to “manage planet earth,” as The Scientific American would later say, or, with even greater hubris, to “save planet earth.”[59]  The first he saw as a choice to live freely, joyfully and even wildly, within our means; the second as a decision to perpetually skirt disaster, living always at the very edge of the biosphere’s tolerances, and entangling ourselves in an ever more comprehensive net of hygienic and environmental controls in order to keep this precarious enterprise “sustainable.”   Today, looking out my door at the masked and fearful people passing on the street, it is hard not to think that Illich’s prophecy has come to pass.  From the beginning of the pandemic there were critical virologists, immunologists and epidemiologist who made three crucial points: first that no one knew the severity of the new disease, i.e. its infection mortality rate; second, that no one knew how different populations and different sub-groups within populations would weather it; and, third, that no one knew how the possibly devastating consequences of prophylactic mass quarantine – lockdown – would compare with the suffering that might be caused by the disease.   But these cautions, to the extent that they were even heard, did not seem to induce any hesitation or produce that alert but quizzical and deliberate attitude that ought to attend such ignorance.  From the very beginning any idea of enduring, adapting or mitigating was condemned as fatalism or “yahoo” recklessness. The emphasis was always on control – “wrestling the virus to the ground”[60] – and on knowledge – gained by colonizing and appearing to tame an uncertain future with mathematical models founded on “educated” guesses.  This posture was reinforced by media who stood by ready to taunt any politician who refused to accept these shibboleths or was unwilling to pretend that control was possible and that scientific knowledge was at hand.  And these media in turn, as I wrote in an earlier essay, were acting as the agents of imperative concepts like risk, safety, management, and life – concepts that have by now entrenched themselves in our minds as unquestionable certainties.  

What has all this to do with the ecological emergency on which I quoted George Monbiot and Bill McKibben at the outset?  Well it seems to me that the attitudes brought to light by the pandemic do not offer much hope in the face of the catastrophic earth changes that both writers expect will be the result of rising oceans and a warming atmosphere – at least not for someone like me, who favours the path Illich recommended – conviviality within restraint – rather than the one he warned against – growth under intensifying control.  And even for those who would affirm the necessity of strict control, and dismiss Illich’s vision of joyful austerity as a long-faded dream, there is the question of whether pandemic policy has fostered intelligent control.  Consider: policy has been driven more by panic than by prudence; science has been at the same time idolized and ignored; the well-off have fortified themselves, while those with a more precarious hold on livelihood, shelter, and even sanity have been cast off; political enmity has intensified; political categories have grown more rigid and confining; media have become more conformist and censorious; the sick and the dying have been denied comfort; and people have grown more afraid of one another.  This does not promise the more sensitive attunement to our world that our ecological impasse asks for.  It suggests an impenetrable human narcissism mesmerized by its own myths and sealed up in an increasingly artificial reality.  

 

AGAMBEN AND PHILOSOPHY

 

The most ambitious attempt to draw out the epochal implications of the COVID-19 pandemic that I have seen is a short piece by Giorgio Agamben called “Medicine and Religion.”[61]  In this article Agamben argues that the pandemic has allowed science in the guise of medicine to occupy the entire space of existence, displacing every other human claim.  In modernity, he says, “three great systems of belief” have uneasily coexisted.  These are Christianity, capitalism and science, and they have achieved, through a history of conflict, intersection and negotiation, “a sort of peaceful articulated co-existence.”  But now bio-medicine has found the occasion to extend its “cult” even into domains where capitalism and Christianity formerly exerted their hegemonies: 

[Medicine’s] cultic practice was like every liturgy episodic and limited in time… [T]he unexpected phenomenon that we are witnessing is that it has become permanent and all-encompassing.  It is no longer a question of taking medicine or submitting when necessary to a doctor visit or surgical intervention, the whole life of human beings must become the place of an uninterrupted cultic celebration. The enemy, the virus, is always present and must be fought unceasingly and without any possible truce. 

Agamben uses the term “cult” here in the sense used by religious scholars to describe the devotional practices of any religion – the means by which a religion is cult-ivated – and not in the contemporary sense of a deviant group under the spell of some charismatic leader.  Medicine’s cult is now total because it can prescribe every gesture we are to make and proscribe the practices of competing cults. 

Agamben’s acknowledged ancestor here is Walter Benjamin.  In a gnomic fragment called “Capitalism as Religion” which was published after his death, Benjamin speculated about capitalism as a form of religion.  Capitalism, he argued, has the same fundamental structure as Christianity but in a displaced or disguised form.  As a result of this displacement, the structure is rendered inaccessible – the devotee of the cult no longer knows what they are doing.  In this way it becomes a total cult.  Every day is a holy day (and therefore no day).  Sin and its forgiveness are effaced, leaving only an endless inexpiable guilt.  The eschatological element in Christianity – the view that a judgment awaits us at the end of time – is dispersed and deferred as a crisis that is never resolved, a growth that is never enough, an innovation always requiring some further innovation.   

Agamben doesn’t spell all this out in his very short essay, but, in calling bio-medicine a cult that now aspires to a total jurisdiction, I believe he is imitating Benjamin’s argument.  (Agamben was the Italian editor of Benjamin’s collected works, and he is the author of an essay called “Capitalism as Religion” which spells out the import of Benjamin’s article much more lucidly than the original.[62])  It is clear enough, I think, that at least while the pandemic lasts, public health authorities are in a position to prescribe the gestures, all the gestures, we will make – where we can go, who we can see, how far away we should stand from them, what we should wear etc. – and to proscribe those we won’t,  including even absolute social and cultural fundamentals like care of the sick and dying, artistic performance, religious celebration, and the maintenance of family and community relationships.  Whether these are only emergency powers, or, as Agamben clearly fears, the inauguration of a permanent state of emergency in which health security will at all times trump other cultural and social obligations, remains to be seen.  Meanwhile his argument – that science in the guise of bio-medicine now superintendents a comprehensive cult whose central object of reverence is life – is persuasive.  People fail to see it or take it for granted only because life and the saving of “lives” has been so compellingly consecrated that it can no longer be examined or reasoned about.  

What is important in Agamben’s argument for me is the claim that we are witnessing the establishment of a new religion and the consolidation of its cult.  To explicitly name this religion as science or medicine can be tricky because one is not just talking about the various practices of these fields, but about their presiding myths.  The institutions of science and medicine supply this new cult with part of its priesthood but they are not what constitute the religion.  What makes a religion, as Emile Durkheim argued more than a century ago, is the designation of a sacred dimension which is not to be touched, investigated or interfered with.[63] The sacred has the power to strike people dumb, to amaze them and, if necessary, to sacrifice them.  This power now inheres in the demi-gods health, safety, risk awareness and, their epitome, life.  So long as a certain course of action is seen to be saving lives, it’s not really necessary to ask what else it might be doing.  

This idea that we are faced with a religion and not just a contestable scientific point-of-view (though it is also that) has multiple implications.  One is that this religion must be faced and criticized as such.   This not to say that questionable scientific claims should not be challenged on scientific grounds, but only to recognize that ideas held, as it were, religiously, under scientific disguise, will not yield to scientific argument, however cogent.  A second is that this new religion has not dropped from the sky but is derived from Christianity, the religion that so many think they have renounced, overcome and set aside.  Benjamin argued in the essay discussed above that capitalism-as-religion is a “parasite” of Christianity. Ivan Illich, my teacher on this point, made the same argument with respect to the new “religiosity,” as he called it, of life.  We would not now be bowing to this new idol, he wrote, if Christians had not for two millennia preached and sought the “life more abundant” that Jesus promised when he announced to his friend Martha, without qualification, “I am Life.”[64]  Agamben, too, shares this view, suggesting in his essay that “The medical religion has unreservedly taken up from Christianity the eschatological urgency that the latter had let fall by the wayside.”  (“Eschatological urgency” here refers to the quasi-apocalyptic, Armageddon-like character of our mobilization against the virus.)    Two ideas follow: the first is that we are never more religious than when we think we have overcome religion; the second that our future is being determined, all unconsciously, by a disowned and disregarded past.  

Agamben’s concern, which he has bravely expressed since the beginning of the pandemic, is that the rule of the religiously-sanctioned health security state has become “all-pervasive,” “normatively obligatory,” and deeply corrosive of any form of life that stands on competing grounds – funeral rites are an obvious example of such forms of life, and the outlawing of such rites, along with the abandonment of the dying, was one of the first elements of the pandemic regime to shock and alarm Agamben.   What is demanded in response, he says, is that “philosophers must again enter into conflict with religion,” – something that has “happened many times in the course of history.”  I believe this to be so, and I believe that what he means by philosophy is not a professional discipline open only to initiates but the very practice of freedom insofar as that practice requires us to understand how we came by our ideas, the grounds on which we are governed, and other such elementary matters.  What Agamben calls “conflict with religion” might also be understood as a claim for freedom of religion (since it is arguable that no one can avoid having a religion, and therefore the best we can aspire to is to hold – and hold off – that religion freely).  Long ago, in 1971’s Deschooling Society Ivan Illich made the claim that compulsory schooling, both by its ritual structure and its vaunting spiritual ambition, constituted a church, and, as such ought to be disestablished.  Had medicine then been compulsory, he would doubtless have made the same claim in his Medical Nemesis (1975) which criticized medical establishments on the same grounds as his earlier book had analyzed compulsory schooling. Agamben’s argument is that medicine has now also made itself “normatively obligatory,” and that this new power will not necessarily recede with the pandemic.  In 1791, the United States adopted a first amendment to its new constitution forbidding any law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Section Two of Canada’s Charter of Rights guarantees Canadians the same freedom.  So far these freedoms have been understood as applying only to what are obvious, explicit and formally-constituted churches.  If Illich and Agamben are right, the truly powerful churches – the ones that tell us not only how we ought to live but how we must live – exert their claims on us in the name of education, health, safety, risk reduction and other shibboleths of the new religion.  It follows that we now need what Illich’s dear friend, the American critic Paul Goodman, called a “new reformation.”[65]  The freedoms for which the first Reformation fought must now be fought for again. 

 

NOTES

[1] https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/17/a-fiasco-in-the-making-as-the-coronavirus-pandemic-takes-hold-we-are-making-decisions-without-reliable-data/

[2] https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/lives-vs-lives-the-global-cost-of-lockdown?utm_medium=email&utm_source=CampaignMonitor_Editorial&utm_campaign=WEEK%20%2020200516%20%20Fisher%20%20AL+CID_91ecdf3e8f5ee7b8abe842ca3cbf65e6

[3] http://www.balancedresponse.ca/

[4] https://gbdeclaration.org/

[5] https://lockdownsceptics.org/what-sage-got-wrong/

[6] Ibid.

[7]https://www.who.int/bulletin/online_first/BLT.20.265892.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=CampaignMonitor_Editorial&utm_campaign=LNCH%20%2020201016%20%20House%20Ads%20%20SM+CID_67ee9eb414f5b55517be202ffd3379bd

[8] Jutta Mason has made a compendium of links to these various open letters, pro and con, on the website of her  Centre for Local Research into Public Space (CELOS).  Both the Ontario and Belgian doctors’ letters can be found there: https://www.celos.ca/wiki/wiki.php?n=BackgroundResearch.Covid19Quarantine

[9] Andrew Coyne, “Herd Immunity is a great strategy is you don’t mind millions of dead,” The Globe and Mail, Oct. 27, ’20, D2

[10] He made this remark during an appearance with his two colleagues on Unherd: https://unherd.com/2020/10/covid-experts-there-is-another-way/

[11] https://medium.com/medical-myths-and-models/the-human-genome-is-full-of-viruses-c18ba52ac195

[12] “la plus grande crise de santé publique de son histoire” – statement in front of the Prime Minister’s residence on March 25, 2020 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzRw-AIeNuY

[13] Ray Oldenburg, The Great Good Place: Cafés, Coffee Shops, Bookstores, Bars, Hair Salons, and Other Hangouts at the Heart of Community, Marlowe and Company, 1989

[14] Uwe Pörksen, Plastic Words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language, Penn State Press, 1995; Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders, ABC: The Alphabetization of the Western Mind, Vintage, 1988, pp. 106-107.

[15] Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Paladin, 1972

[16] Bruno Latour, Science in Action, Harvard, 1987

[17] Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life, Princeton, 2011, p. 13

[18] Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour, Peter Weibel, M.I.T., 2005

[19] Broadcasts here: http://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-science-part-1-24-1.2953274; transcripts here: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/542c2af8e4b00b7cfca08972/t/58ffb590db29d67edabd4e26/1493153189310/How+To+Think+About+Science.pdf   See also Ideas on the Nature of Science, ed. David Cayley, Goose Lane, 2009

[20] Zain Chagla, Sumon Chakrabarti, Isaac Bogoch, and Dominik Mertz, “Healthy Discussions: Diversity of Thought Is  Needed In Pandemic Response,” The National Post, Nov. 6, 2020, A13.

[21] Socrates speaks of “the noble lie” in Republic, Book III, 414b

[22] Sunetra Gupta, “A Contagion of Hatred and Hysteria,” https://www.aier.org/article/a-contagion-of-hatred-and-hysteria/

[23] https://www.aier.org/about/

[24] André Picard, “Don’t be complacent about COVID-19,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29, 2020, A13.

[25] “Forget Politics.  It’s time to fight COVID-19,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 21, 2020, A12

[26] André Picard, “Fasten your seat-belts,” The Globe and Mail, Nov. 9, 3030, p. A7

[27] https://ocla.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Rancourt-Masks-dont-work-review-science-re-COVID19-policy.pdf

[28] Carl Heneghan and Tom Jefferson, “Do Face Masks Work?” The Spectator, Nov. 19, 20

[29] Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, p. ix

[30] Illich met Kohr in Puerto Rico in the 1950’s, and they remained friends thereafter.   lllich wrote the introduction to Kohr’s book, The Inner City (Talybont: Y Lolfa, 1989) and gave the laudatio at a celebration of Kohr’s eightieth birthday.  He speaks of their friendship in David Cayley, Ivan Illich in Conversation, House of Anansi, 1992, pp. 82-84

[31] See D’arcy Thompson, On Growth and Form, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 (first edition 1917) and J.B.S. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size,” in James R. Newman, The World of Mathematics, Vol. 2, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1956 (originally published in 1928).

[32] https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/sex-covid-19-councillor-calling-for-sexual-health-clinics-to-open-1.5662208

[33] See note 13 above

[34] Luke 5:37

[35] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed . Michael Oakeshott, Collier Macmillian, 1962, p. 132

[36] https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/event201/about

[37] https://plandemicseries.com/

[38] https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/events-archive/2005_atlantic_storm/

[39] https://vaxxedthemovie.com/

[40] The paper is here and still legible under the big RETRACTED stamp on every page: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673697110960/fulltext

[41] Republic, Book V, 473 c-e

[42] Matthew 5:5

[43] See note 12 above

[44] https://canada.autonews.com/coronavirus/canadian-suppliers-team-help-produce-10000-ventilators-ontario;

[45] https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/vexos-to-manufacture-and-deliver-10-000-mvm-ventilators-to-the-government-of-canada-in-its-national-mobilization-to-combat-the-covid-19-pandemic-890140952.html

[46] See, for example: Dr. Matt Strauss, “The Underground Doctors’ Movement Questioning the Use of Ventilators,” The Spectator, May 2, 2020

[47] The Spectator, Oct. 6, 2020

[48] Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. I: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, Black Rose Books, 1979, p. 71

[49] “We are the masters of our pandemic fate,” The Globe and Mail, Nov. 3, 2020, A10

[50] “Covid-zero” is the brand devised by infectious disease specialist Dr. Andrew Morris and some colleagues for their proposal that Canada adopt an “aggressive national strategy” to fight the pandemic: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-monday-edition-1.5803690/you-don-t-copy-the-losers-says-doctor-pushing-covid-zero-strategy-1.5805367

[51] Kelly Grant, “How an Australian state beat back its second wave,” The Globe and Mail, Nov. 14, ’20, A14

[52] André Picard, “Don’t be complacent about COVID-19,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29. 2020, A11

[53] E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century,” Past and Present, No. 50, Feb., 1971 – reprinted in E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture, New Press, 1993; James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, Yale, 1999; Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites, WW Norton,  1995; and Ivan Illich, Shadow Work, Marion Boyars, 1981.

[54] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/covid-19-is-natures-wake-up-call-to-complacent-civilisation

[55] Bill McKibben, “The End of the World as We Know It,” TLS, July 31, 2020

[56] ttps://www.aier.org/article/an-education-in-viruses-and-public-health-from-michael-yeadon-former-vp-of-pfizer/

[57] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.604339/full#SM6

[58] https://lockdownsceptics.org/what-sage-got-wrong/

[59] Managing Planet Earth: Readings from Scientific American Magazine, W.H. Freeman and Co., 1990

[60] Editorial, The Globe and Mail, May 12, 2020

[61] https://itself.blog/2020/05/02/giorgio-agamben-medicine-as-religion/

[62] Giorgio Agamben, “Capitalism as Religion,” in Agamben and Radical Politics, ed. Daniel McLoughlin, University of Edinburgh Press, 2016

[63] Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, The Free Press, 1995 (first published 1912)

[64] Ivan Illich, “The Institutional Construction of a New Fetish: Human Life,” in In the Mirror of the Past, Marion Boyars, 1992; “life more abundant,” John 10:10 – “I am come that they should have life and have it more abundantly.”; “I am Life” John 11:25 – “I am the Resurrection and the LIfe.”

[65] In 1970, two years before his death, Goodman published New Reformation: Notes of a Neolithic Conservative (PM Press, 2010)

Questions About the Current Pandemic From the Point of View of Ivan Illich

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QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT PANDEMIC FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF IVAN ILLICH 

 

Last week I began an essay on the current pandemic in which I tried to address what I take to be the central question that it raises:  Is the massive and costly effort to contain and limit the harm that the virus will do the only choice we have?  Is it no more than an obvious and unavoidable exercise of prudence undertaken to protect the most vulnerable?  Or is it a disastrous effort to maintain control of what is obviously out of control, an effort which will compound the damage being done by the disease with new troubles that will reverberate far into the future?  I hadn’t been writing for long before I began to realize that many of the assumptions I was making were quite remote from those being expressed all around me.  These assumptions had mainly come, I reflected, from my prolonged conversation with the work of Ivan Illich.  What this suggested was that, before I could speak intelligibly about our present circumstances, I would first have to sketch the attitude towards health, medicine and well-being that Illich developed over a lifetime of reflection on these themes.  Accordingly, in what follows, I will start with a brief account of the evolution of Illich’s critique of bio-medicine and then try to answer the questions I just posed in this light..

At the beginning of his 1973 book Tools of Conviviality, Illich described what he thought was the typical course of development followed by contemporary institutions, using medicine as his example.  Medicine, he said, had gone through “two watersheds.”  The first had been crossed in the early years of the 20th century when medical treatments became demonstrably effective and benefits generally began to exceed harms.  For many medical historians this is the only relevant marker – from this point on progress will proceed indefinitely, and, though there may be diminishing returns, there will be no point, in principle, at which progress will stop.  This was not the case for Illich.  He hypothesized a second watershed, which he thought was already being  crossed and even exceeded around the time he was writing.  Beyond this second watershed, he supposed, what he called counterproductivity would set in – medical intervention would begin to defeat its own objects, generating more harm than good.  This, he argued, was characteristic of any institution, good or service – a point could be identified at which there was enough of it and, after which, there would be too much.  Tools for Conviviality, was an attempt to identify these “natural scales” – the only such general and programmatic search for a philosophy of technology that Illich undertook. 

Two years later in Medical Nemesis – later renamed, in its final and most comprehensive edition, Limits to Medicine – Illich tried to lay out in detail the goods and the harms that medicine does.  He was generally favourable to the large-scale innovations in public health that have given us good food, safe water, clean air, sewage disposal etc.  He also praised efforts then underway in China and Chile to establish a basic medical toolkit and pharmacopeia that would be available and affordable for all citizens, rather than allowing medicine to develop luxury goods that would remain forever out of reach of the majority.  But the main point of his book was to identify and describe the counterproductive effects that he felt were becoming evident as medicine crossed its second watershed.  He spoke of these fall-outs from too much medicine as iatrogenesis, and addressed them under three headings: clinical, social and cultural.  The first everyone, by now, understands – you get the wrong diagnosis, the wrong drug, the wrong operation, you get sick in hospital etc.  This collateral damage is not trivial.  An article in the Canadian magazine The Walrus – Rachel Giese, “The Errors of Their Ways, April 2012 – estimated 7.5% of the Canadians admitted to hospitals every year suffer at least one “adverse event” and 24,000 die as a result of medical mistakes. Around the same time, Ralph Nader, writing in Harper’s Magazine, suggested that the number of people in the United States who die annually as a result of preventable medical errors is around 400,000.  This is an impressive number, even if exaggerated – Nader’s estimate is twice as high per capita as The Walrus’s – but this accidental harm was not, by any means, Illich’s focus.  What really concerned him was the way in which excessive medical treatment weakens basic social and cultural aptitudes.  An instance of what he called social iatrogenesis is the way in which the art of medicine, in which the physician acts as healer, witness, and counsellor, tends to give way to the science of medicine, in which the doctor, as a scientist, must, by definition, treat his or her patient as an experimental subject and not as a unique case.  And, finally, there was the ultimate injury that medicine inflicts: cultural iatrogenesis.  This occurs, Illich said, when cultural abilities, built up and passed on over many generations, are first undermined and then, gradually, replaced altogether.  These abilities include, above all, the willingness to suffer and bear one’s own reality, and the capacity to die one’s own death.  The art of suffering was being overshadowed, he argued, by the expectation that all suffering can and should be immediately relieved – an attitude which doesn’t, in fact, end suffering but rather renders it meaningless, making it merely an anomaly or technical miscarriage.   And death, finally, was being transformed from an intimate, personal act – something each one can do – into a meaningless defeat – a mere cessation of treatment or “pulling the plug,” as is sometimes heartlessly said.  Behind Illich’s arguments lay a traditional Christian attitude.  He affirmed that suffering and  death are inherent in the human condition – they are part of what defines this condition.  And he argued that the loss of this condition would involve a catastrophic rupture both with our past and with our own creatureliness.  To mitigate and ameliorate the human condition was good, he said.  To lose it altogether was a catastrophe because we can only know God as creatures – i.e. created or given beings – not as gods who have taken charge of our own destiny.  

Medical Nemesis is a book about professional power – a point on which it’s worth dwelling for a moment in view of the extraordinary powers that are currently being asserted in the name of public health.  According to Illich, contemporary medicine, at all times, exercises political power, though this character may be hidden by the claim that all that is being asserted is care.  In the province of Ontario where I live, “health care” currently gobbles up more than 40% of the government’s budget, which should make the point clearly enough.  But this everyday power, great as it is, can be further expanded by what Illich calls “the ritualization of crisis.”  This confers on medicine “a license that usually only the military can claim.”  He continues: 

Under the stress of crisis, the professional who is believed to be in command can easily presume immunity from the ordinary rules of justice and decency.  He who is assigned control over death ceases to be an ordinary human…Because they form a charmed borderland not quite of this world, the time-span and the community space claimed by the medical enterprise are as sacred as their religious and military counterparts. 

In a footnote to this passage Illich adds that “he who successfully claims power in an emergency suspends and can destroy rational evaluation.  The insistence of the physician on his exclusive capacity to evaluate and solve individual crises moves him symbolically into the neighborhood of the White House.”  There is a striking parallel here with the German jurist Carl Schmitt’s claim in his Political Theology that the hallmark of true sovereignty is the power to “decide on the exception.”  Schmitt’s point is that sovereignty stands above law because in an emergency the sovereign can suspend the law – declare an exception - and rule in its place as the very source of law.   This is precisely the power that Illich says the physician “claims…in an emergency.”  Exceptional circumstances make him/her “immune” to the “ordinary rules” and able to make new ones as the case dictates.  But there is an interesting and, to me, telling difference between Schmitt and Illich.  Schmitt is transfixed by what he calls “the political.”  Illich notices that much of what Schmitt calls sovereignty has escaped, or been usurped from the political realm and reinvested in various professional hegemonies.  

Ten years after Medical Nemesis was published, Illich revisited and revised his argument.  He did not, by any means, renounce what he had written earlier, but he did add to it quite dramatically.  In his book, he now said, he had been “blind to a much more profound symbolic iatrogenic effect: the iatrogenesis of the body itself.”  He had “overlooked the degree to which, at mid-century, the experience of ‘our bodies and our selves’ had become the result of medical concepts and cares.”  In other words he had written, in Medical Nemesis, as if there were a natural body, standing outside the web of techniques by which its self-awareness is constructed, and now he could see that there is no such standpoint.  “Each historical moment,” he wrote, “is incarnated in an epoch-specific body.”  Medicine doesn’t just act on a preexisting state – rather it participates in creating this state. 

This recognition was just the beginning of a new stance on Illich’s part.  Medical Nemesis had addressed a citizenry that was imagined as capable of acting to limit the scope of medical intervention.  Now he spoke of people whose very self-image was being generated by bio-medicine.  Medical Nemesis had claimed, in its opening sentence, that “the medical establishment has become a major threat to health.”  Now he judged that that the major threat to health was the pursuit of health itself.   Behind this change of mind lay his sense that the world, in the meanwhile, had undergone an epochal change.  “I believe,” he told me in 1988, “that…there [has been] a change in the mental space in which many people live.  Some kind of a catastrophic breakdown of one way of seeing things has led to the emergence of a different way of seeing things.  The subject of my writing has been the perception of sense in the way we live; and, in this respect, we are, in my opinion, at this moment, passing over a watershed.  I had not expected in my lifetime to observe this passage.”  Illich characterized “the new way of seeing things” as the advent of what he called “the age of systems” or “an ontology of systems.”  The age that he saw as ending had been dominated by the idea of instrumentality – of using instrumental means, like medicine, to achieve some end or good, like health.  Characteristic of this age was a clear distinction between subjects and objects, means and ends, tools and their users etc.  In the age of systems, he said, these distinctions have collapsed.  A system, conceived cybernetically, is all encompassing – it has no outside.  The user of a tool takes up the tool to accomplish some end.  Users of systems are inside the system, constantly adjusting their state to the system, as the system adjusts its state to them.  A bounded individual pursuing personal well-being gives way to an immune system which constantly recalibrates its porous boundary with the surrounding system.

Within this new “system analytic discourse,” as Illich named it, the characteristic state of people is disembodiment.  This is a paradox, obviously, since what Illich called “the pathogenic pursuit of health” may involve an intense, unremitting and virtually narcissistic preoccupation with one’s bodily state.  Why Illich conceived it as disembodying can best be understood by the example of “risk awareness” which he called “the most important religiously celebrated ideology today.”  Risk was disembodying, he said, because “it is a strictly mathematical concept.”  It does not pertain to persons but to populations – no one knows what will happen to this or that person, but what will happen to the aggregate of such persons can be expressed as a probability.   To identify oneself with this statistical figment is to engage, Illich said, in “intensive self-algorithmization.” 

His most distressing encounter with this “religiously celebrated ideology” occurred in the field of genetic testing during pregnancy.  He was introduced to it by his friend and colleague Silja Samerski who was studying the genetic counselling that is mandatory for pregnant women considering genetic testing in Germany – a subject she would later write about in a book called The Decision Trap (Imprint-Academic, 2015).  Genetic testing in pregnancy does not reveal anything definite about the child which the woman being tested is expecting.  All it detects are markers whose uncertain meaning can be expressed in probabilities – a likelihood calculated across the entire population to which the one being tested belongs, by her age, family history, ethnicity etc.  When she is told, for example, that there is a 30% chance that her baby will have this or that syndrome, she is told nothing about herself or the fruit of her womb – she is told only what might happen to someone like her.  She knows nothing more about her actual circumstances than what her hopes, dreams and intuitions reveal, but the risk profile that has been ascertained for her statistical doppelganger demands a decision.  The choice is existential; the information on which it is based is the probability curve on which the chooser has been inscribed.  Illich found this to be a perfect horror.  It was not that he could not recognize that all human action is a shot in the dark – a prudential calculation in the face of the unknown.  His horror was at seeing people reconceive themselves in the image of a statistical construct.  For him, this was an eclipse of persons by populations; an effort to prevent the future from disclosing anything unforeseen; and a substitution of scientific models for sensed experience. And this was happening, Illich realized, not just with regard to genetic testing in pregnancy but more or less across the board in health care.  Increasingly people were acting prospectively, probabilistically, according to their risk.  They were becoming, as Canadian health researcher Allan Cassels once joked, “pre-diseased” – vigilant and active against illnesses that someone like them might get.  Individual cases were increasingly managed as general cases, as instances of a category or class, rather than as unique predicaments, and doctors were increasingly the servo-mechanisms of this cloud of probabilities rather than intimate advisors alert to specific differences and personal meanings.  This was what Illich meant by “self-algorithmization” or disembodiment.

One way of getting at the iatrogenic body that Illich saw as the primary effect of contemporary biomedicine is by going back to an essay that was widely read and discussed in his milieu in the early 1990’s.  Called “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Constitutions of Self in Immune System Discourse,” it was written by historian and philosopher of science Donna Haraway and appears in her 1991 book Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature.  This essay is interesting not just because I think it influenced Illich’s sense of how bio-medical discourse was shifting, but also because Haraway, seeing – I would claim – almost exactly the same things as Illich, draws conclusions that are, point-for-point, diametrically opposite.  In this article, for example, she says, with reference to what she calls “the post-modern body,” that “human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical.”  “In a sense,” she continues, “organisms have ceased to exist as objects of knowledge, giving way to biotic components.”  This leads to a situation in which “no objects, spaces or bodies are sacred in themselves; and components can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language.”  In a world of interfaces, where boundaries regulate “rates of flow” rather than marking real differences, “the integrity of natural objects” is no longer a concern.  “The ‘integrity’ or ‘sincerity’ of the Western self,” she writes, “gives way to decision procedures, expert systems, and resource investment strategies.”

In other words, Haraway, like Illich understands that persons, as unique, stable and hallowed beings, have dissolved into provisionally self-regulating sub-systems in constant interchange with the larger systems in which they are enmeshed.  In her words, “we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism…the cyborg is our ontology.”  The difference between them lies in their reactions.  Haraway, elsewhere in the volume from which the essay I have been quoting comes, issues what she calls her “Cyborg Manifesto.”  It calls on people to recognize and accept this new situation but to “read it” with a view to liberation.  In a patriarchal society, there is no acceptable condition to which one could hope to return, so she offers “an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction.”  For Illich, on the other hand, the “cyborg ontology,” as Haraway calls it, was not an option.  For him what was at stake was the very character of human persons as ensouled beings with a divine origin and a divine destiny.  As the last vestiges of sense washed out of the bodily self-perception of his contemporaries, he saw a world that had become “immune to its own salvation.”  “I have come to the conclusion,” he told me plaintively, “that when the angel Gabriel told that girl in the town of Nazareth in Galilee that God wanted to be in her belly, he pointed to a body which has gone from the world in which I live.”

The “new way of seeing things” which was reflected in the orientation of bio-medicine amounted, according to Illich, to “a new stage of religiosity.” He used the word religiosity in a broad sense to refer to something deeper and more pervasive than formal or institutional religion.  Religiosity is the ground on which we stand, our feeling about how and why things are as they are, the very horizon within which meaning takes shape.  For Illich, the createdness, or given-ness of the world was the foundation of his entire sensibility.  What he saw coming was a religiosity of total immanence in which the world is its own cause and there is no source of meaning or order outside of it – “a cosmos,” as he said, “in the hands of man.”  The highest good in such a world is life, and the primary duty of people is to conserve and foster life.  But this is not the life which is spoken of in the Bible – the life which comes from God – it is a rather a resource which people possess and ought to manage responsibly.  Its peculiar property is to be at the same time an object of reverence and of manipulation.  This naturalized life, divorced from its source, is the new god.  Health and safety are its adjutants.  Its enemy is death.   Death still imposes a final defeat but has no other personal meaning.  There is no proper time to die – death ensues when treatment fails or is terminated. 

Illich refused to “interiorize systems into the self.”  He would give up neither human nature nor natural law. “I just cannot shed the certainty,” he said in an interview with his friend Douglas Lummis, “that the norms with which we ought to live correspond to our insight into what we are.”  This led him to reject “responsibility for health,” conceived as a management of intermeshed systems.  How can one be responsible, he asked, for what has neither sense, boundary nor ground?  Better to give up such comforting illusions and to live instead in a spirit of self-limitation which he defined as “courageous, disciplined, self-critical renunciation accomplished in community.” 

To summarize: Illich, in his later years, concluded that humanity, at least in his vicinity, had taken leave of its senses and moved lock, stock and barrel into a system construct lacking any ground whatsoever for ethical decision.  The bodies in which people lived and walked around had become synthetic constructs woven out of CAT-scans and risk curves.  Life had become a quasi-religious idol, presiding over an “ontology of systems.” Death had become a meaningless obscenity rather than an intelligible companion.  All this was expressed forcefully and unequivocally.  He did not attempt to soften it or offer a comforting “on the other hand…”. What he attended to was what he sensed was happening around him, and all his care was to try to register it as sensitively as he could and address it as truthfully as he could.  The world, in his view, was not in his hands, but in the hands of God.

By the time he died, in 2002, Illich stood far outside the new “way of seeing things” that he felt had established itself during the second half his life.  He felt that in this new “age of systems” the primary unit of creation, the human person, had begun to lose its boundary, its distinction and its dignity.  He thought that the revelation in which he was rooted had been corrupted – the “life more abundant” that had been promised in the New Testament transformed into a human hegemony so total and so claustrophobic that no intimation from outside the system could disturb it.  He believed that medicine had so far exceeded the threshold at which it might have eased and complemented the human condition that it was now threatening to abolish this condition altogether.  And he had concluded that much of humanity is no longer willing to “bear…[its] rebellious, torn and disoriented flesh” and has instead traded its art of suffering and its art of dying for a few years of life expectancy and the comforts of life in an “artificial creation.”  Can any sense be made of the current “crisis” from this point of view?  I would say yes, but only insofar as we can step back from the urgencies of the moment and take time to consider what is being revealed about our underlying dispositions – our “certainties,” as Illich called them. 

First of all, Illich’s perspective indicates that for some time now we’ve been practicing the attitudes that have characterized the response to the current pandemic.  It’s a striking thing about events which are perceived to have changed history, or “changed everything,” as one sometimes hears, that people often seem to be somehow ready for them or even unconsciously or semi-consciously expecting them.  Recalling the beginning of the First World War, economic historian Karl Polanyi used the image of sleep-walking to characterize the way in which the countries of Europe shuffled to their doom – automatons blindly accepting the fate they had unknowingly projected.   The events of Sept. 11, 2001 – 9/11 as we now know it – seemed to be instantly interpreted and understood, as if everyone had just been waiting to declare the patent meaning of what had occurred – the end of the Age of Irony, the beginning of the War on Terror, whatever it might be.  Some of this is surely a trick of perspective by which hindsight instantly turns contingency into necessity – since something did happen, we assume that it was bound to happen all along.  But I don’t think this can be the whole story.  

At the heart of the coronavirus response has been the claim that we must act prospectively to prevent what has not yet occurred: an exponential growth in infections, an overwhelming of the resources of the medical system, which will put medical personnel in the invidious position of performing triage, etc.  Otherwise, it is said, by the time we find out what we’re dealing with, it will be too late.  (It’s worth pointing out, in passing, that this is unverifiable idea: if we succeed, and what we fear does not take place, then we will be able to say that our actions prevented it, but we will never actually know whether this was the case.). This idea that prospective action is crucial has been readily accepted, and people have even vied with one in another in denouncing the laggards who have shown resistance to it.  But to act like this requires experience in living in a hypothetical space where prevention outranks cure, and this is exactly what Illich describes when he speaks of risk as “the most important religiously celebrated ideology today.”  An expression like “flattening the curve” can become overnight common sense only in a society practiced in “staying ahead of the curve” and in thinking in terms of population dynamics rather than actual cases. 

Risk has a history.  One of the first to identify it as the preoccupation of a new form of society was German sociologist Ulrich Beck in his 1986 book Risk Society, published in English in 1992.  In this book, Beck portrayed late modernity as an uncontrolled science experiment.  By uncontrolled he meant that we have no spare planet on which we can conduct a nuclear war to see how it goes, no second atmosphere which we can heat and observe the results.  This means that techno-scientific society is, on the one hand, hyper-scientific and, on the other, radically unscientific insofar as it has no standard against which it can measure or assess what it has done.  There are endless examples of this sort of uncontrolled experiment – from transgenic sheep to mass international tourism to the transformation of persons into communications relays.  All these, insofar as they have unforeseeable and unpredictable consequences, already constitute a kind of living in the future.  And just because we are citizens of risk society, and therefore participants by definition, in an uncontrolled science experiment, we have become – paradoxically or not – preoccupied with controlling risk.  As I pointed out above, we are treated and screened for diseases we do not yet have, on the basis of our probability of getting them.  Pregnant couples make life and death decisions based on probabilistic risk profiles.  Safety becomes a mantra – “farewell” becomes “be safe” – health becomes a god.  

Equally important in the current atmosphere has been the idolization of life, and aversion from its obscene other, death.  That we must at all costs “save lives” is not questioned.  This makes it very easy to start a stampede.  Making an entire country “go home and stay home,” as our prime minister said not long ago, has immense and incalculable costs.  No one knows how many businesses will fail, how many jobs will be lost, how many will sicken from loneliness, how many will resume addictions or beat each other up in their isolation.  But these costs seem bearable as soon the spectre of lives lost is brought on the scene.  Again, we have been practicing counting lives for a long time. The obsession with the “death toll” from the latest catastrophe is simply the other side of the coin.  Life becomes an abstraction – a number without a story.   

Illich claimed in the mid-1980’s that he was beginning to meet people whose “very selves” were a product of “medical concepts and cares.”  I think this helps to explain why the Canadian state, and its component provincial and municipal governments, have largely failed to acknowledge what is currently at stake in our “war” on “the virus.”  Sheltering behind the skirts of science – even where there is no science – and deferring to the gods of health and safety has appeared to them as political necessity.  Those who have been acclaimed for their leadership, like Quebec premier François Legault, have been those who have distinguished themselves by their single-minded consistency in applying the conventional wisdom.  Few have yet dared to question the cost – and, when those few include Donald Trump, the prevailing complacency is only fortified – who would dare agree with him?  In this respect insistent repetition of the metaphor of war has been influential – in a war no one counts costs or reckons who is actually paying them.  First, we must win the war.  Wars create social solidarity and discourage dissent – those not showing the flag are apt to be shown the equivalent of the white feather with which non-combatants were shamed during World War One.   

At the date at which I am writing – early April – no one really knows what is going on.  Since no one knows how many have the disease, nobody knows what the death rate is – Italy’s is currently listed at over 10%, which puts it in the range of the catastrophic influenza at the end of World War I, while Germany’s is at .8%, which is more in line with what happens unremarked every year – some very old people, and a few younger ones, catch the flu and die.  What does seem clear, here in Canada, is that, with the exception of a few local sites of true emergency, the pervasive sense of panic and crisis is largely a result of the measures taken against the pandemic and not of the pandemic itself.  Here the word itself has played an important role – the declaration by the World Health Organization that a pandemic was now officially in progress didn’t change anyone’s health status but it dramatically changed the public atmosphere.  It was the signal the media had been waiting for to introduce a regime in which nothing else but the virus could be discussed.  By now a story in the newspaper not concerned with coronavirus is actually shocking.  This cannot help but give the impression of a world on fire.  If you talk about nothing else, it will soon come to seem as if there is nothing else.  A bird, a crocus, a spring breeze can begin to seem almost irresponsible – “don’t they know it’s the end of the world?” as an old country music classic asks.  The virus acquires extraordinary agency – it is said to have depressed the stock market, shuttered businesses, and generated panic fear, as if these were not the actions of responsible people but of the illness itself.  Emblematic for me, here in Toronto, was a headline in The National Post.  In a font that occupied much of the top half of the front page, it said simply PANIC.   Nothing indicated whether the word was to be read as a description or an instruction.  This ambiguity is constitutive of all media, and disregarding it is the characteristic déformation professionelle of the journalist, but it becomes particularly easy to ignore in a certified crisis.  It is not the obsessive reporting or the egging on of authorities to do more that has turned the world upside down – it is the virus that has done it.  Don’t blame the messenger.  A headline on the web-site STAT on April 1, and I don’t think it was a joke, even claimed that “Covid-19 has sunk the ship of state.”  It is interesting, in this respect, to perform a thought experiment.  How much of an emergency would we feel ourselves to be in if this had never been called a pandemic and such stringent measures taken against it?  Plenty of troubles escape the notice of the media.  How much do we know or care about the catastrophic political disintegration of South Sudan in recent years, or about the millions who died in the Democratic Republic of Congo after civil war broke out there in 2004?  It is our attention that constitutes what we take to be the relevant world at any given moment.  The media do not act alone – people must be disposed to attend where the media directs their attention – but I don’t think it can be denied that the pandemic is a constructed object that might have been constructed differently. 

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau remarked on March 25th that we are facing “the greatest health care crisis in our history.”  If he is understood to be referring to a health crisis, this seems to me a grotesque exaggeration.  Think of the disastrous effect of smallpox on indigenous communities, or of a score of other catastrophic epidemics from cholera and yellow fever to diphtheria and polio.  Can you then really say that a flu epidemic which appears mainly to kill the old or those made susceptible by some other condition is even comparable to the ravaging of whole peoples, let alone worse?    And yet, unprecedented, like the Prime Minister’s “greatest ever,” seems to be the word on everyone’s lips.  However, if we take the Prime Minister’s words by the letter, as referring to health care, and not just health, the case changes.   From the beginning the public health measures taken in Canada have been explicitly aimed at protecting the health care system from any overload.  To me this points to an extraordinary dependence on hospitals and an extraordinary lack of confidence in our ability to care for one another.  Whether Canadian hospitals are ever flooded or not, a strange and fearful mystique seems to be involved – the hospital and its cadres are felt to be indispensable, even when things could be more easily and safely dealt with at home. Again Illich was prescient in his claim, in his essay “Disabling Professions,” that overextended professional hegemonies sap popular capacities and make people doubt their own resources.  

The measures mandated by “the greatest health care crisis in our history” have involved a remarkable curtailing of civil liberty.  This has been done, it is said, to protect life and, by the same token, to avoid death.  Death is not only to be averted but also kept hidden and unconsidered.  Years ago I heard a story about a bemused listener at one of Illich’s lectures on Medical Nemesis who afterwards turned to his companion and asked, “What does he want, let people die?”  Perhaps some of my readers would like to ask me the same question.  Well, I’m sure there are many other old people who would join me in saying that they don’t want to see young lives ruined in order that they can live a year or two longer.  But, beyond that, “let people die” is a very funny formulation because it implies that the power to determine who lives or dies is in the hands of the one to whom the question is addressed.  The we who are imagined as having the power to “let die” exist in an ideal world of perfect information and perfect technical mastery.  In this world nothing occurs which has not been chosen.  If someone dies, it will be because they have been “let…die.”  The state must, at all costs, foster, regulate and protect life – this is the essence of what Michel Foucault called biopolitics, the regime that now unquestionably rules us.  Death must be kept out of sight and out of mind.  It must be denied meaning.  No one’s time ever comes – they are let go.  The grim reaper may survive as a comic figure in New Yorker cartoons, but he has no place in public discussion.  This makes it difficult even to talk about death as something other than someone’s negligence or, at the least, a final exhaustion of treatment options.  To accept death is to accept defeat. 

The events of recent weeks reveal how totally we live inside systems, how much we have become populations rather than associated citizens, how much we are governed by the need to continually outsmart the future we ourselves have prepared.  When Illich wrote books like Tools for Conviviality and Medical Nemesis, he still hoped that life within limits was possible.  He tried to identify the thresholds at which technology must be restrained in order to keep the world at the local, sensible, conversable scale on which human beings could remain the political animals that Aristotle thought we were meant to be.  Many others saw the same vision, and many have tried over the last fifty years to keep it alive.  But there is no doubt that the world Illich warned of has come to pass.  It is a world which lives primarily in disembodied states and hypothetical spaces, a world of permanent emergency in which the next crisis is always right around the corner, a world in which the ceaseless babble of communication has stretched language past its breaking point, a world in which overstretched science has become indistinguishable from superstition.  How then can Illich’s ideas possibly gain any purchase in a world that seems to have moved out of reach of his concepts of scale, balance, and personal meaning?  Shouldn’t one just accept that the degree of social control that has recently been exerted is proportionate and necessary in the global immune system of which we are, in Haraway’s expression, “biotic components?” 

Perhaps, but it’s an old political axiom which can be found in Plato, Thomas More, and, more recently, Canadian philosopher George Grant that if you can’t achieve the best, at least prevent the worst.  And things can certainly get worse as a result of this pandemic.  It has already become a somewhat ominous commonplace that the world will not be the same once it is over.  Some see it as a rehearsal and admit frankly that, though this particular plague may not fully justify the measures being taken against it, these measures still constitute a valuable rehearsal for future and potentially worse plagues.  Others view it as a “wake-up call” and hope that, when it’s all over, a chastened humanity will begin to edge its way back from the lip of catastrophe.  My fear, and one that I think is shared by many, is that it will leave behind a disposition to accept much increased surveillance and social control, more telescreens and telepresencing, and heightened mistrust.  At the moment, everyone is optimistically describing physical distancing as a form of solidarity, but it’s also practice in regarding one another, and even ourselves – “don’t touch your face” – as potential disease vectors.   

I have said already that one of the certainties that the pandemic is driving deeper into the popular mind is risk.  But this is easy to overlook since risk is so easily conflated with real danger. The difference, I would say, is that danger is identified by a practical judgment resting on experience, whereas risk is a statistical construct pertaining to a population.  Risk has no room for individual experience or for practical judgment.  It tells you only what will happen in general.  It is an abstract of a population, not a picture of any person, or a guide to that person’s destiny.  Destiny is a concept that simply dissolves in the face of risk, where all are arrayed, uncertainly, on the same curve.  What Illich calls “the mysterious historicity” of each existence – or, more simply, its meaning – is annulled.  During this pandemic, risk society has come of age.  This is evident, for example, in the tremendous authority that has been accorded to models – even when everyone knows that they are informed by little more than what one hopes are educated guesses.  Another illustration is the familiarity with which people speak of “flattening the curve,” as if this were an everyday object – I have even recently heard songs about it.  When it becomes an object of public policy to operate on a purely imaginary, mathematical object, like a risk curve, it is certain that risk society has taken a great leap forward.   This, I think, is what Illich meant about disembodiment – the impalpable become palpable, the hypothetical becomes actual, and the realm of everyday experience becomes indistinguishable from its representation in newsrooms, laboratories and statistical models.  Humans have lived, at all times, in imagined worlds, but this, I think, is different.  In the sphere of religion, for example, even the most naïve believers have the sense that the beings they summon and address in their gatherings are not everyday objects.  In the discourse of the pandemic, everyone consorts familiarly with scientific phantoms as if there were as real as rocks and trees.  

Another related feature of the current landscape is government-by-science and its necessary complement - the abdication of political leadership resting on any other grounds.   This too is a field long-tilled and prepared for planting.  Illich wrote nearly fifty years ago in Tools for Conviviality that contemporary society is “stunned by a delusion about science.”  This delusion takes many forms, but its essence is to construct out of the messy, contingent practices of a myriad of sciences a single golden calf before which all must bow.  It is this giant mirage that is usually invoked when we are instructed to “listen to the science” or told what “studies show” or “science says.” But there is no such thing as science, only sciences, each one with its unique uses and unique limitations.   When “science” is abstracted from all the vicissitudes and shadows of knowledge production, and elevated into an omniscient oracle whose priests can be identified by their outfits, their solemn postures and their impressive credentials, what suffers, in Illich’s view, is political judgment.  We do not do what appears good to our rough and ready sense of how things are down here on the ground but only what can be dressed up as science says.   In a book called Rationality and Ritual, British sociologist of science Brian Wynne studied a public inquiry carried out by a British High Court Judge in 1977 on the question of whether a new plant should be added to the British nuclear energy complex at Sellafield on the Cumbrian coast.   Wynne shows how the judge approached the question as one which “science” would answer – is it safe? – without any need to consult moral or political principles.  This is a classic case of the displacement of political judgment onto the shoulders of Science, conceived along the mythical lines I sketched above.  This displacement is now evident in many fields.  One of its hallmarks is that people, thinking that “science” knows more than it does, imagine that they know more than they do.  No actual knowledge need support this confidence.  Epidemiologists may say frankly, as many have, that, in the present case, there is very little sturdy evidence to go on, but this has not prevented politicians from acting as if they were merely the executive arm of Science.  In my opinion, the adoption of a policy of semi-quarantining those who are not sick – a policy apt to have disastrous consequences down the road in lost jobs, failed businesses, distressed people, and debt-suffocated governments – is a political decision and ought to be discussed as such.  But, at the moment, the ample skirts of Science shelter all politicians from view.  Nor does anyone speak of impending moral decisions.  Science will decide. 

In his late writings Illich introduced, but never really developed, a concept that he called “epistemic sentimentality” – not a catchy phrase, admittedly, but one that I think sheds on light on what is currently going on.  His argument, in brief, was that we live in a world of “fictitious substances” and “management-bred phantoms” – any number of nebulous goods from institutionally-defined education to the “pathogenic pursuit of health” could serve as examples – and that in this “semantic desert full of muddled echoes” we need “some prestigious fetish” to serve as a “Linus blanket.”  In the essay I’ve been quoting “Life” is his primary example.  “Epistemic sentimentality” attaches itself to Life, and Life becomes the banner under which projects of social control and technological overreach acquire warmth and lustre.  Illich calls this  epistemic sentimentality because it involves constructed objects of knowledge that are then naturalized under the kindly aegis of the “prestigious fetish.”  In the present case we are frantically saving lives and protecting our health care system.  These noble objects enable a gush of sentiment which is very hard to resist.  For me it is summed up in the almost unbearably unctuous tone in which our Prime Minister now addresses us daily.  But who is not in an agony of solicitude?  Who has not said that we are avoiding each other because of the depth of our care for one another?  This is epistemic sentimentality not just because it solaces us and makes a ghostly reality seem humane but also because it hides the other things that are going on – like the mass experiment in social control and social compliance, the legitimation of tele-presence as a mode of sociability and of instruction, the increase of surveillance, the normalization of biopolitics, and the reinforcement of risk awareness as a foundation of social life.  

Another concept that I believe Illich has to contribute to current discussion is the idea of “dynamic balances” that he develops in Tools for Conviviality.  This thought came to me recently while reading, in the Chronicle of Higher Education, a refutation of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s dissident position on the pandemicAgamben had written earlier against the inhumanity of a policy that lets people die alone and then outlaws funerals, arguing that a society which sets “bare life” higher than the preservation of its own way of life has embraced what amounts to a fate worse than death.  Fellow philosopher Anastasia Berg, in her response, expresses respect for Agamben, but then claims that he has missed the boat.  People are cancelling funerals, isolating the sick and avoiding one another not because mere survival has become the be-all and end-all of public policy, as Agamben claims, but in a spirit of loving sacrifice which Agamben is too obtuse and theory- besotted to notice.  The two positions appear starkly opposed, and the choice an either/or.  One either views social distancing, with Anastasia Berg, as a paradoxical and sacrificial form of solidarity, or one views it with Agamben as a fateful step into a world where inherited ways of life dissolve in an ethos of survival at all costs.  What Illich tried to argue in Tools for Conviviality is that public policy must always strike a balance between opposed domains, opposed rationalities, opposed virtues.  The whole book is an attempt to discern the point at which serviceable tools – tools for conviviality – turn into tools which become ends in themselves and begin to dictate to their users.  In the same way he tried to distinguish practical political judgment from expert opinion, home-made speech from the coinages of mass media, vernacular practices from institutional norms.  Many of these attempted distinctions have since drowned in the monochrome of “the system,” but the idea can still be helpful I think.  It encourages us to ask the question, what is enough? where is the point of balance?  Right now this question is not asked because the goods we pursue are generally taken to be unlimited – we cannot, by assumption, have too much education, too much health, too much law, or too much of any of the other institutional staples on which we lavish our hope and our substance.  But what if the question were revived?  This would require us to ask in what way Agamben might be right, while still allowing Berg’s point.  Perhaps a point of balance could be found. But this would require some ability to sustain a divided mind – the very hallmark of thinking, according to Hannah Arendt – as well as the resuscitation of political judgment.   Such an exercise of political judgment would involve a discussion of what is being lost in the present crisis as well as what is being gained.  But who deliberates in an emergency?    Total mobilization – total preoccupation – the feeling that everything has changed – the certainty of living in a state of exception rather than in ordinary time – all these things militate against political deliberation.  This is a vicious circle: we can’t deliberate because we’re in an emergency, and we’re in an emergency because we can’t deliberate.  The only way out of the circle is by the way in – the way created by assumptions that have become so ingrained as to seem obvious.   

Illich had a sense, during the last twenty years of his life, of a world immured in “an ontology of systems,” a world immune to grace, alienated from death, and totally convinced of its duty to manage every eventuality – a world, as he once put it, in which “exciting, soul-capturing abstractions have extended themselves over the perception of world and self like plastic pillowcases.”  Such a view does not readily lend itself to policy prescriptions.  Policy is made in the moment according to the exigencies of the moment.  Illich was talking about modes of sensing, of thinking, and of feeling that had crept into people at a much deeper level.  Accordingly, I hope that no one who has read this far thinks that I have been making facile policy proposals rather than trying to describe a fate that all share.  Still my view of the situation is probably clear enough from what I have written.  I think this tunnel we have entered – of physical distancing, flattening the curve etc. – will be very hard to get out of – either we call it off soon and face the possibility that it was all for naught, or we extend it and create harms that may be worse than the casualties we have averted.  This is not to say we should do nothing.  It is a pandemic.  But it would have been better, in my view, to try and keep going and used targeted quarantine for the demonstrably ill and their contacts.  Close baseball stadiums and large hockey arenas, by all means, but keep small businesses open and attempt to space the customers in the same way as the stores that have stayed open are doing.  Would more then die?  Perhaps, but this is far from clear.  And that’s exactly my point: no one knows.  Swedish economist Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, made the same point recently in defence of Sweden’s current policy of precaution without shut-down. “The theory of lockdown,” he says, is “untested” – which is true – and, consequently, “It’s not Sweden that’s conducting a mass experiment. It’s everyone else.”   

But, to say it again, my intention here is not to contest policy but to bring to light the practiced certainties that make our current policy seem incontestable.  Let me take a final example.  Recently a Toronto newspaper columnist suggested that the current emergency can be construed as a choice between “saving the economy” or “saving granny.”  In this figure two prime certainties are pitted against one another.  If we take these phantoms as real things rather than as questionable constructions, we can only end up by setting a price on granny’s head.   Better, I want to argue, to try to think and speak in a different way.  Perhaps the impossible choices thrown up by the world of modelling and management are a sign that things are being framed in the wrong way.  Is there a way to move from granny as a “demographic” to a person who can be nursed and comforted and accompanied to the end of her road; from The Economy as the ultimate abstraction to the shop down the street in which someone has invested all they have and which they may now lose.   At present, “the crisis” holds reality hostage, captive in its enclosed and airless system.  It’s very difficult to find a way of speaking in which life is something other and more than a resource which each of us must responsibly manage, conserve, and, finally, save.   But I think it important to take a careful look at what has come into the light in recent weeks: medical science’s ability to “decide on the exception” and then take power; the media’s power to remake what is sensed as reality, while disowning its own agency;  the abdication of politics before Science, even when there is no science; the disabling of practical judgment; the enhanced power of risk awareness; and the emergence of Life as the new sovereign.   Crises change history but not necessarily for the better.  A lot will depend on what the event is understood to have meant. If, in the aftermath, the certainties I have sketched here are not brought into question, then the only possible outcome I can see is that they will fasten themselves all the more securely on our minds and become obvious, invisible, and unquestionable.

 

 

 

FURTHER READING

 

Here some links to articles which I have cited above or which have influenced my thinking: 

https://nationalpost.com/opinion/why-draconian-measures-may-not-work-two-experts-say-we-should-prioritize-those-at-risk-from-covid-19-than-to-try-to-contain 

https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/17/a-fiasco-in-the-making-as-the-coronavirus-pandemic-takes-hold-we-are-making-decisions-without-reliable-data/ 

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/The-evidence-on-Covid-19-is-not-as-clear-as-we-think 

https://off-guardian.org/2020/03/17/listen-cbc-radio-cuts-off-expert-when-he-questions-covid19-narrative/  (This story is misheaded – Duncan McCue doesn’t cut off Dr. Kettner – it’s because Kettner gets to make so many strong points that the item is valuable.) 

https://off-guardian.org/2020/03/24/12-experts-questioning-the-coronavirus-panic/ 

https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers/ (Agamben’s view can be found here along with a lot of other interesting material.) 

Giorgio Agamben’s Coronavirus Cluelessness  (Anastasia Berg’s critique of Agamben) 

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/no-lockdown-please-w-re-swedish  (Frederik Erixon)

 



 

 

 

 

Whatever Happened to Man?

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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO MAN?

(Recently I send the Penn State Press a lengthy manuscript of a book about the life and thought of Ivan Illich. Because of its length, I had to cut a number of sections that I wrote after the main body of the text was already complete. They deal with subjects that I felt had been left out or inadequately treated. Aside from occasional blind references to the book from which they have been excised, I think they are well enough able to stand on their own to justify my presenting them here. This is one of those sections.) 

 

In a book called The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933-1973, American writer Mark Greif argues that, during the period enumerated in his title, there was a prolonged panic about “Man.”  A few quotations will illustrate.  Jacques Maritain, who was Illich’s teacher in Rome in the late 1940’s, said, “The only way of regeneration for the human community is a rediscovery of the true image of man.”[1]  Lewis Mumford, reflecting on the threat posed by nuclear weapons, claimed that “it may be necessary to scrap almost everything to save man.”  Hannah Arendt, in her essay “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man,” argued that the projection of technological power, reflected in “the conquest of space,” had not only “lowered…the stature of man” but now threatened to destroy it utterly.[2]  Herbert Marcuse, in a book that  exerted a powerful influence on the New Left of the 1960’s, portrayed contemporary man as “one-dimensional.”[3]  The Port Huron Statement, the manifesto by which Students for A Democratic Society (SDS) announced its arrival on the political scene in 1962, expressed its intention to “counter…the dominant conceptions of Man in the 20th century.”[4]  Man was ubiquitous in political discourse, and everywhere he appeared he was at risk, in danger, on the brink of extinction.  In a book of that name, published in 1947, C.S. Lewis spoke of “the abolition of man.”[5]  

The Illich of the early 1960’s and early 1970’s clearly belongs to this literature.  In Celebration of Awareness, we read of “man’s race to maturity” and of the hazards that he risks should he lose this race and be overcome by “the demonic nature of present systems which force man to consent to his own deepening self-destruction.”[6]  In “The Rise of Epimethean Man,” the essay which concluded Deschooling Society, the reader is told that “Man himself is at stake.”[7]  In Tools for Conviviality, “man” is warned to “set limits to the interference of his tools with the environment” or face a “gruesome apocalypse.”[8] And man is at much at risk as his environment: “Mankind may wither and disappear,” Illich writes, “because he is deprived of basic structures of language, law and myth.”[9] The same warnings are sounded in Limits to Medicine (Medical Nemesis, as its first editions were called) where Illich portrays the ultimate consequence of unlimited medicalization as a “cultural iatrogenesis” in which the very ability to suffer disease and death basic is sapped and enervated, and people, in losing the art of dying, lose the art of living.  He ends with a plea for a restoration of “Man’s consciously lived fragility, individuality and relatedness” – a sense, he says, of which “the experience of pain…sickness and…death [is] an integral part.”  There is an implication throughout that there is both a nature and a condition which is proper to Man, that this nature and condition have been exceeded, and that consequently Man as a norm, a destiny and archetype will disappear unless  “a major change of direction” is soon undertaken.[10] Illich is not included in Grief’s inventory of the discourses of “the crisis of man,” but I think there can be no doubt that he belongs with Arendt, Maritain, Mumford and the many others who foresee “the abolition of man.” 

Later in his life, Illich was more tentative about the kind of language he used in his jeremiads of the 1970’s.  When I quoted his statement that “man himself is at stake” to him in 1988, he said “I wouldn’t any longer be able to speak so easily of man.”  But this was not, he went on because he would now distinguish she from he but because he had “become more prudent.”  He was now, he said, “increasingly silent in public because I have more and more learned to recognize that even very careful and traditional use of words does not allow me to bespeak the percepts my grandfather knew, because they aren’t there any more.”[11]  This says, in effect, that what Illich predicted, in fact, occurred, and that he now refrains from speaking of man because few will even know what he means.  The world went over the cliff that prophets of “the crisis of man” saw looming ahead, and we now live with the consequences – a situation in which there is no normative human nature and no normative human condition.  Indeed the very frontier of civil rights among the young is the struggle against any norm that might obstruct the free flow of identity and the adventure of discovering one’s own.  People may still talk of ethics, and values, but neither have the slightest foundation.  Medical ethics, for example, do not set absolute and unequivocal limits, but rather express the medical institution’s prudent curation of its “image.” The word values may sometimes be used as a synonym for moral standards that are believed to be unequivocally right or wrong, but in itself it only refers to what a given individuals prefers or invests in, what he/she values.  

There are two ways of looking at Greif’s “age of the crisis of man.”  As a young writer trying to clear an intellectual and cultural space that does not begin with “post” – post-modern, post human, post-secular, post-historical etc. – he does not lament the disappearance of man.  It is not just that he sympathizes with the skeptics who began to refuse the discourse of man in the 1960’s and 1970’s – with Levi-Strauss who speaks for pluralism and says that “the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute but to dissolve man”[12]; with Michel Foucault’s recoil from “the moralizing pool of humanistic sermons” and his claim that “man is an invention of recent date,” doomed to be “erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”[13]; with the apostles of difference, or différance in Derrida’s lingo; with feminists who saw man as male; with blacks who read man as “the Man,” etc.  Greif gives a generous account of these critiques, but, in the end, he is arguing not for or against man, but rather for a new, less polarized problematic.  If you find yourself, he writes, “at the threshold of the question of man,” then just stop, because all you will find across that threshold are “pre-programmed answers.”[14]  That’s one view – one that hasn’t given up on “a new paradigm,” even if it can’t say what it is.  The other is the view I ascribed to Illich – that the disappearance of “the question of man” represents not just the vanishing of a way of speaking but of the very possibility of a unified or normative view of humanity.  

Man is obviously a problematic term.  The problem is worse in some European languages than others – in German one can say der Mensch which doesn’t imply maleness, despite its grammatical gender, while in English man in general can  always be taken as pointing at men in particular – but the gender problem is only the beginning.  The word claims universality, but arguably points to a specific class – the propertied, literate, white, male individuals who consider themselves to be the subjects of history.   It takes for granted a certain conception of subjectivity – Charles Taylor’s “buffered self,” C.B. Macpherson’s “possessive individual” etc.[15] – a certain, decidedly Christian conception of the individual as one who attains to both uniqueness and universality by his participation in Christ, and a certain conception of history of which European man is the subject.  This is the image that Foucault wants to erase, that Derrida wants to unsettle, that Greif wants to transcend.  

And why not?  Well the question I want to raise is what Illich meant when he wrote in 1970 that “man himself is at stake.”  And if he/she was at stake, and subsequently disappeared – a logical conclusion, given that none of the steps required to save man were taken – then what?  For Greif, the crisis of man was the last gasp of an expiring humanism, and will, he hopes, give way to something less parochial and less phallocentric, something more plural and more adequate to the variety of human adventures.  And, if Christianity must go on to the historical refuse heap, along with Man, well, good riddance. The idea of a single, comprehensive human destiny constituting itself as history simple must be abandoned.  But with Illich, and other Christians attempting to renew their faith in the absence of man, matters are more complicated.  

Let me first try to address the specific difficulty of an English word that means both humanity-in-general and a male person.  For some women I know this difficulty is insuperable, and out of deference to them, I have never used the term man.  At the same time, I am aware that the available replacement terms – humanity, humankind, people, human beings, etc. – have a completely different valence than man.  Man evokes an archetype, a single being, while the possible replacements all suggest an assembly or gathering composed of many discrete parts that compose a heap but not a whole.  This is the problem in a nutshell. 

In the beginning, according to the Revised Standard Version of The Holy Bible, after God had made the heavens and the earth, and everything that lives upon the earth, He said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion…over all the earth.”[16]  Man is both singular and plural, a being made in single image – the image of God – and a multitude – a them, not just a he.  Much turns on this idea of humanity as a single being.  Not only does all of humanity fall in a single event, but all of humanity is redeemed in a single man.  This redeemer is a comprehensive and complete man, to be sure, the one who takes every place as home, every other one as his mother and brother, whose life is at once myth and history, an event in time and symbol of the timeless.[17]  But the Christ remains a being and an event that occurs in a definite place at a definite time, and will unfold as an earthly history.  The centrality of Christ can certainly be expressed with greater modesty and humility than triumphalist Christianity, in smug and confident possession of the truth, has generally done.  British theologian John Milbank has gone so far as to say that, although Christians believe Christ is “the fulfillment of everything,” that this must be considered “a weird kind of fulfillment…a kind of counter-fulfillment” because it doesn’t claim that Christianity possesses a superior doctrine, a superior metaphysics or any other claim to pre-eminence, but only that God is most fully shown in a single perfected, or fully expressed, human being.[18] But, even the most unassuming theologies and cautious missiologies, must assert that Christ is, as von Balthasar says, “the concrete universal,” and this implies, by some name or other, man i.e. a destiny that belongs to human beings as such and can’t be dissolved either in pluralism or a cosmic mysticism that swallows history.  

This, I think, is the nub.  In Illich’s account of Church history in The Rivers North of the Future almost everything that could go wrong has gone wrong, even to the point that he feels obliged to confess a temptation “to curse the Incarnation.”[19]  On principle, he never develops the hypothetical history that would tell us what might have been if the  church had “centred its faith” on the imminent danger of institutionalizing revelation as “anti-Christ,” beyond saying that the Gospel might have furnished “the crowning proportion” in a world that remained proportioned at human and natural scales rather than incubating its destruction.  Nevertheless, I think there are certain fundamental notes even in his chastened, de-clericalized, and self-aware evangelism.  Christianity must be evangelical i.e. it must be shared, even if it is shared only by example and in humble recognition that, in the words of the Kena Upanishad, “it is not understood by those who understand it/ It is understood by those who do not understand it.”[20]  (This paradox echoes through every scripture from Lao-Tzu’s “those who know do not tell/Those who tell do not know” to Jesus’ “seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear.”[21])  Christianity must be historical i.e. it must find its fulfillment in history.  And it must be apocalyptic i.e. it must understand the Incarnation as a decisive revelation which confronts humanity with a final choice – life or death, God’s way or no way at all.   In all these ways, a unified and unifying narrative is implied.  The being that is the subject of this narrative need not be called man.  There are many good reasons why it would be better if it were not.  But the unity of humanity, which is fully expressed in the word, and only weakly and diffusely in the alternatives, must be kept in sight.  

Perhaps a good solution is offered in theologian Walter Wink’s wonderful book, The Human Being: Jesus and the Enigma of the Son of Man.  Writing in the tradition of Carl Jung’s Answer to Job and Elizabeth Howes’ Guild for Psychological Studies in San Francisco, which extended and developed Jung’s dialogue with Christianity, Wink examines the enigmatic Biblical term the Son of Man.  It appears first in the Book of Ezekiel, where the prophet is addressed by that name by the Lord, and he sees a vision in which a radiant “Son of Man” confronts a senescent God portrayed as the Ancient of Days.  In the Gospels this is the main term that Jesus applies to himself – he doesn’t, despite his frequent references to his Father, call himself the Son of God but rather the Son of Man.  (And, if the term were literally translated Wink says it would actually be “the Son of the Man.”)  Wink thinks that a good translation would be “the human being.”   The term preserves the archetypal character of man while purging its gender.  I will not go further here into Wink’s “Christology from below” or his attempt to refute the received view of Jesus as “the omnipotent God in a man-suit,” but I do think that his account of Jesus as “the Human Being” – the one in whom divinity is fully realized as humanity – is very compatible with Illich’s understanding.  


[1] Mark Greif, The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933-1973, Princeton, 2015, p. 7

[2] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Viking Press, 1968, pp. 265-280

[3] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Beacon Press, 1964

[4] Greif, op. cit., p. 265

[5]  C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, Macmillan, 1947

[6] Ivan Illich, Celebration of Awareness, Doubleday, 1970, p. 5

[7] Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, Penguin, 1973, p. 108

[8] Ivan Illich Tools for Conviviality, Harper and Row, 1973, p. 108

[9] ibid., p. 83

[10] Deschooling Society, op. cit., p. 112

[11] David Cayley, Ivan Illich in Conversation, Anansi, 1992, p. 125

[12] Greif, op. cit., p. 115

[13] ibid., p. 285, 303 (check page references)

[14] ibid., p. 328

[15] Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, Harvard, 1907; Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Clarendon Press, 1962

[16] Genesis, 1:26

[17] This sentence is not an exact quote but closely follows a sentence of Owen Barfield’s that is quoted in Simon Blaxland-de Lange, Owen Barfield: Romanticism Come of Age: A Biography, Temple Lodge, 2006; “mother and brother” refers to Matthew 12:48, Mark 3:33, and Luke 8:21; “a symbol of the timeless” refers, among other passages, to John 8:56: “Before Abraham was, I am.”

[18] Milbank develops these thoughts in Part Six of my radio series, “The Myth of the Secular,” which can be found here: http://www.davidcayley.com/podcasts?category=Myth+of+the+Secular

[19] Ivan Illich/David Cayley, The Rivers North of the Future, Anansi, 2005, p. 61

[20] Kena Upanashad, II – 3, quoted in Panikkar, op. cit., p. 31

[21] The Way of Life According to Lao Tzu, trans. Witter Bynner, Capricorn Books, 1944, Stanza 56, p. 60; Matthew 13: 13no w

Echoes, Affinities, Resonances: Ivan Illich in Contemporary Thought

ECHOES, AFFINITIES, RESONANCES:

   IVAN ILLICH IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

(Recently I send the Penn State Press a lengthy manuscript of a book about the life and thought of Ivan Illich. Because of its length, I had to cut a number of sections that I wrote after the main body of the text was already complete. They deal with subjects that I felt had been left out or inadequately treated. Aside from occasional blind references to the book from which they have been excised, I think they are well enough able to stand on their own to justify my presenting them here. This is one of those sections.) 

 

 

In the year before he died, Ivan Illich was the guest of his friend Jerry Brown in Oakland, California where Brown was then the mayor.  Brown lived in what he called a loft, a large building near Jack London Square and the Oakland inner harbour, which he had renovated to make space for offices, meetings rooms and an ample number of guest rooms, along with his own apartment.  Beginning in the year 2000, he had invited Illich and his associates to use this space for a couple of months in the early fall to conduct meetings and seminars– an event that became known as The Oakland Table.[1]  During its second 2001 edition, Brown recalled, in an obituary tribute to his friend…                                  

[Illich] invited the local archbishop to discuss matters of Catholic theology that greatly troubled him. Before he died, Illich wanted to engage ecclesiastical representatives in a conversation about corruption in the early church and the evolution – as he saw it – of Christian charity from a personal act to planned institutional services. This he called the corruption of the best becoming the worst – Corruptio optimi quae est pessima . His interlocutors arrived at my loft and were ushered into the library. Illich spoke at length, summoning up his vast store of Church history. He tried one subject, then another, but the bishop and his clerical assistants seemed nonplussed, even uncomfortable. Soon the conversation was over and our guests excused themselves and left. I am sure they were wondering what in the world Illich was getting at.[2] 

This failed encounter typified Illich’s relationship to the Church from whose service he had withdrawn in 1969 – the year in which he concluded that the climate of scandal and innuendo which his opponents had generated around his name made it impossible for him to continue as a churchman.  His disappointment with the archbishop continued a theme he had sounded with me in 1993, when he said that, on the subject of how modern service institutions express “a perverse transmutation of…Christian vocation…I have not even found a first conversational partner within any of the established churches.”[3]  And it was not just the Church that was deaf to what Illich had to say.  In the 1970’s his lectures were mobbed, princes and prime ministers sought him out, and his essays were published in the Saturday Review and the New York Review of Books.  By the later 1980’s he was still in demand, and still the centre of a lively intellectual circle, but no longer quite au courant.   This was in many ways good.  Illich had no wish, as he said, to become “a jukebox,” spinning the same old tunes, and he could never have maintained the fevered pace of the early 1970’s when, as I related earlier, he once came to Vancouver and thought he was in Seattle.   He was never going to be an ordinary man – there was nothing ordinary about him – but the smaller settings and unhurried friendships of his later years were certainly a gift to his friends and, I think, to him as well.  Nevertheless there was the sense of a voice unheeded, and of seeds that, outside a small circle of friends, and a few outposts of unreconstructed 60’s radicalism, had fallen on “stony places where they had little earth.”[4] 

This was the situation, as I understood it as well, when I broadcast “The Corruption of Christianity” on CBC radio the beginning of January, 2000, when people were still adjusting to the fact that their computers hadn’t all gone haywire at the stroke of midnight on New Year’s Day.  My standing at Ideas, and the traces of celebrity that still clung to Illich’s name, were enough to justify my launching, just twelve years after “Part Moon, Part Travelling Salesman,” a second week-long series of broadcasts which otherwise would have faced the objection that we had already “done” Illich.  But I had no sense that I was presenting something that dovetailed with any contemporary school of thought or body of opinion that I could identify.  I understood that “secularization” theories were abundant, and that Illich was hardly the first to suggest that Christianity had had a formative influence on the West, but the way he had framed his account of modernity – neither as a transformation of Christianity, nor as its repudiation, but as its perversion – was entirely new to me and seemed to hold implications far beyond what I could then think or imagine.  It’s hardly an exaggeration to say that it’s taken much of the twenty years that have elapsed since my final interviews with Illich were recorded to get me to the place where I feel I have some perspective on “the testament,” as I called it, with which Illich left me.  This effort to become equal, or at least adequate, to what I had been given took two forms: reflection on Illich’s hypothesis as it touched my life and the interpretation of his work, and a research aimed at discovering other contemporary thinkers in whom Illich’s corruptio optimi pessima has some echo, intimation or resonance. The first straw in the wind was a call from Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, while “The Corruption of Christianity” was being broadcast, to tell me that “the basic thesis” of the account of Western modernity on which he was then working “was similar to Illich’s.”[5]  (Taylor had first advanced his thesis that “secular civilization” is a mutation of Latin Christendom in his 1998-99 Gifford Lectures and would publish his work in finished form in 2007’s A Secular Age.)  Taylor’s championing of The Rivers North of the Future, both in the preface he wrote for the book and his sympathetic discussion of it in A Secular Age, gave my book a broader readership than it might otherwise have had. 

I soon noticed many other resonances.  One example, on which I have already commented several times, is the theological movement known as “Radical Orthodoxy.”  Its first proponents were British theologians John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward.[6] I had already read Catherine Pickstock’s After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy at the time of the interviews that comprise the second half of The Rivers North of the Future, and an echo of Illich endorsement of Pickstock’s thesis can be found on the last page of Rivers where Illich supposes that “those who propose a new orthodoxy” and claim that philosophy must culminate in praise, not propositions, are in harmony with his lifelong attempt to put celebration at the centre of social existence.[7]  Further reading, particularly in John Milbank’s monumental, and yet still manifesto-like Theology and Social Theory, convinced me that there are profound and far-reaching affinities between Illich’s thought and Milbank’s. 

Radical Orthodoxy is just one version of the radical potential of a perfectly orthodox Christianity.  G.K. Chesterton, himself an instance of this potential, has a chapter in his book The Everlasting Man called “Five Deaths of Faith,” in which he isolates the moments at which he thinks Christianity has died and revived.  He mentions the heresies that threatened to engulf the early Church, the Albigensian heresy, skeptical Renaissance humanism, Enlightenment rationalism, and “after Darwin.”  In each case some form of revival or awakening has followed, and several, beginning with the great religious revival of the 1730’s and 1740’s, have been called Great Awakenings.[8]  Robert Inchausti in a book called Subversive Orthodoxy wonders whether the post-modern moment might not be another.  (Inchausti’s book in which Illich is featured alongside a long list of radical Christians, from William Blake to Wendell Berry, makes no reference to Radical Orthodoxy, but its title is a variation on the same theme.) 

Another important encounter was with the theologically-oriented Irish philosopher Richard Kearney whom I featured in an Ideas series in 2005.  Through him I began to discover the “theological turn” in phenomenological philosophy.  Kearney in a book called The God Who May Be introduced me to the idea that God exists in the mode of potentiality, or possibility, rather than as a definite and substantial being of whom one can ask the question, is he there or not, yes or no?  When Moses comes across the bush in the wilderness that burns without being consumed and the voice of the Lord calls on him to lead the people of Israel out of captivity, Moses asks the Lord how he should respond, if the people should ask, what is the name of the one who sent you to us?  Most translators have given God’s answer as “I am who I am…say to the people of Israel, ‘I Am’ has sent me to you.”  Modern translators, beginning with Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber in their rendering of the Hebrew Bible into German, have suggested, “I will be who I will be” is also a possible translation i.e. God’s manifestation is linked to human manifestation, each depending on the other.  What God will be depends on the answer we give to a call, a voice, whose existence we will partly determine by our response, not because we make God, but because Man and God are a mutually interpenetrating polarity, in which God is discovered in Man, just as Man is discovered in God.          

Through Kearney I began to see that atheism could be considered a cultural phase, a period of purgation and darkness, which potentially has a farther shore.  Nietzsche presents the death of God as a happening, indeed a killing.  His “Madman” who declares “the death of God” in The Gay Science says that “what was holiest…has bled to death under our knives.”[9] The death of God to this way of thinking is a historical event – the divine image that had prevailed in the West had atrophied in the hearts of Nietzsche’s contemporaries.  That’s why he gives them such an active role as murderers.  But what has died is only one historical and psychological image of the living power in which we “live and move and have our being.”[10]  To let go of what Kearney calls the “omni-God” does not necessarily imply atheism.  His alternative is what he calls “anatheism,” a disposition in which the absence and the presence of God are both allowed their moment, an attitude in which the couplet God/man is not fatally divided, and an isolated and self-enclosed humanity left to wonder where God has gone.  

Kearney’s anatheism points to a “zone of indecision,” a moment of not knowing which is the inseparable complement of knowing, the moment when Mary is confronted by a messenger who tells her – is he mad? – that she will conceive the Son of God in her virgin womb.  At this moment, the event on which, according to Christians, all history pivots, hangs in the balance.  It will happen, evidently, only if this obscure teenager in Galilee says yes.  Reality at this point is unknown, unformed, undecided – a true surprise, as Illich says.  God may, by definition, foresee the outcome, and theologians may offer subtle accounts of how it is possible that the outcome of free actions can be foreknown – Einsteinian physicists too have their way of proving that time is an illusion and the future already exists – but from the point of view of the present this is only speculation.[11]  This zone of indecision represents a limit for philosophy – a darkness in which it cannot easily be distinguished from theology.  Such a distinction was crucial, even in Heidegger’s early writings, because theology is, in Heidegger’s words, “a positive science,” i.e. it reflects on a content already given by divine revelation, while philosophy is free, speculative thought.  But, once philosophy discovers that what is given in revelation is both a structure of experience, and an implication of language, the distinction begins to dissolve.  Philosophy, in a sense, discovers that it has as much faith as theology, even if this faith is framed in atheist terms.  Jacques Derrida’s celebrated bon mot that he “rightly passes for an atheist” perfectly captures this new mood.  Yes he is an atheist in that he lives within the horizon of “the death of God,” and yet he only “passes” for an atheist, even if “rightly,” because what he discovers at the limit of his experience is “the gift of death” and “a messianism without religion.”[12]  Derrida’s “acts of religion,” as one of his books is called , are echoed in the works of Jean Luc Nancy, Slavoj Zizek, Gianni Vattimo, Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben and others – all of them philosophers who could say with Derrida that they rightly pass for atheists, and yet all of them recognizing what is given in Christianity as an unsurpassable horizon, the very “nervation” of the West as Nancy says.[13] 

Rudolf Steiner, who believed that human consciousness undergoes evolution, characterized the modern period as the time when what he calls Consciousness Soul develops.  According to Owen Barfield, Steiner’s wonderfully lucid interpreter, “The Consciousness Soul indicates the maximum point of self-consciousness, the point at which the individual feels himself to be entirely cut off from the surrounding cosmos and is for that reason fully conscious of himself as an individual.”[14] Shakespeare’s Hamlet, plunged into the abyss of self-consciousness, and thus into endless indecision, is the proto-type of Consciousness Soul.  Consciousness soul, Steiner says, cannot believe, because all that is finally real for it is the self.  Steiner’s response was to ask his students “not to believe.”  “Think these thoughts without believing in them,” he once said.[15]  This is germane to the theological turn in philosophy, I think.  If it is true, as I said earlier, that the death of God is an event not an idea, an experience, not the failure of some cosmological hypothesis, then it is very natural for philosophers to now be exploring Christianity without belief.  Kearney’s anatheism is a way of naming the disposition within which this can occur.  The prefix ana indicates up, back, again – it refers to the moment before we know what we are facing, the moment when we are thrown back on ourselves, the moment that repeats but always repeats differently.  It allows atheism and theism to coexist, making neither final.   

Illich’s corruptio optimi pessima has various implications: it urges us to see a displaced and degenerate salvation being enacted in our great “service” institutions, and it invites us to return to the Incarnation and its witness in the Gospel in order to understand them again differently in the light of their corruption.  I want to argue that the developments I have sketched above, in both philosophy and theology, have created a climate which is much more receptive to what Illich has to say than the one in which he thought he was operating towards the end of his life.  I say “thought he was operating” because the first intimations of this new climate are clearly evident, at least in retrospect, during the last years of his life – Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory, for example, was published in 1990.   In what follows I want to examine several of the thinkers who have treated the same themes as Illich, and, in the process, helped me to understand these themes. 

GIORGIO AGAMBEN 

Giorgio Agamben is a prolific Italian philosopher, now seventy five years old, who has explicitly recognized his affinity with Illich.  He has acquired Illich’s Italian literary rights and already introduced a new edition of Illich’s Gender (Genere in Italian) to the Italian public.  In his introduction to this new edition, he asserts that Illich’s work, misread and misunderstood when it was first presented, has now reached its “hour of legibility” and that Illich is unique in contemplating “the catastrophic consequences of [Christianity’s] secular perversion” from a position deeply rooted in its tradition.[16]  Agamben has also written an introduction to a new collection of Illich’s essays and lectures, mostly written when he was still in Church service, that the Penn State Press has just published as The Powerless Church.  In this essay, Agamben argues that the “thought of the kingdom” is central to Illich’s thought as a whole, a reading which coincides with the emphasis on the messianic moment in Agamben’s own thought, but is still, I think, substantially correct.  This is one of many overlaps between Agamben’s themes and Illich’s.   

Agamben’s concern, according to one recent commentator, is with nothing less than “the metaphysical structure of modernity.”[17] I think this term, though grander, corresponds fairly closely with Illich’s “certainties” – those things we don’t think about because they are, in effect, what we think with.  Agamben’s ultimate aim is liberation from this metaphysical structure – a task in which he thinks the messianic plays a crucial role.  Speaking in Notre Dame Cathedral in March of 2009, in the presence of the Bishop of Paris and other high-ranking church officials, Agamben gave what he was not afraid to call a homily on the subject.  “The Church,” he said, “has lost the messianic experience of time that defines it.”[18]   He went on to distinguish the messianic from the apocalyptic, or what he elsewhere calls the eschatological.  Eschatology is concerned with the last or final things, with the end of time, and of the world.  The Messianic is possible at any moment.  Agamben’s watchword, here as in other texts, is Walter Benjamin’s saying that “every day, every instant is the small gate through which the Messiah enters.”[19]  The messianic, in other words, is not the end of time but a changed experience of time occurring within time.  So long as we live in what Benjamin calls “empty homogeneous time” – that indifferent, inexorable carriage that speeds us helplessly from moment to moment – and believe that this is the only time, then “the time in which we believe we live [will] separate…us from what we are and transform…us into powerless  spectators of our own lives.”[20]  The messianic, in effect, makes time real – it allows us to seize it and inhabit it, and, in this way, to realize its inherent relationship to eternity, and the end of time.  In Agamben’s words: “What is messianic is not the end of time but the relationship of every moment…to eternity.”[21]  (Agamben doesn’t say so explicitly, but I would add this is because the terms, time/eternity, are generative polar opposites interpenetrating in the field which their polar opposition creates.)   

Agamben’s scriptural proof text, mentioned in the Notre Dame talk but analyzed at much greater length in his book The Time That Remains, is the passage in the apostle Paul’s first letter to the church in Corinth, in which Paul advises his brothers and sisters there that “the time has grown very short.” (This is the translation in the Revised Standard Version, Agamben prefers “the time has contracted.”)  In view of this shortening or contraction, he advises the Corinthians that each should remain in his/her existing status. “Let those who have wives,” Paul writes, “live as though they had none, and those that mourn as though they were not mourning, and those that rejoice as though they were not rejoicing, and those that buy as though they had no goods, and those that deal with the world as though they had no dealings with the world. For the form of this world is passing away.”[22]  This “as though,” or, “as not” is crucially important to Agamben.  It signifies, he says, “the revocation of every vocation.”[23] This is the condition – he sometimes calls it “inoperativity” – towards which Agamben strives in his writing.  It’s a state in which all that holds our world and ourselves in thrall and pre-determines the way we will go, is cancelled or held at bay – an awakening to all that is held down and imprisoned by our habits, by our unthought assumptions, by the weight of history, and by a conception of time as a railway on which we are hurried along.   

Agamben reads Paul very selectively.  He does not draw attention to the passage in 1 Thessalonians where Paul imagines a cinematic Second Coming in which “the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel’s call, and with the sound of the trumpets of God.  And the dead in Christ will rise first; then we who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air.”[24] So extravagantly mythological an account would not suit Agamben’s purposes, for it would show that Paul was not seeking a renewed experience of the inwardness of time, but a positive Rapture in which the faithful are swept up.  But there is another Paul, the Paul who says in the same letter I have been quoting that “the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night,” an event unlikely to be heralded by a trumpet.[25]  He also says, to the Corinthians, without any apparent reference to futurity or celestial light-shows, “Now is the day of salvation.”[26]  Agamben recuperates this side of Paul and demonstrates how it might be possible for those of us, who are on the other side of the death of God, to understand Paul anew – to, as it were, recover messianic Paul from eschatological Paul. 

Agamben’s argument in Notre Dame cathedral was that, once it became clear that the once-and-for-all end of the world was imminent only in the elastic sense in which the apostle Peter says that “one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day,” the Church largely forgot about the messianic as an experience of the present and got on with the task of government.[27]  For the early Church – “in the eyes of the Church Fathers, Agamben says – “history [is] a field traversed by two opposing forces.”  The first is that binding, worldly power that the Second Letter to the Thessalonians calls “the Restrainer” (to katechon), that force which “maintains and ceaselessly defers the end along the linear and homogeneous line of chronological time.”[28] The second is the force that Agamben calls Messiah, which revokes all vocations and turns time inside out, showing it, in the words of William Blake, as “the mercy of eternity,” the mirror in which eternity becomes visible to us as embodied creatures enclosed in what Paul calls “this body of death.”[29]  It is the task of the Church to reveal this dimension of time, and, only when it does, Agamben continues, can a truly human community be created.  “The only way a community can form and last” is if both poles – both the restraining and the liberating force – “are present and a dialectical tension between them prevails.”[30] The Church, however, has put itself on the side of the restraining force.  “Let us call this force Law or State,” Agamben writes, “dedicated as it is to economy, which is to say, dedicated as it is to the indefinite – and indeed infinite – governance of the world.”[31]   Agamben then concludes his homily with these words: “The question I came here today to ask, without any other authority than an obstinate habit of reading the signs of the times, is this: Will the Church finally grasp the historic occasion and recover its messianic vocation?”[32] 

Thus Giorgio Agamben to the Bishop of Paris in 2009.  One would like to say these words resounded like Luther’s Ninety-five Theses, nailed to the church door in Wittenberg in 1517.  I don’t see much evidence as yet, but, of course, most historians now say it is mere legend that Luther’s theses were ever nailed to that famous door in the first place, so perhaps one day it will be said that Giorgio Agamben nailed his manifesto for a messianic church to the great doors of Notre Dame and started a revolution.  Certainly one can see the deep affinity with Illich.  “The entirety of Illich’s thought,” Agamben writes in his introduction to The Powerless Church, “appears as the thought of the kingdom [and] of its special presence among us, already accomplished and not yet accomplished.”  Entirety may be overdrawn – Illich was a shrewd sociologist, as well as an evangelist – and yet I think Agamben, in the end, is right.  The constantly recurring emphasis in Illich on celebration, on surprise, and on relationship is, finally, “the thought of the kingdom” – the thought of a reality that can steal upon us, like Paul’s thief, only when our management of the world and ourselves is modified, complemented and undercut by a counter-vailing emphasis on the power that can turn time inside out.  Agamben has adopted Illich because Illich, writing from a position, as Agamben notes, “deeply rooted in [Catholic] tradition,” consistently denounced the absence of the Messiah in the discourses of the Church and its many offspring.  This was rarely done explicitly because Illich judged that he would inevitably be misunderstood.  “I did not want to be taken for a proselytizer, a fundamentalist – or worse, a Catholic theologian,” he told the Catholic Philosophical Association in Los Angeles in 1996.  “When speaking in Philadelphia or Bremen,” he went on, “I felt I ought to shroud my ultimate motive in apophasy.”  (Apophasy, as sometimes happens with Illich, is a word none of my dictionaries even recognize – they show only apophasis as the name of the rhetorical device whereby a speaker brings something up by saying he’s not going to bring it up – but I think Illich intends the practice of apophatic, or negative theology. ) This was “the tightrope,” he says, “on which he had to do his balancing act as a teacher.”[33]  This reticence was real, but never quite as total as Illich sometimes made it seem in looking back.  Deschooling Society, for example, is explicit that confusing education with schooling is equivalent to “confusing salvation with the Church.”[34]  And this corresponds exactly with Agamben’s point.  Instead of taking its stand at a point outside history (though one could equally well say inside history) the Church has identified salvation with its own history.  It has seen its task as, primarily, one of government during the interval between the Christ’s ascension and return and thus has deferred the end, as Agamben says, “along the…homogeneous line of chronological time.”  The end is never now.  But now, Illich says, is all we ever  have.  “The only time the Lord is present to us is at the present moment which we celebrate together,” Illich says. “We have no idea if there is a future.  To live as a Christian means to live in the spirit of the Maran Atha – the Lord is coming at this moment.  It means to live and enjoy living at the edge of time, at the end moment of time.”[35]  This is completely in the messianic spirit that Agamben feels has been otherwise absent from the Church. 

It is interesting – as an aside here – that Agamben who is not explicitly a Christian (though not explicitly not a Christian either, a point I’ll get to presently) should be so open about what Illich felt should remain “shrouded” in his teaching.  The difference is an index of the changed times, I think.  Illich remained protective of the Church – it was because he wanted to protect the Church from further self-inflicted scandal that he resigned from church service in 1969.  It was only towards the end of his life, I think, that Illich, as a man who had always quite rigorously “abstained from making apocalyptic statements,” felt able to say publicly that it might be “quite close to the end of the world.”[36] Agamben, on the other hand, has more or less taken “the end of the world” for granted throughout his writings.  He has identified the concentration camp as “the hidden matrix…of the political space in which we…live.”[37]  He has described the condition in which we live as a permanent state of emergency and exception.[38]  And he has noted that “the nations of the earth” are all being driven “toward a single common destiny” as a result of “the alienation of linguistic being, the uprooting of all peoples from their vital dwelling in language.”  This last is part of his larger point that definite, local forms-of-life are increasingly being reduced to “bare life,” a point I’ll develop at more length in a moment.  Agamben, in other words, takes as a starting point a condition that Illich is hesitant to reveal, or interpret in terms of Biblical prophecy, even though awareness of this condition continually breaks through in his last texts.[39]  And, Agamben, accordingly, honours Illich as one who recognized the condition in which Agamben thinks we live and tried to change it.  Illich, in the first half of his career, could still imagine the apocalyptic tide stemmed, and the world brought back within politically-defined limits; Agamben thinks only of the new possibilities that might open when this tide reaches its flood. 

Illich’s works are full of hints at the ecclesiastical and theological origins of contemporary styles of thought and ways of life.  In his final interviews with me he made his “hypothesis that modernity can be studied as an extension of church history” more explicit and sketched a few of the “lines of evolution” along which he saw the metamorphosis of the medieval church into the modern state taking place.[40]  Agamben has now gone much farther along these lines, notably in his The Kingdom and the Glory.  This book, to simplify a little, describes the way in which “the economy of salvation,” the figure by which the early church tried to understand the historical effect of the Incarnation, became in time the limitless economy without salvation in which we presently live.  Oikonomia in Greek meant the management of a household.  The Christian church adopted the term to describe the workings of divine providence, operating within the interactive image of a God “in three persons” – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – each giving way to the other, each mediating the other, so that the Son is the image of the Father, the Spirit is the love between the Father and the Son, etc.[41]  The idea of history as a meaningful process appears first, Agamben says, as the “economy” of salvation.  Oikonomia names the process or plan by which God realizes his intention and the three persons of the Trinity work their will.  It allows a transcendent God to be both one and three – to found a worldly art of government while remaining above it all.  One might say, though these are not Agamben’s words, that it takes a mystery – Illich’s “surprise” that must, but its nature, “remain a surprise” – and turns the mystery into mechanics, though a mechanics always oiled and, at the same time, obscured by an effulgent glory that blinds the too eager or too attentive gaze and prevents us from getting too close.  In establishing this idea that the world is the object of divine government, Agamben says, Christianity “sunders being and praxis” i.e. creates a situation in which our doing will no longer necessarily follow the contours of a nature or being that defines us.  The Greek gods express nature – they do not make it.  The Judeo-Christian God makes the world as a gratuitous act – quia vult, because he wanted to, Augustine says– and so it is not necessary that things be or remain as they are.[42]  

Agamben’s archaeology of the idea of divine economy supplements and spells out the intuition of Michel Foucault’s that modern “governmentality” has its roots in the Christian exercise of pastoral power.  Prolonged reflection on the inner workings of divine providence creates an entrenched habit of thought.[43]  What we first imagine of God, we later execute on our own behalf.  The Panopticon, the figure of universal visibility that Foucault borrows from Jeremy Bentham, is unthinkable without the all-seeing God as its ultimate paradigm, “the ceaseless flow” that constitutes the inner life of the Trinity becomes the endless circulation that we glorify and depend on in the modern economy.    Theological oikonomia “transmits [a] structure,” Agamben writes, to modern governmentality.[44] One of the ways in which this is done is through what he calls “signatures.”  A signature is a sign that “retains its identity in displacement.”  The inner identity of theological oikonomia and modern economy is an example.  “Archaeology” is one Agamben’s names for the attempt to unearth the foundations on which our unconscious thinking rests, and “archaeology,” he says, “is a science of signatures.”[45] 

Agamben’s book also makes many evocative observations about what he calls “the theology of glory” – observations which I think help us to understand why we remain speechless and disarmed in the face of the many quasi-theological manoeuvres by which the present day economy is explained and justified.  The intricacies of the economy of salvation, with its “general providence” now and then requiring modification by the interventions of “special providence,” constitute what Agamben sometimes calls a “machine.”  The stuff which this machine produces, and which, at the same time, hides the operation of the machine is called glory.  Glory is “praise without content.”  The concluding amen which “says nothing but merely assents to and concludes what has already been said” is an example.  Alleluia which praises God as such is the same.  Hymns are often pure praise –a “radical deactivation of signifying language,” Agamben says.[46] “Holy, holy, holy! though the darkness hide thee,” says a hymn that imprinted itself strongly on my mind in childhood. “Though the eye of sinful man thy glory may not see,/Only though art holy; there is none beside thee,/perfect in power, in love, and purity.”[47]  This does not, in Agamben’s terms, “signify,” i.e. point to something, because it is entirely assertion, or acclamation, the production of a radiance so intense that “the eye of sinful man” cannot even see it.  This glory passes back and forth in the ruling economy.  “Father glorify your son, that the Son may glorify you,” Jesus prays, in the Gospel of John, on the day before his crucifixion.[48]  Likewise, Agamben says, in the subsequent economy of salvation “Government glorifies the kingdom, and the kingdom glorifies government.”  But at the centre of all this glory sits “an empty throne.” “The centre of the machine is empty,” Agamben says, “and glory is nothing but the splendor that emanates from this emptiness.”[49] “Glory,” he goes on, “both in theology and politics, is precisely what takes the place of that unthinkable emptiness that amounts to the inoperativity of power.  And yet precisely this unsayable vacuity is what nourishes and feeds power.”[50]  Inoperativity, as we shall see, is a word that plays a big part in Agamben’s philosophy, but, for the time being, it can be read simply as what does not work.  “Glory must cover with its splendor the unaccountable figure of divine inoperativity.”[51]  

Inoperativity, in Agamben, refers to anything that is reduced to its pure potentiality, the point at which it has been deprived of all its existing uses and may therefore be put to use in some new way.  Poetry, for example, “exemplifies inoperativity” – it is language, Agamben says, “with its informative and communicative functions deactivated…language contemplating its own power of saying.” It answers no need, performs no function, but is pure celebration – language which does nothing and wants nothing but, like Walt Whitman, celebrates itself and sings itself with “all creeds and schools in abeyance.”[52]   By inoperativity people are liberated from “biological and social destinies” and, to that extent, made free for “the indefinable sphere of politics” – the sphere in which, for Agamben as for Hannah Arendt, a human life may be made.  In another place he calls politics the “sphere of pure mediality without end,” which I take to mean what is neither a means to an end, nor an end in itself, but pure play, or, so to speak, a means in itself.[53]  In a passage that Agamben cites more than once, Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics, says that man as such has no vocation, i.e. no path determined by nature.  He is free and must make himself – he is a “good for nothing,” in Agamben’s joking paraphrase, who is also by the same token a good for everything.[54]  Inoperativity returns people to this condition of potentiality.  When the apostle Paul writes to the Galatians “I no longer live but Christ lives in me,” this is, for Agamben, “a figure of inoperativity.” The messianic life which Paul says he now lives is a life beyond any predetermined form, a life that begins when every predetermined form is cancelled and revoked – when “those that mourn are as though they were not mourning, and those that rejoice as though they were not rejoicing.”[55]  

Agamben is a keen reader and interpreter of Walter Benjamin – he was the Italian editor of Benjamin’s collected works – and traces of Benjamin’s highly original Marxism can be found in Agamben’s work, along with Benjamin’s emphasis on the messianic.  In one of Benjamin’s fragments, called “Capitalism as Religion,” he asserts that capitalism is “a pure religious cult, a cult without dogma.”  Agamben’s paraphrase of the central idea of this essay is that we live in “a single uninterrupted holiday [holy day] in which work coincides with the celebration of the cult”[56]   I find Benjamin’s essay elusive, but I think he is trying to say that capitalism, far from being an irreligious way of life, is a kind of quintessence or distillation of religion.  Christianity “changed into capitalism,” and became unconscious in capitalism, and so we are doomed to perpetual celebration that never finally feels like celebration because there is nothing but celebration and therefore no celebration at all.  I don’t really know if this is an accurate rendering of Benjamin’s thought, but the idea is certainly visible in Agamben, and perhaps a spelling out of the not-quite-articulate nuggets of Benjamin’s thought has been one of Agamben’s tasks.  In what Benjamin calls capitalism, the world has withdrawn and become inaccessible, just as in Marx’s thought of the “commodity form” which he already identifies as having its only analogy in “the misty realm of religion.”[57] The commodity, taken in its broadest possible sense – Illich’s sense in which even services count as “commodifications” of charity – withdraws into a religious sphere in which it is available to us and yet not available.  Two of Agamben’s figures for this availablility/unavailability are the Museum and the Tourist.  “The Museum,” he says, “occupies exactly the space and function once reserved for the Temple as the place of sacrifice.”  The potsherd, the warrior’s shield, the trade blanket encased at the museum have been “sacrificed,” or dedicated to the gods, and can no longer be used.  The tourist, in effect, moves through such a museum, a world arranged and ordered in such a way that he/she may never touch it or alter its predetermined meaning.  “Inasmuch as it represents the cult and central altar of the capitalist religion,” Agamben writes, “tourism is the primary industry in the world…Nothing is so astonishing as the fact that millions of ordinary people are able to carry out on their own flesh what is perhaps the most desperate [experience] that one can have: the irrevocable loss of all use.”[58]  The tourist, Agamben says, is a continuation of the Christian pilgrim who also expressed his “irreducible foreignness to the world.”[59] But, while the Christian peregrinus found at least a glimmer of the transcendent God at the shrine that was his destination, the modern tourist, devotee of the pure cult in which God has been absorbed and entombed, can only go on in mirthless celebration, accumulating experiences he can never assimilate.  Capitalist modernity, Agamben says, is a condition in which the law is “in force without signifying” – the cult solicits and compels our obedience/participation but its meaning is obscure.[60] 

Another example of what is withdrawn from use and made untouchable is the sphere of the media.  Agamben, here influenced by Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, identifies the social formation in which we live as “the spectacular democratic regime.”[61]  In another place he refers to “the spectacular religion.”[62] Language, when consigned to “the spectacular sphere” loses its potential.  The apparatuses of the media, Agamben says, “prevent language from disclosing the possibility of a new use.” Words and concepts acquire an impenetrable gloss which disables them for any other use than the intended one.  “In the spectacular religion the pure means, suspended and exhibited in the sphere of the media, shows its own emptiness, speaks only of its own nothingness, as if no other use were possible, as if no other experience of the word were possible.”[63]  This saturation of language, in which its capacity for redeployment is quenched and eliminated, was also extremely important to Illich – he speaks of the “extraordinarily beautiful freedom which is implicit in language, and which requires of my interlocutor the patience to allow his words to be turned around in my mouth” and of the way in which this freedom is lost in a world of icons, compulsory feelings, and other veiled commands issuing from “the media.”[64]   

Behind Agamben’s apprehension of the “irrevocable loss of all use,” which the contemporary consumer experiences even while his every need is satisfied, lies his sense of the sacred and the profane which is the fundamental structure of alienated human experience.  Something is consecrated, or made sacred, in Agamben’s understanding when it is removed from the free use of people and reserved for the gods.  Religion names the sphere to which it is removed, and sacrifice is the “apparatus” that effects the separation and makes the separated item untouchable.[65] So much is universal.  But Christianity complicates the picture.  The idea of God himself as a sacrificial victim – God sacrificed to God – puts God in the place where humans had once been and thus “threatened to paralyze the sacrificial machine of Christianity.”  This “put the distinction between the sacred and profane into crisis” by creating “a zone of undecideability” in which “the divine sphere is always in the process of collapsing into the human sphere and man always already passes over into the divine.”[66]  This is as close as Agamben comes, in the books I have read, to Illich’s corruptio optimi pessima.  He does not go as far as René Girard in saying that the Gospels unmask the sacrificial machine, or as far as Illich, Girard and  many others in saying that Christianity is, potentially, the overcoming and fulfillment of religion rather than its continuation; but he does recognize, with Benjamin, that Christianity, by paralyzing the sacrificial machinery, potentially extends its sway and eventually makes it total, producing a cult helplessly unaware of itself as such – a condition often decried as one in which nothing is sacred, when its predicament is just the opposition: everything is sacred. 

The sacrificial machine creates and enforces separation, removing what it hallows by sacrifice from both analysis and use, and Christianity extends this operation via secularization to all domains.  “Christianity generalizes in every domain the structure of separation that defines religion…there is now a single, multiform, ceaseless process of separation that assails everything, every place, every human activity in order to divide it from itself.”[67]  Agamben’s answer to this universal domination of the sacred is to praise “profanation.”  To profane, he says, is to return something that has been reserved for the gods to use “free of sacred names.”  Such profanation is sharply distinguished from mere “secularization.”  The latter term is how he names the process we have been discussing in which the sacred runs everywhere.  The transcendence of God, for example, becomes the paradigm of sovereign power, and the earthly sovereign preserves all the powers and prerogatives of the heavenly one.  Profanation, on the other hand, “neutralizes what it profanes.”  What was “unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use.  Both are political operations: the first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred model.  The second deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces that power had seized.”[68]   

To make visible and overcome “the impossibility of using” is clearly Agamben’s aim.  That is how he defines the messianic: “Every worldly condition is released from itself to allow for its use.”[69]  And he holds that as the world moves inexorably to a condition of dispossession, the possibility of a reversal, of returning to use, occurs.  Take, for example, language.  Agamben says, in a passage I quoted earlier, that “all peoples” are being “uprooted…from their vital dwelling in language.”  But this very deprivation, he says, affords people the opportunity “to experience their own linguistic essence,” the opportunity “to experience not some language content or true proposition but language itself [my italics].”  Those who become aware of language as such “will become the first citizens of a community with neither presuppositions nor a state…the citizens of this community will enter the paradise of language.”[70]  This remarkable passage is the clearest and most explicit statement I can find in Agamben of a model/mechanism/paradigm that seems to be everywhere in his thought: dispossession as the possibility of repossession.  It clearly owes something to the mystical Marxism he inherits from Benjamin – the proletariat is the universal class, and the bearer of liberation, because it loses everything - but it also makes me think of Eliot: “In order to possess what you do not possess/ You must go by the way of dispossession./ In order to arrive at what you are not/ You must go by the way of dispossession.”  In this way we will at last “arrive where we started/ And know the place for the first time.”[71]  Carl Jung, though never mentioned by Agamben, speaks of enantiodromia, or the tendency of things to turn into their opposites when pushed to their extreme.  Many of the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount speak of similar reversals, as, for example, the meek inheriting the earth.  But, whether this reversal occurs by a conscious praxis, according to Agamben, or is automatic, is unclear to me.  When there are no longer any words that speak of me, or to me, will I necessarily experience my own “linguistic essence” and thereby stand on the thresh-hold of the paradise of language, or must I painfully, gradually, improbably awaken to this condition? 

Another case in which an apocalyptic (i.e. revealing) extremity is being reached in our time, according to Agamben, is what he calls “bare life,” that is life deprived of all the qualities and qualifications it acquires in a form-of-life, or culture, and reduced to a state in which “our private biological body has become indistinguishable from our body politic,” or, one might also say, a condition in which we have been completely naturalized.[72]  “Political power,” Agamben says, “…always founds itself – in the last instance – on the separation of a sphere of naked life from the context of a form of life.”[73] He makes this statement without exception.  Political power rests for him, not on a contract, but on a ban or exclusion – on the possibility that someone will be stripped of all standing and all dignity and made expendable.  His paradigm of bare life, Homo Sacer, a figure in Roman culture who “persists into codified Roman Law,” is an outcast who may be killed with impunity but not sacrificed to the gods.  The name, Homo Sacer, is important because the term, in its Roman context, signifies both sacred and accursed and thus demonstrates the inner link between the two concepts – the sacred is maintained by what it bans or curses.  Homo sacer stands, in Agamben’ discourse, for “a figure that belongs to the primitive life of many peoples.”  It also “includes the bandit, the outlaw, and the wolfman (wargus) or friedlos (man without peace) of German antiquity.” [74]  

Ostracism or exclusion, for Agamben, has been the basis of political power, so long as there has been political power, but it remained for a long time an exceptional or limiting case.  In modernity, bare life moves to the centre of political discourse, and so reveals itself as the true basis of sovereignty.  “The realm of bare life…originally situated at the margins of the political order gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios [social status] and zoē [aliveness as such], right and fact enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.”[75] In saying this, Agamben announces himself as the successor and inheritor of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt (and he might have added Ivan Illich, had he known Illich’s reflections on “life” when he wrote Homo Sacer.)  Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition had written that “biological life as such…occup[ies] the very center of the political science of modernity.”[76]  Her thought was that modernity’s emphasis on making rather than doing, and its preoccupation with production, had gradually turned society into a giant metabolism concerned only with its own maintenance and reproduction.  Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France, beginning in 1977, introduced the concepts of bio-power and governmentality.  He argued, as is now entirely obvious, that, in modernity, life itself had increasingly become the object of government.  But these insights, in Agamben’s view, were not systematically followed up. He saw himself in Homo Sacer as offering the political theory that neither Arendt or Foucault ever fully spelled out. 

“The politicization of life as such,” Agamben says, “constitutes the decisive event of modernity.”  The contrast with “life as such” is life-in-context.  Agamben often speaks of forms-of-life, a term which began its philosophical career with Ludwig Wittgenstein and refers generally to an accustomed way of doing things, but culture, and way of life are also rough synonyms.  It is Agamben’s contention that people everywhere are gradually being deprived of their characters and made into interchangeable units of life.  The refugee, deprived of a state and the rights of citizenship, and the concentration camp, where law is suspended altogether, are his paradigms, but he argues that life-as-such has become the subject of political life generally.  The discourses of medicine in which people appear as sets of symptoms or as statistical abstracts of the class to which they belong can serve as an example.  But wherever our “buttons are pushed,” whether by political rhetorics or popular entertainments, and whenever we are addressed at our lowest common denominator, life-as-such has triumphed. 

One of Agamben’s examples in Homo Sacer is the doomed gathering of young Chinese citizens in Tienanmen Square in 1989.  He notes “the relative absence of specific contents in their demands” and says that they were “a force that could not and did not want to be represented but that presented itself nonetheless as a community and a common life.” They were “without either presuppositions or conditions of belonging.” Agamben’s describes the Tienanmen manifestation as a harbinger of “the whatever singularity – the singularity that wants to take possession of belonging itself as well as of its own being-into-language, and that thus declines any identity and any condition of belonging.”  “The whatever singularity,” he concludes, “is the new protagonist of the coming politics.”[77]  Subsequent events appear to have borne Agamben out – with movements like Occupy and Idle No More seeming to assert their mere obstinate existence more than any actual political programme. 

With the “whatever singularity,” as with our expulsion from our home in language, and our reduction to bare life, we are again face to face with Agamben’s curious optimism: the “coming politics” in which we will encounter ourselves anew at the extremity of loss, discovering belonging through not belonging, our linguistic essence through being uprooted from our dwelling in language, our pure potentiality in our estrangement from all definite forms of life.   It seems partly Hegelian/Marxist – the negation of the negation, the expropriators expropriated etc. – and partly Christian – “the stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner” – and yet one still wants to ask, what is its basis?[78]  On what ground does Agamben stand when he excoriates the church for having forgotten its messianic mission?  He never declares himself to be a Christian.  The throne obscured by the circulation of glory in the divine oikonomia is said to be empty.  In The Time That Remains, he says that “revelation is always and above all a revelation of language itself, an experience of a pure event of the word.”  This “pure event [which] exceeds every signification,” he goes on, “is …animated by two opposing tendencies.  The first which Paul calls nomos [law] attempts to encapsulate the excess by articulating it in precepts and semantic concepts.  The second which coincides with pistis [faith] is oriented on the contrary, toward maintaining it open beyond any determinative significance.”[79]  Elsewhere he says, “The name of God, that is the name that names language is, therefore, a word without meaning, the place of pure signification without anything being signified.”[80] This seems to indicate a limit of what we can know about revelation.  If language exceeds its own significance, addressing us, soliciting us, and commanding us in ways that form the ultimate horizon of what we can understand, then the question of what stands behind language is simply by-passed.  And indeed Agamben says in one place that he does not want to evade “the problem of God” so much as to “suppress” it.[81] 

This has led some theologians to call him a nihilist. This is Connor Cunningham’s approach in his article “Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?” in The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought.[82] For Cunningham nihilism equates roughly with materialism – there is no soul, no spirit, no God – but nothing, not even nihilism, can define itself as “mere lack,” so it has moved in our time “to colonize theology” and set up “counterfeit theologies.”  Agamben, for Cunningham, is among these counterfeit theologians.  One of Agamben’s recurring touchstones is the figure of Bartleby the Scrivener, the eponymous hero of a story by 19th century American writer, Herman Melville.  The story is told in the voice of a Wall St. lawyer who hires a copyist – a scrivener – who at first does skillful work but then begins to answer all requests with the enigmatic phrase, “I’d prefer not to.”  For Agamben the story embodies the ambiguity that he thinks is characteristic of so many contemporary phenomena – that “zone of indecision” about which I quoted him earlier.  Erasure of the distinction between biological and political existence is an example.  Bartleby says neither yes, nor no, but, cryptically, refuses the alternatives.  He dwells “obstinately in the abyss of potentiality,” Agamben says.[83] As Cunningham paraphrases Agamben, Bartleby’s refusal “loosens the chains of the system’s logic, sending it into a sort of fibrillation.”  And thus we are plunged into the “abyss of potentiality” where radical change, as for example the entry into “the paradise of language,” becomes possible.

For Cunningham, a cheerful and occasionally bombastic apologist for orthodox Christianity, this is all mostly an empty play with words, a “counterfeit theology,” because it is purely formal.  For him, “the swamp of potentiality,” as he calls it, offers no way out of “the zone of indecision.”  I am perhaps too much in that zone myself to speak quite as confidently.  To me Agamben appears not as a nihilist, but as what one writer on his work calls “a non-non-Christian.”[84]  The phrase is absurd – non’s could be added indefinitely – and yet it also expresses a certain desirable reticence to give positive names to what stands at the very edge of possible understanding.   Agamben is certainly not a Christian in that he seems to affirm nothing beyond the horizon of language and to treat the messianic as a way of apprehending time rather than as an encounter with an actual Messiah.  And yet he is also not not a Christian in his insistence that the “metaphysical structure of modernity” is composed of theological figures. We are all Christians in this sense because, if Christianity is, as Nancy says, the “nervation” of the West, then it must necessarily think us as much as we think it.  Hostile Cunningham sees Agamben’s “counterfeit theology” as “diabolical.”  I see it as an attempt to understand how our world has been made and how it might be remade, an attempt undertaken from within the enclosure of contemporary consciousness, from within, one might say, “the death of God.” 

Earlier, I mentioned the term Consciousness Soul which was coined by Rudolf Steiner, and also elaborated by his English interpreter Owen Barfield, to describe modernity’s characteristic state of mind.  Before the dawn of Consciousness soul, in Steiner’s scheme, there was Intellectual Soul, which still participated in nature and believed that mind belonged to a rational order that it could understand because it belonged to it.  Consciousness Soul believes only what appears to consciousness – “nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so,” says Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who speaks as the very archetype of this new state of mind.  For Steiner/Barfield, this is a necessary phase in the evolution of consciousness, because it puts everything to the test, banishing “occult forces” from science and challenging what Francis Bacon calls “the idols of the mind,” but it results in extreme isolation and self-enclosure.  I see Agamben as operating at this extreme.  As a proper philosopher who is trying to “overcome metaphysics” he cannot admit a reality that is outside and beyond consciousness – a real Christ, let’s say.  And yet he has also understood that religion comprises real experiences.  Thus he is put to ingenious, sometime merely clever, but often enlightening explanations of the nature of these experiences.  He shows us, for example, how the apostle Paul’s messianism is a structure of experience, and an implication of language, that can be understood and practiced without in any way affirming Paul’s eschatology.  Perhaps one could say that he sticks to the phenomena that present themselves to his consciousness without his being able to ask what stands beyond, behind, or within them.  Homo religiosus has returned, i.e. there doesn’t seem to be anything else that’s as important to think about as the matters that lie “occulted,” so to speak, in theology and religion, but the whole inquiry is carried out within the basic presumption of “consciousness soul,” i.e. that all we can know is what the thinking and speaking mind can discern and explain.  Accordingly, when Agamben says that “revelation is always and above all a revelation of language” he is making an axiomatic statement, something that on his first principles must be the case.  What else, for Consciousness Soul, could it be?

Be that as it may, there is still a remarkable congruence between Agamben and Illich.  Agamben may be an a-theist, and Illich a believer, but their conclusions are so similar, as to raise puzzling questions about the nature of this difference – the kind of question Simone Weil raises when she calls atheism “a purification” and says that “of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies him is perhaps nearer to him than the other.”[85] Richard Kearney’s attempt to destabilize the theism/atheism distinction with his anatheism is also germane.  But what do Agamben and Illich agree about?  Essentially that the attempt to quench the messianic spirit and yoke the Kingdom of God to the earthly progress of the Church – to “confuse salvation with the Church,” as Illich says[86] - has produced a condition of total administration in which power, set free to act in the name of love, life, health and happiness, threatens to efface every boundary, every distinction, every limit within which humans beings once celebrated and suffered their condition.  Agamben and Illich are likewise agreed on the symptoms of this condition: forms of life reduced to bare life, a “hypertrophy of law,” loss of language, loss of judgment in an endless temporization with “crisis” and “emergency” etc.  The main difference would seem to be Agamben’s idea of a “coming community” which will have learned, through dispossession and “absolute impotence”, to live in the very heart of its own inexhaustible potential.[87]  This post-modern Dream-time, or restored paradise of the archetypes, is not a hope shared by Illich.  Illich said little about the future, once it was clear that “conviviality” was not a political option, and even made it a matter of principle to refrain from doing so, but it is clear from his vehement rejection of the idea of “post-Christianity” that he believed that no restored innocence, no new Dreaming, was possible.  The Incarnation was the final role of the dice – “the mystery of evil” will continue to be “the entrance door into the entire mystery of the Incarnation” until it is either grasped or its dominion becomes total.  But then, again, one has to ask: if Illich rejects all mythological accounts of this Day of Judgment, and sees it rather as playing out within history, then perhaps he is not so far from Agamben after all.  Both await the Kingdom.  And to say that “the name of God is pure signification without anything being signified,” as Agamben does, is to say what many believers would say – that God is not a meaning, but the very possibility of meaning.  Behold, I show you a mystery.[88] 

ERIC VOEGELIN

 

Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) is a political philosopher whose work, I think, sheds light on Illich’s account of the West as a corruptio optimi pessima, a corruption of the best which is the worst.  Voegelin, though a generation older, grew up, like Illich, in Vienna.  Also like Illich, he was driven into exile by the Nazi occupation and, after 1938, made his career and his name in the United States.  His collected works run to thirty-four volumes, and his best known work, the series Order and History, already runs to five full volumes, but I will rely here on his The New Science of Politics in which he outlined the main contours of this thought.  I will first summarize the parts of Voegelin that I think are germane to Illich, and then briefly compare the two. 

A society, Voegelin says, “is a whole little world, a cosmion [a cosmos in miniature], illuminated with meaning from within by human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization.”  The source of this illumination is “an elaborate symbolism…from rite, through myth to theory.”[89]  Voegelin calls this compact and interlaced symbolism, from which a world is spun, a “civil theology.”  In the ancient empires, this civil theology was the whole of theology – “the order of society and truth [were] identical,” Voegelin writes[90] – but this changed during the period, between, approximately, 800 and 200 B.C.E., that German philosopher Karl Jaspers called “the Axial Age.”  During this time a truth beyond society, and in potential contradiction with it, was announced by voices as diverse as Plato in Greece, Isaiah in ancient Israel, and Lao-Tzu in China.  Voegelin speaks of a “psychic differentiation” in which philosophers, prophets, and mystics discover “a new center in man at which he experiences himself as open towards transcendental reality.”[91]

Christianity belongs to this “opening of the soul.”  It de-divinizes, Voegelin says, both the city and its gods, and nature and its divinities.  Nature “loses its demonic terrors” – all “petty demons,” says Tertullian, “[are] subdue[d and] put to daily disgrace.”  Set free in Christ, the Christian is, as Illich also says, ““superior to the most powerful demons, watchdogs, dragons, horrors and menaces which, in the world before Jesus, guarded the ‘we’.”[92] What the Christian fears is not the old gods but his own back-sliding.  But the Church Fathers, according to Voegelin, failed to see that “paganism [as a “civil theology”] symbolized the truth of Roman society.”  It could not simply be replaced by otherworldly Christianity.  Bishops like Ambrose of Milan [c.340-397] and Augustine of Hippo [354-430] were obtuse in not recognizing that Christianity’s progress in the late Roman Empire did not consist merely in “a conversion of individual human beings to a higher truth” but in “the imposition of a new theologia civilis on society.”[93] This, I think, is very close to Illich’s understanding.  Illich’s whole philosophy of mission boils down to the idea that the Gospel should be added to other societies as a “crowning proportion,” rather than as a “civil theology” which attempts to replace the existing one.

The Christian Church, at first, Voegelin writes, “oscillated between expectation of the Parousia [Christ’s return] that would usher in the Kingdom and “the understanding of the Church as the apocalypse of Christ in history.” This latter view, which became known as “realized eschatology,” argued that the Church, in effect, is the Kingdom.  From there it was only a short step to becoming an earthly government.  A fatal confusion between city of God and the earthly city began to set in.  But Christianity was in no way suited to play the part of a civil theology.  The Gospel brings every social institution into question.  The sacred is questioned – “The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath[94] - filial duty is relativized – “Who is my mother and who are my brothers?”[95] – the ways of the “world” are portrayed as nothing, when compared to that “pearl of great price,” the Kingdom.[96]  And Christianity, moreover, offers an extremely difficult path – “Strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it”[97] – a crucial point in Voegelin’s account.  Faith, according to Paul, is “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.”[98]  This says, in effect, that faith is its own substance, its own evidence.  It has no other, and can have no other, because if it did it would no longer be faith but its antithesis, certainty.  While we live, we see “though a glass darkly,” and only at the end will we see “face to face.”[99] Faith, as a conviction that is its own evidence and rests on no other proof, is defined by uncertainty.  “I am quite sure,” says Simone Weil, that “God [is] nothing…like what I am able to conceive when I pronounce this word.”[100] Her only certainty, in other words, is uncertainty because whatever the imagination can grasp and hold becomes an idol.  Faith must reach beyond conception.  “I pray God to rid me of God,” Meister Eckhart says.[101]  But this trembling on the edge of certainty, a certainty so evanescent that it can never be gained without, by the same token, being lost, creates, Voegelin says, an arduous and disappointing vocation.  And the difficulty is compounded by the fact that most Christians, at any time, are only nominal Christians who have been “drawn or pressured into the Christian orbit” and who, therefore, must, in the nature of the case, “lack the spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure of the soul that is Christianity.”[102]

The result of this predicament was that Christianity was eventually recast in more achievable, more accessible, and more satisfying forms.  Voegelin sees the beginnings of this move in the writings of the 12th century Cistercian monk Joachim of Flores (or Fiore) (1135-1202).  Joachim applied the symbolism of the Trinity to history, where he discerned an Age of the Father, corresponding with the “Old” Testament, an Age of the Son, in which Christ and his Church mediated between God and man, and an about-to-begin Age of the Spirit – he set the date at 1260 - when there would be no further need for mediating institutions and doctrines because man would know God, as it were, face to face.  Joachim had a mixed reception within the Church.   Dante discerned a “prophetic spirit in him,” and Joachimite movements sprang up; but some of his ideas were condemned by the Lateran Council of 1215, and both Aquinas and Bonaventure firmly opposed his thinking.[103]  Voegelin is interested in him mainly as an exemplar or prototype.  Joachim, in his view, was the first to perceive an eidos, or pattern in history and, more than that, to perceive the tripartite, or Trinitarian pattern that would be put forward again and again in Western history.  As examples, Voegelin mentions, among others, Vico (Gods/heroes/men), Hegel (thesis/ antithesis/synthesis) Marx (primitive society/class society/communism), as well as National Socialism’s view of itself as the Third Reich, and the Eastern church’s claim, after the fall of Constantinople, to be the third Rome. 

Joachim, in Voegelin’s view, represented the self-assertion of a confident and expansive society eager to thrown off “Augustinian defeatism with regard to the mundane sphere of existence.”[104] But his vision was founded on a fallacy.  For Voegelin, there is no pattern in history because the course of history as a whole is not an object of experience, and never can be, so long as history includes an unknown future.  “The meaning of history,” he writes, “is an illusion…created by treating a symbol of faith as if it were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience.”[105] “Immanentization,” in Voegelin’s philosophy of history plays the role that “misplaced concreteness” play in the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead: it refers to an illegitimate transposition from the spiritual to the historical plane (or, in Whitehead’s terms, from the abstract to the empirical.)  It is well attested, though I have never quite been able to believe it, that when Voegelin’s thought enjoyed a vogue at William Buckley’s National Review in the 1960’s the phrase “don’t immanentize the eschaton” became a byword.[106]  People fell for this elementary fallacy, Voegelin says, because they wanted to.   Christianity was too hard, and too unavailing, so people sought “experiential alternatives” that mimicked the experience of faith without its rigors and uncertainties.  They could not simply fall back on themselves (which would be absolute despair, Voegelin says), so they “fell back on a less differentiated culture of spiritual experience.”[107]

Voegelin’s names this new historicized faith Gnosticism.  Conditioned by Christianity and so unable to “fall back” either on themselves or on pre-Christian worldviews, Christians fell into the heresy “which had accompanied Christianity from its very beginnings.”[108]   Man and society were “re-divinized,” but not by an impossible revival of polytheistic antiquity (though this was sometimes pretended) but rather by the adoption of ideas “that were suppressed as heretical by the universal church.”   By Gnosticism, Voegelin means, roughly speaking, the view that the world, as it is, is alien and unsatisfactory and ought to be redeemed or remade by initiates capable of taking the actions for which they alone know the formula.[109]  The term Gnosticism derives from the Greek word for knowledge, gnosis, and, according to Voegelin, this is what it promises: “Gnostic experiences” offer the possibility of “bringing our knowledge of  transcendence into a firmer grip than the cognitio fidei [knowledge derived from faith] will afford.”   Through this lens, Voegelin is able to align most of what Charles Taylor includes in the central trope of his A Secular Age, the “Reform Master Narrative,” the “drive to Reform [that] was the matrix out of which the modern European idea of Revolution emerges.”[110]  Whether he’s discussing Calvinism or Communism, Voegelin sees Gnosticism: an elect animated by a “cause” and opposed by “anti-social elements” that must be eliminated. But behind it all he sees the same elementary mistake: the confusion of the spiritual and the historical.  “Faith is the anticipation of a supernatural perfection of man,” he writes, “it is not this perfection itself.  The realm of God is not of this world, and the representative of the civitas dei [the city of God] in history, the church, is not a substitute for civil society.”

Modernity, Voegelin claims, constitutes an entry into “the higher realm of the Gnostic dream world.”  He applies this phrase to the thought of Thomas Hobbes, claiming that in Hobbes the thought of transcendence is eliminated and replaced by the “mortal god.”  Hobbes supposed a world, says Voegelin, in which the truth of the soul would no longer “agitate men” because in trading their obedience for peace and security they would extinguish their “longing for transcendence”[111]  And this “dream world,” Voegelin says, substitutes itself for reality ever more completely as modernity unfolds.  By our time, he wrote in 1950’s, “the dream world has blended into the real world terminologically.”  In the hope of replacing reality by its transfiguration, “the dreamers adopt the vocabulary of reality while changing its meaning, as if the dream were the reality.” “In the Gnostic dream world,” he concludes, “non-recognition of reality is the first principle.”[112]

So Voegelin holds, in brief, that Christianity is characterized by a disposition, faith, that can never achieve worldly certainty or definitive institutional form, but that this precarious stance is increasingly abandoned in favour of a world-denying and world-improving Gnosticism which promises fulfillment in history.   Illich knew Voegelin’s theory and cites it approvingly in Limits to Medicine, where he says that modern medicine exactly conforms to Voegelin’s description of modern Gnosticism i.e. the world is unsatisfactory and “intrinsically poorly organized,” but salvation from it is possible for an elect who take the “technical actions” for which they “monopolize the special formula.”[113]  This is the only reference to Voegelin that I know of in Illich’s work, and he doesn’t seem to have thought of Voegelin when he elaborated his idea of the modern West as a corruption of the best which is the worst.  Nevertheless I find the overlapping of their thoughts quite striking, and I think that Voegelin spells out a good deal that Illich leaves implicit.  Illich from the very beginning of his work showed an awareness of the “other-worldly” roots of the kingdom of God and the impossibility that the church could ever replace civil society.  For example, when he went to Puerto Rico 1956 as a university administrator, he decided to get out of “any kind of official relationship to a bishop for whom I would work in the pastoral care of his people.”  The reason, he says, was because, “I didn’t want to get mixed up in a conflict between the priestly office of making the other-worldly unity and brotherhood of the liturgy real and my personal stance as a politician.”[114]  The Kingdom of God, or Kingdom of Heaven, can be recognized and celebrated.  It can leaven and brighten every social occasion, relationship, and institution, and, in that way, illuminate and change the world.  But it can never be harnessed, predicted, or made to perform as what Voegelin calls “a civil theology.”  I return to Wendell Berry’s wonderful formula: “It floats among us like a cloud and is the realest thing we know and the least to be captured, the least to be possessed by anybody for itself.”  This was Illich’s view, I think, and it conditioned his view of the Church as both a mysterious She – the Kingdom among us – and a corporate It, not essentially any different in its obedience to worldly necessities than General Motors or General Dynamics.  That the Church should have the aspect of an It could not have been avoided.  It was an object in the world, faced with unanswerable historical predicaments, like the decline of the Roman Empire and the resulting  power vacuum into which the Church was drawn willy-nilly, and it was subject to worldly necessities.  But awareness of the difference between She and It could have been maintained and upheld.  I remember, as an example, the delight with which Illich told me the story of Girolamo Savonarola’s last day on earth.  As Savonarola, and his two monastic brothers, approached the scaffold on which they would be hung and then burned in Florence in 1498, they confronted the special delegate of the Pope, who told Savonarola that “he was being condemned as a heretic and schismatic and…excluded henceforth from… the Church on earth and the Church in heaven… Savonarola responded in his usual quiet, strong, unbroken voice, as the official observer of these proceedings noted, ‘You may exclude me from the temporal church, sir,’ he said, ‘but only from the temporal church.  You don’t have the authority to decree the second [exclusion from the Church in heaven.]’”[115] 

Know the difference, could have been Illich’s motto, as much as the one he chose for himself – “I fear the Lord is passing me by” – and it seems also to have been a crucial idea for Eric Voegelin.  He reproaches pillars of the early Church, like Ambrose and Augustine, with forgetting this difference.  They did not see, he says, that “dissolving the civic religion” of Roman society would “leave a vacuum” – a vacuum which would pull Christianity into a vocation for which it couldn’t have been more unsuited.[116]  Likewise Illich reproaches the Church, as it established itself, with forgetting the temptation of anti-Christ.  From that point on their stories diverge somewhat.  Voegelin locates the roots of Protestant sectarianism and political revolution in a decay of Christian faith into Gnostic certainty, while Illich is concerned with how the Catholic church itself created the template for the modern state, but they have in common the idea, in Voegelin’s words, that “the church is not a substitute for civil society” and also the idea that, as this substitution occurs, it becomes harder and harder to know the difference and harder and harder to tell the truth.  Voegelin’s speaks of the “Gnostic dreamworld,” Illich of modern institutions as unconscious churches, but, in either case, one lives “as if the dream were the reality.”  That one ought to know the difference between heaven and earth seems a simple, even obvious idea, and yet it seems not to be.  Illich says that our ostensibly post-Christian era, in fact, “the most obviously Christian epoch,” Voegelin that “the dream world has blended into the real world.”  I think these statements are very close, and their evidence is all around us in the strangely altered and unrecognized faith, yet not faith, that animates the fantastic hopes of an unsustainable and increasingly uncivil society.  For this reason I think it is illuminating to read Voegelin and Illich together.

 

FELIX Ó’MURCHADHA

 

In 2013 Irish scholar Felix Ó’Murchadha, a professor of philosophy at the National University of Ireland in Galway, published a book called A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night.  He described it as “an experiment [in] think[ing] philosophically in a Christian manner.”[117]  I  found that it illuminated many of Illich’s themes, and I wonder if the reverse might also be true: if Illich’s work might also help to draw out some of what is implicit in Ó’Murchadha’s approach. 

“It is not by philosophy,” said Bishop Ambrose of Milan (340-397) “that it has pleased God to save his people.”  He echoed the famous challenge of Tertullian of Carthage, who earlier had asked, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”[118]  The relationship of Christianity and philosophy has been at issue ever since.   Benedict XVI in his celebrated Regensburg Address of 2006, argued that, since Ambrose and Tertullian’s time, an “inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry” had taken place within Catholic Christianity and that this harmonization of faith and reason had not only defined the Western Church but was also “an event of decisive importance…from the standpoint of…world history.”[119]  This is a contested opinion.  Luther wished “to liberate the Christian experience hidden beneath Greek philosophical terms” and sometime spoke of this negative function of his theology of the cross as destruction, a term later adopted by Heidegger as Destruktion and then by Jacques Derrida as deconstruction.  Ó’Murchadha, too, generally opposes Christianity to philosophy, but, interestingly, he does so in the name of a new style of philosophy – phenomenological philosophy which, in his view, dovetails with Christianity in a way that metaphysical philosophy never did.  In fact, he argues that theology has been nothing else but an attempt to manage “the tensions arising from the marrying of Platonism and scriptural revelation.”[120]

This is no place for a history of phenomenology – nor would I be capable of one – but the essential idea lies in what Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, called the “phenomenological reduction.” Husserl wanted to get back, as he said, to the “things themselves” rather than viewing them in the light of some pre-established metaphysical system by which they were, in effect, known in advance.  He proposed a “bracketing” – his term was epoché, an ancient Greek word meaning suspension – by which one would attempt to hold at bay all assumptions, both practical and theoretical, about what a given object is.  With this procedure, Ó’Murchadha thinks, phenomenology gave up philosophy’s main pretension – to bring things to light as elements of some comprehensive and perspicuous system – and entered into the dark.  Reduction, in Husserl’s sense, is kenosis, self-emptying, the word the apostle Paul uses when he says that “Christ Jesus who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God as a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant…and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.”[121]  We can only make room for something by giving up our own instrumental/practical interest in it.  Prayer, Simone Weil says, is “empty thought,” or pure attention, and Ó’Murchadha argues that Husserl’s project of getting to the “things themselves” is nothing less.[122]  To seek what Ó’Murchadha calls “the original epiphany of appearance” and “the original radiance of creation” is to be willing to undergo what he calls “a triple dispossession” – “of language, self and time” – and this willingness aligns phenomenology with the practices of prayer and praise more than with the speculative energies of philosophy.[123]

For Ó’Murchadha Plato’s parable of the cave, in The Republic, is paradigmatic of all philosophies of enlightenment.  In the cave sit the prisoners facing a wall on which they observe a play of shadows.  Having been “fettered from childhood,” and so knowing nothing else, they take the shadows for “reality” itself.  Only the philosopher braves the arduous way out of the cave, along “an ascent which is rough and steep.”  Eventually, he is “drawn into the light of the sun” and, once accustomed to its, at first, blinding brilliance, becomes capable of perceiving “its true nature.”[124] This light, once discovered, illuminates all things, making everything appear as it is.  Philosophy can finally know the truth, even if it is hard put to convey it to the cave dwellers.  The light spoken of in the Prologue to the Gospel of John is of quite a different nature.  There the Word which was “in the beginning,” the Word that “was with God…and was God” is also compared to a light.  This light, according to the King James translation, shone “in darkness” but the darkness “comprehended it not.”  The Revised Standard Version emends this to “overcame it not.”  The King James is more evocative, suggesting not only that the darkness could not extinguish the light, but also that it could not understand it, but, either way, the light and the darkness are made to co-exist.  The darkness cannot quench the light, but neither does the light illuminate the darkness in a display of clarifying power.  This light appears only to those who are able, in effect, to perceive it within the dark.  “He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.[125] “The uniqueness of Christ,” Ó’Murchadha writes, “is that in the darkness of his form he makes manifest a light which can be seen only through the eyes of faith.”  Indeed, he continues, that’s what faith is: “a sight which is possible only by seeing in darkness.”[126] 

Darkness, and night, the figure Ó’Murchadha uses in his title, are central to his account of Christianity.  Christianity, he says, quoting Karl Barth, “has no cosmology.”[127]  By this I think he means that Christianity offers no general account of things.  It proposes no map or framework in which every item of reality can be assigned its place, function and importance.  The light of John’s Gospel is not a radiance that illuminates everything.  Rather, it is a light that lights the singularity of each being from within.  The story of God-in-the-world does not end in enlightenment – it ends with a judicial murder.  During the three hours that Jesus hangs on the Cross there is “a darkness over all the land” and, at the end, according to Matthew and Mark’s Gospels, he feels himself abandoned even by God.[128]   Resurrection follows, but it is perceptible only to faith.  When he appears he is sometimes, at first, unrecognized.  The disciples on the road to Emmaus spend the whole afternoon walking and talking with him but they do not know him until, at last, he breaks bread with them.[129]  Mary Magdalen at the empty tomb mistakes him for the gardener.[130] Often he vanishes soon after he is recognized.  There are no appearances in the agora or the temple, the court or the palace where his presence might have been officially certified.  Later, when the Resurrection has become dogma  and the Church an establishment, Resurrection will become an item of belief, recited in a compulsory credo, but at first it is the experience of that handful of people who are able to see through the terrorizing power of the Crucifixion and understand that his ignominious death did not disprove his claim to be “the one to redeem Israel.”[131]  They develop the faculty that  Christianity calls faith, the ability, as Ó’Murchada says, of “seeing in darkness.”  The truth comes to those who are called, to those who suddenly understand – it is not a light by which all can see.  Easter doesn’t wipe out Good Friday – it puts it into a different perspective.

O’Murchadha develops his idea of night in many ways.  He points to the many Christian thinkers who have emphasized darkness as the way to God: from John of the Cross’s “dark night of the soul’ to Nicolas of Cusa’s “learned ignorance”; from Meister Eckhart’s “I pray God to rid me of God” to Simone Weil’s “desire without an object.”  All evoke a soul which must know itself, at some point, as nothing but desire, a desire which must burn in darkness, waiting for the One of which it can form no true image. In Plato, on the other hand, desire is the savage part of the soul, symbolized by the unruly, unbroken and unbridled horse, which must be “humbled” and trained “to obey the counsel of his driver,” if the soul is to steer an orderly course towards wisdom.[132]  Desire is extinguished when its object is achieved.  The gods do not philosophize, Plato says, because they are already wise.  They have no need to love wisdom because they do not lack wisdom and love is desire for what is lacking. [133] Wisdom, once achieved, makes desire redundant.  But Christianity, on the other hand “embodies the wisdom of the lover, not the seeker of wisdom.” Love’s wisdom is the “ever deepening realization of desire…without end.”[134] Desire is excited not by lack but by abundance, and superabundance.  French philosopher/theologian Jean Luc Marion speaks of the “saturated phenomenon” which exceeds any concept or horizon that can be imposed on it.[135]  We strive, Ó’Murchadha says, for what we are “fundamentally incapable of reaching,” experiencing desire “for that of which I have no idea, that which I can in no way possess and that which I can receive only through dispossession.”[136]

Darkness, in O’Murchadha’s account, lies at the heart of all appearance.  In reflecting light, he says, objects, in a sense, refuse it – they send it back, and this is the condition of their being seen at all.  But the invisible offends modern sensibilities – we would prefer to treat it as the not yet seen.  Coleridge, in his Biographia Literaria, speaks of “the despotism of the eye” and continues…

…we are restless because invisible things are not the objects of vision; and metaphysical systems, for the most part, become popular, not for their truth, but in proportion as they attribute to causes a susceptibility of being seen, if only our visual organs were sufficiently powerful.[137]

This is true of “metaphysical systems,” but not true of the Bible where what can be seen is de-emphasized, a point literary critic Eric Auerbach made long ago in his Mimesis when he contrasted the Homeric and the Biblical style.  “The basic impulse of the Homeric style,” writes Auerbach, “[is] to represent phenemona in a fully externalized form, visible and palpable in all their parts and completely fixed in their spatial and temporal relations.”  Everything is “brought to light in perfect fullness, so that a continuous rhythmic procession of phenomena passes by, and never is there a form left fragmentary or half illuminated, never a lacuna, never a gap, never a glimpse of unplumbed depths.”[138]  This lucidity is entirely foreign to the Bible.  Auerbach chooses as his first example Genesis 22:1: “And it came to pass…that God did tempt Abraham, and said to him, “Abraham! And he said, Behold here I am.”  There follows the story of the command to sacrifice his son Isaac, the journey to the mountain in Moriah, the eventual substitution of a ram for Isaac, and the blessing of Abraham, all narrated in nineteen short verses during which we are not provided with a single unnecessary detail.  There is not a single adjective in the entire passage.  We do not know where God is, or where Abraham is, when the call comes.  We learn nothing of the landscapes through which Abraham and Isaac pass, nor what they wore, nor how they felt, nor what they said.  The story takes place, as it were, in the heart of reality, rather than in any definite natural setting.  It is not intended, like the limpid Greek epics, to charm or captivate us, but to confront us.[139]  O’Murchadha doesn’t mention Auerbach, but he makes the same point.  The Bible is not about what can be seen but what can be heard, and what can be heard above all is a call.  “Now the Lord said to Abram [who would become Abraham], ‘Go from your country, and your kindred, and your father’s house, to the land that I will show you.”  Just that – obedience to the call counts for everything.  Abram doesn’t protest that he has a wedding to attend the following Tuesday.  God’s glory, Ó’Murchadha writes, “is not a ‘name which binds the sky to the earth.’”[140]  It is a rhythm of call and obedient response.  This is all contained in O’Muchadha’s image of night: it is not something that can be seen, or pictured in metaphors that imply visibility.  Hiddenness is another name for the darkness in which we listen.  The apostle Paul tells the Colossians they have died to the world and “your life is now hidden with Christ in God.”[141]  Glory has changed its meaning.  Paul preaches the glory of the Cross, a glory not of this world which glows in darkness and is radiant in humiliation.  From the point of view of what can be seen, Paul’s Christians are “the offscouring of all things” – other translations propose “scum of the earth,” “everybody’s trash,” etc.[142]

Night, finally, is silence.  It is what cannot be said, or reduced to a saying.  “Revelation,” O’Murchadha says, “means nothing” in the sense that it can’t be reduced to a message.  What enters the world with the Incarnation, and, thereafter is in the world, is still not of the world, and so cannot be fully expressed in worldly terms.  Christ is “a broken sign” - broken by incomprehension, broken on the Cross, broken again, in memoriam, in the Eucharist – as well as a sign of brokenness, and this sign “ruptures any system of signs that might contain it.”[143]  Night, silence and hiddenness all represent the presence in the world of something more than the world can contain, a presence which points to the dark and uncontainable excess within each one.   Glory, as I said above, changes it meaning, and this is reflected in the interesting career of the Greek word doxa, which in Christian usage came to mean praise, as in orthodoxy, right praise.  In Plato’s time, doxa still meant opinion, but also fame, as the weight that opinion carries when it is powerful.  But, when the Hebrew scriptures were rendered into Greek, beginning in the 3rd Century BCE – the translation that came to be known as the Septuagint, for the seventy scholars who eventually worked on it – the Hebrew word kabod, which refers to what makes God apparent, or the invisible somehow detectable, was translated as doxa.  And, with this usage, a reversal occurred because the glory of the Lord is invisible.  Unlike fame or reputation, which shine in the world, glory is an excess of light which blinds human vision and is, therefore, fundamentally, darkness.  In Plato, doxa prevails only until things are seen as they truly are by episteme, knowledge.  In the Christian inversion, doxa stands above episteme -  there are things that we can recognize only with praise, not with certain knowledge

The Incarnation, as Ó’Murchadha understands it, represents a radical tear within worldly existence.  As the being “in the world” of what is not “of the world,” it breaks with the orders of the everyday, the scientific and the metaphysical.   Each is relativized by that seeing in the dark that Christians call faith.  The Incarnation breaks with the sacred, as previously understood.  Sacred logic is a logic of purity and classification, even when it is pursued through rational philosophy rather than ritual.  Dirt, anthropologist Mary Douglas says, is what is “out of place” – what violates the order of classification, or endangers the purity of the set aside and untouchable.  But “Incarnational logic,” Ó’Murchadha says, “is…a logic not just of contagion but of contamination, indeed profanation.”  It stands opposed to the “sacred logic which still governs Plato’s texts.”  Sacred logic abhors mixtures and maintains hierarchy through prohibitions inscribed in law, but Christianity mixes what is kept apart in Platonism – above all, the divine and the human, but also matter and form, life and death, being and becoming.[144] And the Incarnation is a contingent event – it reflects no discernible reason or necessity but arises purely from love.  Creation calls for it, Paul says, but that the call should be answered is no more certain than is Abram’s decision to leave Ur or Mary’s assent to the strange prophecy that she will become the mother of God.[145]  Later the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo will arise to account for this contingency.  The world has no frame and no necessary existence other than the one that God has given it.  The Incarnation reveals the character which the Creation had from the outset – it arose from love and was given to humanity as radical freedom.  Creatures are set free from God, and “God is disclosed in every creature as nothing other than the creature itself in its absolute distance from God.”[146] (Recall Illich’s definition of prayer as the moment of maximum distance between man and God.[147]

Incarnation is a rupture in what had been understood as the nature of things.  As an unforeseeable contingency, and a scandalous conflation of the sacred and the profane, it is a singularity.  It is not an instance of something that can be generalized or repeated, but something that is utterly, inexhaustibly itself.  And it points to this quality in each one that it touches.  But the self, insofar as it is unique, is also invisible.  It is non-apparent, by definition, O’Murchadha says, because generalization, and generalizability, is a condition of knowledge.  To happen once, as Catherine Pickstock says, something must happen twice, and so become a recognizable and categorizable instance.[148]  The true self is therefore hidden and must be approached in its concealment, if it is not to be obscenely, or blasphemously exposed.[149]  Singular beings, moreover, are impure insofar as they have not been clarified, categorized or classified, and must inevitably, therefore, constitute some sort of impure mixture.  The messianic, having neither time nor place – “the Son of Man has no place even to lay his head”[150] – displaces and reveals an essence in each one which is not in time or space.[151]

All this points to what Illich calls the “mysterious new glory, thickness [and] phenomenological density that the body takes on under the influence of Christianity.”[152]  O’Murchadha understands, with Illich, that embodiment in the light of God’s Incarnation takes on a novel quality which places it beyond the various dualisms of spirit and matter that have structured philosophy and religion.  Incarnation transforms embodied being.  It adds a new dimension to flesh, rather than mandating domination of the body, or escape from it.[153]  The flesh is the site of spiritual encounter, but each one, as a singular being, remains dark, opaque, unknown until this surprising and revelatory encounter occurs.

O’Murchadha also hints at an understanding of the principle of corruptio optimi pessima, though he doesn’t mention it by name.  First, he remarks that once the possibility of being “not of this world” is opened up, then “the scope of evil [potentially] extends to infinity.”[154] Freedom, unfettered, can as easily be demonic as angelic.  The thought is not developed in Illich’s direction – the Kingdom brought under administration – but it certainly suggests evil escaping worldly limits as an implication of the Incarnation.  The second point is Ó’Murchadha’s recognition of the volatility, or double potential, of the idea of contingency.  Thinking that created beings arise from nothing, as the world arises at God’s word from nothing, may allow us to perceive their singularity and therefore treat them with loving care, but it can also have the opposite effect.  Thinking that beings are nothing in themselves can make them available for unlimited exploitation.  In both cases the best quickly becomes the worst. 

Christianity, as “a transcendence of the world in the world,” produces a condition that Ó’Murchadha calls “worldly worldlessness.”[155]  I found the phrase interesting, particularly in the light of Hannah Arendt’s claim that Christianity has produced the condition that she calls “worldlessness.”   Arendt has various reasons for this claim: that “charity cannot found a public realm,” that the conception of the Christian community as a body and a family was “un-political” and “non-public” in making the private public, and that a world whose end is imagined cannot provide a stable stage for political action.[156] Arendt’s points are all fruitful and suggestive, but the idea of “worldlessness” is one-sided, because it leaves out what has been added, rather than taken away, by the Incarnation – what Illich calls “phenomenological density.”  “Worldly worldlessness” rights this balance. It points to the increased significance of worldly encounters that is just as much a part of the revelation of the world’s roots in heaven as is the undermining of what Arendt’s conceives as “the public realm.”  Christianity is world-less in the sense that it is a-cosmic, and so cannot locate everything in a neat hierarchy of being.  The radical freedom both of God and of the humanity which God absolves and sets free, as the darkness in which faith must learn to see, preclude the existence of the stable, sunlit world that Arendt supposes was once the backdrop for the storied acts that she thinks Christianity has enervated.  But the world in the Christian perspective has also becomes more real.  By refusing an illuminated “world-view” in favour of the darkness in which faith must feel its way, it opens itself to surprise – the genuine surprise that may occur only in the face of what cannot be typified, contained or identically repeated.  The general revolves and recurs, the unique reaches beyond time.  What is less worldly in one sense is more worldly in another.

Perhaps it’s clear why the terms in which Ó’Murchadha unfolds Christianity as phenomenological philosophy seem to me to clarify and perhaps extend the scope of certain of Illich’s most characteristic ideas.  Illich insisted many times on surprise as a defining aim of his life.  This is either the motto of an adventurer, or the statement of a man who, even if with all due prudence, sometimes left the reins of his life in the hands of God.  Illich said that he wished “take the other at his word” – an impossible aim which comes very close to the phenomenological epoché, or bracketing, which attempts to exclude everything that confines and predetermines my understanding.  Illich feared the power of diagnosis – one of the very last lectures he ever gave was called, “Lead Us Not Into Diagnosis,” in imitation of the Lord’s prayer’s, “lead us not into temptation.”[157]  Diagnosis is a generalizing, typifying, categorizing power – a power that drowns the unique case in the class to which it belongs, until individuals are entirely overshadowed by their ghostly, statistical doubles.  But, more than this, Illich implicitly claimed that Christianity might have been something utterly different than what it became, if only it had remembered the temptation of anti-Christ and its vocation to be “in the world but not of it.”  O’Murchadha, in my view, has begun to open the modest, self-critical and self-aware path that Illich himself sought.

 

 

(I have used the following abbreviations for Illich’s books in the endnotes: RNF – The Rivers North of the Future, Anansi, 2005; DS – Deschooling Society, Penguin, 1973; IIC – Ivan Illich in Conversation, Anansi, 1992; and LM – Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis, Penguin, 1976.)

[1] Information about the event can be found here: http://www.wtp.org/oaklandtable.html

[2] Brown’s obituary which appeared in the Whole Earth Review is available here: http://www.wtp.org/

[3] IIC, p. 279  - I have slightly reorganized the phrases in this quotation to fit my text.

[4] The parable of the sower: Matthew 13, Luke 4, Mark 8.

[5] RNF, p. x

[6] See Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, Routledge, 1999, and The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, ed. John Milbank and Simon Oliver, Routledge, 2009

[7] RNF, p. 229

[8] For the various uses of this soubriquet see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Awakening

[9] The Portable Nietzscheop. cit., p. 95

[10] The phrase is the apostle Paul’s during his address to the Athenians on the Areopagus.  (Acts 17:28)

[11] Jacques Maritain, for example, explains God’s omniscience by saying that “God does not foresee the things of time, he sees them…in the pure existential freshness of their coming into being.”  For him, once we grasp that eternity is not “a species of time before and after time” but rather “a limitless instant which indivisibly embraces the whole succession of time,” the problem of how freedom can be part of a “plan,” or foreknowledge compatible with an undetermined present, goes away. (Existence and the Existent, Pantheon, 1948, p. 87, 9, 113)  Maritain’s assurance in describing how the world happens to God is striking and helps to illustrate the innovation of phenomenological philosophy in trying to remain within what is directly given.

[12] The Gift of Death, Chicago, 1996 (first French edition 1992); Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International, Routledge, 1994, p. 59.

[13] Jean Luc Nancy,  Disenclosure : The Deconstruction of Christianity, Fordham, 2008, p. 142

[14] Owen Barfield, Romanticism Comes of Age, 2nd expanded edition, Wesleyan, 1966 (first edition 1944), p. 72

[15] ibid. p. 76

[16] Ivan Illich, Genere, Neri Pozza Editore, 2013, p. 7, 14

[17] Mathew Abbott, The Figure of this World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology, Edinburgh University Press, 2014, p. 188

[18] Giorgio Agamben, The Church and the Kingdom, Seagull Books, 2010, p. 4

[19] Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, Schocken, 1968, p. 264.  The rendering of Benjamin’s German here is slightly different than Agamben’s, but the thought is the same.

[20] The Church and the Kingdom, op. cit., p. 12

[21] ibid., p. 8

[22] 1 Corinthians, 7:29-31

[23] The Church and the Kingdom, op. cit., p. 18

[24] 1 Thessalonians 4: 16-17

[25] 1 Thessalonians 5:2

[26] 2 Corinthians 6:2

[27] 2 Peter 3:8

[28] The Church and the Kingdom, op. cit., pp. 34-35

[29] Blake, “Milton,” plate 24, line 72, op. cit., p. 121; Romans 7:24 (This is the RSV translation; the King James has the famous “body of this death.”

[30] The Church and the Kingdom, op. cit., p. 35

[31] ibid., p. 35

[32] ibid., p. 41

[33] Ivan Illich, “Philosophy…Artifacts…Friendship,” here: https://www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/Illich96PHILARPU.pdf

[34] DS, p. 18

[35] Ivan Illich, The Powerless Church, Penn State, 2018, p. 159

[36] IIC, p. 66; RNF, p. 170

[37] “What is a Camp?” in Means Without Ends, Minnesota, 2000 (first Italian edition 1996), p. 36

[38] The state of exception is the subject of a whole book of that name (Chicago, 2003); the state of permanent emergency is noted, among many other references, in Agamben’s introduction to the new Italian edition of Gender (op. cit.)  where he writes that “the central concept [of] the secularized eschatology of modernity is that of crisis,” a crisis that is “prolonged indefinitely in time” as a result of “decisions that do not…decide anything.”

[39] Typical in this respect is the passage from “Health As One’s Own Responsibility: No, Thank You!”in which he speaks of his contemporaries “matter of fact acceptance of a bottomless evil which Hitler and Stalin did not reach.”  That lecture is available here: https://www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/Illich_1429id.pdf

[40] RNF, p. 169. 190

[41] Colossians 1:15; Augustine, On the Trinity XV.17.24

[42] Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a TheologicaL Genealogy of Economy and Government, Stanford, 2011, p. 55

[43] ibid., p. 109

[44] ibid., p. 140

[45] ibid., p. 112

[46] ibid., p. 236

[47] The Hymn Book of the Anglican Church in Canada and the United Church of Canada, 1971, #50

[48] John 17:1

[49] ibid., p. 211

[50] ibid., p. 242

[51] ibid., p. 162

[52] Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself” begins “I celebrate myself and sing myself” and, for this, he adds at the end of the first section of the poem “all creeds and schools” must be held “in abeyance,” an expression which harmonizes nicely with Agamben’s inoperativity.

[53] Means Without Ends, op. cit., p. 117

[54] ibid., op, cit., p. 141

[55] Galatians 2:20; 1 Corinthians 7:30

[56] Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, M.I.T. Press, 2007, p. 80

[57] Karl Marx, Capital, Penguin Classics, 1990, p. 165

[58] Profanations, op. cit., p. 84, 85

[59] The Kingdom and the Glory, op. cit., p. 140

[60] Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford, 1998 (Italian 1995), p. 56

[61] Means Without Ends, op. cit., p. 85

[62] Profanations, op. cit., p. 89

[63] ibid., 87

[64] RNF, p. 159

[65] Profanations, op. cit., p. 73

[66] ibid., p. 79

[67] ibid., p. 81

[68] ibid., p. 77

[69] Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, Stanford, 2005 (Italian 2000), p. 43

[70] Means Without Ends, op. cit., p. 85

[71] T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1943, p. 15, 39

[72] Means Without Ends, op. cit., 138

[73] ibid., p. 4

[74] Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford, 1998 (Italian 1995), p. 57

[75] ibid. p. 9

[76] ibid. p. 3 – I cannot find this precise wording in The Human Condition, but it is entirely faithful to Arendt’s thought in the book.

[77] Means Without Ends, op. cit., p. 89

[78] Capital, Volume One, Chpt. 32; Psalms 118:22; Matthew 21:42; Acts 4:11

[79] The Time That Remains, op. cit., p. 134

[80] Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford, 1999, p. 42

[81] Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, Stanford, 1999, p. 126, note 14

[82] The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought., ed. Nicolas Adams, George Pattison, Graham Ward, Oxford, 2013

[83] Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, Minnesota, 1993, p. 254

[84] Hollis Phelps, “Performing Profanation: Giorgio Agamben’s Non-Non-Christianity,” Political Theology Today, Nov. 27, 2001 (http://www.politicaltheology.com/blog/performing-profanation-giorgio-agambens-non-non-christianity/)

[85] Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953,  p. 103

[86] DS, p. 15

[87] The Coming Community, op. cit.; Means Without Ends, op. cit., p. 138

[88] 1 Corinthians 15:51

[89] Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, Chicago, 1952, p. 27

[90] ibid., p 41

[91] ibid., p. 67

[92] Tertullian is quoted in Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism, Harvard, 2014, p. 70; RNF, p. 99

[93] New Science of Politics, op, cit., p. 156

[94] Mark 2:27

[95] Matthew 12:48

[96] Matthew 13:46

[97] Matthew 7:14 KJV

[98] Hebrews 11:1 – this is the memorable, and often cited King James translation; the RSV substitutes “the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.”

[99] 1 Corinthians 13:12

[100] Gravity and Grace, op. cit., p. 103

[101] “The Poor in Spirit,” Sermon LXXXVII in Franz Pfeiffer, Meister Eckhart, translated by C. de B. Evans, Watkins, 1952

[102] New Science of Politics, op. cit., p. 123

[103] http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08406c.htm

[104] New Science of Politics, op. cit., p, 119

[105] ibid., 120

[106] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanentize_the_eschaton

[107] New Science of Politics, op. cit., p. 123

[108] ibid., p. 123

[109] Illich gives more or less this digest of Voegelin’s definition of Gnosticism in LM, p. 117, citing Voegelin’s Science, Politics and Mysticism

[110] A Secular Age, op. cit., p. 61

[111] New Science of Politics, op. cit., p. 161

[112] ibid., p. 161

[113] LM, p. 117

[114] IIC, p. 99

[115] RNF, pp. 155-156

[116] New Science of Politics, op. cit., p. 159

[117] Felix Ó’Murchadha, A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night, Indiana, 2013, p. 199

[118] Terullian’s question occurs in Chaper Seven of his De Praescriptione Haereticorum; I have not been able to find a citation for Ambrose’s frequently quoted remark.

[119] The text of the lecture is here: http://www.catholic-ew.org.uk/Home/News/2006/Full-Text-of-the-Pope-Benedict-XVI-s-Regensburg-Lecture.  See p. 4

[120] Ó’Murchhadha, op. cit., p. xiii

[121] Letter to the Philippians, 2: 5-8

[122] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 59

[123] ibid., p. 35, 62

[124] Republic, VII, 514 ff. in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns, Pantheon (Bollingen Series LXXI), 1961, pp. 747 ff.

[125] John 1: 1-10

[126] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 86

[127] ibid., p. 3 – he cites Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, Part Two, pp. 3-6

[128] Matthew 27:45-47, Mark 15:33-35

[129] Luke 24: 13-35

[130] John 20:15

[131] Luke 24:21

[132] Phaedrus, 254e, in Plato, op. cit., p. 500

[133] Symposium 204a, ibid., p. 556

[134] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 55

[135] The idea appears in various places in Marion’s work, but see particularly Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness (Stanford, 2002), p. 199 ff.

[136] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 55

[137] Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, Oxford, 1971, p. 19.  (Barfield cites Biographia Literaria, ed. Shawcross, 62, I, 64)

[138] Eric Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Princeton, 1953/2003 (first German edition 1946), pp. 6-7

[139] ibid., p. 8 ff.

[140] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 76

[141] Colossians 3:3

[142] 1 Corinthians 4:13; O’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 108

[143] ibid., p. 110

[144] ibid., p. 6

[145] Romans 8:22

[146] ibid., p, 53

[147] CA, p. 33

[148] Repetition and Identity, op. cit., p. 73

[149] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 39, 90, 91

[150] Luke 9:58

[151] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 102

[152] RNF, p. 110

[153] Ó’Murchadha, op. cit., p. 141

[154] ibid., p. 126

[155] ibid., p. 85

[156] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, 1958, pp. 53-54

[157] Matthew 6:9-13; “Lead Us Not Into Diagnosis” remains unpublished and does not appear to be  available on-line in English.

Was Ivan Illich a Romantic?

WAS IVAN ILLICH A ROMANTIC?

(Recently I send the Penn State Press a lengthy manuscript of a book about the life and thought of Ivan Illich. Because of its length, I had to cut a number of sections that I wrote after the main body of the text was already complete. They deal with subjects that I felt had been left out or inadequately treated. Aside from occasional blind references to the book from which they have been excised, I think they are well enough able to stand on their own to justify my presenting them here. This is one of those sections.) 

 

A serious human life, no matter what “religion” is invoked, can hardly begin until we see an element of illusion in what is really there, and something real in fantasies about might be there instead.

-Northrop Frye[1]

 

In his book on English Romanticism, Northrop Frye says that, “Romanticism…is the first major phase in an imaginative revolution which has carried on until our own day and has by no means completed itself yet.”[2]  English philosopher and critic Owen Barfield says more or less the same thing with his Romanticism Comes of Age.  His title takes his hope for the event, but otherwise agrees with Frye that romanticism remains an unfinished revolution.   Charles Taylor takes a similar view.  He has argued, in many of his writings, that modernity cannot be fairly considered only in the one-sided terms favoured by its critics – individualism, disenchantment, anomie, instrumentalism etc. – but must also be thought of as including its powerful romantic counter-current.[3]  Illich mainly tried to fend off the idea that he was a romantic.  “I am neither a romantic, nor a Luddite, nor a utopian,” he said to me, and a version of this disclaimer is repeated in a number of essays.[4]  But I think he used the word romantic mainly in its colloquial sense of a rose-coloured or gauze-filtered view of things, particularly of the past – the sense in which the opposite of a romantic is a realist – and not in the sense in which Taylor, Barfield and Frye are speaking.   Here I would like to ask whether Illich is a Romantic in this larger sense.  Another way of putting the question is to ask whether Illich sees any good in the modern or whether he conceives it entirely as loss, decline and falling away.   

Several recent writers on Romanticism have said that it is impossible to give a strict definition of the term.  Sometimes it is used as little more than a casual slander.  Novelist Zinovy Zinik, for example, in an essay for the Times Literary Supplement (TLS) recently characterized “the Age or Romanticism” by “its nostalgia for the glorious past, national roots, blood,  soil and rural idyll, accompanied by xenophobia thinly veiled as patriotism.”[5]  Charles Larmore,  in his The Romantic Legacy, says that this name can refer to such disparate phenomena and thought styles as to rule out any exact statement of its scope, but, even so, he goes on, it  does assemble things that bear a certain family resemblance and it does contain “a precious inheritance” that he want to retrieve and conserve.  I can certainly see the difficulty.  I have recently been re-reading Wendell Berry’s long essay “Poetry and Place” in which he excoriates Percy Bysshe Shelley for everything that would seem to be worst in “romanticism”: his vanity, his self-pity, his grandiosity, his vagueness, his glorification of the Satanic, as in Shelley’s famous statement that Satan is the real hero of Milton’s Paradise Lost.[6]  This trouncing of Shelley, and the strong defence of Pope that precedes it, might seem to identify Berry as a “conservative” and “traditionalist” – the very opposite of a romantic.  And yet I’m sure I would have no difficulty in finding critics who think of Berry as an arch-romantic, a writer of rural idylls that virtually define the type.  So can anything be made of a term so elastic? 

I would say yes, insofar as the question of romanticism encodes a crucial question about modernity: is there some greatness in modernity that can be, as Charles Taylor says, retrieved, or is it, by now, a darkness so deep that we can only find our way at all by listening for what George Grant calls our “intimations of deprival?”[7]  Illich can be found, at different times, on both sides of this divide.  There is no doubt that his early work calls for a moderated and reformed modernity.  During the 1960’s he writes of the liberating possibilities in what he calls “secularization,” seeing in what Bonhoeffer calls “a world come of age” the possibility that he will at last be able, with others, “to celebrate my faith for no purpose at all.”[8]  “The development of humanity,” he says in the same essay, “tends towards the realization of the kingdom.”[9]  In Tools for Conviviality, the life within limits that he imagines is an explicitly modern possibility with a crucial role allotted to reformed versions of science, technology and liberal political institutions.   But later he will speak of our world as being “enveloped” in “mysterious darkness” and “demonic night.”[10]  He will identify himself as an “apocalyptic” thinker who thinks that we might be “quite close to the end of the world.”[11]  And he will say that what “determines our epoch” is “a bottomless evil that Hitler and Stalin did not reach.”[12]  In asking whether Illich is a romantic, therefore, I am asking finally for his position on modernity and his position within modernity. 

Let me begin by saying what I think Frye’s “romantic revolution” consists in.  Frye’s paradigm, as his readers will know, is the work of the poet engraver William Blake.  Blake, Frye says simply, “wraps up the whole romantic movement within himself.”   Frye goes on to describe the essence of this movement as the universe turned “upside-down.”[13]  The structure of the antique cosmos, which was mirrored in Christian theology, was top-down.  “Theologically,” Frye says, “there are four levels… 

…There is, first of all, the presence of God, which is associated with metaphors of ‘up there’…Then there is the state that God intended man to live in, that is, the Garden of Eden, the Golden Age, Paradise.  Then there is, third, the fallen world, the world man fell into with the sin of Adam and Eve.  Then there is, fourth, the demonic world, the world below the order of nature.  On that scheme…the destiny of man is to climb out of the fallen world as nearly as he can to the state that was originally designed for him.  He does this under a structure of authority: the sacraments of religion, the practice of morality, education and so forth.” 

In this traditional view, creativity and originality is entirely on the side of God.  Art could only, as Hamlet says, “hold the mirror up to nature.”[14]  (The figure of the mirror is used in M.H. Abrams famous study of Romanticism, The Mirror and the Lamp, where the mirror stands for art as imitation/reflection/mimesis, and the lamp for imaginative creation that shines by its own light.)  Blake and the Romantics, Frye says, turn this world upside down… 

For Blake what happens is that the child, who is the central figure of the Songs of Innocence is born believing that the world is made for his benefit, that the world makes human sense.  He then grows up and discovers that the world isn’t like this at all.  So what happens to his childlike vision?  Blake says it gets driven underground, what we would now call the subconscious.  There you have the embryonic mythical shape that is worked on later by people like Schopenhauer, Marx, and Freud…For Blake, you have to think of God as at the bottom of creation, trying to rebuild it, and as working through man to that effect.  

The uppermost realm, in the tradition scheme, is the realm of quintessence, the pure stuff of which the heavenly bodies are made.   In the new scheme the endless space of the universe is the space of alienation.  “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me,” Blaise Pascal had already written a century before Blake.  God, for Blake, is within – “All gods reside within the human breast” – and below, as can be seen in his “Marriage of Heaven and Hell” where “energy is eternal delight,” “the tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction,” and “angels” have something to learn from “devils.”[15] The important thing here is what Frye calls the “embryonic mythical shape” that appears in many Romantics and, for Frye, is summarized or “wrapped up” in Blake.  He uses the term myth for a structure that contains and determines thought – myth not as story but as story shape.  Such structures, says German philosopher Hans Blumenberg, constitute a “horizon of meaning” because “they cannot be dissolved into conceptuality.”  Blumenberg speaks of “absolute metaphors” and Frye of “mythological frameworks,” but I take it that they are talking about the same thing: the container rather than the content of thought.[16]  The basic elements of this new structure, according to Frye/Blake – often indistinguishable as Frye freely acknowledged – are that God is no longer on the side of authority, or of a corresponding “objective” order; that “creation” is an imaginative achievement and not a pre-existing array; and that the imagination is the divine life in us.  “The real Selfhood is the Imagination in the Divine Man,” says Blake.[17]  In other places, he drops the copula altogether and just speaks of “Christ, the Imagination.”  For all the romantics, imagination was the faculty through which the world exists for us; for Blake it was also the world’s redemption.  “When the sun rises,” Blake supposes himself being asked, “do you not see a round disk of fire somewhat like a Guineau [a golden coin]?”  “Oh, no, no,” he answers, “I see an innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying, Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty.  I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would question a Window concerning a Sight.  I look through it not with it.”[18]  Imagination here means something very different than the faculty that “gives to airy Nothing a local habitation and a name.”[19] It means the very ability to discover what is real.   

Let me now take a second step with Barfield’s “romanticism come of age” before returning to Illich.  Barfield traces the human journey from original participation to what he calls final participation.  Initially we are indistinguishable from the world in which we are conscious and of which we are conscious.  Citing Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, he writes, “the history of human consciousness was not a progress from an initial condition of blank darkness towards wider and wider awareness of a pre-existing outer world, but the gradual extrication of a small but a growing and an increasingly clear and self-determined focus of inner human experience from a dream-like state of virtual identity with the life of the body and of its environment.”[20]  This process can be observed in language, Barfield says, where the words which we use to refer to immaterial phenomenon originate as references to material entities. The New Testament word for spirit, for example is pneuma, which originally meant wind.  There has been, says Barfield, “an age-long process of contraction of the immaterial qualities of the cosmos into a human centre, into an inner world which…made possible the development of an immaterial language.”[21]  Spirit is wind made articulate in speech.  The Incarnation, for Barfield, is the epicentre of this process of contraction, the moment at which the polarity of inner and outer are reversed.  “Jesus,” he writes, “reverses…direction from outside in to inside out – he was, or represented the turning point.  He taught that ‘it is not that which cometh into a man which defileth him but that which goeth out of him’ or “The kingdom of heaven is within you.”[22]  But, with humans, as Blake says, it is only “the road of excess [which] leads to the palace of wisdom,” and so this process of contraction does not stop at the point of balance between inner and outer worlds.[23]  The rejection of anthropocentrism – of, in Barfield’s word, “finding in the world what we have now properly located in ourselves” – proceeds to the point that everything is within ourselves, all “occult qualities” are banished from nature, and humankind becomes, in Blake’s words, “a little grovelling root,” cut off from all participation with nature and other people.  This is the dilemma in which “science” finally finds itself.  Barfield puts it this way… 

The denial of inner being to the processes of nature leads inevitably to the denial of it in Man himself.  For, if physical objects and physical causes are all that we can know, it follows that man himself can only be known to the extent that he is a physical object among physical objects.[24]  

American philosopher Stanley Rosen, contemplating the same difficulty, says, “If knowledge is enlightenment and science is knowledge, then to be enlightened is either to endure self-ignorance or to undergo reification.”[25] i.e. If knowledge is reliable insofar as it objectifies, then I must either remain ignorant of myself, insofar as I am a subject, or turn myself into an object.  This predicament is often traced to the Cartesian cut between subject and object, mind and nature, res cogitans and res extensa, but Barfield sees the Cartesian cogito as only an episode in a gradual and lengthy process.  “Objectivity,” he says, “is not something that was handed us on a plate once and for all by Descartes.”  It is rather a hard-won mental and moral achievement – precious, even as it turns destructive, and entirely necessary to the synthesis that Barfield calls final participation.   

The Romantic reaction indicts the one-sidedness of scientific reductionism.  At the mere touch of “cold philosophy,” Keats wrote, “all charms fly.”  (Science, in Keats’ time was still called natural philosophy.) Newtonian science, Keats said, would “unweave a rainbow” or “clip an angel’s wings.”[26]  Blake, in a famous engraving, pictures Newton at the bottom of the sea, staring intently downwards at the figure he is drawing with a compass on the scroll at his feet.  “May God us keep,” Blake prays, “from single vision and Newton’s sleep.”[27]  Romanticism gives birth not just to a critique of science but also to a counter-current within science.  Goethe, another critic of Newton, formed “the hypothesis that it might be possible to derive all plant forms from one original plant.”[28]  At one of his first meetings with his friend-to-be Friedrich von Schiller Goethe explained his idea of an urpflanze, usually translated as primal or archetypal plant.  Schiller objected, “This is not an observation from experience, this is an idea.”  Goethe responded, “Then I may rejoice that I have ideas without knowing it and can see them with my own eyes.”[29] Goethe’s work gave birth to a strand of “scientific” inquiry that is much more experiential and much more contemplative that what we normally call science.  He also began the work that has continued into our time of overcoming the divorce between mind and nature.[30]  I won’t go into that further here.  Barfield in his time was very impressed by the findings of quantum mechanics, whose pioneers had reached the foundation of matter only to discover, as Arthur Eddington quipped, that “something unknown is doing we don’t know what.”[31]  “The same elements,” Erwin Schrödinger concluded, “compose my mind and the world...Subject and object are only one.”[32]  Physics, once it had reached the limits of objectivity, was “pitchforked,” Barfield says, “back into philosophy.”[33] 

My point here is that Barfield believed that the detour through materialism and objectivity was a necessary stage in the achievement of what he called “final participation.”  Without separation, and withdrawal from the dream-state of original participation, it would not have been possible, he thought, to understand the role of imagination in overcoming “the abrupt gap between matter and spirit.”[34]  “Romanticism come of age” is his idea of a fully achieved synthesis in which the contracted ego, chastened by scientific materialism, expands again in new participation.  Humanity can wrestle self-consciousness, or subjectivity, out of its world only by polarizing inner and outer, subject and object.  This stance reaches it limit in our time, as all the convenient distinctions on which modernity was erected break down – not just subject and object, but equally private and public, society and nature, secularity and religion etc.  This is the crisis of what Latour calls “the modern constitution,” expressed in the modern institutional landscape but originally constituted in our minds.  We are now at the point, according to Barfield, where it is possible to understand that the nature from which we wrested our hard-won subjectivity, and then took it for all of consciousness, is itself unconscious mind – that the wind that became spirit was spirit all along, awaiting its name.  This new understanding is not an abolition of science/objectivity/the on-looker stance, but is rather, in Hegelian language, its sublation or sublimation (aufhebung), its lifting up into a new synthesis. 

This “New Age” view, of which I have taken Barfield as the representation, was profoundly attractive to me and determined much of the writing and broadcasting I did in the ten years before I reconnected with Illich in 1988.  Having come through the 1960’s, and the myriad of “revolutions” those years were said to portend, I had concluded that it made most sense to think of our time as an interregnum between ages.[35]  What was ending could be described on various scales: the industrial age, at least, or the modern age, or Illich’s age of tools, dated from the 12th century, or the Age of Pisces, now giving way to the Age of Aquarius (astrological epochs, or Great Years,  move  backwards through the zodiac),  or even the entire period of historical consciousness, dated from Karl Jaspers Axial Age (roughly 800-200 BCE)   However considered, one could see that what was ending, though far from over, and still producing brilliant sunset effects, was inexorably revealing its limitations.  But what was beginning?  Well, to be brief, the peaceable, ecologically sustainable, trans-religious and trans-cultural way of life towards which I thought the forcing house of nuclear and ecological apocalypse was insistently pointing.  Meeting Illich again in 1987 was quite a challenge to the more facile and uncritical elements of this stance, but, now, at last, I want to ask whether Illich himself in some way fits into a chastened version of what Barfield called “romanticism come of age.”  

Let me first just list the various ways in which Illich fits into the Romantic counter-culture, when it is taken at its best.  This “best” stands out in clear relief only when one follows Charles Larmore in rejecting the sterile dichotomy – Blake’s “two horn’d Reasoning, Cloven Fiction” – that has dominated too much of popular discussion.[36]   This dichotomy, as in the earlier mentioned image of “the mirror and the lamp,” pits a “responsive” stance – humble,  reverential, soberly aware of human limitations – against an expressive one which glorifies the “creative” imagination.  Hundreds of other opposed pairs get divided in the same way – left v. right, equality v. hierarchy, etc. – and so become opponents rather than complementary aspects of a large whole.  But, at its “precarious height,” Larmore argues, Romanticism tends to a “fragile synthesis,” which collapses into these opposed pairs only in its (frequent) corruptions and degenerations.   This synthesis, or movement of integration, is what I mean by Romanticism at its best.   Illich fits it as a critic of science who understands that political communities will recover their power of judgment only when “Science” is de-mythified, i.e. deprived of its current status as an oracle and put in its proper place as an invaluable but limited mode of knowledge.  He belongs as someone who understands the crucial role of tradition in the continuance of humanity as a recognizable being – one who has not, as Illich wrote in Tools for Conviviality, broken “all normative bridges to the past.”[37]  Sometimes, as I have said, Illich also hints that the very gateway to the future, or, better, to the rivers north of the future, may also lie in the past.  Illich is a Romantic, above all, in his respect for the spontaneous, the unplanned, the unconscious.  This is especially clear in his essay on “Vernacular Values” when Illich speaks rhapsodically of “the domain of the wild,” “the vernacular,” “living language,” “free and anarchic development” and contrasts these things with the plans of Spanish humanist Antonio Nebrija whose grammar of the Catilian tongue is, Illich says, an attempt “to engineer, to synthesize chemically, a language.”  Illich sees Nebrija, and by extension all the other Renaissance humanists who were trying to shape national languages and instruct their peoples in their use, as a colonizer who wants to turn Castilian into a “resource to be mined,” to invent “an educational sphere” outside of which there will be, in future, “no salvation,” and to initiate “a war on subsistence.”[38]  This essay, like many of Illich’s, is polemical – the point he wishes to impress on the minds of contemporary readers is its shaping and selecting principle – so one has to allow for a certain exaggeration on this account.  Nevertheless, I think the preference for spontaneous cultural formations is plain enough.  To this, I would also add the fears about the collapse of imagination in a unisex and, otherwise, uniform world that Illich expresses in Gender.  With the undoing of “otherness,” Illich says, metaphor has nowhere to go, because the unknown has become only the not yet known, and so imagination loses its purpose.  It keeps its prestige – contemporary people incessantly pursue “their dreams” – but it is reduced either to an entertainment – the profuse cult of “stories” – or to an instrumental role as the faculty which visualizes success.  (This disappearance of otherness occurs, in Illich’s view, not just between men and women under the impress of unisex.  The otherness of heaven and earth is also undermined by a church which believes it possesses the keys to the kingdom, as is the otherness of here and there in an era of globalization.)  A symbol for Illich is not a cypher or a sign, it is a mystery, constituting all we can know of what we encounter within the symbol.  Imagination is the faculty by which this encounter occurs.  It follows that Illich rates imagination, though rarely by that name, as high as any Romantic. 

Illich, as I’ve argued, is a polemical, occasional and, one might even say, evangelical writer.  By evangelical I mean not that he is a proselytizer, which he never was, but that what concerns him in his study of social configurations is whether they ultimately foster, or, alternately, undermine, the capacity to recognize and celebrate the Word of God.   The style in which his essays realize this high calling tends frequently to satire, by which I mean the use of humour, particularly irony, sarcasm, and exaggeration, to lampoon his object.  To take the case mentioned above, a balanced account of Nebrija’s work is not the point of Illich’s essay on “vernacular values.”  Nebrija, in a sense, is a sacrifice to the evangelical purpose of the essay, which is to prick the pretensions of the “educational sphere” and deflate its claim to monopolize education as the church had once monopolized salvation.  I’m reluctant to call this a lack of balance, since balance is exactly what Illich is seeking to redress in a world that has relentlessly institutionalized every conceivable good, but it is a lack of balance in the sense that Illich never says that he is looking for a balance between the authority of grammarians and the authority of wild, untutored speech, allowed its own “free, anarchic development.”  He restricts himself to satirizing Nebrija and drawing a more or less straight line from the grammarian’s first attempts to coax a “language” out of the wild and unregulated profusion of popular tongues to the dominated, manipulated and over-schooled languages that are spoken and written today.  

I mention this polemical and evangelical tendency because I think it obscures the affinity I am trying to draw out here between Illich and Barfield’s grown-up Romanticism.  One has to go back to the 1960’s to find Illich speaking openly of what he then called “man’s race to maturity” – the phrase occurs in a “call to celebration” written in 1967 with which he begins his book Celebration of Awareness.  That book concludes with an equally hopeful “Constitution for Cultural Revolution,” an expression that Illich used at the time to distinguish the metanoia, or changed mind, that he was preaching from a mere “political” revolution in which nothing changes but the face behind the desk.  Presumably he thought that this cultural revolution either failed or miscarried, or a little of both.  Illich rarely dwelled on the past, but one hears nothing more from him about a new age of human maturity.  As late as Gender (1982) an emerging “archipelago of conviviality” – a phrase he borrowed from André Gorz – was still on Illich’s horizon, but its further growth depended, he said, on a recovery and enlargement of the commons to which he never again referred.  (He was sympathetic to the claims of Gustavo Esteva, and others, that “new commons” were emerging in marginalized communities that had seen through the hollow promise of “development’’ and were now regenerating tradition and improvising livelihood outside of modern economic assumptions, but he did not see his hopes for a revival of vernacular independence realized among the social movements whose attention he had briefly enjoyed in the 1970’s.[39])  Nevertheless, I think Illich makes a crucial contribution to the Romanticism come of age that was Frye and Barfield’s hope.  For me this principally consists in a vision of the Gospel, as it might have been and might still be, and in the deinstitutionalization that would necessarily follow a recognition of what necessarily exceeds institutionalization, of what, now and forever, must remain in the domain of the unpredictable and the uncontained – the realm, as Illich says, of surprise.


[1] Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981, p. 50

[2] Northrop Frye, A Study of English Romanticism, Random House, 1968, p. 15

[3] This idea appears throughout Taylor’s work but is nicely, and briefly summarized in The Malaise of Modernity (Anansi, 1991). 

[4] IIC, p. 188

[5] Zinovy Zink, “Accentless Souls,” TLS, May 26, 2017

[6] Wendell Berry, Standing by Words, Counterpoint, 1983, pp. 106-213

[7] In his Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Harvard, 1989), Taylor describes the work as “an essay in retrieval” (p. 10) and elsewhere as “an exercise in retrieval” (p. xi); George Grant hints that all we have left of the good is our nagging sense of having lost it in “A Platitude” in Technology and Empire (Anansi, 1969), p. 239 ff.

[8] CA, p. 94

[9] CA, p. 87

[10] “Hospitality and Pain,” op. cit., p. 1

[11] RNF, p. 170

[12] “Health As One’s Own Responsibility - No Thank You!” op. cit., p. 3

[13] The exposition of this idea of the “upside-down universe” occurs in the chapter on “Milton and the Romantic Tradition” in Northrop Frye in Conversation, op. cit., p. 97ff.  All of the quotations that follow are taken from this chapter.

[14] William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene ii

[15] Blake, op. cit., p. 33ff.

[16] Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Cornell, 2010 (first German edition 1960), p. 5; Northrop Frye in Conversation, op. cit., p. 39

[17] Blake, op. cit., p. 233

[18] ibid., 565-566

[19] So says Duke Theseus in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.

[20] Owen Barfield, The Rediscovery of Meaning and Other Essays, Wesleyan University Press, 1977, p. 16

[21] ibid., p. 235

[22] ibid., p. 235

[23] This is one of Blake’s “proverbs of hell”, op. cit., p. 35

[24] Barfield, op. cit., p. 12

[25] Stanley Rosen, Hermenutics as Politics, Yale, 1987, p. 4

[26] John Keats, Lamia, Part Two, lines 230-240

[27] Blake, op. cit., p. 722

[28] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Italian Journey, 1786-1788, Penguin Classics, 1970, p. 71

[29] Goethe relates the meeting under heading “A Fortunate Encounter,” in Scientific Studies, ed. and trans. Douglas Miller, Goethe edition, Vol 12, Suhrkamp, 1988, p. 20

[30] Goethe’s Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, ed. David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc (SUNY Press, 1998) provides a good introduction.

[31] Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, Macmillan, 1928, p. 191

[32] Erwin Schrödinger, “Why Not Talk Physics” in Quantum Questions, ed. Ken Wilber, Shambhala, 1984, p. 79

[33] Barfield, op. cit., p. 179

[34] ibid., p. 150

[35] I first put forward this view in a radio series, broadcast, in 1981 called “Between Two Ages.”  It can be found here: http://www.davidcayley.com/podcasts?category=Between+Two+Ages

[36] The point is argued at length in the opening pages of The Romantic Legacy, op. cit.;  Blake, op. cit., 268

[37] TC, p. 83

[38] SW, pp. 29-51

[39] An extensive bibliography of Esteva’s writings in English is provided in this Wikipedia entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavo_Esteva

 

Ivan Illich as An Esoteric Writer

IVAN ILLICH AS AN ESOTERIC WRITER

 (Recently I send the Penn State Press a lengthy manuscript of a book about the life and thought of Ivan Illich. Because of its length, I had to cut a number of sections that I wrote after the main body of the text was already complete. They deal with subjects that I felt had been left out or inadequately treated. Aside from occasional blind references to the book from which they have been excised, I think they are well enough able to stand on their own to justify my presenting them here. This is one of those sections. It draws on, and, in places, overlaps with my review essay on Arthur Melzer’s Philosophy Between the LInes which I have also posted.)  

In his book The Prophet of Cuernavaca, historian Todd Hartch has argued that, in most of the writings Ivan Illich published after he withdrew from Church service in 1969, Illich dissimulated his true purpose.  “Most of his teaching and writing,” Hartch asserts, “had a hidden purpose.”  Hartch goes on to speak of “an encoded theology,” of his having “camouflaged his theology,” and of his use of “social and political critique as a sort of code.”  He argues further that this obscure motive resulted in a “lack of lucidity.  “Many of his friends and supporters longed for the day when he would produce a clear, direct and simple speech or text, but he never did.”  Some of them “lacked the theological background” to even “engage the religious side of his argument.”[1] 

Hartch’s understanding, in my opinion, is partial, obtuse and strangely blunted.  For example, the very authors Hartch uses to reproach and correct Illich – most notably Vincent Donovan and Lamin Sanneh – seem to me, on the contrary, to be in fairly exact consonance with Illich.  I have written, at length, about this elsewhere and will not go into it further here.[2]  But this does not mean, of course, that Hartch is entirely wrong.  He quotes Illich himself as saying, in a speech to the Thomas More Association in Chicago in 1970, that, “My only reason personally, intimately, for moving into analysis of the school was in order to provide an analysis for what really happened to the church.”[3]  Later, in conversation with me in 1988, he simplifies the same idea into what is almost a caricature.  “The key for what I have written in my life,” he says, lies in his attempt “to walk beneath the nose of God.”  If people want to understand Deschooling Society, he goes on, “let them look for Thomas Luckmann’s book The Invisible Religion, and they’ll see where it all began.  When he speaks about ‘church’ and ‘faith,’ I simply put in ‘school’ and ‘education’.”[4]  The advice to go back to Luckmann’s book is good – the two men came from a very similar Yugoslavian/Austrian background, and Luckmann’s work certainly influenced Illich – but the idea that Deschooling Society is simply a coded analysis of the Church, with the words mechanically altered, is, at best, a pointed joke, and, at worst, a red herring.  In the first place, as I have already pointed out, Deschooling Society is quite explicit both about the ritual and liturgical character of schooling, and about the fact that the school is “a World church”.  To confuse “equal educational opportunity” with “obligatory schooling,” Illich says, is “to confuse salvation with the Church.”[5] Indeed, the whole argument of the book that school must be “dis-established” implies that the compulsory school is a displaced church, which illegitimately claims privileges long since denied to other churches.   Readers may not have grasped the point, but this does not mean that the argument is coded.  Illich’s love for the church certainly provided what he calls the “intimate” reason for his analysis of schooling, but that does not at all mean that the only reason to analyze schooling is to shed light on the Church.   

My point here is that schooling warrants analysis as a contemporary religious ritual, and that’s what Illich provided.  Insofar as the school spells out what the church began – salvation by catechism; learning as a product of teaching; the institutional container confused with the content – analysis of schools may also shed light on the church.  But the school is where the action is for most people.  It’s the institution that represents the ideology of the “church militant” in its currently effective form.  To claim that Illich is doing something “coded” or “camouflaged” in examining hospitals and highways, schools and prisons is to fail grasp his idea that these are the actual outworkings of a Christian ideology, an ideology which can’t be understood without facing these institutions.  The Church can neither be understood nor changed without understanding these modern extensions of the church project.   Illich may have been more explicit in his late interviews with me, and in some of his late lectures, but, in my opinion,  he never, at any time, disguised or camouflaged “his hypothesis that modernity can be studied as an extension of church history.”[6]  If he indicated what is wrong with the church in showing what is wrong with the ideology of compulsory mass education, so much the better, but the fault in this ideology must  be recognized as a real and present emergency, not just as a cipher for the church.  Once it is understood that the school, as its extension, is the church, then the exposure of the church-like element in schooling, which was he task Illich explicitly set himself, becomes a crucial undertaking in itself.  There is no camouflage.  Illich is not doing hidden theology – he’s doing theology right out in the open, only on terms so new that most of his contemporaries couldn’t recognize what he was up to. 

This said, Hartch still raises a question about Illich’s mode of writing that I would like to consider.   Illich’s purposes may not be so hidden, camouflaged or coded as Hartch supposes, but this does rule out the possibility that they are still things going on “between the lines.”[7] Illich wrote, first of all, for occasions – there was no sense of a philosopher or a theologian building a system or expounding his thought for its own sake.  He called himself a pamphleteer, and, even when he produced original scholarship, as I think he did in his In the Vineyard of the Text with his analysis of the 12th century paleographic revolution that led to “the visible text,” he disclaimed any intention of making “a learned contribution,” saying rather that his purpose was to shed light on the contemporary transition from text to hyper-text.[8] Most of his books or essays were produced by a request, an invitation, or a sense of public emergency – in short, a call.  This is already a stringent restriction.  It doesn’t belie the powerful enthusiasm with which he wrote and taught, but it does imply a lifelong effort to discern what “the times” asked of him and to stick to that. 

In Illich’s book The Church, Change and Development, he begins with an “Author’s Note,” which takes the form of a letter to Jim Morton, then the director of the Urban Training Center for Christian Mission.  The Urban Training Center was an institution with which Illich had been closely connected – he speaks in his letter of “us at the UTC” – and Morton, later the dean of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, was a friend.  Illich tells Morton, in this letter, that each of the papers in the book was “meant for an audience…people into whose faces I could look.”  He goes on to express the hope that readers will understand that they are now holding a book of essays – he says “gropings” – that have been abstracted from these unique contexts and made deceptively permanent.  This was a lifelong preoccupation.  In our radio interviews in 1988, he speaks of what we are doing as “a public intercourse exhibition” and says that he is willing to display himself to strangers in front of the “keyhole” represented by my microphone only out of love for me.”[9]  Later he speaks of the radio documentaries I will eventually compose as “this mosaic we’re making out of stones broken from readings and writings which were set in a different context.”[10]   At the end of the 1997 interviews that make up the main text of The Rivers North of the Future, he is still marveling, ruefully, that “totally unknown people, perhaps after my death, will listen to these voices” and think to know us by our “digitalized utterance[s] without ever seeing “our faces or the changes in your smile or frown.”[11]   

Illich, at least in aspiration, was an oralist who deprecated an “acoustic climate” in which “the spoken word” and its “place engendering power” is drowned out by the recorded, amplified and broadcast voice.  In a paper called “The Environmental Threat to the Survival of the Voice,” he says…  

For a quarter of a century, I have tried to avoid using a microphone, even when addressing a large audience.  I use it only when I’m on a panel, or when the architecture of the auditorium is so modern that it silences the naked voice.  I refuse to made into a loudspeaker.  I refuse to address people who are beyond the reach of my voice.  I refuse to address people who are put at an acoustic disadvantage during the question period because of my access to a microphone.  I refuse, because I treasure the balance between auditory and visual presence, and reject the phony intimacy which arises from the distant speaker’s overpowering “whisper.”[12] 

There is an element of bravado here – a hostile reader might even say hypocrisy – from a man whose reputation was built on the world-wide dissemination of his voice and image through modern media.  Illich could not have possibly intervened in “public discussion” in the way he did, nor entertained the hope he expressed in his writings of the 1970’s that a “political majority” could be assembled for his proposals to deschool, decelerate, and demedicalize, had he not been able to throw his voice far beyond its “naked” capability.  Still I take him seriously.  I have seen too many people fall under the mystifying spell of “the distant speaker’s overpowering whisper” not to.  As with so many of Illich’s provocations, I think he has to be seen as offering a way of thinking, which can potentially begin to change the balance between ethereal voices and actual ones, rather than a rule of conduct or a pat solution to a “problem.”  But I quote the passage here to point to his preference for the dialogic and interpersonal over the amplified and de-contextualized word.[13]  

In Plato’s critique of writing in Phaedrus, Socrates says, “Once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn’t know how to address the right people and not address the wrong.”[14]  This is the classic objection to writing as inert, frozen speech, abstracted from all occasions, and too easily made into an idol or oracle.  Illich, I think largely agreed with it, though perhaps he also recognized the force of the New Testament parable of the sower in which the word is broadcast widely even though it only occasionally falls into “good soil.”[15]  I can remember him once saying to my wife Jutta, with equal parts of gravity and playfulness, “Think of all the harm I did with my books” – a remark that may me think ruefully of all the times I was told that a radio broadcast of mine had said something quite different than what I had thought (and intended).   Written words, as Plato says, “drift all over” and their author cannot come to their aid when they are “ill-treated or abused.”  Illich had two responses to this difficulty.  One was the view that texts are only valuable and useful as starting points.  In his letter to Jim Morton, when he speaks of each essay as a deliverance to “people into whose faces I could look,” he goes on to say that each one “attempted to question the value of a context within which we think, rather than…to state and solve a puzzle .”  To successfully question a context of thought, he goes on, does not mean either that we have solved a problem or generated a definitive “new paradigm.”  Rather we have “open[ed] a horizon on which new paradigms for thought can appear.”  He compares this opening of new horizons to leav[ing] home on a pilgrimage,” and not “the pilgrimage of the West which leads over a travelled road to a famed sanctuary,” but rather the pilgrimage of the Christian East which does not know where the road might lead and the journey end.”  His second response was to compose his texts with extraordinary care and to write in a poetically condensed style that resisted easy misappropriation.  His sentences were intended as seeds, not as elements of a system.   

Another difficulty that Illich faced in writing, particularly after 1969, was that he addressed audiences in which most did not share his Christian faith.  Late in his life he was surprised one day in his class in Bremen to discover that almost none of those present could recognize the phrase “on earth as it is in heaven” from the Lord’s Prayer – the prayer with which Jesus answered his disciples request that he “teach [them] to pray.”[16]  This was so striking that he actually took a survey and discovered that only seventeen of the two hundred people present were familiar with the prayer.[17]  But even from the beginning of his experiment in priesthood outside the Church, he set himself the task of making arguments intelligible to those who did not share his faith.  This is why I insist so vehemently that he did not have, as Hartch supposes, “a hidden purpose.”  He may have been, as his friend Lee Hoinacki said, “doing theology in a new way,” but this newness consisted in subjecting modern institutions to a theologically-informed analysis which recognized their liturgical, myth-making character, not in writing in ciphers accessible only to those who had sent away for the secret decoder ring.[18]  Nevertheless Illich’s attempt “to write as an historian curious about the undeniable historical consequences of Christian belief,” rather than as an apostle sharing his faith did impose certain restrictions on him. 

Once when Illich was staying with his friends Sajay Samuel and Samar Farage in State College, Pennsylvania, he received a visit from Islamic scholar William Chittick, also a friend.  During an evening’s conversation, Chittick asked Illich why he had not been listened to.   The question passed but, during the night, Illich later told Samuel, he woke up laughing.  If he had not been listened to anyway, then what had been the point of his conscientious effort to construct his arguments without reference to his faith.[19]  This was how he saw matters at a certain moment, and I do not at all want to deny that this was profound laughter, as Illich told Samuel it was – the divine humour is deep, and Illich more than once compared spiritual intuition to “getting” a joke.  But I think there is another way of looking at it.  Illich, in an early essay, called “The American Parish” criticized “the lack of missionary spirit” among his fellow Catholics.  “If Catholics every lose their concern for those who do not have God,” he wrote, “they lose also their charity.”[20] This couldn’t be clearer: charity demands that faith be shared.  I don’t think Illich ever thought otherwise.  But faith is only real insofar as it is enacted, and it can be enacted without being professed.  Real prophets are distinguished from false prophets “by their fruits,” Jesus says.[21] His faith, in this sense, was implicit in everything Illich did.  Part of the issue here is the prevalent picture of religions as exclusive clubs which provide “identity” to those who hold a membership card.  Religion is further understood to be a matter of belief i.e. it is sustained by an irrational conviction which must be kept out of the public sphere where evidence and rational argument supposedly obtain.   And religions, finally, are thought to be in competition, each prosecuting its truth claim against the incompatible truth claims of the other religions – a competition liable at any moment to degenerate into violence.  But Illich was not a very religious man – his friend Barbara Duden once joked, with me, that she had never known anyone less religious.  By religion, of course, she meant scrupulosity, ritualism, concern for doctrinal niceties, and hypocritical piety, not faith.  But she is right.  Illich had a remarkably open and ecumenical understanding of what it meant to practice Christian faith.  He once laid it out as follows: 

…the kingdom is a social reality at a transcendental level. Hence, it cannot be communicated except by means of a communitarian and fraternal form-of-life. Historically,
Jesus did so. And today I cannot do this but by means of communion of faith and messianic hope of a fraternal community. The transmission of faith is the result of testimony, and not of conceptual teaching; it is the result of the fulfillment of the kingdom in the heart of the witness with which the neophyte can identify; it is not the fruit of the intellectual conviction that can be attained by means of great doctrine. The Christian dogmas have the same role as the dogmas of Huineng or the Sufis; they are negations that exclude the intrusion of myth in the search of mystery.[22]

Doctrine here is given a crucial but still merely prophylactic and regulatory role.  The emphasis is on celebration and on personal encounter.  It is a real question, I think, whether such celebration must be called Christian in order to be Christian.  “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”[23]  Many people entered into communion with Ivan Illich without being able to make the same doctrinal affirmations that he did.  This was his very point, quoted above, about the blessing of living in a time when hope has no cosmological “scaffold”: it turns us towards one another.  

One further aside here on religion: Simone Weil speaks of atheism as a “purification.” The term has multiple meanings in her thought.  She speaks first in the sense in which Meister Eckhart says, “I pray God to rid me of God” i.e. an achieved image of God is always already an idol.  Weil says… 

A case of contradictories which are true: God exists; God does not exist.  Where is the problem?  I am quite sure that there is a God in the sense that I am quite sure my love is not illusory.  I am quite sure that there is not a God in the sense that I am quite sure nothing real can be anything like what I am able to conceive when I pronounce this word.  But that which I cannot conceive is not an illusion.[24] 

This is from the perspective of the “believer” who must endlessly resist the action of what Weil calls “imagination which fills the void.”  From the perspective of the professed atheist, she says, “Of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies him is perhaps nearer to him than the other.” i.e. the believer who inherits Christianity as part of his mental and spiritual furniture may be farther from God from the atheist who tells the truth about his experience.   And finally she says that “religion insofar as it is a source of consolation is a hindrance to true faith.”  To “religion as…consolation,” one could also add religion as the handmaiden of political power, religion as the disguise for punitive emotions, religion as moral posturing etc.  This does not exhaust the question of religion, and I don’t want to pretend to have done so, but, insofar, as religion and faith stand opposed, the mass departure from religion in our time can be understood as a kind of purification.  The shadow of this move into a society that increasingly deems itself “spiritual but not religious” is the danger that faith will be buried in the rubble of a collapsing church. 

My point here is to encourage readers to look for faith, not explicit religion, in Illich’s work.  Notwithstanding his laugh on himself in the night, or his retrospective sense that he ought to have been explicit about his commitments, I think Illich’s work can be seen in the light of his attempt to “live today the ordinary life of tomorrow’s priest.”  This phrase comes from an essay in Celebration of Awareness, called “The Vanishing Clergyman.”   In it, he speaks tentatively.  “May we pray,” he asks, for “courageous priests…willing to risk misunderstanding and suspension,” for priests “who leave the Church in order to pioneer the church of the future?”  This essay was first drafted in 1959, ten years before the hostility and incomprehension of his superiors turned Illich into one of those pioneering priests.  Illich speaks of this new vocation as the expression of a radical “secularization” which is overtaking the church, but one might also speak, cautiously, about the emergence of a “post-religious” church.  In either case, there is an understanding that the modern constitution, in which religion occupies its own airtight compartment, has collapsed, and “Christianity” must return to the mountainsides, market places and dining rooms in which the Gospels locate it and be understood, if it is to be understood at all, simply as truth and not as some set-apart religious truth.  This, I think, is the context in which Illich is to be read as a Christian writer. 

The nature of “the kingdom,” Illich says, can only be “communicated…by means of a fraternal [and one might add, sororal] form-of-life.”  The church, insofar as it had confused its purpose as the guardian of a tradition and a mystery with its “visibility” as an institution, had substituted itself for the actual practice of this form-of-life.  Just as labour is alienated in its products, according to Marx, so salvation, as the practice of the kingdom right here, right now, was alienated in the Church.  (In an address given in the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris in 2009, Giorgio Agamben speaks of the Church’s “incessant deferral of the Last Judgment,” by which he means that the church has substituted administered salvation for messianic hope.[25])  The difficulty intensifies with the emergence of the metastasized churches and secular clerisies of “The Age of Disabling Professions,” as Illich once tried to name our time.[26]  The Incarnation reveals, according to Illich, that our highest possibility consists in our freedom to love and form Samaritan-like relationships.  This is the pearl of great price for which everything else can be given up.  (“…the kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchant…seeking goodly pearls, who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all he had and bought it.”[27])  Modern institutions block this possibility in various ways – above all, by substituting themselves for the good they promise.  It follows that Illich’s efforts to mock the pretensions and undermine the foundations of these institutions, etc. was missionary, even if it was not explicitly apologetic.  Institutions claim independence of individual persons – they will accomplish what charity demands punctually and reliably without reference to the personal dispositions of the people who staff the institutions. You will still have gained an “education,” even your schooling never exposes you to a single gifted teacher, and every question that is answered is a question you never asked.  Salvation is not just “confused” with the church – it becomes a product of the Church, a place you can’t get to by any other road.  The thing itself is obscured by its counterfeits, and so completely obscured that desire for the thing may be extinguished.  A majority leaves school, not just with a head full of knowledge that will be quickly forgotten because it answers no curiosity and therefore has no place to attach, but as confirmed anti-intellectuals who in future will resist and resent what was prematurely imposed on them.   

It seems to me a preeminently “Christian” task to criticize such institutions, not in order to inculcate Christianity, but in order to prevent people from being made immune to surprise.  What surprise can there be, where all roads are mapped, all predicaments provided for, all tasks assigned to the competent authorities, and all questions answered before they are asked?  And without the capacity for surprise, how can one be open to an event that occurs “as a surprise, remains a surprise and could not exist as anything else” – God’s Incarnation?   My point is that institutionalization, once its passes into “paradoxical counter-productivity” and begins to saturate social space, not only hides sin but blocks awareness of the presence of God.  It follows that Ilich’s iconoclastic task in his institutional critiques of the 1970’s was fully within the missionary purpose that he says is a desideratum of Christian charity.  (“If Catholics every lose their concern for those who do not have God, they lose also their charity.”[28])   This missionary purpose, in my opinion, never ceased to inform and govern Illich’s writing. 

I have argued that Illich writes under various constraints and determinations: as an oralist suspicious of writing’s unresponsive immobility; as a Christian iconoclast, bent on clearing away idols; and as a missionary who wants to make the good news audible by reducing the noise that currently drowns it out.  All these are implicit purposes that will be evident to readers according to their understanding and disposition.  I don’t want to write a reception history of Deschooling Society, but I think it is clear enough that the full scope of the work was appreciated by very few readers at the time.  If Illich was, as Hoinacki says, “doing theology in a new way,” then few initially recognized the genre.  But this does not argue an esoteric or hidden purpose so much as a novel one.  We have seen that Illich believed, at least for a time, that what he proposed during the later 1960’s and early 1970’s might have been accepted by a political majority: that deschooling, technological limits, reduced speeds and demedicalization were not only necessary by possible.  But one can see in retrospect that this was not true.  The times were wild and unsettled – there was a genuine leaning towards “making a new society, right now”[29] – but accounts of what exactly was ending, and, even more, of what was beginning were so various, so partial, and often so primitive that the consensus Illich briefly imagined was completely out of reach.  It’s reversing my field somewhat to say so, but this, in a funny way, argues that Illich’s most celebrated writings were, in fact, more esoteric than the people who thought they understood them at the time ever recognized.  It wasn’t necessarily Illich’s intention to address the future – “to hell with the future,,” isn’t much of a motto, if that’s your hope – but his arguments rested on foundations that are clearer today, at least to me, than they were fifty years ago.   

But is Illich an esoteric writer in any other pertinent sense?  The answer to that question, I think, depends on a clarification on the highly problematic term esoteric.  This word is the accepted term of art for writing that disguises some part of its purpose or hopes to be understood in different ways by different readers.  The trouble is that, for most contemporary readers, the word connotes something arcane, out of the way, and not worth bothering about.  Such is our commitment to plain speech, majority rule, and the ability of scientific and instrumental reason to illuminate all important questions, that the very word we use for writing that is in any way subtle, layered or indirect rules it out of bounds a priori.  One needs to remember therefore that what was formerly called esoteric writing dealt with the highest and most difficult questions and not with how many angels can dance on the head of a pin – the example that has been used to parody scholasticism for hundreds of years.[30] 

In his 1952 book, Persecution and the Art of Writing, political theorist Leo Strauss argued that since philosophy lives by questioning and unmasking conventional wisdom, philosophers have always had to practice a defensive “art of writing” which hides the scandal and offense they would otherwise give to popular opinion.  Only in very recent times has the idea arisen that a harmony is possible between the ideal and the real, and that militant intellectuals have the vocation to realize this harmony.  (Marx gives the classic formulation in his Theses on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”)   Strauss’s book, in time, scandalized the political left and became part of his reputation, in left-wing circles, as a sinister elitist, the godfather of neo-conservatism, and the inspiration for a conspiratorial band of “Straussians” bent on transforming American foreign policy.[31]  More recently, in a wonderfully lucid book called Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost Art of Esoteric Writing, American political thinker, Arthur Melzer, has revived, clarified and extended Strauss’s argument.  He argues, in brief, that it is impossible to understand the history of political thought without appreciating that from Plato’s time right through the end of the 18th century all philosophical writers wrote esoterically, though they may not have always called it that.   Erasmus, condemning the destructive effect of his contemporary Luther’s combativeness and intemperance, says mildly, “A prudent steward will husband the truth.”  Truth, Erasmus says, has “a bitter taste for most people” and will only subvert the accepted order of things to no good end when “poured out all at once,” as Luther has done in his “torrent of pamphlets.”[32] Plato, in one of his letters, considers the pleasing and tempting prospect of writing “a treatise…for the general public.”  “What finer achievement would there be,” he asks, “than to write a work of great benefit to all mankind and to bring the nature of things to light for all men?” But no, he concludes, this would not be good, for the result would be “to excite in some an unjustified contempt,” while others would be filled with “lofty and vain hopes.”[33] 

Melzer provides a compelling tapestry of quotations which show the argument of Plato and Erasmus to be the common opinion until the 18th century, when the question of human perfectibility moves from the religious into the political sphere, and opinion divides – to paraphrase Lincoln – as to how many of the people can be fooled for how much of the time.  One of the most interesting of these quotations is from Goethe.  Writing to a friend in 1811, he says: “I have always considered it an evil, indeed a disaster, which, in the second half of the previous century, gained more and more ground, that one no longer drew a distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric.[34]   From the time at which Goethe wrote one can trace a history in which distaste for the esoteric becomes steadily more visceral.  The idea that everybody should be exposed to everything at all times gathers speed until it culminates in the strange a-sociality of “social media” in which each one is their own broadcasting station.  The metaphor of enlightenment becomes literal in the seemingly irrresistible belief that progress consists in shining the light of publicity into every corner and relentlessly making the private public until the very distinction is in tatters.   

There remain holdouts among the poets and philosophers.  Jacques Derrida will still profess “a taste for the secret”; Emily Dickinson will still say, “Tell all the truth but tell it slant”;  Robert Frost that “Heaven gives its glimpses only to those/ Not in position to look too close.; T.S. Eliot that “human kind cannot bear very much reality” [35]  But what I would like to point out here, before returning to the question of the genre in which Illich writes, is how very inept and outmoded the very distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric now seems.  This is not to say that there are not philosophers who dissimulate their purposes, or veil some elements of their doctrine, but only that this is the mere tip of the iceberg.  My essential point is that all writing is, to some extent esoteric writing.  This is most obviously true for people who can’t read at all, but it remains true even as one’s reading grows more sophisticated and discerning.  There is no one for whom some branch of literature, be it only the literature of quantum physics or Melanesian marriage customs, is not esoteric.  And there is another sense in which all writing is esoteric as well: all writing of any ambition is bound to be misunderstood, as any writer will tell you.  Its meaning is hidden whether the writer wishes it or not.  “That is not it all/ That is not what I meant at all,” T.S. Eliot writes in his “Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock.”[36]  Illich’s joke about the harm he did with his books plays on the same idea: you may think you are calling, quite precisely and explicitly, for the disestablishment of compulsory schooling, but this will not prevent the majority of your readers from concluding that what you are against is schools as such, and not the extraordinary constitutional privilege they currently enjoy.  There is no frictionless transmission of meaning from one mind to another, and control, always partial, of potential misunderstanding will always be a great part of the writer’s art.  Erasmus’s reproach to Luther can be cited in support of esoteric writing, but he is not asking Luther to write in invisible ink, or even in veiled figures. He is asking him to be more prudent, more discreet, more reticent in order to limit the endless trouble he is stirring up with his belligerent “Here I stand, I can do no other” attitude. [37]  Esoteric doesn’t seem to me a helpful word for this elementary caution, especially now that the word is widely understood to refer to the practice of philosophers able to secretly instruct the initiated while at the same time mollifying the uninitiated.   

Written words, as Plato says, “drift all over the place,” never knowing where they are, powerless to correct the reader who misconstrues them.  Every word sets off a cascade of associations, which will necessarily differ from reader to reader.  One doesn’t have to contemplate the interference patterns created by these waves of association for long before it begins to seem miraculous that we understand each other at all.  In addition written language, simply by having been put in a fixed form, is reified – it becomes stupid, inert and unresponsive to its reader, an absence masquerading as a presence.  It was for this reason that Heidegger first suggested the practice, later deployed more extensively by Jacques Derrida, of writing “under erasure” i.e. crossing out a word so that it remains legible under the erasure, and in that way giving a graphic representation of the fact that every word belies itself.  This is why I say that willful and artful concealment of one’s full meaning, though it may sometimes occur, is neither the most interesting nor the most pertinent aspect of the question of writing as it presents itself today. 

All texts are esoteric because all true teachings are contradictory.  “Those who know do not tell/ Those who tell do not know,” says the Tao Te Ching, but the saying occurs in the midst of the book’s seeming attempt to tell what cannot be told.[38]  The Gospels evince the same problem, surprising as it may be to think of Jesus of Nazareth as a practitioner of what Melzer calls “philosophical esotericism”.   Jesus was, to begin with, an oralist.  Like Socrates, he committed none of his teachings to writing.  He was also careful what he said and where he said it.  He taught in stories, explaining to his disciples that “the secret of the kingdom” was granted to them while “to those who are outside everything comes in parables.”[39]  He warned against casting “pearls before swine” lest “they [the swine] turn and rend you.”[40]  After quizzing the disciples about who they thought he was, and receiving the answer from Peter that he is the Christ, he enjoined him to tell no one about it.[41]  Likewise when he was transfigured with Moses and Elijah, he warned Peter, James and John to keep the whole story to themselves.[42]  Later, the apostle Paul also adjusted his doctrine to his audience, telling the Corinthians that, at first, he fed them on milk because they were not yet ready for solid food.[43]  Examples could be multiplied, but it seems clear enough that there are abundant traces in the gospels of a teacher well aware of the dangers full disclosure might pose to himself and others.  There is also a contradiction between this esoteric practice, and the triumphalist strain in which trumpeting angels unfurl banners and shout the good news from the skies.  A similar contradiction exists between the prudent teacher who practices protective esotericism, and the anointed one whose death is inevitable and whose passion has been entirely foretold. (“All this happened,” Matthew says, “to fulfill the prophecies in scripture.”[44]) Arguably this tension continued in Christianity once it began to be formulated as a religion.  Earlier I quoted Simone Weil’s view that the Resurrection was a doctrine that ought to have put forward only with the greatest tact, discretion and reserve i.e. esoterically.  Instead it was shouted from the rooftops, though tellingly not in the Gospels themselves.  The Gospel of Mark, in its earliest redaction, ends with the women returning from the empty tomb in “trembling and astonishment” and saying “nothing to anyone, for they were afraid.” All four Gospels make it clear that there is a connection between faith and the ability to perceive the risen Lord – he does not appear in the market, the Temple, or Pilate’s court – and, even when he condescends to let “doubting Thomas” feel the wound in his side, he makes it clear that it would have been better to have believed without such evidence.[45]  For Weil, the “theology of glory” which proclaimed the resurrection as a triumphant happy ending and a universal destiny was a travesty, a denaturing of the bitter truth of the crucifixion.  She affirmed the resurrection but only when hedged with the recognition of all the damage such an idea could do when treated as the sign of the Christian religion’s triumphant destiny i.e. made exoteric.  

I am trying to expand the idea of the esoteric here to include the need, particularly in writing that will “drift all over the place,” for tact, discretion, reserve and a sense of occasion.  My intention is not to salvage the word esoteric, but rather to prevent a larger discussion about the terms on which human beings are perfectible from being unduly narrowed by the unfortunate connotations of secrecy, conspiratorial elitism, or arcane subtlety that this word now carries.  In the meanwhile, I will continue to use it, in order to keep my presentation unified and join it to the view of Strauss and Melzer that the history of philosophy cannot be grasped without reference to esoteric writing.   Let me now try to make a link with Illich.  Illich claimed that the Incarnation, which he regarded as the supreme good, was accompanied by a proportionate danger which he dared, at the end of his life, to call anti-Christ: the danger that the unprecedented  freedom promised to a forgiven and redeemed humanity in the New Testament will be recoined by “those who organize Christianity” as “an entirely new kind of power.”[46]  Implied is the idea that this explosive Gospel ought to have been propagated only esoterically, i.e. only to those with “ears to hear” and only in the clear eyed recognition that a previously unthought and unimagined evil was its inevitable companion and complement. [47] In Illich’s way of putting it, “the Church had gone pregnant with an evil that would have found no nesting place in the old Testament.”[48]  Plato refrained from trying “to bring the nature of things to light for all men” because he thought it would either induce grandiosity and contempt or excite “lofty and vain hopes.”  How different is this from what Illich says happened when “those who organize Christianity” failed to show similar restraint?  

The early Church, Illich argues, knew that it was playing with fire.  That was why, he says, each community had prophets whose vocation was “to announce a mystery, which was that the final evil that would bring the world to an end was already present.  This evil was called Anti-Christ, and the Church was identified as the milieu in which it would nest.” I have already said that I can find little direct evidence in the New Testament for this claim, but I don’t think this matters much.  The point is that this ought to have been the infant Church’s posture, in Illich’s view.  And he is certainly right that such awareness, if it existed, had died out by the time the Church took the burden of the crumbling Roman empire on its shoulders.  It was replaced, Illich says, by what he calls “a brutal form of earnestness.”  And this earnestness was expressed not just in the loss of the idea of anti-Christ but also “in the progressive loss of the sense that the freedom for which Christ is our model and our witness is folly.”  Christianity, in becoming Christianity, lost its unworldliness, and, gradually, its ability to distinguish between what can be built, held and confidently announced, from what can only be waited for, celebrated and told, as Emily Dickinson says, “slant.”  

Illich argues that the history of the West can be summed up in the old proverb that “the corruption of the best is the worst.”  I understand his hypothesis in terms of the philosophy of complementarity that he lays out in his book Gender and in subsequent writings on the theme of “proportionality.”  A philosophy of complementarity holds, in brief, that everything in the world is defined by its opposite and has an inbuilt tendency to turn into its opposite if pushed to an extreme.   This is a principle of limitation – a way in which things check and limit each other in the social world, as they observably do in the natural world.  But it is also a principle of the imagination – it allows for a domain standing opposite to each one which can only be imagined.  And ultimately, Illich says in Gender, it is a foundational principle of metaphysics, as much as of physics.  We cannot know God directly, because God is not among the things that can be known directly, but we can recognize God analogically if we recognize an otherness in things that is always beyond our immediate reach – this is the gift of the other as other.   It is an implication of a philosophy of complementarity that written words can never set out the whole truth at once except by speaking in paradoxes and contradictions, like the Lord’s oscillating instruction in the Gospel to tell everyone/tell no one, or the Tao Te Ching’s claim, while telling, that “he who knows does not tell.”   

Esotericism can therefore be understood as an aspect of complementarity.  And, when so understood, the question of whether philosopher’s have secret doctrines becomes relatively trivial. The important thing is that some philosophers, at least, know the difference between heaven and earth, between what can be said and what cannot be said, between what the old Sufi story I cited early calls the container and content.  I would say that they understand contradiction, which is also an aspect of complementarity.  “Contradictions,” Simone Weil says, …are the criterion of the real,” the way we know that what we are confronting is not imaginary.  The cross, with its horizontal and vertical arms joined and opposed, is its symbol.  “All true good, Weil goes on “carries with it conditions which are contradictory.”  These contradictions cannot be resolved, but they can be accepted, contemplated and transcended.[49]  The virtues are often in contradiction: prudence and courage, or equanimity and justice, pull against each other.  At the highest level God is felt, Nicolas of Cusa says, as complex of opposites (coincidntia oppositorum), in which justice strains against mercy, provident care against impartiality.  Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, portrays God, at one moment as responsive concern – “everyone who asks receives” – and, at another, as serene indifference – “he makes his sun to shine on the evil and the good, and sends his rain on the just and the unjust.” [50]  I think Illich substantially agrees with Weil, whatever distaste he may have felt for her Platonism, her masochism, her severity or whatever it was he disliked about her.  The fateful history in which the Gospel is turned “inside out” and people become, in effect, immune to their own salvation is a prime instance of contradiction or complementarity.  The Gospel itself contains this contradiction in the form of the antithetical injunctions to tell everyone and to tell no one.  The Gospel must be proclaimed/ the Gospel cannot be proclaimed is a paradox of the same kind as Weil’s “God exists/God does not exist.”[51]  Illich’s answer, always, is awareness.  Anti-Christ, in his account, is a name for awareness of the evil that must, of necessity, accompany and shadow the Incarnation.  One cannot relativize boundaries, as the Samaritan does, without endangering boundaries.  One cannot exceed the law without invoking the possibility that this excess will one day be normalized and legalized.  Corruptio optimi pessima.  But one can be aware of the possibility, and, in being aware of it, renounce it.  One can recognize limit and contradiction and, beyond them, Nemesis.  One can, as Illich says, be a fool who makes the impossible possible by not denying that it is impossible.  “Brutal earnestness” is only avoided by this dance of awareness, this attentiveness to limit, this knowledge that heaven can be, as Frost says, “glimpsed” but never grasped.  (Frost’s line is wonderfully ambiguous: it might mean that Heaven is an illusion available only to those who don’t have the misfortune of getting “too close” and, thereby, discovering the prosaic truth of the matter, or it might mean that “glimpses” are all we can know of Heaven.) 

So is Illich an esoteric writer?  Well he’s certainly full of unresolved contradictions.  He’s a mandarin and an anarchist, superbly proud and utterly humble, a critical intellectual and a prayerful pilgrim, a man of tradition and “a pioneer of the church of the future,” someone deferential to properly constituted authority and an advocate of “finding out for oneself.”  I won’t try to document these antinomies here, but evidence for all of them can be found throughout this book.  A vivid memory, for me, was meeting Illich at the Toronto airport in 1970, when he came to address a teach-in my friends and I had organized.  Canada’s prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, whom Illich already knew, had just declared martial law in Canada in response to the kidnapping by the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) of the British trade consul and the Minister of Labour for the province of Quebec.  Almost everyone I knew was appalled by Trudeau’s action and had demonstrated against it.  I expressed this opposition to Illich, confident that the man I thought of as a “radical,” like me, would agree.  Instead he astonished me with a whole-hearted defence of Trudeau’s draconian policy, saying that Trudeau had been wise to apply sudden and excessive force rather than temporizing with the FLQ’s terrorism – a view that seems much more plausible to me today than it did in 1970.  Illich, seeing my discomfiture, went on to say that he was much more conservative than might appear from the vogue he was then enjoying in “progressive” circles.  (It would be a stretch to say Illich ever got much of a hearing with the New Left, insofar as it saw itself as fomenting political revolution, and therefore thought of Illich’s “institutional revolution” as “reformism,” or, worse, an apology for cutbacks in government services, but he was certainly, for a time, the darling of the devotees of cultural revolution.)  This was when he joked with me that he appeared radical, only because his orthodoxy was so antique, so total and so unfamiliar as to seem avant-garde - a harbinger of the movement that John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward and their friends, a generation later, would call “radical orthodoxy.”  Illich, when he was interviewed by Doug Lummis during the 1980’s, said that the only political labels that fitted him even partially were anarchist and what his friend Paul Goodman had called “neolithic conservatism.”[52]   

The contradictions I have mentioned confused and sometimes dismayed many of Illich’s contemporaries.  The feminists of Berkeley thought they were being bullied by a European maître à penser, when he lectured on gender there in 1982.   Francine du Plessix Gray, in her 1970 profile of Illich for The New Yorker, thought she detected in Illich’s opposition to  development “the aristocrat’s sentimental attachment – recalling Tolstoy’s – for cultures of poverty untainted by bourgeois aspiration.”[53]  Liberation theologians were put off by his insistence that the Church must remain outside politics, even while “taking the moral stance which corresponds to the vocation implied in the  Gospel.”[54]  Political radicals who were drawn to CIDOC disliked Illich’s emphasis on what he called “le bon ton …our basically correct behavior.”  “I believe in good manners,” he told du Plessix Gray, “in playing [by] the rules of the game.”[55]  Canadian scholar activist Ursula Franklin, though an admirer, thought that he “pontificated on things in which he had no participation.”  “I could identify with Illich,” she said to me once, “but I have no idea whether Illich could identify with me.”[56]  Neil Postman thought him “a mystic…a utopian…and an authoritarian.[57]  Postman claimed that deschooling was a utopia, presented as if it were a practical policy proposal, while remaining, as something that had never existed and could never exist, “invulnerable to criticism.”[58]  Tod Hartch, as we have seen, thinks he was writing a veiled theology that even his closest associates didn’t really understand.  When he died newspapers around the world printed obituaries in which he appeared, variously, as everything from a holy man to a “renowned sociologist,” a “culture critic” to a “liberation theologian.  I concluded, in my introduction to The Rivers North of the Future, that these obituaries, in their variety, showed that “the world had lost not only a brilliant intellectual but also a fabulous rumour.[59]  

These contradiction are also peppered through his writings.  Readers may sometimes wonder, once they have gotten over the fireworks, what genre they are reading.  The inept names used by the obituary writers testify to this confusion.  What confuses perhaps is the variety of his effects – he can be aphoristic, poetical, and even sarcastic, in his more polemical passages, but he can also be somewhat scholastic, in the proper sense of the medieval schoolmen who wrote in formally set out articles, questions, objections, answers etc.  Speaking of his studies of Aquinas in Jacques Maritain’s seminar in Rome in the later 1940’s, when Illich was at the Gregorian University and Maritain was the French ambassador to the Vatican, Illich told me that in Maritain’s company he “discovered Thomas as a magnificent shell.”[60]  In another place, he speaks of how Maritain’s “Gothic approach” to the texts of St. Thomas “laid the Thomistic foundation of his entire perceptual mode.”  By Gothic he specifies, “narrow, precise and extraordinarily illuminating.”[61]  I take this seriously.  The terms – shell, mode, approach – relate to form more than content, and I think there is a scaffolding of pre-modern Catholic theology in Illich.  It doesn’t derive only from Aquinas, by any means.  Less scholastic authors like Aelred of Riveaulx and Hugh of St. Victor are equally important – in Hugh’s case, perhaps more important, though it’s hard to argue that anything is more important than “the foundation of [one’s] entire perceptual mode.”  One sees this in the schematic and propositional character of many of Illich’s writings.  Subjects are broken down into clear analytical subsets.  In Tools for Conviviality, Illich first sets out the “five dimensions on which the balance of life depends, and then proceeds to the “three formidable obstacles” that stand in the way of a recovery of this balance.  Objections are anticipated and answered.  

That this formal style never, in my view, becomes pedantic is a tribute to Illich’s wit.  By wit, I mean sense of humour, certainly, but also something more – the ability to make sentences that escape or contain their own contradictions, sentences that retain all that there are not able to say as an aura, sentences that are condensed, balanced, limited and accurate.  It is a tribute also to Illich’s clairvoyant power of observation.  My wife Jutta, on first reading Gender, put down the book and asked me, in a tone of real astonishment, “How does he know these things?”  Then, on reflection, she answered herself, “He’s like a bird cocking his head this way and that to take everything in.”  His colleague and friend, Sajay Samuel, said of Gender that, from its pages, he could “see his grandmother’s house” in south India.  Illich himself recalled, sitting under the table at his grandparent’s house in Vienna, drinking in the conversation.  He sensed what was going on in his times in a way that went beyond the usual pathways of sociological analysis or “cultural criticism.”  Carl Jung supposed that each one’s encounter with the world is mediated by four functions: thinking/feeling/intuiting/sensing.[62]  I find relatively equal and balanced attention to all four in Illich’s work.  He can be, as I said, clairvoyant, leaping intuitively beyond what would seem to be the facts at hand.  But, he is at the same time a surgically precise thinker; and he never neglects the sensory and the affective dimensions of his subject.  All this creates a literary presentation that is sui generis

The best way to understand Illich, in my opinion, is as an apophatic thinker.  The word comes from Greek – apo, other than, and phanai, speak – and is used mainly in theology to refer to an approach to the divine that proceeds by negation, by saying what God is not.  Illich’s friend Lee Hoinacki was the first, I think, to locate Illich in the tradition of apophatic theology.  John McKnight, another friend of Illich’s, remembered him as saying that he wanted to engage in proscription, not prescription – terms which exactly reproduced the distinction between apophatic and cataphatic, i.e affirmative, theology.[63] Illich is not interested in describing an imagined future society or in telling people how to get to it.  He is interested in creating conditions in which the presence of God can be expressed and experience in a convivial, communal and celebratory form of life.  He did not need to invent this form of life – it was a mandate from the One who fully revealed the nature of God.  Nor did he need to teach people how to make culture.  What he felt he needed to do was to demolish the idols that he felt were dis-abling self-reliance and preventing people from making satisfying lives together.   

I believe that all of Illich’s work can be read in this light.  Each is an attempt to clear away obstacles, whether it is the school’s interference with the ability to find out for oneself, the medical system’s interference with my ability to die my own death, or technology’s replacement of vital human capacities.  Salvation is an individual matter, something no one else can anticipate, accomplish or even understand – it belongs to what Illich calls the “total otherness” which we confront in one another.[64]  One can only denounce the ideas, institutions, and techniques that interpose themselves between individuals and their salvation.  (I know salvation is a problematic word here, but I don’t think it would help if I substituted enlightenment or some other equally dubious and compromised term.  What I mean by it, roughly speaking, is what bears on the unique existence which it is mine to express and fulfill.)  The few prerogatives on which Illich insists - “to choose whom I will love and where I will love,” to seek surprises, to watch for the Lord’s passing, and listen for the voice of “him who speaks”[65] – all refer to this individual salvation – to my ability to recognize and respond to what calls to me, and might “appear arbitrary from everybody else’s point of view”[66]  All Illich could do as a writer was to denounce the conditions inhibiting salvation, in the sense I specified above, and foster the conditions favourable to it.   

I hope that, by a rather circuitous route, I have made clear what I object to in Hartch’s idea of a hidden or camouflaged theology.  I believe with Hoinacki that Illich is rather “doing theology in a new way,” a way so new that most could not recognize it as theology, and so different that Illich himself did not think that it should be called theology – his forthright declaration “I am no theologian” should make it clear enough.[67]  This, however, does not mean that he was not exercising his priesthood and “pioneer[ing] the church of the future.”  To take just one example, he says that “the ritual of schooling” casts “a spell” on those who become believers in this ritual.  Those who fall under this spell become the devotees of a religion.  One can awaken to the abundance and availability of the world God has created and revealed only by “breaking the spell,” the purpose of all Illich’s critiques.  This is an eminently evangelical undertaking, whether or not it is called a practice of theology.  There is nothing secretive about it. 

I have answered the question of whether Illich is an esoteric writer with a yes and a no.  He is esoteric, insofar as he is discreet, understands the pitfalls of written words, shapes his discourses to the occasions that present themselves, avoids all prescription, and limits himself to denouncing what prevents people from realizing their various and mysterious vocations.  Otherwise, I think his purpose is plain enough in retrospect.  He wanted to expose the tragedy of Christianity as it is enacted in the many modern institutions that interpose themselves between individuals and their salvation.

[1] Todd Hartch, The Prophet of Cuernavaca: Ivan Illich and the Crisis of the West, Oxford, 2015. p. 145 ff.

[2] http://www.davidcayley.com/blog?category=Todd+Hartch

[3] Hartch, op. cit., p. 147

[4] David Cayley, Ivan Illich in Conversation, Anansi, 1992, p. 242

[5] DS, p. 18

[6] Ivan Illich/David Cayley, The Rivers North of the Future, Anansi, 2005, p. 169

[7] Arthur Melzer uses this expression as part of the title of his book, Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost Art of Esoteric Writing  (University of Chicago Press, 2014)  His book helped me to think about the question of esoteric writing, and I have reviewed it here: http://www.davidcayley.com/blog?category=Philosophy+Between+Lines.  I rely on Melzer’s book in what follows and sometimes repeat whole passages from my review.

[8] This theme is addressed at length in my chapter on language.

[9] Ivan Illich in Conversation, op. cit., p. 161

[10] Ibid., p. 235

[11] The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., p. 171

[12] This paper, written in 1990, which I have in typescript, has not yet been published in English, and, unusually, does not appear to be available on the web.  Illich describes it as “the continuation of a period of gregarious rumination in the company of Mother Jerome, OSB, and Valentina Borremans.”

[13] Interpersonal, I know, is a badly damaged word, hard to separate from the idea that there exists a trainable technique of  “interpersonal communication”.  When Illich used this word with me – because, like me, he could think of no alternative – he said he did so only cautiously and reluctantly. (See The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., p. 191)

[14] Phaedrus 275e in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns, Pantheon (Bollingen Series LXXI), 1961,  p 521

[15] Luke 8:4ff.  The story appears in all three synoptic Gospels.  John Durham Peters, in a book called Speaking Into the Air (Chicago, 1999) has suggested that a Platonic preference for dialogue has sometimes overshadowed and undermined the value of the “he who has ears to hear, let him hear” dissemination of the word that Jesus seems to endorse in his parable.

[16] Luke 11:1ff.

[17] The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., pp. 130-131

[18] Hoinack’s claim that Illich is “doing theology in a new way” was made in my radio series, “Part Moon, Part Travelling Salesman: Conversations with Ivan Illich,” page 32 in the transcript, which is here: http://www.davidcayley.com/transcripts/  More on secret decoder rings here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_decoder_ring

[19] Sajay Samuel told me the story.

[20] Ivan Illich, “The American Parish,” Integrity, June 1955.  (reprinted in The Powerless Church and Other Selected Writings: 1955-1985, Penn State Press, 2018.)

[21] Matthew 7:16

[22] Ivan Illich, The Powerless Church and Other Selected Writings: 1955-1985, op. cit., p. 87

[23] William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II

[24] Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, p. 103; subsequent quotes are from the same section of this book.

[25] The Church and the Kingdom, op cit., p. 40

[26] Disabling Professions, op. cit., p. 11

[27] Matthew 13: 45-46 (KJV)

[28] See note lxxx above.

[29] Ivan Illich in Conversation, op. cit., p. 213

[30] This figure goes back at least four hundred years.   In An exposition with notes vpon the first Epistle to the Thessalonians (1619), English divine William Sclater (1575-1626) claimed that scholastic philosophers occupied themselves with such pointless questions as whether angels "did occupie a place; and so, whether many might be in one place at one time; and how many might sit on a Needles point; and six hundred such like needlesse points."  See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/How_many_angels_can_dance_on_the_head_of_a_pin%3F

[31] In Canada Shadia Drury, a professor of Political Science at the University of Regina, has led the charge with Leo Strauss and the American Right (Palgrave Macmillan 1999), portraying Strauss as an advocate of “perpetual deception of the citizens by those in power.”  Among American critics, Nicolas Xenos goes so far as to find in Strauss’s teaching a nucleus of “pure fascism.”  (This charge is quoted in Strauss’s Wikipedia entry.)   I have always considered these charges against a retiring professor of philosophy, and the supposed influence of his students – the Straussians” – somewhat overblown.

[32] Melzer, op. cit., p. 270 

[33] Seventh Letter, 341, d,e, in Plato, op. cit., p. 1589

[34] Goethe to Franz Passow, Oct. 20, 1811, cited in Melzer, op. cit., p. xxi

[35] Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, Polity 2001 (first published in Italian as Il Gusto del Segreto, 1997);  Dickinson’s wonderful poem is worth quoting in full: “Tell all the truth but tell it slant —/ Success in Circuit lies/ Too bright for our infirm Delight/ The Truth's superb surprise/ As Lightning to the Children eased/ With explanation kind/ The Truth must dazzle gradually/ Or every man be blind¾” (The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Reading Edition (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Frost, “A Passing Glimpse,” Selected Poems, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1963; Four Quartets, op. cit., p. 4 

[36]  Collected Poems, op. cit., p. 17

[37] Luther is said to have concluded his defence of his ideas before the Emperor Charles V at the Diet of Worms in 1521 with these words.  Some dispute the words themselves, but not the combative attitude they represent. 

[38] The Way of Life According to Lao Tzu, translated by Witter Bynner, Capricorn Books, 1962 (first edition 1944), Part 56, p. 60.   This is far and away my favourite version of the Tao Te Ching and has been a vade mecum ever since I first discovered it as an undergraduate in the early 1960’s. 

[39] Mark 4:11

[40] Mathew 7:6

[41] Mark 8: 27-30

[42] Luke 9: 2-10

[43] 1 Corinthians 3:2

[44] Matthew 26:56 – “All this was done that the scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled.”  This formula recurs many times as an explanation of why things happen as they do.

[45] John 20: 24-29

[46] The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., p. 47

[47] Mark 4:9 – “He who has ears to hear, let him hear.”  The expression is found at various other place in the Synoptic [Matthew, Mark, Luke] Gospels as well.

[48] The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., p. 59

[49] Gravity and Grace, op. cit., p. 89

[50] Matthew 7:8, 5:45

[51] Gravity and Grace, op. cit. p. 103

[52] The Lummis interview is unpublished; Paul Goodman, The New Reformation: Notes of A Neolithic Conservative, PM Press, 2010 (first edition 1970).

[53] Francine du Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience: Profiles in Catholic Radicalism, Knopf, 1970, p. 288

[54] Ivan Illich in Conversation, op. cit., p. 103; Illich says this after telling me that he had resigned his official position, as advisor to Cardinal Suenens, one of the four moderators of the Second Vatican Council, which sat from 1962 to 1965, after the Council failed to unequivocally condemn nuclear weapons.  To have done so, as Illich urged, would have “corresponded to the vocation implied in the Gospel.”  The crucial distinction is between a moral stance and a partisan political one.  

[55] Gray, op. cit., p. 274

[56]  Ursula Franklin, a professor of physics at the University of Toronto and a lifelong peace activist, was a friend and sometime colleague at Ideas, the CBC radio program where I worked.   She admired Illich, and once came to tea, bringing muffins, when he was staying with me.  I am quoting from a private conversation in which she expressed her reservation about what she saw as Illich’s patrician, above-the-fray political style.

[57] Neil Postman, “My Ivan Illich Problem,” in After Deschooling, What? ed. Alan Gerntner, Colin Greer, Frank Riessman, Harper and Row, 1973, p. 137, 141, 143

[58] ibid., p. 141

[59] The Rivers North of the Future, op. cit., p. 28

[60] Ivan Illich in Conversation, op. cit., p. 152

[61] Ibid., p. 150

[62]  Jung refers to this scheme throughout his work.  He developed it first, as I recall, in Two Essays in Analytical Psychology.

[63] The Challenges of Ivan Illich, ed. Carl Mitcham and Lee Hoinacki, SUNY, 2001, p. 1; “Part Moon, Part Travelling Salesman: Conversations with Ivan Illich,” CBC Transcript, p. 31.  The transcript is here: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/542c2af8e4b00b7cfca08972/t/58ffc9a55016e102f4cf8010/1493158442475/Part+Moon_3.pdf

[64] “Today’s Educational Enterprise viewed by the dropout, in the light of the Gospel,” p. 13, available here: http://www.davidtinapple.com/illich/1988_Educational.html

[65] Ivan Illich in Conversation, op. cit., p. 243

[66] The Rovers North of the Future, op. cit. p. 52

[67] Ibid., p. 121